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CIVIL DISTURBANCES: BATTLES FOR JUSTICE
IN NEW YORK CITY
CIVIL DISTURBANCES chronicles some of the Important legal
struggles waged by public Interest lawyers and activists in NYC
over the past 30 years. Many ended in victory; others continue to
challenge us today. All have sought to extend rights guaranteed by
America's constitution and laws to all sectors of society.
Fig. 1 Laurie Ourlicht, Brown v. Board of Education [front]
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SEPARATE BUT NOT EQUAL
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guaran-
tees that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." But even
after the abolition of slavery, government-sanctioned
segregation was the law of the land.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF)
was founded in 1940 to fight racial injustice through the
courts. From its headquarters at 20 West 40th Street in
midtown Manhattan, LDF led a nationwide legal attack
on Jim Crow laws.
Central to LDF's mission was its litigation campaign to
desegregate public schools. This struggle culminated on
May 17, 1954, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown
v. Board of Education, struck down the "separate but
equal" doctrine and declared segregated public schools
to be unconstitutional. This ruling led to the eventual
banning of segregation in all areas of public life, and laid
the foundation for the modern Civil Rights movement.
The success of LDF's litigation strategy also redefined the
role of the courts in bringing about social justice in
America, and has served as a model for generations of
public interest lawyers.
CIVIL DISTURBANCES: JUSTICE UNDER SIEGE
Budget cuts and political attacks threaten the practice of public
Interest law as never before. What will happen if the disadvan-
taged can no longer gain access to justice?
CIVIL DISTURBANCES is a REPOhistory project. Sponsered
by Now York Lawyers for the Public Interest. For a
* TORY map and project guide, caii (212) 727-2270, or visit our web site
at http://rpe.history.xs2.net.
Fig. 2 Laurie Ourlicht, Brown v. Board of Education [back]
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Fig. 3 Mona Jimenez, Goldberg v. Kelly [front]
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Fig. 4, Mona Jimcncz, Goldberg v. Kelly [backi
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BRUNO V. CODD - 1978
LEGAL VICTORY FOR BATTERED WOMEN
In 1976, several legal aid and legal services
programs filed a class action suit against the New
York City Police Department and the New York
Family Court for failing to protect married women
who had been battered by their husbands.
Prior to this case, domestic -viblenc e was largely
treated as a personal or private family matter.
The women described how the police failed to arrest
husbands who assaulted them, even refusing to
enforce orders of protection. Family Court personnel
effectively denied battered wives access to the court
through endless bureaucratic procedures.
Fig. 5 Stephanie Basch, Bruno v. Codd [front]
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Fig. 6 Stephanic Basch, Bruno v. Codd [back]
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McCain v. Koch: A Right to Shelter...
1983 Legal Aid sues to force the City to provide decent
shelter for homeless families. Yvonne McCain, the lead
plaintiff, had been placed in The Martinique, an infamous
welfare hotel near Herald Square. She and her three
children lived in a rodent- and bug-infested room with
a urine-soaked mattress and nowhere to cook.
1986-1987 A State appeals court rules unanimously
that the City must provide shelter for all homeless families.
The State's highest court later rules that such housing must
meet "minimum standards of habitability."
1987-1998 The City vig-orouslv resists efforts to
enforce compliance. "We are
doing everything we possibly
can right now within reason,"
says one City lawyer. "This
is the real world, not
fantasy
land."
Fig. 7 Mark O'Brien and Kit Warren, McCain v. Koch [front]
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...a h ouse of Cards
The McCain lawsuit has focused public attention on the
plight of homcless families in NYC and provided Yvonne
McCain and thousands of others with
Fig. 8 Mark O'Bricn and Kit Warren, McCain v. Koch Iback]
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Fig. 10 Janet Koenig, Disabled in Action v. Empire State Building [back]
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Fig. 11. Susan Schuppli, Berkman 14 FDNY [front]
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Iig. 12 Susan Schuppli, Berkman v FDNY [back]
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Pig. 13 Greg Sholette, Marisol v Giuliani [front]
1999] 13413
FORDIIAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
Fig. 14 Greg Sholette, Marisol v. Giuliani [back]
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Fig. 15 Miug Mur-Ray, Chinese Staff & Workers v. City of New York I front]
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Iig. 16 Ming Mur..Ray, (ChiInese Staff & Workers v. City of New York [back]
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INTRODUCTION:
CIVIL DISTURBANCES - BATTLES FOR
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK CITY
Matthew Diller*
The Fordham Urban Law Journal has performed a true service in
making selections from Civil Disturbances: Battles for Justice in
New York City accessible to a wide audience. Civil Disturbances is
a collaborative project between artists and lawyers that commemo-
rates both the achievements and unfinished work in the battle for
social justice in the City of New York. The project consists of
twenty signs containing images and text that have been posted at
pertinent sites around the City of New York.' The signs commem-
orate landmark public interest law suits and a number of legal
struggles still under way. On one level, the signs are cleverly
designed vehicles for conveying information. On a deeper level,
they present powerful images that provoke strong and disturbing
visceral reactions. Ultimately, they are works of beauty. Adding
to the original project, the Urban Law Journal has also included a
number of essays discussing a number of the cases represented by
the signs from the perspective of both artists and lawyers. The edi-
tors also have given us excerpts from a forum held in connection
with the project at New York Law School on November 17, 1998.
Civil Disturbances is the work of REPOhistory, a collective of
artists that concentrates on site-specific public art works designed
to "repossess" history by evoking remembrance of events and peo-
ple that are often omitted or excluded from mainstream historical
accounts.2 The group's declared purpose is to "create works that
intervene in an anonymous city-scape by drawing attention to the
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. A complete set of signs can be viewed in its entirety in and around Foley
Square, near the largest courthouses in Manhattan. Members of the public called forjury duty in Supreme Court, New York County, receive brochures explaining the pro-
ject, so that they can view the signs during lunch breaks. The signs will be posted
from August 4, 1998 through July 23, 1999.
2. Artists participating in Civil Disturbances include Mark O'Brien (Project Di-
rector), Stephanie Basch, Neil Bogan, Jim Costanzo, Marina Gutierrez, Mona
Jimenez, Lisa Maya Knauer, Janet Koenig, Irene Ledwith, Cynthia Liesenfeld, Bill
Menking, Ming Mur-Ray, Laurie Ourlicht, Jayne Pagnucco, Jenny Polak, Susan
Schuppli, Cynthia Seymour, Greg Sholette, George Spencer, David Thorne and Kit
Warren.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
forgotten or suppressed narratives while revealing the spatial rela-
tionships inherent in power, usage and memory."'3 The concepts of
community inclusion and collaboration have been central to the
vision of REPOhistory.4
REPOhistory got its start in 1992 with the Lower Manhattan
Sign Project, which presented an alternative account of the history
of New York's financial district. Subsequent projects have in-
cluded Queer Spaces, a project honoring the 25th anniversary of
the Stonewall riots in New York City, Entering Buttermilk Bottom,
an examination of an African American community in Atlanta de-
stroyed by urban renewal, and Out From Under King George Ho-
tel, a historical study of a specific site in downtown Houston that
sheds light on the process of growth and displacement in an urban
environment.
Civil Disturbances represents REPOhistory's attempt to come to
terms with the impact of law and legal institutions on urban soci-
ety. The project was proposed by Joan Vermeulen, executive direc-
tor of New York Lawyers for the Public Interest ("NYLPI"), one
of the premier public interest law offices in New York City. In
supporting Civil Disturbances, NYLPI sought to raise awareness
about the impact of public interest law on our society. Mark
O'Brien directed the project. A long time member of REPOhis-
tory and the coordinator of pro bono work for a major law firm.
Mr. O'Brien has a thorough understanding of the perspectives of
both artists and lawyers. His leadership was essential in making
the collaboration between the two disciplines productive and
creative.
To lawyers accustomed to dealing with text, rather than images,
the idea of artistic representations of lawsuits and legal issues may
appear to be a mere curiosity. However, visual images have long
played an important role in legal proceedings. The physical ar-
rangement of the traditional courtroom, the judge's robes, the
scales of justice, and the image of justice as a blindfolded figure all
convey and reinforce attitudes toward the justice system. These
traditional images have focused on the authority and neutrality of
-the judiciary as a means of fostering respect for the law. The idea
of strength has been central to this message, thereby aligning the
legal system with the centers of power in society.
3. See REPOhistory, Civil Disturbances (visited June 10, 1999) <http://repo.his-
tory.xs2.net> (providing a fuller description of REPOhistory and additional selections
of its work).
4. See id.
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Moreover, apart from these institutional images, imagery plays a
central role in the lawyer's craft. Every skilled courtroom lawyer
uses as many means of communication as possible to convey his or
her message to a jury. In addition to the increasing use of demon-
strative evidence, visual aspects of presentation such as clothing,
facial expressions and body language are frequently exploited in
order to evoke emotional responses from the judge or jury.5 Open-
ing and closing arguments are often used to "paint" images to bring
the events in question to life for the jury.6 The courtroom has al-
ways had an element of theater, and visual images have always
been of central importance on the stage.
Seen in this light, artists and lawyers are a natural pairing. The
signs created by REPOhistory convey powerful emotional
messages about the lawsuits that they represent, in much the same
way that lawyers draw on emotions in presenting their cases. The
images in Civil Disturbances, however, are dramatically different
from the traditional iconography of law - while the symbols of
law strive to be dispassionate and detached, the images of Civil
Disturbances are vivid and intense, calling for engagement with,
rather than distance from the issues.
In proposing the project, NYLPI's initial goal was celebratory -
to commemorate the successes that have been achieved in the
struggle for social justice through law and efforts that are still con-
tinuing. The celebration, however, was not simply an end in itself.
The project was intended to draw attention to the accomplishments
of public interest law at a time when funding for legal services is
under attack.7 After a process of collaboration between artists,
5. Texts on trial technique offer advice on how lawyers should position them-
selves and how to use body language and gestures for effect. A leading text advises
that lawyers addressing the jury should:
Keep your hands out of your pants or coat pockets, avoid playing with coins,
pencils or papers and restrict constant or aimless wandering about the court-
room. Use upper body gestures, those involving your hands, arms, shoul-
ders, head and face, since these usually strengthen your speech. Remember
that your physical and verbal mannerisms should always reinforce your
speech.
THOMAS MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 49 (3d ed. 1992).
6. Mauet counsels that effective opening statements are based on good story tell-
ing. See id. at 43. Where appropriate, he advises that the story should be "emotional
and dramatic" in order to create empathy for the litigant. See id.
7. As posted, each sign contains the following text at the bottom:
CIVIL DISTURBANCES: JUSTICE UNDER SEIGE
Budget cuts and political attacks threaten the practice of public interest law
as never before. What will happen if the disadvantaged can no longer gain
access to justice?
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
lawyers and some of the litigants involved in the cases, the final
product is more ambivalent and nuanced than might be expected in
a celebration. Many of the signs focus attention on the underlying
injustices that the lawsuits sought or seek to address. Many of them
deal with issues that remain unresolved. Nonetheless, the signs
serve as a reminder that law can be an agent for freedom and
equality that can help us to reach for the highest aspirations that
we hold for society. The signs point out the rich and long history in
which lawyers, courageous individuals and communities have
worked to use law as an instrument for achieving social justice.
The medium of the project - public signs posted at critical loca-
tions - reinforces the point that the struggle for social justice
through law has had an immediate impact on the lives of New
Yorkers and the City's communities. In this sense, Civil Distur-
bances grounds the fight for social justice in the physical terrain of
the City. The signs remind us that lawsuits brought on behalf of
disempowered individuals and communities have shaped the fabric
of life in New York City as much as the streets on which New
Yorkers walk and the buildings in which we live and work.
Before turning to the specific signs included in this selection, it is
important to note that Civil Disturbances came perilously close to
becoming a battle for social justice in its own right. Hours before
the signs were due to be posted, the City of New York announced
that it was denying the necessary permits on the basis of a policy
prohibiting the posting of any signs on New York street lamps
other than those relating to traffic.8 To New Yorkers accustomed
to seeing all kinds of postings on lampposts, including holiday dec-
orations, parade banners and community notices, the existence of
such a policy must surely come as a surprise. After threatened liti-
gation, the City relented and allowed the project to go forward
three months later. The dispute over Civil Disturbances is a re-
minder of the fact that free expression in New York's public places
continues to be a contested issue.9
8. See David Gonzalez, Lampposts as a Forum For Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1998; Stuart Elliot, Some Legal History Still Being Overturned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1998.
9. See Benjamin Weiser, City Pays $59,000 to Settle Times Sq. Preaching Group
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at B6; Bruce Lambert, The Giuliani Way: Sue and be
Sued, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999; Benjamin Weiser, Ban on Big Gatherings at City Hall
Is Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1998; Susan Sachs, Giuliani's Goal of
Civilized City Runs into First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1998.
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The sign for McCain v. Koch,10 the lawsuit which established the
right of homeless families to decent emergency shelter, is posted
outside of the old Martinique Hotel, where hundreds of homeless
children were sheltered in filthy inhuman conditions during the
1980s. The design, by artists Mark O'Brien and Kit Warren,
evokes a child's fantasy of home, while at the same time revealing
the illusory nature of promises of safe housing. It draws on tradi-
tional images of a home as a source of warmth and spiritual repose,
completely at odds with the reality of the nightmarish conditions of
the Martinique Hotel. Also included remarks by Steven Banks,
the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in McCain."
Goldberg v. Kelly 2 was initiated by John Kelly, a resident of the
Lower East Side, with the assistance of MFY Legal Services, the
first store front legal services office in the nation. The Supreme
Court's decision in Goldberg established that welfare recipients are
entitled to a hearing prior to termination of benefits. The pair of
hands holding up a piece of paper suggests both an emphatic asser-
tion of rights and a desperate plea. The growing size of the text
suggests that due process demands not simply an opportunity to
speak, but a right to be listened to. The editors of the Urban Law
Journal have also given us the remarks of Henry Freedman,' 3 one
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Goldberg and Mona Jimenez
14
the artist who designed the sign relating to the case. The sign is
posted outside the welfare office responsible for assigning recipi-
ents to workfare positions.
Disabled in Action v. Empire State Building15 was the first public
access case brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"). It challenged the inaccessibility of the building's obser-
vation deck to people with disabilities. Artist Janet Koenig's circu-
lar design suggests the mobility of a wheelchair - a reference that
is explicit on the back of the sign which depicts the building itself
on wheels. The images remind us that community activism and law
can work together to move the most rooted of institutions and
structures. The sign commemorating the case is posted outside of
10. 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987).
11. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: McCain v. Koch (remarks of
Steven Banks).
12. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: Goldberg v. Kelly (remarks of
Henry A. Treedman).
14. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: Goldberg v. Kelly (remarks of
Mona Jiminez).
15. United States Dep't of Justice Complaint No. 202-51-1 (Jan. 27, 1992).
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the building. In addition, Cary LaCheen, one the lawyers for the
plaintiffs, has given us a fascinating account of how the case was
brought and the impact that it has had. 16
The sign commemorating Berkman v. City of New York 1.7 em-
phasizes the strength and power of Brenda Berkman, the plaintiff
who challenged the New York City Fire Department's refusal to
hire women firefighters. The image of a woman's flexed biceps si-
multaneously points out Ms. Berkman's qualifications as a
firefighter and her power as a fighter for justice. It suggests that
the Fire Department discovered the hard way that Ms. Berkman
has considerable incendiary power of her own - she ignited a fire
that the Department simply could not extinguish. The sign is
posted on Livingston Street in Brooklyn, at the site of the Fire De-
partment's former headquarters. Included in this collection are re-
marks by Brenda Berkman, 8 her attorney Laura Sager 9 and artist
Susan Schuppli. °
Marisol v. Giuliani2l is a major class action challenging the City
of New York's mal-administration of its child welfare system. The
case was settled on the eve of trial in 1998. The childlike lettering
of the sign contrasts the image of innocence associated with child-
hood with the grim realities of the City's foster care system. The
sign hangs on Chambers Street, just north of City Hall. In accom-
panying essays, artist Greg Sholette discusses his goals and ap-
proach to the sign2 2 and Marcia Lowery, attorney for the plaintiff
class, has provided discussion of the litigation.23
Also included in this selection is artist Ming Mur-Ray's sign for
Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of New York. 4 In Chinese
Staff & Workers, New York's highest court required that zoning
decisions take into consideration the impact of proposed develop-
16. See infra, Cary LaCheen, REPOhistory: "Equal Access is Our Right": Increas-
ing Accessibility at the Empire State Building.
17. 536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983), later pro-
ceeding 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part 12 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
18. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: Berkman v. City of New York
(remarks of Brenda Berkman).
19. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: Berkman v. City of New York
(remarks of Laura Sager).
20. See infra, REPOhistory Roundtable Discussion: Berkman v. City of New York
(remarks of Susan Schuppli).
21. 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
22. See infra, Greg Sholette, REPOhistory: 51 We Not Human?.
23. See infra, Marcia Robinson Lowry, REPOhistory: Why Settle When You" Can
Win: Institutional Reform and Marisol v. Giuliani.
24. 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986).
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ments on community residents and businesses, including the dis-
placement of low income residents that can result from the process
of "gentrification." The decision recognizes that the character of
the neighborhoods is an important component of the urban envi-
ronment. As is often the case, the judicial decision is the tip of an
iceberg. The lawsuit grew out of the efforts of activists and com-
munity groups to halt the creation of a high rise luxury apartment
building in the heart of Chinatown. The sign is posted at the cor-
ner of Henry and Mott streets, in the heart of New York's
Chinatown.
Bruno v. Codd2 5 challenged the failure of the New York City
Police Department and the Family Court to protect wives from vio-
lence perpetrated by their husbands. The sign, designed by Stepha-
nie Basch, points out how treatment of spousal abuse as a private
matter was used to deny women police protection from violence
and access to the justice system. It is posted outside of police
headquarters.
Finally, the editors have included the sign for Brown v. Board of
Education,6 a decision that needs no introduction. Although the
Brown decision is more likely to evoke images of Topeka than of
Manhattan, the sign honors the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, a
New York institution for more than fifty years. It is posted at 20
West 40th Street, the site from which Thurgood Marshall and his
colleagues waged their battle against segregation during the years
when Brown was litigated. As an eight year old child, artist Laurie
Ourlicht was a plaintiff in the first suit brought to desegregate De-
troit's public schools. That case was filed in 1962.
In sum, the artists of REPOhistory, the lawyers of NYLPI and
the editors of the Urban Law Journal have joined together to pres-
ent a truly unique experience for the readers of this journal. Their
work, however, is underpinned by the labors of the lawyers, judges,
community activists and individual litigants that made possible the
accomplishments commemorated in this project.
25. 47 NY.2d 582 (1979).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"EQUAL ACCESS IS OUR RIGHT":
INCREASING ACCESSIBILITY AT THE
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
Cary LaCheen*
The Empire State Building is a symbol, indeed it is the symbol, of
New York City. Over 3.8 million people visit its observatories each
year.1 To date there have been over 120 million visitors.2 Up until
1994, however, not one of these observatory visitors reached the
observatory in a wheelchair. To people with mobility impairments,
the Empire State Building was long a symbol of a different kind -
a symbol of the exclusion of people with disabilities from main-
stream public life.
Much of the discrimination faced by people with disabilities has
been "the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thought-
lessness and indifference - of benign neglect."' 3 The longstanding
failure to use accessible building design and to make modifications
in existing buildings so that services are accessible to people with
disabilities, is one of the more tangible results of this neglect. A
Lou Harris poll published in 1986 found that the large majority of
people with disabilities never went to restaurants, grocery stores,
movies, theaters, sporting events, churches, or synagogues. 4 When
businesses, public transportation, and sidewalks are not accessible,
people with many disabilities stay at home, perpetuating their in-
visibility. As a result, people with disabilities have routinely been
excluded from the mainstream of public life and relegated to sec-
ond class status.
In 1973, Congress enacted what would later become Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act,5 which prohibits discrimination against
* Instructor of Law, New York University School of Law; Senior Staff, New
York Lawyers for the Public Interest (1990-97). J.D., New York University School of
Law (1988); A.B., Brown University.
1. Information Desk, Empire State Building (visited Mar. 27, 1999) <http://db.
esbnyc.com/body-answers.cfm>.
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). See also Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act (legislative history).
4. Louis Harris and Associates, The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bring-
ing People with Disabilities into the Mainstream 32-41, cited in H.R. REP. No. 101-485
(1990).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
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people with disabilities in federal agencies and any entity that re-
ceives federal financial assistance. Though most state and local
governments receive federal assistance for transportation, educa-
tion, and other services, states and localities largely ignored Section
504, with little or no repercussions. Moreover, Section 504 did not
reach one of the most pervasive problems facing people with disa-
bilities, namely, the lack of accessibility of privately owned places
of public accommodation. Restaurants, movie theaters, doctors' of-
fices, supermarkets, concert halls and other businesses open to the
public were free to do as they chose, unless they received federal
funds.
People with disabilities wanted a comprehensive federal law that
reached not only the conduct of federal agencies and grantees, but
a wide range of services, activities and entities. After a concerted
effort which brought together a coalition of disability, civil rights
and other groups, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
was passed and signed into law by President George Bush on July
26, 1990.6 The ADA is comprehensive in scope, addressing dis-
crimination in employment, all State and local government pro-
grams and services, telecommunications, transportation, and the
activities of privately owned places of public accommodation.7 Its
purpose is to "provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against people with
disabilities."8
The preamble of the ADA reflects a clear understanding by
Congress that discrimination against people with disabilities takes
many forms, including "the discriminatory effects of architectural,
transportation, and communication barriers."9 The ADA ad-
dresses these barriers in a number of ways. Title III defines "public
accommodations" that are subject to the law broadly to include
twelve categories of businesses, including retail establishments,
schools, hotels and other places of lodging, social service establish-
ments such as doctors' offices, places of recreation, places of dis-
play such as museums, and places of public gathering.10 This
definition is far broader than that used in Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,11 the law on which Title III was modeled in
6. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(A)-(L) (1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994).
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part, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race by restau-
rants, hotels and places of entertainment. In explaining its reason-
ing for adopting a broader definition, the legislative history of the
ADA states "[i]t is critical to define places of public accommoda-
tion to include all places open to the public ... because discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities is not limited to specific
categories of public accommodation. 1 2
Title III contains different standards for new construction 13 and
existing facilities.14 While new construction must be designed and
built so that it is "readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities,"' 5 existing facilities must remove architectural and
structural communication barriers in existing facilities only where
such removal is "readily achievable, 16 defined as "accomplishable
and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. "17
In determining whether a modification is readily achievable, the
factors to be considered include the nature and the cost of the
modification; the overall financial resources of the particular facil-
ity involved; the number of employees at the facility; and the im-
pact of the barrier removal on the operation of the facility.1 8 In
addition, the overall resources of the public accomodation, the
number of its employees and the number of its facilities are to be
considered where a public accomodation operates at multiple
sites.' 9 Finally, the nature of the business, and its workforce, and
the relationship of the particular facility to the larger public ac-
comodation are to be considered as well. 20 What is "readily
achievable" for a small "mom and pop" grocery store will be differ-
ent than what is required of a large supermarket that is part of a
nationwide chain. Nevertheless, the "readily achievable" analysis
is not the end of the inquiry. Even when architectural modifica-
tions are not "readily achievable," a place of public accommoda-
tion must make its services available to people with disabilities
through alternative, readily achievable methods. 21 A mom and
pop grocery store may not have to ramp its entrance or lower
12. See H. REP. No. 101-485(I), at 36; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 11.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(b)(2)(a)(iv),(1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(iv) (1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (1994)
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9)(A),(B).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)(C).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)(D).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(v) (1994).
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shelves, but it will probably have to provide sidewalk service or
home delivery to someone who cannot get in the door or lift mer-
chandise from high shelves.2 2 The ADA "strike[s] a balance be-
tween guaranteeing access to individuals with disabilities and
recognizing legitimate cost concerns of businesses and other pri-
vate entities. '2 3 The regulations even contain an order of priorities
for barrier removal,2 4 reflecting the understanding that places of
public accommodation could not do everything at once. As a re-
sult, Congress gave public accommodations eighteen months after
the ADA passed before requiring compliance. 5 Instead of using
this time productively to evaluate the accessibility of its public ac-
commodations, and make needed changes, many public accommo-
dations did nothing.
The owners and operators of the Empire State Building were
among this group. Members of Disabled in Action of Metropolitan
New York ("DIA"), a local disability rights organization, informed
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc. ("NYLPI") that the
Empire State Building observatory was not accessible to wheel-
chair users and no changes appeared to be underway in anticipa-
tion of the ADA's effective date. It was virtually impossible for
wheelchair users to purchase a ticket to the observatory because
metal poles directing traffic flow made it impossible for wheelchair
users to wait in line for tickets, and even if they could somehow
make it to the ticket booth, the booth itself was prohibitively high
and difficult to reach from a wheelchair. There were no signs indi-
cating alternative wheelchair accessible routes to the observatory.
To reach the main observatory on the 86th floor, one needed to
transfer elevators on the 80th floor; however, a turnstile in the mid-
dle of the hallway on this floor made it impossible for wheelchair
users to proceed further. On the 86th floor itself, visitors departing
the elevators were confronted with three flights of stairs, which
were the only means of getting to the outside observation deck and
the souvenir and concession stands. It was not even possible to
look out of the window and see the view without using the stairs.
None of the stairs were ramped or had wheelchair lifts. When
asked how a wheelchair user could see the view, a guard said the
person would have to be carried up the stairs, a demeaning and
unsafe practice that U.S. Department of Justice has said is unac-
22. 28 C.F.R. 36, app. A § 36.305 (1998).
23. 28 C.F.R. 36, app. A § 36.304 (1998).
24. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.304(c)(1)-(4) (1998).
25. Pub. L.101-336, § 310, 104 Stat. 365 (1990).
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ceptable as a method of achieving program accessibility.26 Even if
a wheelchair user could manage to make it up these stairs, it was
necessary to use another set of stairs to reach the observation deck
outside. Even if it had been possible to get to the deck, the parapet
walls surrounding the deck made it impossible to see the view from
a seated position. The women's bathroom was down a steep flight
of stairs, and the men's room had a door that was too narrow for a
wheelchair user to enter, and visitors were not permitted to use any
other bathroom in the building. The public telephones on the 86th
floor and the building lobby were too high to be usable by wheel-
chair users and lacked any assisted listening equipment required by
Title III. As for entry into the building itself, the main entrance on
Fifth Avenue had a revolving door - a virtual chamber of death to
a wheelchair user. In short, the building and observatory were
about as accessible as many other places of public accomodation -
not accessible at all.27
NYLPI asked a designer who worked for Eastern Paralyzed Vet-
erans Association to pay the building a visit. After he did, he in-
formed NYLPI that the outside observation deck could be made
accessible by installing wheelchair lifts for $13,000 each. Modifying
one of the bathrooms was also possible, and removing the barriers
to the ticket booth and on the 80th floor was also possible and
almost cost-free. Given that the observatories received over 2.5
million visitors each year28 and the regular ticket price was $3.50,29
it seemed safe to assume that these modifications could be accom-
plished and carried out "without much difficulty or expense."
In early December, 1991, NYLPI wrote a letter to Harry Helms-
ley, President of Helmsley-Spear, the managing agents for the
building, requesting that measures be taken to make the observa-
tory accessible before the approaching effective date of Title III. It
was not possible to write to the owners directly, as the building had
26. See 28 C.F.R. 35, app. A § 35.150 (1998); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § II-
5.2000 (1993).
27. The Empire State Building also has a smaller observatory on the 102nd floor,
from which visitors can enjoy the view from an even higher vantage point. This obser-
vatory has no observation deck or souvenir standards. The low ceiling on the 102nd
floor made its windows inaccessible to wheelchair users, but no reasonable architec-
tural modifications could have remedied this problem.
28. Mitchell J. Shields, The Ups and Downs of New York's 60-Year Wonder, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at C1.
29. This information was obtained by the author during visits to the Empire State
building in November and December, 1991.
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recently been purchased by a holding corporation,3 ° and the identi-
ties of the owners were secret. The letter received no response.
On January 27, 1992, NYLPI filed a complaint with the U.S. De-
partment of Justice,3' which has enforcement authority over Title
III, concerning lack of accessibility of the Empire State Building
observatory. It was the first complaint filed under Title III of the
ADA anywhere in the country, on the first business day that the
law went into effect.32 Title III has two private enforcement mech-
anisms: private lawsuits33 and administrative complaints filed with
the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 34 DOJ has the duty to
investigate these complaints35 and the authority to bring an action
in court to obtain injunctive relief and civil penalties. 36 NYLPI
chose to use the administrative complaint process, rather than file a
court action, to test the administrative complaint system. NYLPI
wanted to gather information about this process so that it could
inform people with disabilities about whether and how to use the
process, and what to expect.
NYPLI held a press conference at the Empire State Building to
announce the filing of the complaint. In conjunction with the press
conference, Disabled in Action held a demonstration. Wearing
signs that read "Equal Access Is Our Right," "We Demand Equal
Access to the Observatory," and "ESB has a Bad Point of View,"
DIA members, many of whom are wheelchair users, entered the
building (through a side entrance) and made their way to the inac-
cessible ticket counter. At one point, the demonstrators decided to
try to go to the observatory itself, and they made their way onto
the elevators. Some got stuck on the 80th floor where the turnstile
made the transfer from one elevator to the other impossible. A
few managed to get to the 86th floor, where they were confronted
with the stairs. The press conference and demonstration were well
attended by both the television and print media, and they were fea-
tured on several news programs that night and in countless news-
paper stories in mainstream, business, and legal publications. 37
30. Deed from Prudential Insurance Co. of America, to E.G. Holding Co. Inc.,
dated and recorded Nov. 27, 1991.
31. United States Dep't of Justice Complaint No. 202-51-1 (Jan. 27, 1992).
32. While the actual effective date for Title III was January 26, 1992, the 26th fell
on a Sunday.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(A)(1) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.502 (1998).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(A)(1)(B) (1994).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(B)(2) (1994).
37. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Advocates of Disabled File Complaint About
the Empire State Building, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at B3; Empire State Building is
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Before the day was over, Helmsley-Spear representatives ap-
peared with a press release from Howard Rubenstein and Associ-
ates, the renowned public relations firm. The release, which quoted
the general manager of the building, acknowledged that the build-
ing was not accessible to wheelchair users but attempted to lay the
blame elsewhere. It said, "unfortunately the architects of the 1920s
failed to appreciate the needs of the physically challenged in creat-
ing rather limited corridors and stairways that ring the observation
deck at the Empire State,"38 as if to suggest that there was nothing
the management could have done in the sixty-one years that had
followed to rectify this problem. Nevertheless, the press release
indicated that an architectural firm had been hired to determine
how to remove the physical barriers.3 9
Following the complaint and the demonstration, the slow process
of waiting for the Department of Justice to investigate the compli-
ant. The first'thing NYLPI learned was that organizations and in-
dividuals filing complaints were not officially "parties" to the
matter and, under DOJ rules, would be excluded from the com-
plaint settlement process. Nor would complainants have access to
information obtained by DOJ in the course of investigating or set-
tling a complaint. Although we were unhappy with this develop-
ment, we went forward with the complaint. Fortunately, our views
and preferences about various access measures were solicited by
DOJ throughout the process.
Finally, on March 4, 1994, more than two years after the com-
plaint was filed, DOJ announced a settlement. In an extremely
thorough twenty-nine page agreement with a four-page rider, the
owners and operators of the building agreed to make modifications
to all of the barriers we had identified and even some we had not,
such as curb ramps on the sidewalks near the building and the
Target of Complaint under Disabilities Act, WALL STREET J., Jan. 29, 1992, at 1;
Jonathan Mandell, A Mission of Admission: Using Lawsuits - Demonstrations -
Whatever it Takes - Disabled in Action Fights to Make New York Accessible to All,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 12, 1992; Figuring Out the Next Step, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 10, 1992; Jay Seeman & Richard Romm, The Americans with Disabilities
Act, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1992; Nick Ravo, New Federal Law for Disabled Slow to Take
Hold, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992; A Landmark for the Disabled, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 30, 1992; Rick Pezzullo, Federal Law Aims to Assist Disabled: Govern-
ment and Businesses Make Changes First, NORTH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 4, 1992, at 21.
38. Howard J. Rubenstein and Associates, Inc., Empire State Building Seeks to
Remove Obstacles from Physically Challenged, Jan. 27, 1992 (press release).
39. See id.
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height of the binoculars on the observation deck.4" The owners
and operators admitted in the settlement agreement that the ma-
jority of these changes were readily achievable,41 and thus that they
had been in violation of the law. The settlement was the first of its
kind under Title III, and it provided advocates, businesses and pub-
lic accommodation with the first glimpse of how the DOJ would
interpret and enforce Title III. The settlement received extensive
coverage in the press,42 indeed, there was greater coverage of the
settlement than of the complaint filing. The DOJ anticipated that
interest in the agreement would be high and it held a telephone
news conference to discuss the settlement.43 Following the settle-
ment, there was another round of press stories when construction
work began on the building."
After signing the settlement agreement, the Empire State Build-
ing management claimed that the changes agreed to in the settle-
ment would cost $1.8 million,45 a far cry from the $13,000 per
wheelchair lift that the designer from Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
Administration estimated. However, it was evident from both the
settlement agreement and the architectural plans of the proposed
modifications that the owners and operators decided to spend far
40. Settlement agreement under the Americans with Disabilities Act between the
United States of America and the owners and operators of the Empire State Building
of New York, New York, for United States Dep't of Justice Complaint No. 202-51-1
(Mar. 3, 1994).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Lindsey Gruson, Getting to Top of Empire State: Opening the Way for
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994 at B3; Empire State Building Sets Renovations for
Disabled, WALL STREET J., Mar. 4, 1994 at A5; Liz Spayed, A Landmark Access
Overhaul at Empire State, WASH. POST, March 4, 1994 at 4; Today's News Update,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1994 at 1; Plus News, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994 at 3; Justice
Dept. Hates Barriers, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Mar. 14, 1994 ; Andrea Hamil-
ton, Empire State Bows to Disabled, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 6, 1994 at
A17; Empire State to be More Accessible, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1994 at
1A; Empire State Building Bows to Disabilities Act Demands, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Mar. 4, 1994 at A8; Andrea Hamilton, Empire State Building Renovations to Provide
Better Access for Disabled, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 4, 1994 at All; Andrea Hamilton,
Empire State Building Settlement Opens New Vistas to Disabled Visitors, FORTH
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 4, 1994 at 19; Empire State Building Makes Way for
Disabled, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Mar. 4, 1994 at 9A; National News, MINNE-
APOLIS ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Mar. 4, 1994 at 7A; The Nation, USA TODAY, Mar. 4,
1994 at 3A.
43. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Officials to Hold Telephone News
Conference to Announce ADA Settlement with Empire State Building (Press Release,
Mar. 4, 1994).
44. See Empire State Building Sets Renovations for Disabled, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4,
1994 at A5D; Alex Monsky, Empire State Bldg. Takes a New View of the Disabled,
N.Y. PosT, Mar. 4, 1994; Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1994 at 1.
45. See id.
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more than necessary to make the observatory and ticket area ac-
cessible. Striking what would become a common theme of respon-
dents in Title III settlements, management then attempted to use
its unnecessary expenditures as evidence that the ADA created an
unreasonable burden on businesses. In fact, when management
made the access modifications, it did so as part of an extensive cap-
ital improvements project costing $40 million. 6 Thus, even the
$1.8 million cost of making the observatory accessible was only a
fraction of the cost of renovations.
The observatory now has ramps, and the parapet wall around the
observation deck has been lowered in a few areas so that visitors
can see the view from a seated position. An accessible unisex bath-
room and accessible telephones were installed, and access signs
were posted in the lobby and telephones in the lobby were made
accessible to people with hearing impairments. Some of the modi-
fications were completed behind the schedule agreed to in the set-
tlement, and management chose to ignore one part of the
settlement altogether, by installing an automatic door in one of the
side entrances, instead of the front entrance. For the most part,
however, the necessary modifications were made.
In the weeks, months, and years that followed, the Empire State
Building complaint was frequently mentioned in the press when-
ever there was a story on an ADA administrative complaint or law-
suit,47 and became a touchstone on the issue of ADA access. On
the fourth anniversary of the signing of the ADA, Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno mentioned the Empire state Building complaint in
46. See Andrea Hamilton, Empire State Building Renovations to Provide Better
Access for Disabled, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 4, 1994.
47. See e.g., Liz Spayd, Disabilities Act Sparks Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992,
at A13; Linda Feldmann, Disability Advisors' Preying on Businesses, Supporters of
New Federal Disabilities Law Warn of Fraudulent Certifications, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 11, 1992; Deborah Kendrick, Being Accessible to all Customers is Just
Good business, CINCINNATI INQUIRER, Feb. 23, 1992 at E12; Cynthia Durcanin, 1990
Disabilities Act Making Life Accessible, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 8, 1992, at D1;
Randall Samborn, No Flood of ADA Suits - Yet, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 3;
Peter McKenna, Friend or Foe? Some Think the New Disabilities Act Hurts Restau-
rants. Others Think it Could Help, RESTAURANT Bus., Mar. 20, 1992; Charlotte Allen,
Disabling Business, INSIGHT MAG., Apr. 13, 1992; Mary Lou Song, Landlords Nail
Down Rehab Plans Under ADA Regulations, CHI. LAW., May 1992; Jay Seeman &
Richard Romm, Real Estate and Title Trends: The Americans with Disabilities Act,
N.Y. L.J., June 10, 1992, at S6; Joe Hall, Lawyers Expect Lots of Suits with ADA in
Effect, NASHVILLE BUS. J., July 27, 1992; Steve Kerch, Disability Act Enters 2nd Scene,
BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, July 12, 1992; Wendy's Will Make Access Easier for the
Disabled, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 28, 1998, at B02; Gary W. Morrison, Straight
Approach, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 29, 1998, at D5; Liz Spayd, Disability Rights
Group Sues Safeway, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1994, at B3.
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public remarks, stating "We have no patience with those who
would thumb their noses at this law that has unlocked the door for
so many people."48
Many people learned about the ADA as a result of the media
coverage of the Empire State Building complaint. Shortly after it
was filed, NYLPI received telephone calls from people with disa-
bilities all over the country who wanted information about how to
enforce their rights under the ADA. The case even made its way
into popular culture when the network television program Saturday
Night Live did a joke about the settlement.4 9
Despite the success and impact of the Empire State Building
complaint, New York City still has a long way to go to become
accessible to people with disabilities. The City's own 1994 survey
found that only one-third of the sidewalks had curb cuts, 50 some of
which may not even be compliant with ADA safety and construc-
tion standards 1.5  Only thirty-five of 469 subway stations were fully
accessible to wheelchair users,52 and under the current timetable,
the New York City Transit Authority has until 2020 to make one
hundred key subway stations accessible.53 The ADA requires cities
with fixed-route public transit systems, such as New York City, to
operate paratransit systems that provide comparable service for in-
dividuals that cannot use the fixed route system; however, New
York City's paratransit system is so inadequate that the City's of-
fice of the Public Advocate filed a formal complaint with the Fed-
eral Transportation Administration concerning the problem. 54 A
non-exhaustive survey by the One-Step Campaign 55 of businesses
48. Reach of Disabilities Law Expands, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, July 26, 1994,
at 6A.
49. Kevin Nealon, the anchor on "Weekend Update", the news segment of "Satur-
day Night Live," announced: "In the Big Apple, New York's Empire State Building
will soon be made accessible for the physically disabled. Spokesmen said, among
other things, a wheelchair ramp will be installed. The ramp will begin in Central Park,
leading 26 blocks up to the building's observatory."
50. New York City Dep't of Transportation, The Americans with Disabilities Act
Pedestrian Ramp Transition Plan (May 13, 1994).
51. See id. Interview with James Weissman, Associate Director of Legal Affairs,
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association (Apr. 26, 1999).
52. Interview with James Weissman, Associate Director of Legal Affairs, Eastern
Paralyzed Veterans Association (Apr. 26, 1999).
53. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 15-b.3(b)-(c) (McKinney 1999).
54. Complaint filed by the New York City Office of the Public Advocate with the
Federal Transportation Administration, Apr. 21, 1998.
55. The One Step Campaign is a coalition comprised of Disabled in Action, the six
Centers for Independent Living in New York City, the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
Administration, and other organizations, to identify businesses in New York City that
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located in the Business Improvement District near the Empire
State Building found that over sixty businesses had one or two
steps at their doorway entrances which prevented wheelchair users
from entering.56 Vigorous advocacy is still needed to ensure that
New York City becomes truly accessible to everyone.
could become accessible to wheelchair users with relatively minimal effort and
expense.
56. Letter from Robert L. Levine and Frieda James, Co-chairpersons, One Step
Campaign, to Daniel A. Biederman, Grand Central Partnership, July 26, 1996 (on file
with the author).
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WHY SETTLE WHEN YOU CAN WIN:
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND
MARISOL v. GIULIANI
Marcia Robinson Lowry*
Introduction: Marisol's Story
Shortly after Marisol was born, her mother left her with a neigh-
bor, until Marisol's mother would return from jail. When Marisol's
mother returned, however, she decided that she did not want
Marisol back. Marisol was then formally placed as a foster child
with the neighbor. The neighbor turned out to be a good mother
to this abandoned child and fell in love with her, telling the city
agency that she wanted to adopt the little girl.
When Marisol was three-and-a-half years old, the New York City
child welfare agency decided to discharge her from foster care and
return Marisol to the home of her birth mother. The agency did
this even though Marisol returned from the weekend visits with her
birth mother filthy, unfed and describing violence in the home. In-
deed, the City agency rejected repeated reports that the child was
being abused in her birth mother's home, including one from the
child's natural aunt. Fifteen months later, a housing inspector dis-
covered Marisol locked in a closet, starving and bearing the scars
of repeated abuse. Most of her hair had been pulled from her head
and she had eaten her own feces, garbage bags and cardboard
boxes to stay alive. Doctors said she would not have survived
much longer.
Marisol re-entered foster care and was placed with the same fos-
ter mother who was still committed to raising her, and now to heal-
ing her. The City's child welfare agency had different plans for
Marisol. The City intended to return Marisol, once again, to her
mother, now in jail for child abuse. The City planned to make this
feasible by offering Marisol's mother some parenting classes.
Thankfully, the City child welfare agency was not left to follow
its usual course. Six months after Marisol reentered City custody,
and less than a month after the well-publicized child abuse death of
* Founder, Executive Director, Children's Rights, Inc., 1995-present; Director,
Children's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union, 1979-1995; Director, Chil-
dren's Rights Project, New York Civil Liberties Union, 1973-1979. J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1969; B.S., Journalism, Northwestern University, 1962.
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Elisa Izquierdo in late in 1995, Marisol became the first named
plaintiff in a class action lawsuit, Marisol v. Giuliani, filed in the
Southern District of New York.
It would be another two years before Marisol was officially
adopted by the foster mother who had raised her for most of her
life. Even these two years of frightening uncertainty were an un-
usually rapid time period in a child welfare system where children
often linger in uncertainty for years. No doubt, Marisol's case was
sped up due to her status in the federal case and constant pressure
by her attorneys. Despite the horrible abuse she suffered, Marisol
was probably more fortunate than all too many children in the
plaintiff class - her scars have had a chance to heal, and now she
lives with a safe, nurturing family.
The Suit
There is nothing remote or theoretical about the issues involved
in a major child welfare lawsuit or about using such a lawsuit to
bring desperately needed, long overdue reforms to a huge, inept
government system on which so many children depend for their
very lives. Marisol v. Giuliani' is such a case. Although the case
raised and resolved many important legal issues, the political con-
text of the case significantly affected the manner in which it went
forward. Moreover, Marisol concerned more than the life of a lit-
tle girl. The case shaped and developed theories about how best to
change institutional behavior, by making hard calculations about
what was necessary to bring about these institutional changes in
the perception-driven and complex environment that is New York
City..
The Marisol case was ready for trial during the summer of 1998
when settlement talks suddenly began mere weeks before the July
trial date. Until that point, the case had been vigorously litigated,
both factually and legally, with discovery being hard fought. Plain-
tiffs were represented by attorneys from two public interest organi-
zations: Children's Rights Inc., a spin-off of the Children's Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, which had brought
more child welfare reform lawsuits than any other organization in
the country and which, at the time, had seven child welfare systems
under some form of court supervision 2, and Lawyers for Children,
1. 929 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
2. G. L. v. Stangler, 873 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (covering Kansas City);
Joseph & Josephine A. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Services, 575 F. Supp. 346
(N.M. 1983); Juan F. v. William O'Neill, Civ. Action No. H-89-859 (AHN) (Conn.
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which represents thousands of children in the New York Family
Courts on a daily basis and thus was intimately familiar with how
the realities of how the system operated and affected children.
These organizations were joined by senior litigation partners from
the prestigious Manhattan law firms of Cahill Gordon & Reindel,
and from Schulte, Roth and Zabel.
New York City and State primarily defended the case by under
staffing it in the early stages. As a result, long delays occurred in
responding to discovery, while the governments' attorneys com-
plained they were working as hard as they could. From the start,
the defendants challenged every possible legal theory upon which
plaintiffs based their claims and attempted to narrow the case as
much as possible. For example, early in the case the plaintiffs
moved for the certification of a class that included all children af-
fected by the child welfare system.3 The defendants first chal-
lenged the scope of plaintiffs' class, on the ground that a class of
more than 100,000 children would be unmanageable. 4 The defend-
ants also challenged whether the Constitution, federal or state laws
were enforceable by children at all.
Increasing Public Scrutiny
From the day it was filed, a very strong undercurrent in the case
has been the public perceptions concerning the issues it addresses,
and the manner in which the political powers have responded to
them. Anyone familiar with child welfare in New York City at the
time knew the system was in a shambles, long neglected by City
government. Then, in November, 1995, the horrible death of little
Elisa Izquierdo, after the City ignored clear signs that she was be-
ing abused, shocked the public as no other child abuse death had.
Because this case remained in the public eye for so long, it made
the problems in New York City's child welfare system impossible
for the political forces to ignore. A year later in December, Mayor
Giuliani and the new Child Welfare Commissioner, Nicholas Scop-
January, 1991); Sheila A. v. Whitman, No. 89-CV-33 (Kan., 1993); LaShawn v. Barry,
762 F. Supp. 958 (D.C. 1991); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
A settlement agreement had also been reached in Philadelphia, Baby Neal et al. v.
Thomas P. Ridge, Civ. No. 90-2343, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14 (January 2, 1996) and
was approved by the court in February, 1999.
3. The class consisted of all children subjected to reported abuse and neglect and
all children in foster care.
4. They did so, despite the fact that appropriateness of certifying precisely that
class had recently been upheld by the Third Circuit. See Baby Neal et al. v. Casey, 43
F.3d 48 (3d Cir. 1994).
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petta, issued a "reform plan" acknowledging the wisdom of twenty
years worth of critical reports, that had been largely ignored. Child
welfare - finally - had become an issue that was not going to go
away, at least not until some very visible steps were taken.
Three weeks after Elisa's murder, Marisol's lawsuit was filed. In
this context, and given the current status of the management of the
child welfare system, the plaintiffs' complaint asked that control of
the system be handed over to a receiver. This was an unprece-
dented strategy move; few public systems have been put under re-
ceiverships by the federal courts. In fact, not only did it take four
years for the only child welfare system in such a status to reach that
point,5 it also required many failed attempts at complying with the
post-judgment remedy. Yet, by asking for a receivership, plaintiffs'
attorneys sent a strong, clear message that the Marisol lawsuit was
different. It signaled that plaintiffs were committed to seeking fun-
damental systemic reform no matter the cost, and that the plaintiffs
did not trust the current administration to be responsive. Request-
ing a receivership put the City and State further on the defensive.
Indeed, Mayor Giuliani announced that the newly established Ad-
ministration for Children's Services ("ACS") 6 was created, in part,
as a response to the call for the appointment of a receiver.
As a significant footnote to these issues, highlighting the degree
to which this case was playing out both in a public as well as legal
forum, Court TV chose to test the federal court ban on television
cameras in the courtroom, by recording the argument on the
Marisol motions for class certification and for dismissal of certain
claims. In February, 1996, Court TV filed a motion seeking per-
mission to film the argument, represented by pre-eminent First
Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams. The application was strenu-
ously opposed by the City defendants, for whom public perception
was a critical factor and who argued that the public would get an
unfairly negative view of the City's child welfare performance
since, in the context of a motion to dismiss, they would not be able
to challenge plaintiffs' factual allegations. In a March 1, 1996 deci-
sion, the Federal District Court Judge Robert J. Ward, to whom
Marisol was assigned, granted Court TV's motion. Consequently,
Court TV provided "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of the argument,
complete with legal commentary.
5. See LaShawn v. Barry, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995).
6. This was the City of New York's child welfare agency's fourth name change in
the last two decades.
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A Very Favorable Legal Context
Four months after the argument, in June 1996, Judge Ward re-
solved the complicated legal issues raised. Judge Ward certified
the class in a fairly straightforward decision, relying heavily on the
Third Circuit's definitive, scholarly ruling in the Baby Neal case.
Moreover, Judge Ward ruled for plaintiffs on virtually all of their
legal claims raised in defendants' motion to dismiss:7 the most ex-
pansive children's rights decision in the country thus far. The court
held, among other things, that:
1) Children could enforce state child welfare statutes;8
2) Children in state foster care custody have a substantive due
process right to be free from harm that extends to freedom
from "unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into their
emotional well-being";9
3) Children in foster care have a substantive due process right
to conditions of confinement which bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the purpose of their custody, including conditions
and duration of foster care reasonably related to this goal;' °
4) The substantive due process right to freedom from harm en-
compasses the right to reasonable services to enable children
to be reunited with biological family members;11
5) The state laws governing the investigation of child abuse and
neglect create constitutionally protected entitlements suffi-
cient to trigger procedural due process rights, a ruling of par-
ticular significance;' 2
6) Children have a private right of action to sue for violations of
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare, and the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Acts, the primary federal
child welfare funding statutes;' 3 and
7) Children in foster care with disabilities have rights under the
federal disability statutes, both to non-discriminatory access
to government services and to affirmative steps to ensure
that the access is meaningful. 14
7. Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
8. Id. at 686, 687.
9. Id. at 675
10. Id.
11. Id. at 677.
12. Id. at 680.
13. Id. at 683-84.
14. Id. at 685.
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The certification of the class was upheld on appeal in the Second
Circuit. The Circuit Court, however, instructed the district court to
create sub-classes for manageability purposes. 15
Unassailable Facts and an Attempted Gag Order
The other major development in the case had to do with factual
development. In most child welfare systems - and New York is
certainly no exception - key information about the children in the
system is simply not collected. Computerized information systems
in use are often too primitive or too inadequate to collect reliable
information. This, of course, assumes that computerized systems
are in use at all. Likewise, some child welfare administrators and
political authorities simply choose not to record the information
that would reveal the system's failures. Unfortunately, information
about the system's impact on children was critical to proving that
the legal rights of children were violated.
Traditional discovery devices could not provide such data; it sim-
ply did not exist. As in many other child welfare lawsuits,' 6 this
data had to be created during the discovery process, in what
amounted to social science research. Normally, data collection is
highly contentious; plaintiffs' results are challenged by the defend-
ants' experts, each side parading studies in front of judge. In
Marisol, however, defendants agreed to a joint, neutral data collec-
tion process, in which experts chosen by all the parties would ex-
tract information from a random sample of children's case records
and produce reports. The parties all agreed that the facts estab-
lished through this process could not be contested and would not
be subject to challenge on methodological grounds.
This arrangement has its pros and cons. The advantages of this
process are obvious: it saves time, money and, most importantly,
provides key information upon which the court can rely. Conse-
quently, this leaves the parties to argue about the legal import of
the findings, rather than conducting diversionary legal battles
about whose experts chose the most valid random sample, and
other arcane points to which there are probably no objective an-
swers. In addition, the findings, because they are presumed to be
neutral, can have a considerable impact on the case. The main dis-
advantage to this arrangement is that, to the degree that any party
might hope to shade an expert's conclusions, such opportunity
15. Marisol A., 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
16. See, e.g., LaShawn v. Barry, 762 F. Supp. 958, 965 (D.D.C. 1991).
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would be lost, as all the parties would be bound by whatever the
joint expert group found. For parties who really want to find out
what is going on, there are no substantial disadvantages, which was
why plaintiffs proposed this approach.
The experts' results in Marisol were just as plaintiffs anticipated:
the expert group's reports produced evidence of widespread sys-
temic problems and their impact on children. Below are some of
the key findings.
" In child abuse and neglect investigations, the City scored only
fifty-two percent in an index of the critical components neces-
sary for a completed investigation, and forty-five percent in an
index of major decisions and assessments that directly affect
the lives of children and families.
" The risk of future abuse or maltreatment to children was ade-
quately assessed in only sixty-six percent of the cases reported
for abuse or neglect.
" There were inadequate assessments of safety throughout the
investigation period in twenty-four percent of the cases.
* Child protective court proceedings were filed for only seventy
percent of the cases that needed them.
" In twenty-one percent of the cases there were "unacceptable"
gaps in necessary case activity.
" In forty-three percent of the cases, additional substantiated
reports of child abuse or maltreatment were recorded after
ACS protective oversight began.
" In thirty percent of the cases that had been closed, case clo-
sure was considered inappropriate for reasons that included
failure to ensure the safety of the children, and in additional
27% of the cases that were closed, it was impossible to deter-
mine whether the cases had been closed appropriately.
* In twenty percent of the cases, there were no face-to-face con-
tacts between children and their caseworkers during the en-
tire six month period for which data was collected.
" In forty percent of the cases where services were identified as
necessary to avert foster care placement, the needed services
were not provided.
" Assessments of case records during the critical first ninety
days after the case was opened found that one-fourth of the
cases lacked plans to meet families' service needs and thirty-
one percent of the cases contained no discussion of whether
the child was safe.
" A large number of findings demonstrated that ACS was fail-
ing to take timely, legally required steps to secure permanent
living arrangements for children at risk of spending their
childhood drifting through the foster care system.
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" Although efforts to reunite foster children with their natural
parents were purportedly a centerpiece of ACS' foster care
program, necessary services and outreach to birth parents
were lacking in a large percentage of cases.
" ACS continued to maintain the goal of returning children to
parents even in cases where parents' whereabouts were un-
known, or where there was evidence of permanent neglect or
abandonment.
" In the portion of the cases that ACS handled directly, rather
than through contracts with private foster care agencies
(about twenty percent of the system), the system's failings
were even more pronounced, with ACS' own performance in
some areas twice as deficient as that of the contract
agencies. 17
Throughout the case, there had been no limitations on the use of
the expert findings that only contained aggregate data, absent all
individually identifiable information. When the first of three re-
ports was issued and the press reported on it, the City immediately
ran to the District Court for a gag order. After Judge Ward denied
that motion, the City took an emergency appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit, where their position was ridiculed and quickly rejected by that
Court.'" Ironically, after the City's aggressive attempt to suppress
the report, the New York Times released the report, featuring it on
the front page.
The expert reports soon became the key evidence in the case.
Judge Ward, repeatedly on-the-record, made clear, the likelihood
he would consider these reports to constitute prima facie evidence
of violations of the legal standards he had established. Indeed, his
main concern was to determine the degree to which these viola-
tions had been, and were being, addressed by the "reform" admin-
istration appointed by Mayor Giuliani.
The Problem to be Solved
A year after it was created, the newly renamed and reorganized
child welfare agency, ACS, issued a lengthy "reform plan."'19 This
17. Reports 1 (Aug. 1997), 2 (Sept. 1997) & 3 (Dec. 1997), Marisol v. Giuliani, 929
F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (95 Civ. 10533) (original on file with author).
18. The City argued that news reports about the study's findings were demoraliz-
ing to public agency workers. One of the appeals court judges inquired during the
argument how many workers had gone into therapy as a result. See City Halls' Fragile
Babies Seem to be Caseworkers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at B6.
19. Administration for Children's Services, Protecting the Children of New York:
A Plan of Action for the Administration for Children's Services (Dec. 19, 1996) (on file
with the author).
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plan reiterated the agency's long history of serious problems"° and
announced a variety of new initiatives that, while lacking in detail,
were bounded by deadlines for implementation. On the eve of
trial, two-and-a-half years later, few of the plans were imple-
mented, and almost none of the deadlines met. To be fair, some
steps were taken, some superficial changes made and a number of
energetic, committed people were brought into leadership posi-
tions in the agency. Clearly, far more attention had been paid. On
the surface, it was not the same agency that had been sued.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. ACS remained an
agency with fundamental problems, many of which were still unad-
dressed and unacknowledged. Indeed, at the City level, even in
those rare instances that problems had been acknowledged, agency
administrators appeared genuinely unable to figure out solutions,
save for paying lip service to many of the popular ideas in child
welfare thought.
At the state level the problem was different. According to state
law, the state oversees the New York City child welfare system,
although it does not have direct operational responsibility to pro-
vide services to children. From time immemorial, however, the
state has neglected this responsibility. Moreover, not one of the
critical reports that state officials had ever issued about the City's
child welfare system resulted in any changes. Amazing, consider-
ing the tone of consternation and impotence throughout the State
documents produced during discovery.
As trial approached, plaintiffs' attempts to reach agreement on
at least some stipulated facts with either the City or state defend-
ants met with complete resistance. The result: with no stipulated
facts at all in a complex case, there was sure to be a lengthy trial.
Because of the breadth and complexity of the issues, and in re-
sponse to a suggestion from plaintiffs, the court decided that each
side would be limited to a total of 300 trial hours. The court had
rejected a request to bifurcate the liability and remedy stages of the
trial, or to freeze the evidence at any particular date, even though
discovery had been closed six months before the trial date. And
once again the court made clear that while no determination of
liability had been made in advance of the presentation of evidence,
20. "Through most of the past twenty-five years, the city agency charged with pro-
tecting children and other organizations and government entities trying to work to the
same end have worked ineffectively, sometimes hindering one another's efforts de-
spite everyone's best intentions." Id. at 17.
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its primary concern was the degree to which the system had im-
proved, and whether and what kind of remedy might be necessary.
Ever since the results of joint case record review became avail-
able, taken together with legal rulings on the motion to dismiss, it
seemed extremely likely to plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs would
succeed in establishing liability. It was also clear that defendants
were committed to prolonging the trial for as long as possible. The
court's rulings allowing liability and remedy to be tried simultane-
ously, allowing an extended period for the trial, and allowing cur-
rent evidence to be admitted 21 meant we were dealing with a
moving target. It seemed highly likely that the already protracted
trial schedule would extend far into the future. Even after the trial
concluded, if it ever did, it was clear that defendants would appeal
a finding of liability, and it was possible that any substantial reme-
dies might be stayed on appeal. While plaintiffs' claims remained
strong, it seemed likely that a court, faced with energetic, articulate
defendants and continuing new developments might, after a finding
of liability, grant to defendants more time to implement their plans
or to create an expert panel to recommend and probably to moni-
tor additional changes.
It seemed likely that significant relief for the children who were
class members was years away. Throughout the course of discov-
ery, plaintiffs' counsel, in consultation with their experts, remained
convinced that even the City's "reform" plans would not result in
significant benefits for children, and because of the uncertainty of
implementation might even create further chaos in an already cha-
otic system.
Several key markers continued to indicate that things were not
getting measurably better. Child fatalities, obviously a particularly
important and sensitive indicator and one on which the City ad-
ministration had been particularly focused, had gone up since the
"reform" administration had taken office. The number of child
abuse deaths of children in foster care had also risen. Adoptions,
which had risen dramatically just before the creation of the new
child welfare agency, had leveled off and started to drop. A plan to
move to a system of "neighborhood-based services" appeared con-
21. In response to plaintiffs' concern that the court's willingness to receive current
evidence on which plaintiffs had not conducted discovery would put plaintiffs at a
disadvantage through surprise, the court made clear that plaintiffs would have the
opportunity to take additional depositions or to receive limited additional discovery
as new facts were presented by defendants, but defendants only had to give plaintiffs
24-hours notice of the intent to use new facts.
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tradictory and poorly thought out. Not only were children going to
be further delayed in getting a better child welfare system, but
things might even get worse.
It would, of course, take years to establish these points, defend a
judgment on appeal, and then develop meaningful relief and have
the court order it. In the process, it was entirely likely that the top
management of the child welfare agency would have been para-
lyzed by the need to respond to the lawsuit. Even the commis-
sioner, notwithstanding his early attractiveness to the media
because he had spent several years of his.childhood in foster care,
was vulnerable to the revelations of a lengthy court process. He
could, perhaps, be removed from office, causing further disorgani-
zation within a very shaky administrative structure.
Under this shadow, plaintiffs agreed to settlement talks with
both the City and the state. These talks proceeded independently
and the content of each was withheld from the other defendant
until late in the process."2 From plaintiffs' prospective, as difficult
as it was to give up what looked like a certain finding of liability, it
was easy to recognize that the settlements moved the process for-
ward by at least two years and offered the best, most immediate
prospect of beginning to solve the problems now. 3 These factors
informed plaintiffs' perspective in finally reaching the settlements
that were submitted to and approved by the court. In their final
form, the City and state settlements are both innovative and
complementary.
State Settlement
The primary failing of the state was that it did not exercise ade-
quate oversight to ensure that the City was following the law and
22. City and state defendants did not appear to have developed a joint strategy in
the case and it appeared from the discovery material that there was a marked lack of
cooperation between the city and state child welfare authorities.
23. The content of all settlement discussions are, of course, confidential. How-
ever, some background on the City settlement talks are provided by a City document
produced during discovery, in which one City expert explains that the city had failed
to seek top level independent expert advice to improve the system's operations be-
cause it feared that such experts would then become trial witnesses against the City.
The report stated: "Because of the Marisol lawsuit, a suggestion by the head of the
Annie E. Casey Foundation to convene an advisory council of 'super experts' to re-
view, discuss, and advise on the agency's reform process foundered on fears that par-
ticipants would inevitably become witnesses for the plaintiffs." Administration for
Children's Services, An Assessment (May 12, 1998) (citing reports by city defendants'
expert Lawrence E. Lynn) (on file with the author).
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protecting children. Under the agreement, the state is obligated to
take a number of concrete steps:
" to increase the staffing of a badly understaffed local oversight
office, and to limit the scope of the office's responsibility to
New York City (changing a metropolitan regional office to a
New York City office);
* to complete the reports on child fatalities on a timely basis (all
of which had been long overdue); to use these reports to de-
termine whether there are significant, recurring problems in
the City's ability to investigate child abuse complaints, and, if
so, to use its authority to require the City to address and cor-
rect the failings that have contributed to these child deaths;
* to take reasonable steps to develop a long overdue computer-
ized information system; and
* to conduct case record reviews and interviews with service re-
cipients to document the City's full range of child welfare
practices, to determine whether the City's child welfare sys-
tem is improving and is protecting children and, if it is not, to
require the City to address the problem while the state
monitors its progress.2 4
The state settlement allows plaintiffs to monitor the state's com-
pliance with its obligations under this agreement, through meetings
with the head of the state agency and review of relevant state docu-
ments. If plaintiffs determine that the state is failing to comply
with its obligations, plaintiffs can return to court for enforcement,
seeking in the first instance an order directing compliance and,
thereafter, a finding of contempt and any appropriate remedies.
The agreement will last for two years, unless it is extended by the
court because the state has failed to fulfill its obligations. During
this period new class actions by class members are barred, but indi-
vidual equitable and damage actions are not.
City Settlement
The settlement with the City follows an innovative approach. In-
stead of the traditional settlement, where the City is obligated to
take specific actions while the plaintiffs monitor the City and re-
turn to court if the City fails to comply with such an agreement,
this settlement builds on ACS' stated commitment to reform.
However, it recognizes ACS' need for outside help to understand
the problems it faces and how to best address the problems. The
settlement provides for independent expert assistance to aid ACS
24. Settlement on file with author.
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in those pursuits, and also ensures rigorous monitoring of the im-
plementation of the recommendations, with the opportunity for far
more powerful court action if necessary.
A key to the settlement's success thus far is the strength and
independence of the expert group. Indeed, both plaintiffs and de-
fendants trust these experts. The members of this four-person ex-
pert panel ("Panel") were administrators in public systems. In
addition, all of the costs associated with the Panel's work, including
the salaries of full-time staff, will be borne by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation, a major private fund raiser for national child welfare
reform in the country. All of the Panel participants have a major
stake in the settlement process working and producing credible re-
sults, as does the Casey Foundation, which certainly has a difficult
course to negotiate and which, to some degree, is putting its repu-
tation on the line. The Casey Foundation, as an added bonus, has a
wide range of national expertise to call upon, and as a present or
future grant-maker, is assured of the enthusiastic cooperation of
anyone the Panel members call upon for assistance.
The Panel's specific responsibility is to assess the child welfare
agency's operations in all key areas and to develop specific recom-
mendations about what ACS needs to do to achieve good child
welfare practices. The City is not obligated to implement the
Panel's specific recommendations, but will be monitored by the
Panel to determine whether it has adequately improved its child
welfare practices, either through implementing the Panel's recom-
mendations or by some other equally effective means. If ACS fails
to make good faith efforts to achieve reform, as measured by this
expert Panel with practical knowledge about what can be done in
systems committed to reform, the Panel can find an absence of
good faith. In this case, plaintiffs can return to court to impose
liability and seek any available remedy, with the Panel as plaintiffs'
witnesses and with no limitation on the duration of any relief the
court may order.
The Settlement also provides the Panel and its staff with ex-
traordinary and unprecedented access to all aspects of the child
welfare agency's operations, staff, meetings and documents, in a
manner that far exceeds anything that could ever be obtained
through discovery or even through more traditional monitoring ef-
forts. Thus the Panel, all experienced and skilled administrators
themselves, will be in a unique position to understand not only
what is, or is not, happening, but why and how.
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If the Panel sets the standard too high and comes up with truly
unachievable recommendations, the City could balk, resume a de-
fensive posture, close off the access to candid discussion of the sys-
tem's problems and refuse the Panel's help. If this occurs, the City
thus forfeits the opportunity to make these reforms voluntarily, in
which case the Panel would have the obligation to make the ab-
sence-of-good faith findings that will bring the parties back to
court, with the Panel members as witnesses against the City. On
the other hand, if the Panel sets the standard too low and subjects
the City to anything less than tough scrutiny by demanding any-
thing less than concrete results for children, plaintiffs will deem the
process a failure and label the Casey Foundation an apologist for
an inadequate system. Neither is likely to happen however. One
can only assume that the Foundation and the very highly skilled
Panel members put themselves in this sensitive position because
they expected to demand the best that is achievable, and subject
the City to appropriate consequences if it falls short of what could
have been done.
This is a highly unusual construct, but one with enormous poten-
tial. Should the Panel find an absence of good faith reform, the
plaintiffs need only establish legal liability to obtain a judicial rem-
edy for the City's violation of the order. Given the legal standards
employed by the district court, the Panel's testimony, which will be
based on full access to all personnel and documents, will be
deemed prima facie evidence of the City's absence of good faith to
reform the child welfare system under the terms of the settlement.
At the least, a finding of absence of good faith reform efforts by
the experts is likely to be enormously persuasive to a court. At
that point, the Panel members may testify about what should and
can be done. This will make the scope of a court order far easier to
determine, and, if necessary, the possibility of a receivership far
more likely. These recommendations, made by experts that are
trusted by the City, will provide the kind of planning, guidance and
independence that the City has long been lacking. The Panel will
then monitor and report on ACS' progress over the next two years
in either implementing the recommendations, or in otherwise ac-
complishing the goals that have been set out in each of the key
child welfare areas. Thus, either the City will have been required
to accomplish necessary reforms within two years - in which case
the plaintiff children will be the winners - or the City will make
clear that even with outside help it is incapable of doing so - in
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which case a court takeover, after a finding of liability, would be
almost inevitable.
Because of the extraordinary access the settlement provides to
the Panel, and because their findings will be reported in public doc-
uments, the settlement prohibits the filing of any new class action
lawsuits during the two years the settlement remains in effect, ab-
sent further judicial action. Although new class actions are barred
during this period, individual actions for either equitable relief or
damages are not. Although this provision is controversial, and has
drawn fire from some advocates, some respected experts and ob-
servers believe that piecemeal class action litigation, which may ad-
vance a particular interest at a particular time, can in fact be
damaging to the creation of a coherent and well-managed system.
Indeed, the New York City child welfare system, long-recognized
to be driven by crisis management, has all too often illustrated that
point, serving one interest at the expense of others, without every
having had the capacity to develop a well-functioning whole.
A final, particularly important part of the City settlement is that
it folds into the agreement the requirements of the consent decree
in Wilder v. Bernstein,5 a lawsuit that was settled in 1985 and gov-
erns many aspects of the City's placement system. Although that
lawsuit has had a significant impact on several aspects of the child
welfare system 6 , it has still not accomplished its goals and the City
has never complied with its terms.2 7 The reason for this is that the
Wilder settlement addresses only one aspect of a child welfare sys-
tem. Of course, the child welfare system is so disorganized and
ineffective in so many different ways, that it is impossible to fix
only a piece of it. Faced with the overwhelming problems that a
dysfunctional placement system represents, the court has not had
adequate constructive alternatives.
The Marisol settlement incorporates the Wilder requirements as
enforceable rights. The Marisol Panel, however, will make the crit-
ical difference in the enforceability of these rights and the degree
to which they can be used to ensure reform. The Panel is free to
modify the details of some of the Wilder requirements and to assess
25. 645 F. Supp 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
26. As a result of Wilder, the federal court enjoined a City plan to go to managed
care, changed the City's method of placing foster children with relatives by employing
supervisory contract agencies rather than the City's directly operated program and
required the City to hire two hundred workers with master's degrees in social work.
See Wilder v. Bernstein, 49 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. Wilder v. Bernstein, No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW), 1998 WL 355413 at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
July 1, 1998).
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the City's compliance with those requirements in the context of the
overall operation of the child welfare system. Non-Wilder aspects
of the City settlement require plaintiffs to obtain judgments on the
underlying legal claims in the face of a lack of good faith finding by
the Panel. This step should present only minimal difficulty given
the breadth of the court's legal rulings on the motion to dismiss, as
discussed above. With regard to the Wilder requirements, how-
ever, the legal rights have already been established, and if the
Panel makes a finding of absence of good faith implementation,
plaintiffs will be entitled to move immediately for contempt. At
that point, the possibility of intrusive remedies, including receiver-
ship, become far more likely than they would have been in the con-
text of the Wilder lawsuit.
Both the City and state settlements reflect an approach that dif-
fers substantially from the standard proscriptive settlement decree,
with specific steps that must be taken within specific time periods.
That is the agreements' strength. Particularly in New York, a new
approach seemed appropriate, one in which a panel of trusted and
skilled experts could prescribe a remedy for what ails a child wel-
fare system in trouble, and then make sure that this remedy is actu-
ally put into place.
The Combined Impact of the Settlements
The Marisol approach is two-pronged. It requires the state to
finally exercise its oversight responsibility toward the City, with the
contempt powers of the court available if the state does not. State
oversight has always been exercised through a regional office, re-
sponsible for several counties in addition to New York. The settle-
ment requires the establishment of a New York City-only office,
and an increase in staff necessary to do the work.
The agreement with the City builds on the lessons learned from
other reform efforts. Although it is relatively easy to specify what
is wrong in these complex child welfare systems, it is far more diffi-
cult to determine, beyond the obvious, why those wrongs have oc-
curred and how to right them. The discovery process is uniquely
suited to identifying the former and not the latter. The wealth of
information relevant to understanding the workings of a complex
bureaucracy and to shifting it in its course is difficult to obtain
through the adversarial process but critical to changing how that
bureaucracy functions. Thus, one of the key and early advantages
to the Marisol City settlement is the immediate access to critical
information that the Marisol Panel and its staff provide. Of course,
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pivotal to the City agreement is the faith of both plaintiffs and de-
fendants in the integrity, independence and skill of the Panel mem-
bers, a group to which both sides agreed. Whether they can remain
strong and tough enough to satisfy plaintiffs that they are making
the difficult calls and the necessary determinations, without losing
their free access to the internal workings of the child welfare bu-
reaucracy and the ability to guide the City's plans, remains to be
seen. It is likely that the City cooperation will disappear if and
when the Panel determines that court involvement is necessary. At
that point, however, the non-adversarial aspects of this agreement
are likely to be over, and the process is likely to move toward legal
findings and court orders. But unlike the situation now, a legal
judgment and court order at that point will be based on full infor-
mation from experts given a unique inside view, with a clear under-
standing of what can but has not been done, and of how to do it.
The case will then have reached the contempt hearing stage, but a
uniquely well-informed one. Should this process not work, the
City will be virtually foreclosed from pleading that it deserves an-
other chance, or the opportunity to do things its own way, since the
team that the City invited in has found that the City cannot or will
not.
The settlements are thus a no-lose proposition for plaintiffs,
moving them to the remedy stage years earlier than after a trial
and appeal. In practical terms, this settlement is likely to lead to
one of two results: (1) The expertise of this Panel will provide the
guidance lacking in City administration and add a behind-the-
scenes pressure to address fundamental problems in a historically
inadequate system; or (2) if the City resists fundamental reforms,
the fact-finding will be up-to-date and based on the best possible
information, from the trusted expert Panel members, who will have
become intimately familiar with the agency's operations, and who
can present to the court a plan to reform the agency that can be
implemented under the court's control. Either way, the children
are the winners.
The one thing that plaintiffs' counsel gave up in agreeing to set-
tling Marisol is the personal pleasure that comes from winning at
trial, and from stripping away the overblown claims of achievement
that have been the hallmark of government agencies willing to ac-
knowledge the shortcomings of their predecessors but all too com-
mitted to minimizing their own. That would have been gratifying.
But that would not, in the short term, have improved the lives of
our clients, our children. And one way or another, the Marisol set-
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tlements have moved us two years ahead in the process of doing
exactly that, and of getting concrete results and better services and
protection for children, the best kind of victory we can achieve for
them.
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',q' WE NOT HUMAN?
Greg Sholette*
Since becoming a father in 1990, I have been intrigued by the
way children and childhood are represented within contemporary
culture. There is a palpable tension between the highly sentimen-
talized way children are typically portrayed in art and the media -
and the way we, as a society, fail them down the line. "Kids Rights
1, 2, and 3," designed for REPOhistory's, "Civil Disturbances: Bat-
tles for Justice in New York City" seeks to evoke this tension.
Before making my images and writing my texts I researched the
legal and historical idea of childhood itself. Many scholars insist
that childhood, as we understand it, emerged at about the time of
the industrial revolution. Prior to that time a child was seen as a
smaller version of an adult and was the legal property of its father.
Yet two conflicted concepts of childhood continued to exist side by
side. On one hand, following the "natural philosophy" of Jean Jac-
ques Rousseau, the children of the bourgeoisie were perceived as
belonging to a separate sphere from adult life, one uncorrupted by
social customs. On the other hand the children of the working
class continued to labor beside adults much as they had since the
middle ages, except that factory work began to supersede agricul-
ture. I believe that these separate versions of childhood, which di-
vide along class lines, continue to affect our understanding of
childhood today. It is this unease between a Victorian notion of
the child as almost pre-human, and the actual, modern "kid" whose
small body is a legal, economic, and commercial battlefield that
informs the overall structure of my three part sign installation for
Civil Disturbances.
"Kids Rights 1" deals with issues of contemporary child labor,
number "2" with the Miranda Rights of young people, and number
"3" with the states legal obligation to protect the welfare of all citi-
zens including children. This last point is addressed through the
class action suit Marisol v. Giuliani. At a historical and cultural
level, Marisol raises the question of who is ultimately responsible
for a child's well being, by arguing that our national constitution
holds the states responsible for this task. In Marisol, New York
* Assistant Professor, School of the Art Institute of Chicago. Founding mem-
ber, REPOhistory.
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failed to provide that constitutional protection to children not only
in its foster care system but in general.
However with "Kids Rights 3 - Freedom from Abuse and Ne-
glect: Marisol v. Giuliani" I also wanted to raise the problem of
economic inequality which I believe can not be separated from the
issue of child abuse and neglect. Unquestionably neglect cuts
across class boundaries, yet the situation faced by a single mother
on work-fare with five kids and no access to child care can not be
equated with a middle class family that employs a full-time nanny.
My text for Marisol tries to bring this social inequity into the pic-
ture by concluding with the line ".... public outcry over child abuse
occurs even as deep cuts in social spending and shrinking federal
resources impede protection of those children most at risk."
The artistic approach I have taken in Marisol also exploits these
conflicts and contradictions. Indeed, all three of my "Kids Rights"
signs employ imagery that looks like children's book illustrations
complete with cookie-dough like typography: Modeled in clay,
painted in bright "candy colors," and then scanned into a com-
puter. My custom alphabet poses a series of rhetorical questions
about the contemporary status of children: "'51' You Looking At
Me?" and "'2' We Not Human?" In other words, does the com-
mercial representation of childhood in popular culture present kids
as sentimental "objects" for our "adult" gaze, and is our looking at
these images of idealized childhood not filled with a mixture of
longing and compassion?
In a sense I also hoped to suggest that my own practice as an
"artist-reformer," not un-like that of Jacob Riis before me, is inevi-
tably caught-up with being an "artist-voyeur." By engaging in the
very act of representing the social wrongs I am inevitably invading
and exploiting another's misery, in this case a child known to the
courts as Marisol. To the degree that any artist or concerned citi-
zen engages these issues such contradictions must be squarely
faced as well.
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ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION*
Berkman v. City of New York1
Plaintiff. Brenda Berkman**
When I first went to Laura Sager in 1978, more than twenty
years ago, I could not have imagined how this case would change
my life. I have been a firefighter now for the past sixteen years.
Life in the firehouse has never been easy. The first seven years
were extremely difficult, and I am not sure I would have enough
stamina to deal with the level of harassment for twenty years. For-
tunately for me, times have changed. Although the Fire Depart-
ment is by no means perfect, the level of harassment, animosity
and even hatred of women firefighters has abated considerably.
While there is still considerable resistance to the integration of
women in the fire service, I believe this case had a dramatic impact
on the New York City Fire Department. But this case not only
forced New York City to finally hire women, it sent out a tremor
that affected Fire Department employment practices throughout
the United States and abroad.
The case also had a tremendous effect on public attitudes about
the role of women in the workplace. Certainly, people still - after
eighteen years- say to me "Oh, you are the first woman firefighter
that I have ever seen. I did not realize that they even had women
firefighters. Do you go on the truck?" Now, however, more and
more, young girls come to the firehouse and they draw pictures of
themselves driving the fire engine and climbing the ladder. To me
that is a dramatic change. The idea that public opinion has
changed to a degree, that girls can try to do anything because they
have seen a woman firefighter, that has been the reward for me in
terms of my participation in this case.
I am very grateful to my lawyers at the New York University
Law School and Debovoise & Plimpton. I am also very grateful to
* These remarks were originally delivered at New York Law School on Nov. 17,
1998. They have been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing.
1. 536 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983), later
proceeding, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part, 812 F.2d
52 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
** Lieutenant, New York City Fire Department. B.A., summa cum laude, St.
Olaf Collage; M.A., American History, Indiana University; J.D., New York
University School of Law.
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my entire network of supporters. Plaintiffs such as myself cannot
survive this kind of case in isolation. There is no way that an indi-
vidual can endure the stress of a lengthy litigation if he or she tries
to go it alone. Plaintiffs need support from many people, and I was
lucky to have that.
I was a lawyer before I became a firefighter and I was in law
school at the time when women were first allowed to apply to be-
come firefighters. Consequently, because of my legal training, I
started the case thinking that the law will provide the solution for
past discrimination, that the law would effect social change. In
many ways, the law was the answer. The court forced the City to
develop a job-related non-discriminatory hiring process and
stopped the City from firing me during my probationary period.
The court also attempted to ensure that I received the same work-
ing conditions as the male firefighters by requiring the Fire Depart-
ment to adopt anti-harassment training and procedures. Yet,
despite these requirements and orders, the law could not protect
me from physical and verbal assaults from co-workers and civilians
alike. No judge could protect me when my co-workers telephoned
death threats to my home or refused to talk to me at work.
Through this experience, I discovered that people fighting dis-
crimination need more than the law and the talents lawyers bring
to bear. Ending discrimination requires political activism. Change
of this magnitude requires the efforts of the entire community -
the efforts of artists, writers and the media.
I feel very good about the REPOhistory sign that memorializes
my case. The sign documents something of which I am very proud.
Through this sign, other will learn of the importance of the struggle
to end discrimination. It reminds people that women trailblazers
have worked hard and suffered for many years to make the work
place better for everyone. Hopefully, this sign will inspire others to
continue their work in the future.
Attorney: Laura Sager***
In 1978 I was a professor at New York University Law School,
where I still teach. In those days I taught a course called the
*** Professor, New York University School of Law. J.D., UCLA School of Law,
1968; B.A., Wellesley College, 1961. First under the auspices of the Women's Rights
Clinic, and then through the Civil Rights Clinic at New York University School of
Law, Professor Sager has represented plaintiffs in many employment discrimination
and other civil rights cases. Her work on behalf of Brenda Berkman lasted for more
than ten years.
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Womens' Rights Clinic for third-year law students working under
supervision on real cases in my area, employment discrimination.
When Brenda Berkman came to see me that year, she was a third-
year law student. She told me that she had taken the entrance
exam to become a New York City firefighter, that she had passed
the written part, but failed the physical part. She told me that all
the women who took the test had failed the physical part. She said
she thought the test discriminated against women.
This was the first time that the firefighter entrance test was open
to women; the first time women even had a chance to apply for this
job. Although Brenda was in law school, and intending to become
a lawyer, she had always wanted to be a firefighter, and so she took
the test. She did that not just for a lark, but because she truly
hoped to pass the test and to get into the Fire Department. She
asked me if the Clinic would take her case, challenging the validity
of the physical test. I thought about it for a while and we talked a
little bit. I agreed to take the case, but I had no conception of what
that would mean for me, for my program or for my life over the
next ten years.
Taking on the task of challenging the validity of the physical test
was quite demanding, and after a year or two of litigation, the law
firm of Debevoise & Plimpton joined as co-counsel in the case, at
the suggestion of New York Lawyers for the Public Interest. As
you may know, there are two legal theories on which a claim of
discrimination can be based. One theory is intentional discrimina-
tion - that is, that an employer intentionally discriminates against
a group of people, for example by intentionally constructing a
physical test for the purpose of making it very difficult, if not im-
possible, for women to pass. The other theory is what is known as
"disparate impact" discrimination. Under this theory, the plaintiff
can claim that regardless of their intent, New York City in fact cre-
ated a test that was much more difficult for women than for men,
and that the test is not valid; that is, there is no evidence that peo-
ple who score higher on the test will perform better on the job than
people who score lower on the test.
When Brenda Berkman first came to see me, she explained that
about 410 women had applied for the position of firefighter and
that all the women had failed the physical test. We agreed that the
focus of the litigation would be to show that the physical test was
invalid - that passing or failing the test was not a predictor of who
could do the job and who could not. Although we had some evi-
dence of intentional discrimination by the City, the essence of the
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case was a disparate impact claim. We argued that women who
were strong and in very good condition (which Brenda Berkman
always was) were capable of performing the physically demanding
job of firefighter and could pass a valid physical test.
As an aside, I just want to mention that throughout the litigation
the City seemed to think that Brenda was just a "stalking-horse"
for other women. City lawyers and officials could not imagine that
a woman who had graduated from N.Y.U. Law School and had
become a lawyer would leave her job to go to work in a firehouse.
Of course, Brenda really meant it and, as you can see, she achieved
her childhood dream of becoming a firefighter. Besides winning
this case, I was gratified to be able to show the City that this person
meant what she said.
The first phase of the litigation consisted of our challenge to the
validity of the physical test. Did the test in fact measure whether a
person could perform the physical requirements of the job? After
a trial that extended over several weeks in the Eastern District of
New York, Judge Sifton found conclusively that it did not. He
ruled that the test was invalid and he ordered the City to devise a
new interim measure to test the fitness of Brenda and the other
class members, and to develop a new test for future use. In 1982,
the new interim test was given and Brenda and many other women
passed. In a very emotionally stirring ceremony, Brenda and the
other women were sworn in as the first women firefighters in the
history of New York City.
Unfortunately, the case did not end there, because, after the
standard one-year probationary period for all Fire Department
personnel, the City determined that all of the women except for
two should be granted tenure. Those two women were Brenda
Berkman and Zaida Gonzales. Brenda Berkman, as you know,
was the lead plaintiff in the case, and had been the subject of a lot
of publicity. Zaida Gonzales also had been the subject of a lot of
publicity because she was featured on the cover of New York Mag-
azine. During their probationary year in the firehouses, both
Brenda and Zaida Gonzalez had a lot of very bad things happen to
them. Both of them were denied training that other probationary
firefighters were given. Both of them were subjected to abusive
treatment by men in the firehouses. Some of the harassment was
sexual in nature, and some was abusive in other ways. For exam-
ple, both Brenda and Zaida were "put out of the meal." In the
firehouse, firefighters eat collectively: they buy the food collec-
tively, they cook and they eat it. But both Brenda and Zaida were
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told that they could not eat with the other firemen. That gives you
some idea of what life was like for them in the firehouses. And
then, at the end of their probationary year, the City announced
that these two women, out of all the women who had now joined
the Fire Department, would be terminated.
So, a year after we had won what we thought was a victory in the
case, we were back in court with a second case claiming that the
termination of Brenda and Zaida Gonzales was unjustified and
constituted retaliation against them. Once again, Judge Sifton
heard the case and he ruled that by denying these two women the
training that was given to other probationary firefighters, and by
permitting them to be subjected to egregious harassment in the
firehouses, the Fire Department had not treated them fairly. The
judge ordered the City to give Brenda and Zaida Gonzalez the
training they had been denied and then test them on their ability to
perform fire-fighting tasks. After several weeks of such training,
the women passed their tests with flying colors and became ten-
ured members of the Fire Department.
The lawsuit, however, continued. The City developed another
physical test that was so demanding that at least one person died
from heart failure while taking it. We challenged that test in an-
other round of litigation, but the courts held that new test was
valid. Subsequently, however, the City gave up on that test, and
has developed yet another test. Hopefully, women will be able to
pass the physical tests that the City gives in the future and there
will be more women firefighters.
Before I close, I want to say a few words about Brenda Berk-
man. Brenda performed the role of named plaintiff in a class ac-
tion as well as anyone could possibly do. She did not merely lend
her name to the case, but provided real leadership and support to
the other women who wanted to be firefighters, the class members.
This case went on for a long time, and Brenda was subjected to an
extraordinary degree of animosity and hatred, even receiving death
threats. But she never wavered in her determination to see the
case through and to become a firefighter.
Looking back, I believe that this case accomplished a great deal.
Brenda Berkman is now a Lieutenant in the Fire Department. Be-
yond that, however, there are many other women in the New York
City Fire Department, including one woman who is about to be-
come a Captain. Who knows, the second Captain may be Brenda
Berkman. What these women have demonstrated through their
commitment, courage and dedication is that gender is not the bar-
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rier that it was once for highly demanding physical work for wo-
men. Working on this case was a wonderful experience for me, and
I am especially happy that Brenda and I have remained friends
through all these years.
Artist: Susan Schuppli****
As an artist I think you always work with a specific image, but
then translate it, transform it, into something a little more general
is capable of reaching a broader audience. My own work has al-
ways dealt with the relationship between women and institutional
structures - predominantly around issues of violence against wo-
men. Brenda's case provided an opportunity for me to continue
the work I already do and am committed to as an artist.
In most of my past projects, I have inserted a female protagonist
into a type of prototypical masculine narrative. This case was in-
teresting because of the subject, a sort of heroic figure, yet largely
masculine figure, the firefighter. Also, the opportunity to work
with a very specific case was appealing. This was not fiction. Thus,
I created a chronology of this very protracted struggle that Brenda
Berkman endured over the course of fifteen or twenty years. And
while the battle in the court may be over, the struggle continues in
her daily life working in the Fire Department. So, this was a very
important opportunity for me to actually work with a very kind of
particular case. So there was no longer the kind of fictionalizing
element that I often used in my work.
At the same time, the challenge for me, and I suspect for a lot of
artists, is to change something that is so complex and enormous as
this case into a sign that conveys the importance of the issues be-
hind it. The first trial alone lasted twenty-two days and produced
more than 3,500 pages of transcripts debating one particular exam
in the court. How do you take all of that information and reduce it
to the form of a sign so it relates to the case, provides information,
but still captures the struggles of what was a very lengthy battle?
As a result, I produced a sign that actually has quite a lot of lan-
guage that had a relationship to the case, words like inflammatory
and ignite.
**** Susan Schuppli is a Canadian visual artist and educator. She has participated
in numerous exhibitions in Canada, the United States and Great Britain, and has also
produced and curated commissioned public art projects in Seattle, Vancouver and San
Diego. She received her MFA from the University of California San Diego and is
currently on the art faculty at the University of Lethbridge, Alberta.
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What was interesting to me actually about the relationship be-
tween art and law is that people who are engaged in those activities
are often quite removed from the effects of their work. Artists and
lawyers often fail to understand the relationship that their activities
have to people's everyday lives. Individuals that are often seen as
doing something that isn't always or understood to be useful, quite
an interesting kind of parallel.
As it has been a point of contention between Brenda and I, I
wanted to conclude by saying that the woman in the sign that I
created is not Brenda Berkman. It is a symbol. I always worked
with visual images that have a symbolic presence. So, for me the
woman in the sign becomes a kind icon, one representing women
of strength. It relates back to that point I made at the beginning
about transforming very specific ideas into general ones, because,
like the final line in the sign says, we need to ignite on-going
awareness about all of the issues that impact upon women's every-
day lives. For me what was most important, in a sense, was that
women could project themselves into that kind of masculine narra-
tive. That is the very heart of the sign.
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McCain v. Koch 2
Attorney: Steven Bankst
In 1982, Yvonne McCain became homeless as a result of domes-
tic violence. She and her three children went to a New York City
shelter due to this abusive relationship. Because she was went to
the City after leaving her mother's home, where she had been liv-
ing in a crowded one-bedroom basement apartment, the City de-
nied her and her children shelter. The City officials denied her
shelter because she was living with a relative; the City denied
Yvonne help on account of her not telling them she was fleeing
from domestic violence. Yvonne, like so many women, had not
come to grips with the domestic violence issues in her life at the
time and yet she was turned away, despite the fact that her mother
would not house her anymore.
Yvonne ended up sleeping on the floor with her kids at a City
Welfare Office. Ultimately, when she was finally provided with
shelter, she was sent to the Martinique hotel, among the most noto-
rious of the welfare hotels. The four of them lived there, sleeping
on a urine stained mattress bare on the floor. They had no towels,
sheets, or operable plumbing. The room was infested with mice
and cockroaches. Yvonne was forced to hang the children's milk
out the window, trying to keep it cold in a box hung outside the
window, because, of course, there were no refrigerators. There
were no window guards either so, it was not very difficult to put the
box outside the window. Ironically, it is a Holiday Inn now. She
and I were actually there a few months ago for an interview she
was doing with a news organization. I think she particularly en-
joyed the fact that there is a REPOhistory sign that is going to be
posted out in front of the Holiday Inn, right near Macy's.
Yvonne went to a community group called the "Redistribute
America Movement," an outgrowth of the Downtown Welfare Ad-
vocacy Center. She went looking for help because she could not
get help from legal services offices or Legal Aid. Yvonne did not
have a housing problem, she had no housing at all; she did not have
a benefits problem because shelter was not a benefit. So she went
to a community group looking for help. I knew someone at that
2. 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987).
t Deputy Attorney-in-Charge, Civil Division, Legal Aid Society; Coordinating
Attorney, Homeless Rights Project, Legal Aid Society. Mr. Banks has been counsel
in the McCain litigation on behalf of homeless families for sixteen years and now
serves as counsel to the Coalition for the Homeless in litigation on behalf of single
adults.
1362
1999] CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN NEW YORK CITY 1363
community group who called me and let me have it. How could it
possibly be that I could not help a person such a Yvonne, one who
needed so much help. At that time, I was a staff attorney in our
Staten Island office and because Yvonne McCain's last address was
in Brooklyn, I couldn't represent her.
Eventually, she ended up being represented initially by a lawyer
named Marcella Silverman, who is now a professor at Fordham
Law School, a colleague of Matt Diller's. I remember calling Mar-
cella about this case and explaining the problem. Marcella inter-
viewed Yvonne and then Marcella and I spoke about the case. I
remember being unsure about whether the law would help her.
Some things just cannot be solved through legal means, I thought.
Still unsure of what to do, Legal Aid lawyers pressed on working
weekends and getting others involved, such as Ann Moynihan and
the other neighborhood office of Legal Aid Society lawyers.
That was about fifteen and-a-half years ago and I wish that I
could say that the litigation has come to a conclusion. Unfortu-
nately it has not. The McCain litigation, however, has been a light-
ening rod for a lot of changes affecting homeless people. There are
some terrific court orders and decisions: orders requiring the City
to provide safe, suitable and adequate shelter and there are very
significant orders that provide for what those conditions have to
be. As a result of that, the Martinique Hotel was closed.
The struggle involving homeless people, however, continues to
be a struggle, now though three mayoral administrations. Unfortu-
nately, the court cannot be with every plaintiff twenty-four hours a
day, and that is part of the problem of fighting this struggle during
so many different mayoral administrations: trying to get compli-
ance with court orders or trying to enforce court orders in litiga-
tion. During the Koch years, the administration initially failed to
acknowledge the legal rights of the homeless, but once court orders
were issued, that administration ultimately complied. During the
Dinkins Administration, there was an acknowledgment that this is
a terrible problem and that they should comply with the orders.
That administration, however, did not comply with the orders. The
current administration, however, has no desire to be bound by any-
thing other than what the administration decides. This is a very
difficult environment to litigate a case in, but that is what weare
currently attempting to do.
Yvonne's problems were resolved during the first phase of litiga-
tion, but she has remained involved throughout these fifteen-and-
a-half years. She testified before the Congress. She has testified in
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a number of other settings about the needs of homeless people and
she currently serves on an advisory board in the Legal Aid Society.
I think she stays involved because no one has answered her original
question yet: Why can the government spend thousands of dollars
to put people in shelters and only give them a couple hundred dol-
lars a month as their rent allowance? We may have to litigate this
in pieces, but Yvonne continues to press on to have that question
answered and continues to hold our feet to the fire.
Currently, Yvonne is doing well with her life. She is working in a
community organization. Her batterer died and, predictably, that
was a major event in her life. Her kids are doing well also. Think-
ing about the sign and thinking about what she thought about the
case reminds me of when I accompanied her to the Welfare Fair
Hearing with her daughter. The State Administrative Law Judge
asked, "Excuse me, are you the Yvonne McCain?" Her daughter
turned and said proudly, "That's my mom." Yvonne cared a lot
about her children and it meant a lot to her that they viewed her as
someone that would not quit. The fact that the government said it
was tough luck, or that you had to sleep on the floor of an office or
the Martinique Hotel. She did not want that for her kids, herself or
any one else, and so, she wanted to change the system.
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Goldberg v. Kelly3
Attorney: Henry A. Freedmantt
Almost thirty-one years have passed since Goldberg v. Kelly was
filed here in New York City. The issues it raised and the problems
it addressed then are still with us today. The importance of these
issues has only grown since the case was decided.
When the case was first filed, it seemed revolutionary from both
a legal and human point of view. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that welfare benefits could not be terminated without advance no-
tice of the reason for the proposed termination and an opportunity
for a hearing before termination, so that the individual could con-
test the correctness of the termination. The decision by Justice
William Brennan contained powerful language to which all law stu-
dents and all persons concerned about the fair treatment of the
powerless should be exposed. Brennan wrote "there is one over-
powering fact which controls here by hypothesis: a welfare recipi-
ent is destitute without funds or assets. Suffice to say that the cut-
off of welfare recipient in the face of brutal need without a prior
hearing of some sort is unconscionable unless overwhelming con-
siderations justify it."
Why was this revolutionary from a legal point of view? Well, for
one thing, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts ever said
any thing like this before until this case was filed. Plaintiffs' law-
yers relied on the Due Process Clause: "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
Creative law professors, led by Charles Reich at Yale, had writ-
ten extensively about the reality of the modern welfare state and
welfare as a property right. Well-being, indeed even the survival of
many individuals, these professors said, depended on benefits con-
3. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), affg sub nom. Kelly et al. v. Wyman,
294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("We hold that a pre-termination hearing for
welfare recipients is constitutionally required and that the procedures set forth above
for such hearing are the constitutional minimum.").
tt Executive Director, Welfare Law Center (formerly the Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law), 1971-present. While a Reginald Herber Smith Fellow at the
Center in 1967, he participated in drafting the papers and filing the complaint in
Goldberg v. Kelly. Freedman was awarded the 1998 New York State Bar Association
Public Interest Law Award and the 1981 National Legal Aid and Defender
Association Reginald Herber Smith Award for Dedicated Service. Before becoming
Executive Director at the Center, Mr. Freedman had been in private practice in New
York City and taught at Catholic University Law School in Washington D.C. Mr.
Freedman has also taught at Columbia and New York University Law Schools, and
Columbia and Fordham Schools of Social Work. He is a graduate of Yale Law School
and Amherst College.
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ferred by the 9tate, whether they be driver's licenses, pilot licenses
or food stamps. Since there were rules on who was eligible for
benefits, Reich argued, these benefits had become a new type of
property, property that the government could not take away with-
out due process of law. The Supreme Court accepted this analysis
in Goldberg v. Kelly.
It was particularly exciting to see these new ideas transformed
into the law of the land. To see the courts empathize with the
plight of persons who needed public assistance was exciting and
moving; it was emotional. Indeed, Justice Brennan understood
what it was like to be desperate and without resources and in need
of government aid.
I was fortunate to be involved in this case from the very begin-
ning. I was working at the Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law (currently the Welfare Law Center). The Center was estab-
lished in 1965 by a great man, Edward Sparer. He was trying to
duplicate, in the area of poverty, the approaches that had been
used in the Civil Rights Movement. I was a new lawyer at the time
and I was helping develop the theories and papers for this kind of
suit.4
As fate would have it, I met up with David Diamond, then at
MFY Legal Services on the lower Eastside, at the City Bar Library
for a meeting. There I said, "David, you have many people coming
into your office at MFY, why don't you see if anybody comes in
who presents this problem. We have the papers; we can go into
court." He called me two days later, ready with six plaintiffs.
I was surprised; I still did not appreciate how common place it
was for eligible recipients - and all six of them were eligible - to
get denied benefits without a hearing. We filed the case, and did a
lot of the work on it. Eventually the senior, more experienced at-
torneys took the case over. Needless to say, as a young lad I
greatly resented that, but I can tell you there is a reason for having
experienced people do things; that is something that one learns
over the years.
Goldberg v. Kelly made a profound difference in the way welfare
programs are administered in New York City, New York State and
around the country. Here in New York State since Goldberg was
4. There had actually been one suit filed in the South. Marion Wright Edelman,
founder and President Children's Defense Fund, was a lawyer in a case in Mississippi,
in the first prior hearing case filed. The State of Mississippi folded and agreed to
grant a prior hearing. So, while Mississippi didn't give benefits that were worth any-
thing, the state was willing to continue aid until there was a hearing.
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decided, millions of hearings have been provided. As a result, mil-
lions of people have obtained the assistance they so desperately
need.
The bad news is that Welfare Administration in this City and
State continues to be a bastion of arbitrariness. Ten years ago, a
New York State Bar Association Task Force concluded that the
most serious threat to the fair hearing system in this state is that
local agencies "appear to have made a cynical cruel choice. Deci-
sions are allowed to be made wrongfully to deny, reduce or termi-
nate benefits, knowing that many decisions will not be challenged
and therefor money will be saved." Currently, our office is en-
gaged in class action litigation against the City and State for not
processing appeals in a timely fashion. We are suing the City for
repeatedly failing and refusing to implement binding hearing deci-
sions rendered by the State.
There is much to be discouraged about. In today's mail, I got the
City Project's Analysis of the Mayor's most recent Management
Report showing that, according to the City's own statistics, the per-
centage of public assistance applications rejected went from 26% in
1993 to 57% in 1998. People have not been losing eligibility over
the last few years; the City has just changed the way those applica-
tions are processed. Indeed, Fair Hearing requests have increased
by 70% because many more wrong decisions are being made. How
do we know there are so many wrong decisions? Because when
you look at the Fair Hearing results in 1998, the City won only 13%
of the hearings. That is appalling. These problems are com-
pounded by the City's explicit policies to make it difficult for per-
sons to collect benefits, regardless of the fact that they meet all
legal requirements.
Today, New York City turns away needy people from Welfare
Offices without being allowed to file applications. At best, the
poor are told to search for a job and come back another day.
Every day we hear that people, are told incorrectly, that they are
ineligible. If they filed an application, they are told to sign a form
withdrawing their application, just in case they have second
thoughts about pursuing it. New York City's poor are repeatedly
denied due process. This problem is compounded by public and
agency officials who thumb their noses at court orders, thus creat-
ing more work for the few lawyers available to bring class actions
and seek systemic change.
It is frustrating that these battles must be waged constantly. I
went to law school to help achieve social and economic justice, or
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to at least make a difference in the lives of others those who are
weak, powerless and in enormous financial need. I am delighted to
have been able to do that and get paid for it.
I am particularly thrilled to see the type of recognition that the
REPOhistory Project brings to these issues. It is so important that
this information be put out on the streets of our City where people
who are affected can see it and can know that these battles are
being fought on their behalf. The signs and the stories behind them
have inspired me. I hope that it will encourage everyone here to
continue in the struggle and to have those struggles recorded in
many more beautiful signs posted all over our City.
Artist: Mona Jiminezttt
My personal history, beyond this sign and my artistic life, has
afforded me a real connection to welfare rights and welfare issues.
I had my first experience with the "system" when I was about
nineteen and pregnant, when my partner and I received Medicaid
to help pay the medical expenses. Later, while a single parent, I
was on assistance for a couple of years, including a job-training
program called the WIN Program. In subsequent years, I learned a
lot about Welfare and public assistance by living and working.
In 1976, I began to do welfare organizing as a founding member
of the Geneva Women's Resource Center in Geneva, New York.
Many of the founding members were single mothers who had expe-
rience with welfare, so the issues of women with low incomes were
important to us and we wanted to help others. In fact, one of the
first components of the Center was walk-in counseling and advo-
cacy on issues of housing and welfare rights.
In 1980, I was hired by Legal Services, and worked there until
1986 as a paralegal. I worked in five rural counties in upstate New
York doing welfare advocacy (including many fair hearings) and
community legal education. Later, I worked as an welfare rights
organizer in Wayne County, a rural county located between Syra-
cuse and Rochester, New York. We did a lot of great work there,
ttt Mona Jimenez is a visual artist who uses electronic tools to make both time-
based work and prints. Her work often involves retelling stories about lost or little
known historical, cultural and personal history. Jimenez has been an artist in
residence at Yaddo, the Millay Colony, and Light Work, and was the recent recipient
of an Artist Fellowship in Computer Arts from the New York Foundation for the
Arts. Her work is held in several video and photographic collections, and has been
published in Light Work's Contact Sheet, CEPA Quarterly, and Felix: A Journal of
Media Arts and Communication. As a media arts consultant, she assists non-profits
with their Internet, multimedia and video projects.
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using tactics that worked, like organizing a free lunch in the wel-
fare office to get media attention about the welfare department's
unconstitutional denials of emergency food stamps.
I remember the day that Mark O'Brien called and asked me to
work on the REPOhistory project. Mark described the project - to
produce signs about landmark court cases - and asked if I wanted
to work on Goldberg v. Kelly. I was stunned; I said it would be an
honor to work on the case, as Goldberg v. Kelly is so fundamental
to welfare rights and has had such a profound impact on so many
people's lives.
While an organizer, I had always wanted to do a series of posters
that spoke about the skills, knowledge and perseverance that wel-
fare recipients must have to get through the system and continue to
live and raise children with self-respect. A couple years ago, I had
done a piece for Felix: A Journal of Media Arts and Communica-
tion that dealt with the issue of fingerprinting welfare recipients.
This sign project was along that line - a public expression of the
welfare rights issue.
As an artist, it was a real challenge for me to do the sign. While
in my artwork I often combine text and image, I usually don't use
many words, and my work tends to be very personal. I tried very
hard to make the language non-technical and to remain, as Henry
Freedman suggested, celebratory of the case, rather than to focus
on complaining about the system. But the real challenge was figur-
ing out what I wanted to say, because there are so many different
aspects to the case.
I first thought about the audience for the sign. I thought that
people who would casually walk by the sign may or may not be-
lieve some of the myths about welfare and low income people that
are so prevalent now. It was important to deal with some of these
myths, and to also assume that some of the people may not know
basic facts about welfare. I also assumed that part of the audience
would be those seeking welfare or those already on welfare that
may not know about their right to a fair hearing. So it was impor-
tant to address both groups.
In creating the sign, I asked myself: what is it that is so essential
about this case, in terms of reality of dealing with the system on a
day to day basis? The image of the hands holding papers came
from the importance paper plays while asserting your rights within
the welfare department. You are constantly saving papers, provid-
ing documentation, writing things down, and telling the welfare
workers to put papers in your case file about your needs or actions
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you have taken. All the paper is so important - it is really the only
way you can prove your side of the story.
That's essentially what the eligibility process is all about, and
what welfare hearings are all about - being able to prove your case.
The flip side of the sign describes what welfare hearings are and
why we need them - that before Goldberg, you could be cut off
arbitrarily, without a chance to tell your side of the story. I also
explained that welfare is not a charity, it is an entitlement for those
who qualify. I gave facts about hearings in New York City, includ-
ing estimates by the Welfare Law Center about how often the City
loses fair hearings, because so many people are being wrongfully
denied welfare benefits. This serves as a sad reminder of how far
we have to go before the vision of Goldberg v. Kelly is finally
realized.
DOROTHY DAY, WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
CATHOLIC AUTHENTICITY
David L. Gregory*
Introduction
Several years ago, I kept a personal resolution to reread all of
the material written by and about Dorothy Day' and Catholic
Worker, the newspaper and the movement she, with Peter Maurin,
co-founded in 1933. I first read this wonderful literature during
high school in the late 1960s. The impact this body of work had on
me was enormous; it compelled me to study philosophy and theol-
ogy throughout college seminary and contemplate entering the Ro-
man Catholic priesthood. Although I discerned my vocation was
to teach,2 rather than to become a priest, my initial immersion into
the writings of Dorothy Day and Catholic Worker strongly influ-
enced my personal and academic work. Since 1982, I have taught
the entire labor and employment law curriculum, as well as consti-
tutional law and jurisprudence, at St. John's University School of
Law, while also teaching periodically at the University of Colo-
rado, Brooklyn, Hofstra and New York Law Schools.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University. B.A., The Catholic University of
America, 1973; M.B.A, Wayne State University, 1977; J.D., University of Detroit,
1980; LL.M., Yale University, 1982; J.S.D., Yale University, 1987. Constantine Dean
Pourakis, (B.A., Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1997;
J.D. candidate, St. John's University School of Law, 2000) provided excellent research
assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Pourakis is also the inaugural Doro-
thy Day Memorial Scholar for Excellence in Labor and Employment Relations at the
St. John's University School of Law, and the Secretary of the School's Labor Rela-
tions and Employment Law Society during the 1998-99 academic year. I thank every-
one who generously commented upon earlier drafts of this paper, during
presentations at the University of Dayton Graduate School of Education on October
29, 1998 and at the Catholic Worker Maryhouse in New York City on November 6,
1998. I was especially honored by the opportunity to present this paper in the Collo-
quium on the Catholic Tradition at the University of Dayton. Rev. James L. Heft,
S.M., Chancellor of the University of Dayton, Professor Charles Russo and Jane Sam-
mon of The Catholic Worker provided special guidance and inspiration.
1. There is voluminous primary and secondary literature on Dorothy Day and
the Catholic Worker movement. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, DOROTHY DAY'S LES-
SONS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J.
57, n.4 (1996) (extensive citation of those many primary and secondary sources).
2. See David L. Gregory, The Discernment of Vocation in Law, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1425 (1998).
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A significant portion of my academic publications have explored
various themes of Catholic social justice 3 in labor and employment
law,4 and the impact of Catholic social justice on the labor move-
3. See POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM (The Condition Of Labor) (1891));
POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (Forty Years) (1931); POPE PIUS XII, SERTUM
LAETIT AE (Crown Of Joy) (1939) POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA (Mother
And Teacher) (1961); SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES (Pastoral Con-
stitution On The Church In The Modern World) (1965); POPE PAUL VI, OCTOGESIMA
ADVENIENS (A Call To Action); (1971) POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS
(On Human Work) (1981); POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS (1987);
POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS (On The Hundredth Anniversary Of
Rerum Novarum) (1991). See also GREGORY BAUM, THE PRIORITY OF LABOR
(1982); GEORGE G. HIGGINS, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE CHURCH REFLECTIONS
OF A "LABOR PRIEST" (1993); CO-CREATION AND CAPITALISM: JOHN PAUL II's
LABOREM EXECCENS (John W. Houck & Oliver F. Williams, eds.) (1983); CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (David O'Brien & Thomas Shan-
non, eds.) (1992). Catholic social teaching is an evolving body of ecclesiastical docu-
ments and a rich tradition of particular, heterogeneous applications. Pope John Paul
II was a powerful champion of the Solidarity movement, a labor union political initia-
tive that brought down the Communist government of Poland. The Canadian and
United States Bishops also have been eloquent spokespersons for the rights of work-
ers. U.S. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS PASTORAL LETTER ECO-
NOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL (1986); CATHOLIC FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC LIFE
(1996). The most influential early work on the Catholic social teachings on labor in
the United States was that of Monsignor John A. Ryan, one of Monsignor George
Higgins' intellectual mentors at the Catholic University of America. See JOHN A.
RYAN, A LIVING WAGE (1906); DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1916). 1 extensively discuss
Catholic social teaching on labor in David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the
Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1987); David L. Gregory,
Catholic Social Teaching On Work, 49 LAB. L.J. 912 (1998); David L. Gregory, Doro-
thy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57 (1996);
David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and Civil Right, 9
Miss. C. L. REV. 119 (1988); David L. Gregory and Charles Russo, Overcoming
NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the Implementation of Catholic Labor Theory, 41 LAB.
L.J. 55 (1990). Catholic social teaching on the rights of workers became popularized
in the Academy-Award winning film, On the Waterfront (1953), inspired by Jesuit
priest John "Pete" Corridan's work against labor racketeering on the New York City
shipping docks. The Nobel Peace Prize for 1996 was awarded to Catholic Bishop
Carlos Beli, the apostolic administrator of Dili, the Capital of East Timor, for his
social justice advocacy for the persecuted populations of Indonesia.
4. See generally, David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Ten-
sions Regarding the Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1997); David L.
Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 119 (1988); David L. Gregory, Catholic Social Teaching on Work, 49 LAB. L.J.
912 (1998); David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of
Work, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57 (1996); David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of
Religion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV.
27 (1992); David L. Gregory, Introduction to the Welfare Workforce Colloquium, 73
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). David L. Gregory and Charles J. Russo,
Overcoming NLRB v. The Yeshiva University By the Implementation of Catholic La-
bor Theory 41 LAB. L.J. 55 (1990); Charles J. Russo and David L. Gregory, Reflec-
tions on the Catholic University Tenure Prerogatives, 43 Loy. L. REV. 181 (1997);
David L. Gregory and Charles J. Russo, The First Amendment and the Labor Rela-
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ment.5 Surprisingly, in almost two decades of teaching law, I have
not encountered one law review article focusing primarily on Dor-
othy Day and Catholic Worker, despite the numerous passing refer-
ences. This inexplicable vacuum stunned me. My personal
resolution thereafter became a professional project, leading me to
ultimately publish the first extensive law review article on the sub-
ject, Dorothy Day's Lessons For the Transformation of Work.6
The winter of 1999 marks the fiftieth anniversary of a defining
moment in the history of Catholic Worker. During the crucible of
that post-World War II winter, then-Archbishop of New York
Francis Spellman broke a strike by Catholic cemetery workers at
the largest Catholic cemetery in New York City. Dorothy Day,
Catholic Worker, and 'the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists
all unequivocally supported the strike.
Ultimately, more important than the labor "battle" of 1949 is the
positive example Dorothy Day provided. The 1949 incident allows
us to reflect upon, and appreciate, the authenticity of the Catholic
tradition and the way in which any Catholic can, and should, com-
municate directly with his or her Bishop. Dorothy Day offered us a
model of how to communicate within the Church and about how to
call to witness the Church's professed commitments to social
justice.
Part I of this Article examines the background of the labor dis-
pute of 1949. Indeed, at the time Catholic Worker and Cardinal
Spellman could not have been more diametrically opposed than
they were during this bitter and tragic labor strike. Part II dis-
cusses Dorothy Day and the example she provides for all Catholics,
and persons of all faiths. This Part also discusses the eventual reso-
lution of the strike and the role Catholic Worker took in bringing
about the end of the dispute. Part III then applies the lessons of
Dorothy Day to current issues of dialogue in Catholic life.
tions of Religiously Affiliated Employers, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming, 1999);
David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and Civil Right, 9
Miss. C.L. REV. 135 (1988); David L. Gregory, The Role of Religion In The Secular
Workplace, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 749 (1990).
5. I have been especially blessed to co-author several articles with Dr. Charles J.
Russo. In addition to several of our co-authored labor and employment law review
articles cited in footnote 4, see also, David L. Gregory and Charles J. Russo, Let Us
Pray (But Not 'Them'!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1991); David L. Gregory and Charles J. Russo, The Supreme
Court's Jurisprudence of Religious Substance and Symbol, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 419
(1997).
6. 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57 (1996).
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I. Background: The 1949 Strike
Tragedy, as Guido Calabresi 7 reminds us, is not the choice be-
tween a right and a wrong, but between a right and a right.8 By this
definition, the 1949 cemetery workers' strike was indeed a tragedy.
There, the need for the performance of a Corporal Work of Mercy
- to bury the dead - was in tension with the dignity and rights of
workers. It is to the 1949 strike that we now turn.
A. The Sides
The Calvary Cemetery ("Employer") of Middle Village, Queens,
is the largest Catholic cemetery in New York City.9 More than one
and a half million persons were buried there in the last century
alone. In addition, the Calvary Cemetery employed the largest
number of unionized cemetery workers in the New York Metropol-
itan area - 240 to be exact. The United Cemetery Workers, Local
293 of the Congress of Industrial Organizations ("Union") pro-
vided the manual labor services for the Cemetery and represented
the labor interests of those who buried the dead there.
By December 1948, the Union had operated under a collective
bargaining agreement for two years. Under that contract, workers
received $59.40 for a six-day, forty-eight hour week, which typically
ran from Monday through Saturday. On December 14, 1948, the
Union, with close to 1,000 members, presented its demands for the
successor contract, specifically seeking a five-day, forty-hour week
for the same $59.40 weekly rate of pay.10 In addition, the Union
asked for overtime pay for working more than eight hours in one
day and for any Saturday work. On January 4, 1949, four days after
the collective bargaining agreement expired, the Archdiocese re-
jected all of the Union's demands and offered a wage increase con-
sonant with the 2.6% annual cost of living increase measured by
7. Mr. Calabresi served as Dean of the Yale School of Law from 1985 to 1994.
Currently he sits as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, a position he has held since 1994.
8. GUIDO CALABRESI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
9. The Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral operated both the Calvary Cemetery
and the Gate of Heaven Cemetery near Hawthorne, New York.
10. The average wage for a gravedigger at Calvary Cemetery was somewhat less
than $3,100 in 1948. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated $4,064 (family of five);
$3,579 (family of four); $3,035 (family of three) necessary for "frugal comfort" in New
York City. And, while the cemetery workers were well paid, relative to other ceme-
tery workers, they earned considerably less than the average $59 weekly industrial
wage (for a forty-hour week) in New York State in 1948. See John Cort, The Calvary
Cemetery Strike, COMMONWEAL Feb. 18, 1949, at 471-72.
1374
DOROTHY DAY
the Bureau of Labor Statistics." Forty-eight hours after receiving
this letter, the rank-and-file voted overwhelmingly to strike.12
B. The Winter of Our Discontent
On January 13, 1949, the Union established a sixteen-man picket
line at the major entrance to the 400-acre Calvary Cemetery.13 As
a result of the walkout, the cemetery could not proceed with the
thirty-five burials scheduled that day.1 4 Coffins were placed in
temporary graves under tarpaulins, awaiting permanent burial
upon the conclusion of the strike.15 The strike's conclusion, how-
ever, was nowhere in sight.
The contentiousness of the strike became its most identifiable
feature. Immediately, the Employer characterized the Union's de-
mands as seeking a 30% increase in their compensation rate.16
Monsignor George C. Ehardt, the Managing Director of the Cal-
vary Cemetery and Archdiocese Co-Chancellor, in an attempt to
demoralize the union members, wrote letters to each striker stating
that the Union leadership was "poor and unprincipled," and "did
not fairly represent you." 7 He continued, threatening that "if the
strikers did not return to work by 7:30 a.m. on January 31, 1949,"
"we shall understand that you intend to sever your relationship
with us."18 In a showing of solidarity, not a single striker returned
11. John Cort, The Calvary Cemetery Strike, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 18, 1949, at 471
[hereinafter Cort, Cemetery Strike]. Moreover, the negotiations, such as they were,
were bizarre. Monsignor George C. Ehardt reportedly told the Union negotiators
that the Passionist priests, who wrote pro-labor literature, were "a bunch of bandits,"
and the Monsignor rhetorically asked the devout, and dumbfounded Union negotia-
tor," "Don't you know then that there is no God?" JOHN COONEY, THE AMERICAN
POPE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN 89 (1984).
12. See Cort, Cemetery Strike, supra note 11.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Strike Suspends Calvary Burials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1949, at A48; Cardinal to
Help Bury Dead Today and Seminarians Replace Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1949, at
Al, A26. According to Archbishop Spellman, much of the grave preparation work
required weekend work. Therefore, according to the Cardinal, the union workers
were demanding a new wage scale of $77.22 for a six-day week. Monsignor George C.
Ehardt reiterated similar sentiments: "We are confronted with a staggering payroll for
our employees and every dollar of the cemetery expense must come out of the pock-
ets of our Catholic people, who, we feel, are now subjected to enough expense, in
their hour of sorrow." Strike Suspends Calvary Burials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1949, at
A48.
17. Id.
18. Cort, Cemetery Strike, supra note 11.
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to work on January 31, 1949.19 Likewise, fifty employees, and fel-
low union members from the Gate of Heaven Cemetery, joined the
striking Calvary Cemetery workers.20 The Association of Catholic
Trade Unionists ("Association"), a satellite initiative flowing di-
rectly from the Catholic Worker movement, also supported the
strike.21 Support for the strikers, who were primarily Irish, Italian
and Polish Catholics, and their Catholic leaders, Union President
Joseph Manning and Union attorney John J. Sheehan,22 began to
mount.
By this time, the scenario had reached macabre proportions.
Over 1,020 bodies lay unburied at the Calvary Cemetery, with sixty
additional bodies arriving daily.23 In addition, another one hun-
dred burials were deferred at the Gate of Heaven Cemetery. New
York City Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Health
Matthew A. Byrne suggested that the situation would soon become
a violation of the City's sanitary codes.24 The sides, however, were
far from resolution.
C. The Strike Intensifies
With no end in sight, the sides became more frustrated and bit-
ter. Five weeks into the Calvary strike, and one week into the
Hawthorne strike, the Employer took to strikebreaking. Lay
brothers from the Maryknoll Seminary began digging graves at the
Hawthorne Cemetery at the request of Archbishop Spellman.25
The Association accused the management of the cemeteries of
"strikebreaking and union-busting. '26 "'It is regrettable,' Roger K.
Larkin, an Association official, said, '[t]hat Catholics should find
themselves on opposite sides of this issue.' , 27 Predictably, the po-
larized situation rapidly deteriorated. Attempts at reconciliation
seemed more futile by the day; Cardinal Spellman's attempt to
19. See id. Later, the 240 Calvary Cemetery employees would unanimously reject
a management order of February 8, 1949 to return to work or face the loss of their
jobs. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Cardinal to Help Bury Dead Today and Seminarians Replace Strikers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1949, at Al. The City's code required that the dead be buried within
ten days, except in the case of special permission granted by the City.
25. See id.
26. Unions Score Cemeteries, Management's of Two Accused of Strikebreaking Ac-
tivities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1949, at A3.
27. Id.
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meet with the strikers on February 28, only left everyone frus-
trated.28 The strike continued, now with cemetery workers carry-
ing various placards pacing back and forth in front of the Chancery
Office of the Archdiocese of New York, on Madison Avenue at
51st Street in Manhattan, near St. Patrick's Cathedral.29
Then, on Ash Wednesday, March 2, 1949, Cardinal Spellman an-
nounced that he and his Archdiocesan seminarians would serve as
replacement workers starting March 3rd, at both the Calvary Cem-
etery and at the Gate of Heaven Cemetery. 30 The Cardinal charac-
terized his seminarian "volunteers" from St. Joseph's Seminary as
engaged purely in the corporal work of mercy of burying the
dead.3 On the same day the Cardinal's "volunteers" replaced the
strikers, Cardinal Spellman ostentatiously proclaimed that the
strike was "Communist-inspired," and that he was "proud and
happy to be a strikebreaker. '32 The Cardinal said, "this resistance
to the strike was the most important thing I have done in my ten
years in New York."'33 Cardinal Spellman also contended that the
parent Union of Local 293, the Food, Tobacco and Agricultural
Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations, was "strongly
Communist-dominated ' 34 and the Cardinal "made it plain that he
would be willing to deal with the employees again if they became
affiliated with another CIO parent group. '" 35
In response, John Sheehan, the attorney for the strikers, called
the Cardinal's invocation of Communism a "red herring '36 (a
somewhat ironic metaphor for the Union attorney to use in charac-
terizing the Cardinal's rhetoric). Sheehan further denounced the
Cardinal as a strikebreaker, stating: "'The action of the Cardinal,
in the opinion of the Union' is 'high-handed, arbitrary and sugges-
28. John Cort, The Cemetery Strike II, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 18, 1949, at 563, 564;
COONEY, supra note 11, at 191-193.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. The works of mercy of the Roman Catholic Church are: to feed the hungry,
clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, visit the imprisoned, care for the sick, and
bury the dead. The Catholic Worker, incidentally, directly counterposes the works of
mercy with, as they term them, the "works of war," which they suggest are: destroy
crops and land, seize food supplies, destroy homes, scatter families, contaminate
water, imprison dissenters, inflict wounds, and kill the living.
32. WILLIAM D. MILLER, DOROTHY DAY: A BIOGRAPHY 404 (1982).
33. Cardinal to Help Bury Dead Today and Seminarians Replace Strikers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1949, at Al.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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tive of the tactics used by anti-union employers ten years ago.' "3
Indeed, days before the March "volunteering," the Cardinal ad-
dressed 200 cemetery workers, asking them to return to work as
individuals "without any Union."38 The Cardinal also previously
appealed to the workers through several direct letters and a tele-
gram, actions the Union attorney characterized as an attempt to
"break the union. 39
The Cardinal pled his case in the New York Times. "There are
men who would permit themselves to be led into an unjustified and
immoral strike against the innocent dead and their bereaved fami-
lies, against their religion and human decency, and even against
themselves and organized labor. ' 40 He said that, as of that time,
nothing in his ten years as Archbishop of New York had caused
him "more thought and pain, than the strike," and he characterized
his action of strikebreaker "as a moral issue, transcending legali-
ties."'4 1 The Cardinal further denounced as a "half truth" the work-
ers' continuing demand for a five-day, forty-hour week:
[T]he strikers themselves have told me that Saturday is the
heaviest day in our cemeteries; that there are more interments
on Saturday than on any other day; and that, in addition, the
graves to be used on Monday must be opened on Saturday.
They told me they wanted six days' work for seven and one-half
days pay, and their agent demanded a new wage scale of $77.22
for a six-day week.42
Union officials characterized the strike differently. John Harold,
counsel to the Union and to the Association of Catholic Trade
Unionists, said, "With all reverence and respect for the Cardinal, it
is more important to recognize the right of workers to organize and
barter collectively in unions of their own choosing and to pay a
living and just wage than to bury the dead. ' 43 Edward Ruggieri,
Chairman of the local Union's negotiating committee said, "to al-
low the seminary to take bread and butter out of our mouths is
wrong. They are strikebreakers. I think the Cardinal has the
wrong approach on this. He has given labor a black eye."' 44 Mean-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Cardinal to Help Bury Dead Today as Seminarians Replace Strikers, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 3, 1949, at Al.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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while, the Archdiocese threatened to go to court to enjoin the
strike, due to the growing safety and health hazard from the ac-
cumulating number of coffins that the strikebreaking seminarians
were not able to relieve.45
II. Dorothy Day and Catholic Worker
Throughout her life, Dorothy Day remained theologically and
liturgically traditional, though radical in her Catholic social justice
activism. She once said, "When it comes to labor and politics I am
inclined to be sympathetic to the left, but when it comes to the
Catholic Church, then I am far to the right.
' 46
A. Criticizing the Cardinal
Predictably, Dorothy Day, along with Catholic Worker and
ACTU, closely monitored and supported the strike. Because of
Day's insistence that the strike was justified, members of Catholic
Worker even joined the picket lines at the cemetery.47 On March 4,
1949, Dorothy Day wrote a very eloquent letter to Cardinal
Spellman:
I am deeply grieved to see the reports . . .of your leading
Dunwoodie seminarians into Calvary Cemetery, past picket
lines, to "break the strike"..., of course you know that a group
of our associates at The Catholic Worker office in New York
have been helping the strikers, both in providing food for their
families, and in picketing .... You have been misinformed. I'm
writing to you, because the strike, though small, is a terribly sig-
nificant one in a way. Instead of people being able to say of us
"see how they love one another," and "behold, how good and
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity," now "we
have become a reproach to our neighbors, an object of derision
and mockery to those about us." It is not just the issue of wages
and hours as I can see from the conversations which our workers
have had with the men. It is a question of their dignity as men,
their dignity as workers, and the right to have a union of their
45. See id.
46. See VOICES FROM THE CATHOLIC WORKER 63, 75, 80, (Rosalie Riegle
Troester ed., 1993). "That was a very funny thing about Dorothy. For all her radical-
ism politically, Dorothy had a profoundly conservative streak in her makeup. She was
a very conservative Catholic, theologically." Id. at 75. "Dorothy was an extremely
orthodox Catholic, not at all theologically a dissident. She certainly would not at all
favor abortion. She would, I think, take a dim view of homosexual behavior." See id.
at 80. See also Alden Whitman, Dorothy Day, Outspoken Catholic Activist Dies at 83,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1980, at A45.
47. MILLER, supra note 32, at 404-5.
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own, and a right to talk over their grievances. It is no use going
into the wages, or the offers that you have made for a high wage
(but the same work week). A wage such as the Holy Fathers
have talked of which would enable the workers to raise and edu-
cate their families of six, seven and eight children, a wage would
enable them to buy homes to save for homeownership, to put by
for the education of the children, certainly the wage which they
have in these days of high prices and exorbitant rents, is not the
wage for which they are working. Regardless of what the Board
of Trustees can afford to pay, the wage is small compared to the
men represented on the Board of Trustees. The way the work-
ers live is in contrast to the way of living of the Board of Trust-
ees . . . . Regardless of rich and poor, the class antagonisms
which exist between the well-to-do, those that live on Park Ave-
nue and Madison Avenue and those who dig the graves in the
cemetery, - regardless of these contrasts which are most assur-
edly there, the issue is always one of the dignity of the workers.
It is a world issue.48
Day's letter emphasized the dignity of all persons, especially, la-
borers. The letter stressed peace, conciliation and the imperative
of charity, decency and kindness toward everyone. It also urged
Cardinal Spellman to negotiate with the graveyard workers, rather
than break their union. The letter poignantly summarized her la-
bor theory, completely symmetrical with the spirit of Pope Leo
XIII's great labor encyclical in 1891, Rerum Novarum, and Pope
Pius XI's labor encyclical in 1931, Quadragesimo Anno.
Day continued:
You are a Prince in the Church, and a great man in the eyes of
the world, and these your opponents are all little men,
hardworking, day laborers, hard handed and hard headed men,
filled with their grievances, an accumulation of their grievances.
They have wanted to talk to you, they have wanted to appeal to
you. They felt that surely their Cardinal would not be against
them. And oh, I do beg you so, with all my heart, to go to them,
as a father to his children some might call it. Do not go to a
court, do not perpetuate a fight, for ages and ages. Go to them,
conciliate them. It is easier for the great to give in than the
poor. They are hungry men, their only weapon has been their
labor, which they have sold for a means of livelihood, to feed
themselves and their families. They have indeed labored with
the sweat of their brows, not lived off the sweat of anyone else.
48. Letter from Dorothy Day to Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New
York (Mar. 4, 1949) (on file with the author). This document was obtained courtesy
of the Marquette University Library's The Catholic Worker archives.
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They have truly worked, they have been poor, they are suffering
now. Any union organizer will tell you that it is not easy to get
men out on strike and it is not easy to keep them out on strike.
But the grievance has grown, the anger has grown here. If there
was only some way to reach peace. I'm sure that the only way is
for you to go to them. You've been known to walk the streets
among your people, and to call on the poor parishes in person
alone and unattended. Why could not you go to the union, ask
for the leaders, tell them that as members of the mystical body,
all members are needed and useful and that we should not quar-
rel together, that you will meet their demands, be their servant
as Christ was the servant of his disciples, washing their feet.
49
Despite her fervent plea, the Cardinal decided not to meet with the
workers.
B. The Collapse of the Strike
The only conciliatory steps taken came from the Union. While
the Cardinal continued to supervise the seminarians' grave digging,
the striking members of Local 293 publicly took an anti-Commu-
nist oath and voted unanimously to disaffiliate with the Food, To-
bacco and Agricultural Workers of America, the parent Union that
the Cardinal attacked as "Communist dominated. '50 The workers
consequently affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the
much less militant labor wing preferred by employers (prior to the
AFL-CIO merger several years later).51 This vote to re-affiliate
was ultimately unanimous. 2 Although the Cardinal said that he
"heartened by the cemetery workers action in quitting their 'Com-
49. Id.
50. Although union members insisted that "Communism was not a real issue in
the strike," the Cardinal arrogantly responded, "They say Communism is not the is-
sue. The issue is this morally unjust strike that leaves all of these people unburied. If
they think that's decency, I don't." Harold Faber, Gravediggers Take Anti-Red Oath:
Move to Split from Parent Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1949, at B1. The Cardinal went
on to say:
I admit to the accusation of strikebreaker and I am proud of it. If stopping a
strike like this isn't a thing of honor, then I don't know what honor is. The
reason I considered trying to break the strike is because I think it is an im-
moral strike, an unjustifiable strike. I don't know about the legality of this
because it is none of my business. And I've had a problem confronting me
for several weeks and know of no other way to solve it. I wish I did.
Id.
51. See id.
52. Gravediggers Break with the CIO to Lay Charge of Communist Link, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 9, 1949, at Al.
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munist parent union,"' there was no effective positive response
from the Archdiocese.5 3
Meanwhile, the strikers continued to meet at the Anoroc Demo-
cratic Club, in Sunnyside, Queens.54 The strikers opened their
union meetings with prayers, reciting the Our Father, the Hail
Mary and the Workers' Prayer of the Association of Catholic Trade
Unionists,55 beginning with these words: "Lord Jesus, Carpenter of
Nazareth, you are a worker as I am." The Cardinal, however, was
not appeased; "[t]hey're getting repentant kind of late" he com-
mented.56 He also equivocated and dodged, saying, "[a]ctions
speak louder than words. I didn't say they were Communists; I
never did, but their tactics were certainly communistic. 57
On March 7, the Cardinal summarily rejected a request to ap-
point a third party to mediate the strike, as presented by five wives
of striking workers.58 The women indicated their willingness to ac-
cept as mediator any priest that he would appoint.59 The Cardinal
was adamant, promising nothing other than that the strikers could
return to work with a small increase, and not as union men.6" The
women left the meeting with Cardinal Spellman "discouraged and
disgusted."6 The strikers' wives' delegation dejectedly reported
that "[h]e, the Cardinal, wants the men to go back to work as indi-
viduals, not as Union men, and [he] said he would not allow mem-
bers of the Strikers Committee to go back to work, because they
are ringleaders."62 "'He wants no part of the Union. We got no
place,' stated Mrs. Sigmund Czack of Maspeth, Queens, who led
the delegation. ' 63 The Cardinal replied, "I feel as badly for them
- the wives - as if it were your own mother in the same circum-
stances. I spoke with them for over two hours. They had nothing
to offer me and I had nothing to offer them. 64
53. Cemetery Strike Still Deadlocked, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1949, at A22.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wives Ask Arbiter for Burial Strike, Plead with Spellman for Two Hours for a
Priest to Mediate, but He Sees Nothing Offered, Ban On Union Maintained, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1949, at A27.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. He further explained his actions:
I feel that I am doing something for proper organized labor. Just because a
Union exists doesn't mean that it is a good Union. Because a strike is called,
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By this time, the entire 200-member student body of the Archdi-
ocese's St. Joseph's Seminary actively engaged in the strikebreak-
ing, doubling the 100-student "volunteers" who originally
accompanied the Cardinal.65 The Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathe-
dral increased their original 3% wage increase offer to 8%.66
Having exhausted all possible avenues without any good faith
gestures from the employer, the strike was settled on Friday,
March 11th.67 The union acquiesced to the Archdiocese's demands
and accepted the 8% wage increase, and returned to working the
48-hour, 6-day work week - essentially the terms that the Archdi-
ocese offered in January. 68 The gravediggers employed by Calvary
Cemetery and the Gate of Heaven Cemetery returned to their jobs
following the settlement of the strike, and set to work digging the
1,000 backlogged needed graves.69
C. The Catholic Worker, April, 1949
The April 1949 issue of The Catholic Worker featured a front-
page article titled, "Cardinal Brings to End New York Strike." The
article crystallized the issues:
[T]he demands were for a 40-hour week for the same pay as the
48-hour week at time and a half for overtime. The Trustees of
the St. Patrick's Cathedral did not see these demands as justi-
fied, feeling, so they said, that they would put an undeserved
burden on the public who owned graves in the Calvary Ceme-
it doesn't mean it is a good strike. Several labor leaders have contacted me
and confirmed my beliefs. Some say it is a shame.
Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Gravediggers Back on Job, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1949, at A21. Cardinal Spell-
man, ever the showman, publicly sent a $65 check to each of the strikers after they
returned to work. These "gifts to the families" of the strikers totaled $17,875. He also
wrote to each striker "undoubtedly the period of unemployment has caused you and
your families many hardships. I am therefore enclosing a gift of $65 to help in reliev-
ing this situation. Praying God's blessing upon you this Eastertide and always, I am
devotedly yours in Christ." 275 Gravediggers Get Gifts from Cardinal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1949, at A12. With a final public relations flourish, the Cardinal treated his
200 seminarian and priest strikebreakers to a "sightseeing trip" to Baltimore, Phila-
delphia, Annapolis, and Washington, D.C. at the Cardinal's expense, they visited
among other sites, the United States Naval Academy during the Easter season of
1949, a particularly ironic and eerie harbinger of the Cardinal's enthusiastic support
two decades later for the United States military position in the Vietnam War. Burial
Aides Rewarded, 200 Priests and Seminarians Start on 3-Day Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21. 1949. at A27.
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tery. That was the problem, in essence. From there on until the
settlement of the dispute, it became a classical lesson in how not
to deal with the strike. Eighty-five percent of the membership
of the Local and 100% of the membership of the Calvary strik-
ers were Catholic. The peculiar slant this gave the strike be-
came more apparent as the dispute went on.7°
The newspaper article went on to say that the Cardinal had no
involvement in the early stages of the strike. Only after the situa-
tion became "totally incapable of resolution by the Trustees, the
Trustees thrust it into his lap. Only then did the Cardinal enter
into the picture."'7 1 Catholic Worker dismissed as specious the Car-
dinal's view that the strike was "Communist-inspired. 7 2 Catholic
Worker poignantly reprinted the Cardinal's most outrageous public
comments: "I am proud and happy to be a strikebreaker. This is
the most important thing that I have done in my ten years in New
York. ' 73 Cardinal Spellman's outrageous statements completely
backfired; Catholic Worker pointed out that the Communist Party's
Daily Worker leaped gleefully into the fray: "Let Catholic men and
women notice carefully the words of their Cardinal and realize that
here, as in the case of Cardinal Mindzenty, the issue is not religion
but the economic and political misuses it lends itself to." 74
Catholic Worker, in alliance with the ACTU,
stuck by the strikers through thick and thin, giving them unspar-
ingly of their time, funds and legal aid - convinced that the
striker's demands were just. The Catholic Worker supplied pick-
ets, direct relief, and encouragement wherever possible. We say
it without shame. We went among them, into their homes, at-
tended their meetings, were on their strike relief committee, lis-
tened to their grievances and formed our opinion. Our opinion:
the strike was justified. We say it still.75
One commentator summarized: "Dorothy Day was one of the few
who publicly supported the Union. She and some of her staff from
Catholic Worker passed out leaflets in front of the Cardinal's resi-
dence and were arrested. The police forbade the gravediggers to
picket Spellman's house. 76
70. Cardinal Brings to End New York Strike, CATHOLIC WORKER, Apr. 1949, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. COONEY, supra note 11.
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Catholic Worker maintained that the strike could have been en-
tirely avoided:
The Trustees could've shown the books to the workers if justice
is on their side, proving in black and white that they were inca-
pable of paying what the strikers asked. The strikers were not
unreasonable or dishonest people. They were hardworking,
simple people driven by what they considered intolerable condi-
tions to strike. The dispute would have been settled there and
then instead of becoming a fratricidal war, looked on with glee
and contempt by the non-Catholic population.7
The article detailed the misery of the strikers' families during the
strike. The article also highlighted the poignant and fundamental
longer-term negative ramifications of the strike, as one striker's
picket sign suggested: "Is Calvary the Graveyard of Catholic Social
Justice? 7 8
Catholic Worker also noted that, in light of the Cardinal's anti-
Communist rhetoric, not even the workers' new union affiliation
could settle the strike:
Responsible labor leaders feel, and justly, that by forcing the
strikers to do this, the Cardinal has dealt a hard blow to the
CIO, in particular, and to labor in general. Hereafter, whenever
an employer comes to the conclusion that its workers' demands
are unjust, it can use the Cardinal's action as a precedent to re-
fuse to deal with their demands unless they give up their alle-
giance to what he can term a Communistic union. Today it is a
local in the CIO, but tomorrow it might be any labor organiza-
tion at all.7 9
The article then concluded,
It's old stuff now, except for those of us who went through it.
And it will be a long time before we lose that nagging sense of
shame and bewilderment that filled us when we first realized
that there were eminent Catholic laymen surrounding Cardinal
Spellman, advising him out of their own weakness, greed and
lack of diplomatic ability to follow a course that must inevitably
lead him to a loss of dignity and humiliation. And all because
they, the lay trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, could not treat
Catholic working men as human beings and brothers.8 °
77. Cardinal Brings to End New York Strike, CATHOLIC WORKER, Apr. 1949, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Dorothy Day stated her feelings unequivocally in the pages of
Catholic Worker as well: "A Cardinal, ill-advised, exercised so
overwhelming a show of force against the union of poor working
men. There is a temptation of the devil to that most awful of all
wars, the war between the clergy and the laity.' '81
Cardinal Spellman was outraged with the critical Catholic press
coverage of his conduct during the strike. "'I'll never forgive Com-
monweal,' Spellman said. 'Not in this world or the next."' 82 Other
critics of the Cardinal, however, were not nearly so generous, or
gentle, as was John Cort in his articles for Commonweal. Novelist
Ernest Hemingway, for example, wrote to the Cardinal:
My dear Cardinal, in every picture that I see of you there is
more mealy mouthed arrogance, fatness, and overconfidence ...
as a strike breaker against Catholic workers, as an attacker of
Mrs. Roosevelt I feel strongly that you are overextending your-
self... you will never be Pope as long as I'm alive.83
Cardinal Spellman concluded that the strike was "one of the most
difficult, grievous, heartbreaking issues that has ever come within
my time as archbishop of New York. '84
D. Post-Strike: Catholic Worker and the Cardinal
Years after the strike, Dorothy Day discussed at some length her
complex and problematic, though essentially respectful, relation-
ship with Cardinal Spellman:
I didn't ever see myself as posing a challenge to church author-
ity. I was a Catholic then, and I am one now, and I hope and
pray I die one. I have not wanted to challenge the Church, not
on any of its doctrinal positions. I try to be loyal to the Church
- to its teachings, its ideals. I love the Church with all my heart
and soul. I never go inside a Church without thanking God Al-
mighty for giving me a home. The Church is my home, and I
don't want to be homeless. I may work with the homeless, but I
have no desire to join their ranks.
Well, that brings us back to the Cardinal[] .... I have my own
way of disagreeing with him. Anyway, the point is that he is our
chief priest and confessor; he is our spiritual leader - of all of
us who live here in New York. But he is not our ruler. He is not
81. ROBERT COLES, DOROTHY DAY: A RADICAL DEVOTION 81 (1987); MILLER,
supra note 32, at 404-5.
82. COONEY, supra note 11, at 191.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 195.
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someone whose every word all Catholics must heed, whose
every deed we must copy.... The Catholic Church is authorita-
rian in a way; it won't budge on what it believes it has been put
here to protect and defend and uphold. The Church has never
told its flock that they have no rights of their own, that they
ought to have no beliefs or loyalties other than those of the
Pope or one of his cardinals. No one in the Church can tell me
what to think about social and political and economic questions
without getting a tough speech back; please leave me alone and
tend your own acreage; I'll take care of mine. It is true that
Cardinal Spellman had no great love for some of the things we
wrote in The Worker or said in public. I am sure, sometimes, he
became annoyed with us, or maybe he really never knew much
about us and cared less .... I know very well that Cardinal
Spellman didn't like The Worker's politics. He wasn't the only
one. Lots of Catholics were angry with us .... If he did pay
close attention to us, then he knew how loyal we were to his
Church, to our Church, how loving of it. He used the word
'challenge'; well, I have never wanted to challenge a Church,
only be part of it, albeit, in return, receive its love and mercy,
and the mercy and love of Jesus.
On March 3, 1951, two years to the day that Cardinal Spellman
led strike breakers into the Calvary cemetery, Monsignor Edward
Gaffney asked Dorothy Day to appear at the New York Archdioc-
esan Chancery office. At that meeting, Dorothy was told that
Catholic Worker would have to cease publication, or change the
name of the newspaper by deleting the word "Catholic" from the
title.
Several days later, Dorothy Day responded respectfully by her
letter to Monsignor Gaffney: "First of all, I wish to assure you of
our love and respectful obedience to the Church, and our gratitude
to this Archdiocese, which has so often and so generously defended
us from many who attack us." She continued, "[b]ecause we do no
wish to take advantage of such kindness, nor count on the official
protection which the name 'Catholic' brings to us, we would
change the name rather than cease publication." After the meeting
with Catholic Worker staff, however, Day advised Monsignor Gaff-
ney that "[n]o one .. .wishes to change the name. All feel that
Catholic Worker has been in existence for 18 years... under that
name, and that this is no time to change it so late in the day." Dor-
othy went on to remind Monsignor Gaffney that, for example, "the
Catholic War Veterans who also use the name Catholic represent
85. COLES, supra note 81, at 81-85.
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their own view, not to be confused with the view of the Archdio-
cese any more than the view of The Catholic Worker presumes to
speak for the Archdiocese of New York." Dorothy Day continued,
"we cannot simply cease the publication of a review which has
been built up, with its worldwide circulation of 63,000 over the last
18 years. This would be a grave scandal to our readers and would
put into the hands of our enemies, the enemies of the Church, a
formidable weapon. "86
Monsignor Gaffney did nothing. There was no censoring of
Catholic Worker nor further initiative by the Archdiocese, or any
of its agents, to close the newspaper or to remove the term "Catho-
lic" from the title. Years later, Dorothy Day reflected upon this
episode:
I never believed that the Monsignor who wanted to shut us
down or to delete the word 'Catholic' from our paper acted on
his own. I'm sure at least a few monsignors were in on the act.
Maybe his eminence the Cardinal. Maybe not. I think they re-
alized we were going to pray very hard, to pray and pray: in
churches and in homes and even on the streets of our cities. We
were ready to go to St. Patrick's, fill up the Church, stand
outside it in prayerful meditation. We were ready to take ad-
vantage of America's freedoms so that we could say what we
thought and do what we believed to be the right thing to do:
seek the guidance of the Almighty .... We did pray a long time
for Cardinal Spellman. We prayed that we would not be pre-
sumptuous in so praying, but we kept praying. If he had or-
dered us close, we might've gone right to St. Patrick's Cathedral
and continued our praying there, day and night, until the good
Lord took us - or settled the matter.87
Today Catholic Worker continues to sell, at its original price of one
penny per copy, almost 100,000 copies, seven issues per year, from
its New York City offices.88
Conclusion - Dorothy Day's Influence Today
The 1949 cemetery workers' strike clearly focuses on the attempt
of Dorothy Day and Catholic Workers to engage in responsible dia-
logue with the Church hierarchy. The relationship between Doro-
thy Day, committed lay Catholic, and Cardinal Spellman, the most
86. MILLER, supra note 32, at 427-28.
87. COLES, supra note 81, at 84-85.
88. See David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day's Lessons for the Transformation of Work,
14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57, 91 n. 306 & 307 (1996).
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powerful leader among the American Catholic hierarchy, was both
very simple and very complex. Because everyone in the Church is
called by God to consider actions and their consequences, Dorothy
Day called the leadership of her Archdiocese to account for its ac-
tions in breaking the strike in 1949.89
The examples of Dorothy Day and Cardinal Spellman continue
to resonate today. There are serious questions for some within the
Church as to the appropriate role and contour of principled dis-
sent. This debate, however, misperceives the more basic issue, the
need to mutually remedy sometimes poor communication between
the hierarchy and the laity, a problem often exacerbated by polit-
ical factionalism. Again, Dorothy Day offers the best example. If
the Archdiocese had closed Catholic Worker newspaper, Dorothy
Day would have complied. She would have also led thousands of
Catholic Workers in peaceful prayer at St. Patrick's Cathedral. In
other words, Dorothy Day would submit to the Magisterium of the
Church respectfully out of faith, but simultaneously would call the
Church to prayerful witness.
How these examples might apply in the Catholic University is
worthy of consideration. In the Catholic University, we are all
called, as members of the University community, to embrace en-
thusiastically, and to effectuate vigorously, the letter and spirit of
John Paul the Great's Apostolic Letter, Ex Corde Ecclesiae ("Born
from the Heart of the Church"), promulgated on August 15, 1990.
Within the Catholic University, Pope John Paul's June 30, 1998 Ap-
ostolic Letter, Ad Tuendam Fidem, further binds those called to
the teaching of theology, ("To Defend the Faith"). The Pope said
that his June 30, 1998 letter had the purpose "to protect the Catho-
lic faith against errors arising on the part of some of the Christian
faithful, in particular among those who studiously dedicate them-
selves to the discipline of sacred theology." The 1989 Profession of
Faith, promulgated by the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith, was modified to include a clause concerning teachings
proposed "definitively." It says, "I also firmly accept and hold
each and everything that is proposed by that same Church defini-
tively with regard to teaching concerning faith or morals."
Each and every person within the Catholic University is called to
fidelity to the spirit and the letter of Ex Corde Ecclesiae, and theo-
logians, in particular, are bound to honor the Pope's most recent
Apostolic Letter. We are called to give witness to the teachings of
89. See COLES, supra note 81, at 85.
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the Church, within our Church-affiliated colleges and universities.
Dorothy Day's complex relationship with Cardinal Spellman, espe-
cially in the crucible of the 1949 cemetery workers strike and its
aftermath, provides opportunity for reflection and assessment. It is
one example by which we might call the Church to faithful fulfill-
ment of its mission in the realm of Catholic higher education.
We live in an era where seemingly few heed, in good faith, the
late Cardinal Bernadin's call for common ground. The Church is
afflicted by politicized factions, quick to disregard the faith-based
core and heritage of our common ground - that the Church is
One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic. It was Dorothy Day who so
powerfully re-invoked the Communion of Saints and the Mystical
Body of Christ. Even her conservative critics recognized Dorothy
Day's model for lay-hierarchy interactions as worthy of respectful
emulation.
The October, 1998 issue of the generally conservative intellectual
journal First Things, edited by Father Richard John Neuhaus of the
Archdiocese of New York, offers these synopses of Dorothy Day's
direct action. As the correspondents recalled:
Indeed, my first acquaintance with the Catholic Worker move-
ment came from a chance encounter with Catholic workers ...
who were picketing St. Patrick's Cathedral on a Sunday morn-
ing. They carried signs condemning the Church for what they
regarded as the Church's complicity in the military-industrial
complex and for the Church's own accumulation of wealth
rather than the case of the poor. Afterwards we all went to
Spring Street for lunch with her [Dorothy Day]. She not only
"countenanced" the action but also commended it.
Dorothy's style of criticizing the Church did not ... involve
"condemning." She pointed out frequently that the institutional
Church had great wealth and that many bishops and priests
lived in great comfort and security. She called for the empty
rooms in rectories, seminaries and monasteries to be filled with
the poor; at the least, each parish should have a hospice for the
poor.
Too often today the style of criticizing the Church has taken
on ways repugnant and abhorrent to Dorothy Day. Last year
outside St. Patrick's Cathedral, Catholic school teacher s pro-
tested so loudly Mass was disturbed; Act-Up in 1989 invaded the
Cathedral and desecrated the Holy Eucharist; and the Women's
Ordination Conference has "alternative liturgies" as well as pro-
tests in churches during Mass. Such behavior . . . Dorothy
would not "countenance." Dorothy did picket, for instance with
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the Catholic cemetery workers in 1949; quietly, prayerfully,
quoting scripture and papal social teaching - far different from
the style of many critics of the Church today. 90
Over the course of the past several months, Catholic Workers
have asked the hierarchy to rethink institutional distribution of
wealth, by their divine obedience (peaceful civil disobedience).
For example, should The Catholic University of America spend
multi-millions of dollars ostentatiously on a magnificent building to
honor Pope John Paul II, rather than address the pressing needs of
the poor and homeless populations in Washington, D.C.? Should
the Cardinal Archbishop of Philadelphia continue to live alone in a
mansion - and a mansion that he constantly expands and polishes
to rival the palace of any Medici -- and establish a new seminary
well outside the City of Philadelphia - while continuing to close
inner-city schools and parishes, and to seemingly avoid any contin-
uing serious engagement with the poor of the Archdiocese of Phil-
adelphia? Why not, instead, follow Peter Maurin's
recommendation, and turn the Archbishop's mansion into the
Archdiocese's Christ House? Moreover, should the Cardinal
Archbishop of Los Angeles put $163 million to construct a new
Cathedral, in light of the pressing social and economic problems
afflicting the poor of the Los Angeles Archdiocese? In each of
these situations, Catholic Workers have engaged in divine obedi-
ence/peaceful civil disobedience, and have, by their words and ex-
amples, urged alternative priorities in accord with the life and
example of Jesus.
The laity should always take heart, even when some members of
the hierarchy may seem contrary. The ordained clergy operates
with the Sacrament of Holy Orders, and that sanctifying grace will,
over time, have its salutary influences. St. Francis of Assisi, one of
the Church's greatest saints, was not an ordained priest. He was in
awe of all priests, because the priest alone has the power to conse-
crate bread and wine into, through the miracle and the mystery of
transubstantiation, the Body and the Blood of Christ. Remember,
for example, that it was an Archbishop who paid Dorothy Day's
modest expenses to come to Flint, Michigan, in order to join in
solidarity with the sit-down strikers, as the autoworkers formed
their union in the crucible of the Depression. She was, with the
support of the Archbishop, one of the few journalists reporting
from within the factories during the UAW sit-down strike at Gen-
90. Correspondence, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1998, at 7-8.
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eral Motors Corporation. It is also most exquisite that Cardinal
O'Connor, directly within the line of Cardinal Spellman's succes-
sion as Archbishop of New York, has joined the call for the canoni-
zation of Dorothy Day.
In my working life within the largest Catholic University in the
United States, at St. John's University with almost 20,000 students,
I am very encouraged by the 1990 Apostolic Letter Ex Corde Eccle-
siae. By the express terms of the Apostolic Letter, the Bishops are
centrally situated internally within the life of the University.91
Therefore, if any University bureaucracy should ever become indif-
ferent to the authenticity of the Catholic tradition and to the Cath-
olic charism of the University Mission, every Catholic can take
great heart and inspiration in knowing that the Bishops and the
Cardinals can be asked to direct their attention to remedy actions
at odds with the Catholic element of the Catholic University's
Mission.
Dorothy Day's letters in early March of 1949 to Cardinal Spell-
man, in the context of the cemetery workers' strike, can serve as a
model. The Catholic Workers who picketed outside St. Patrick's
Cathedral and outside the cemeteries, in solidarity with the strikers
in 1949, continue to serve as worthy examples for the even more
direct Catholic action of divine obedience today. The ordained hi-
erarchy is infused, and bound, by the Sacrament of Holy Orders,
and by Jesus' injunction - it would be better for one within the
clergy to have a millstone wrapped around the neck and thrown to
the bottom of the lake than to lead one of the least astray. The
example of Jesus prompts dialogue; the laity may write and demon-
strate. Jesus also prompts, through the Sacrament of Holy Orders,
the hierarchy to read, to listen, to speak, and to lead. If laity and
hierarchy do not engage in this often difficult, but indispensable,
dialogue, the "alternative" for us all is the millpond.
91. David L. Gregory, The Bishop's Role in the Catholic Law School, 10 REGENT
L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
1392
1998 SURVEY OF ETHICS IN
LAND-USE PLANNING
Patricia E. Salkin*
Introduction
The activities currently taking place in Washington, D.C. remind
the American public of the importance of public sector ethics.
From the appointment of an independent counsel to unprece-
dented decisions by the federal courts,' it is clear there is height-
ened media and citizen attention to questions related to ethics.
Despite the sensationalism with which they are often handled,
these scandals involving public officials actually help to open the
door for greater governmental scrutiny and reform efforts.2
Meanwhile, what happens on the national scene clearly has im-
plications for activities at the local government level, including sit-
uations surrounding land-use planning and zoning decision-
making. This impact is evident by the increase in the number of
land-use ethics cases reported in 1998.3 When considering the
range of ethics issues that may confront land-use lawyers,4 it is no
surprise that 1998 yielded a number of reported decisions and pub-
lished opinions from across the country. The issues these opinions
address can be divided into several major categories: 1) conflicts of
interest, 2) compatibility of office, 3) bias and prejudgment and 4)
miscellaneous.
* Associate Dean and Director, Government Law Center of Albany Law
School.
1. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 122 F.3d 910 (8h Cir. 1997).
2. See JOSEPH ZIMMERMAN, CURBING UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT
(1994).
3. This author conducted a similar survey last year that included a review of all
land-use ethics cases and opinions in the 1990s. See Patricia E. Salkin, Legal Ethics
and Land-Use Planning, 30 URB. LAW. 383 (1998), reprinted in MATTHEW BENDER,
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT
DOMAIN (1998).
4. Arising issues include questions of professional ethics under professional
codes of responsibility, local and state ethics laws and judicial decrees that bear on the
moral conduct of public sector attorneys. See id.
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II.. Conflicts of Interest
The amount at stake, from both a financial standpoint and a
quality of life perspective, when planning and zoning boards make
land-use decisions places these actions under increased scrutiny, in-
cluding an intensive search for possible violations of ethical stan-
dards.5 Conflicts of interest cases most often arise where there is
potential of financial gain for oneself, a family member or a busi-
ness associate.
A. Personal Financial Gain
Several 1998 cases illustrate how individuals perceive the use of
land-use decisionmaking to personally profit. For example, a Cali-
fornia citizen challenged a zoning board's development decision,
claiming that a board member owned real property in the vicinity
of where the proposed project was to be located.6 Although the
court decided the case on procedural grounds - that the longer
statute of limitations under the California Political Reform Act7
did not apply to an appeal of a zoning decision - the litigation
illustrates the type of ethics-related allegations that may be em-
ployed to overturn an unpopular decision.8
Similarly, a Connecticut appellate court upheld a challenge by
abutting property owners to a zoning commission's decision to
grant a permit allowing a skeet shooting range on a sporting club's
property. The court rationalized that an ex officio member of the
commission failed to disqualify himself from the proceedings. 9
Connecticut statutes specifically prohibit member participation on
zoning boards when a direct or indirect conflict of interest exists,
stating that "No member of any zoning commission or board...
shall participate in the hearing or decision of the board or commis-
sion of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is di-
rectly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense."'10
5. See Patricia E. Salkin, Ethics and the Land-Use Lawyer, 5 LAND-USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (1997).
6. See Ching v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 60 Cal. App. 4th 888 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
7. The Political Reform Act provides that, "No public official at any level of state
or local government shall make, participate in making or in any way attempt to use
his official position to influence a governmental decision in which he knows or has
reason to know he has a financial interest." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 87100 (West 1993).
8. See Ching, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 888.
9. See Nazarko v. Conservation Comm'n, 717 A.2d 850 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-11 (1989). With respect to conservation commissions,
Connecticut legislation provides, in part, that: "[n]o member or alternate member of
such board or commission shall participate in the hearing or decision of such board or
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Although the relevant statute did not specifically mandate applica-
tion to ex officio members of commissions, the court resolved the
ambiguity in adopting the "more reasonable construction" of the
statute and "repeatedly emphasized that '[n]eutrality and imparti-
ality of members are essential to the fair and proper operation of
* . .[zoning] authorities.""' Further, while the ex officio member
of the commission only attended two of the three hearings and did
not participate in the voting, the court concluded his mere presence
constituted a prohibited conflict of interest because he held a mem-
bership in the sporting club and owned the only gun shop in
town.
12
In another 1998 Connecticut case, a plaintiff, after being denied
site plan approval by the zoning commission, argued the decision
should be null and void based on alleged conflict of interest and
predisposition of certain board members.' 3 In this situation, a
board member owned a campground across the street from the
plaintiff's proposed bituminous concrete manufacturing site. The
member questioned the legality of the proposed use under the zon-
ing code, initiated conversations regarding such with the town
planner and the town attorney, procured an engineering firm to
review the application and participated in one meeting. Despite
these zealous efforts, the member later withdrew from the commis-
sion and did not personally participate in the hearing on the site
plan application.' 4 The court found nothing in the statute that pro-
hibits a member not participating in a matter from presenting their
own view on the subject.' 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that
commission of which he is a member upon any matter in which he is directly or indi-
rectly interested in a personal or financial sense." Id. § 22(a)-42(c) (1995).
11. Nazarko, 717 A.2d at 852 (quoting Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
264 A.2d 566, 571 (1969)).
12. See id. The court reiterated that "[t]he decision as to whether a particular
interest is sufficient to disqualify is necessarily a factual one and depends on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case." Id. at 853 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-11, 8-21).
The court also noted "the appearance of impropriety created by a public official's
participation in a matter in which he has a pecuniary or personal interest in is suffi-
cient to require disqualification ..." Id. at 852. "Public policy requires that members
of public boards cannot be permitted to place themselves in a position in which per-
sonal interest may conflict with public duty." Id. at 853 (citing Zeigler v. Thomaston,
654 A.2d 392, 397 (Conn. Super. 1994)).
13. See Phillips v. Town of Salem Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 113120, 1998
WL 258332 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
14. See id. at *2. She was, however, represented by counsel at the hearing on the
matter.
15. See id. at *10 (citing Massimo v. Planning Comm'n, 564 A.2d 1075-76 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1989)).
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although the board member had a direct personal, and possibly fi-
nancial, conflict of interest, she did not violate the statutory provi-
sions because she withdrew from the board on the matter. 16
B. Family Relationships
Cases from 1998 also show that the public is concerned that indi-
viduals use zoning decisionmaking to assist financial prospects of
close family members. Two New Jersey cases involved alleged con-
flicts of interest based on familial relationships, yet the courts
reached opposite conclusions based upon the facts therein. Both
cases involved benefits of a proposed siting to a board member's
elderly parents.' 7 In one case, plaintiffs alleged that a board mem-
ber could not remain impartial in considering a site application be-
cause he would personally benefit from the proposed supermarket
construction. The alleged benefit was that the board member
would no longer have to assist in or complete his parent's grocery
shopping because the new supermarket would be located closer to
where his elderly parents live. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued there
was a conflict of interest because his parents signed a petition that
was presented to the board in favor of the proposed store. 18 The
board member argued that his parents did their own shopping and
that he saw them briefly only once or twice a week. The court
found no conflict of interest nor any appearance of impropriety,
concluding that these facts did not indicate that the member was
conflicted by desires of aiding himself or his parents on one hand
and serving the needs of the Cranford community on the other.19
In a second case, the court invalidated the board's variance and
site plan approval for a supermarket because a member's eighty-
three year old mother owned a commercial enterprise within fifty
feet of the proponent's property.20 The ownership constituted a
16. See id. at *11.
17. See Lincoln Heights Ass'n v. Township of Cranford Planning Bd., 714 A.2d
995 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); Ex. rel. Tenafly, Inc. v. Tenafly Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 704 A.2d 1032 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
18. See Lincoln Heights, 714 A.2d at 998.
19. See id. The court stated:
Local governments would be seriously handicapped if every possible inter-
est, no matter how remote and speculative, would serve as a disqualification
of an official. If this were so, it would discourage capable men and women
from holding public office .... The determinations of municipal officials
should not be approached with a general feeling of suspicion, for as Justice
Holmes has said, "Universal distrust creates universal incompetency."
Id. at 1001-02 (citing Van Itallie v. Franklin Lakes, 146 A.2d 111 (1958)).
20. See Tenafly, 704 A.2d at 1032.
1396
SURVEY OF ETHICS
disqualifying conflict of interest. In relying on the Local Govern-
ment Ethics Law,21 the court found that "potential for psychologi-
cal influences" existed because his mother needed the income
derived from her property to subsist. In addition, the value of her
property would definitely be influenced by the board's decision.22
Although the supermarket applicant argued that this conflict of in-
terest should not nullify the granted approvals based upon equity,23
the court found no authority allowing them to ignore a conflict of
interest based upon equitable factors.24
C. Conflicts of Interest Based Upon Alleged Political Pressure
Political pressure may also be cited as a disqualifying conflict of
interest. In one 1998 New Jersey case, the applicant alleged that all
of the zoning board members had a conflict of interest when the
township attorney appeared before them to oppose the applica-
tion.25 The alleged conflict, the applicant argued, was that zoning
board members are appointed by the township council, who also
directed the attorney to appear before the zoning board. The New
Jersey court applied the four-part test articulated in Wyzykowski v.
Rizas,26 concluding that no conflict existed when the township at-
21. This statute reads:
No local government officer or employee shall act in his official capacity in
any matter where he, a member of his immediate family, or a business or-
ganization in which he has an interest, has a direct or indirect financial or
personal involvement that might reasonably be expected to impair his objec-
tivity or independence of judgment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-22-5d (West 1991)
22. See Tenafly, 704 A.2d at 1038.
23. See id. at 1039. A&P argued that the nullification remedy was harsh because
1) they were not made aware of the alleged conflict of interest until almost three
weeks after they had been granted approval; 2) the Grand Union and other objectors
had not raised the allegation of the conflict; 3) the issue was raised for the first time
by Care in its appeal to the governing body; and 4) they (A&P) had already spent $1.2
million in approval costs. See id.
24. See id. at 1040. The court concluded by stating,
Protecting the public interest in the integrity of the quasi-judicial process is
the key. Applying estoppel when the objectors have made a timely chal-
lenge to the approvals diminishes that protection. The purpose of the con-
flict of interest statute is "prophylaxis against misconduct and its effect can
be exerted fully only if it is applied without discrimination where
applicable."
Id. (quoting Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 125 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1956)).
25. See Paruszewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 711 A.2d 273 (1998).
26. 626 A.2d 406 (1993). The following four circumstances will constitute a con-
flict of interest:
(1) "Direct pecuniary interests," when an official votes on a matter benefit-
ing the official's own property or affording a direct financial gain; (2) "Indi-
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torney appeared on behalf of the public, not himself, and when the
township committee had no authority to review the decision of the
zoning board."
D. Conflicts of Interest for the Attorney/Public Official
Attorneys must also be careful to avoid conflicts of interest when
they concurrently hold a public office and maintain a private law
practice. A 1998 Maryland case illustrates one type of conflict that
may arise when an attorney serves as a member of the county plan-
ning and zoning commission while representing clients on real es-
tate matters in the county.28 In this case, the attorney represented
clients who had business before the county. During the course of
the representation, the attorney-commissioner recused himself
from the public proceedings when his client's request first came to
the commission.29 After the commission approved the initial re-
quest, the attorney-commissioner proceeded to represent his cli-
ents in the next phase of their land development project by
preparing and filing an application with another public department,
not the county commission. Two weeks later, the attorney-commis-
sioner participated in a discussion at a county commission meeting
regarding proposed amendments to his client's plans, moving and
voting for the approval of the plan.30 According to the court, it was
the latter two acts that constituted a violation of the county ethics
law. While the attorney argued that the application to another de-
partment did not violate the conflicts of interest provision in the
local law,3' the court held that these applications may sometimes
rect pecuniary interests," when an official votes on a matter that financially
benefits one closely tied to the official, such as an employer, or family mem-
ber; (3) "Direct personal interest," when an official votes on a matter that
benefits a blood relative or a close friend in a non-financial way, but a matter
of great importance ... ; and (4) "Indirect Personal Interest," when an offi-
cial votes on a matter in which an individual's judgment may be affected
because of membership in some organization and a desire to help that or-
ganization further its policies.
Id. (citing Michael A. Pane, Conflict of Interest: Sometimes a Confusing Maze, 2 N.J.
MUNICIPALITIEs 8-9 (March 1980)).
27. See Paruszewski, 711 A.2d at 273.
28. See Carroll County Ethics Comm'n v. Lennon, 703 A.2d 1338 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1998).
29. See id. at 1340. Specifically, the clients needed to extend water service to their
property, an issue to be decided by the County Commission.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1346. The relevant provision of the Carroll County Ethics Ordinance
states that county officials and employees who are subject to this ordinance shall not:
be employed by a business entity that; has or is negotiating a contract of
more than $3,500 with the County or is regulated by their agency; except as
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be referred to the county commission for action, and while that was
not the case in the present situation, the event's mere possibility
was enough to satisfy the conflict of interest standard. The attor-
ney's participation at the last county commission meeting also vio-
lated the ethics law because his clients were regulated by the
commission of which their attorney was a member.32
IH. Compatibility of Office
Individuals must also be careful while concurrently holding pub-
lic offices that affiliation with one office does not constitute a con-
flict with one's duties to the other. In 1998, the Arkansas Attorney
General, among others, presented poignant commentary on poten-
tial problems with an individual's dual role.
A. Incompatible Offices
The Arkansas Attorney General opined that although nothing in
state statutes specifically prohibited a member of a county quorum
court from serving on the county planning board, the dual appoint-
ment should constitute an "incompatibility of office" as it would
under the common law.33  In reaching this conclusion, the Attor-
ney General noted that the two positions are incompatible based
upon their respective statutory powers and functions.34
B. Offices Found Compatible
In other 1998 commentary, the Arkansas Attorney General con-
cluded that although there is no inherent conflict of interest for an
acting city attorney to also serve as chairman of the city's zoning
exempted by this Commission pursuant to Section 6 of this ordinance[ ]...
[or] hold any outside employment relationship that would impair
impartiality.
Id.
32. See id. at 1348.
33. The Attorney General stated that two positions are incompatible when "there
is a conflict of interest" or "where one office is subordinate to the other." 98 Op. Ark.
Att'y Gen. 226 (1998) (citing Byrd v. State, 402 S.W.2d 121 (1966)).
34. See id. The Attorney General points out that "A majority of the quorum court
must approve creation of the planning board, and the quorum court must confirm
appointments to the board." Id. In addition, "[m]embers of the planning board are
subject to removal upon recommendation by the county judge and confirmation by
the quorum court." Id. Additional statutory reasons were cited including the quorum
court's authority to accept, modify or reject the board's recommendation or to initiate
its own planning and zoning laws, and the procedures for adoption of the official
plans. See id.
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commission, the potential for incompatibility existed. Finding no
constitutional, statutory or common law prohibition against hold-
ing dual office, the Attorney General warned that if a conflict ever
arose between the two positions, the attorney-chairman may have
to recuse himself or herself from involvement in either role.36
Throughout 1998, officials from other states also presented simi-
lar opinions on this topic. For example, the New York Attorney
General opined that the dual positions of planning board director
and member of the county industrial development agency ("IDA")
were compatible because one was not subordinate to the other, and
after a review of the job description for planning board director
and the functions of the IDA,37 there appeared to be no conflict of
duties.38
Case law from 1998 also presents evidence that holders of dual
public offices are not always precluded from such service based
upon incompatibility. In a Connecticut case brought by abutting
property owners challenging the zoning commission's granting of
subdivision approval, the plaintiffs claimed that one of the commis-
sion members held a salaried municipal office, thereby precluding
his participation in the matter.39 By statute, the zoning commission
in Connecticut is to consist of five people who hold no salaried
municipal office. 4° The presiding court, however, found that the
commission member was not a salaried employee, 41 and held that
because the subject applications were unanimously approved by all
six voting members of the commission, his participation did not re-
quire the court to invalidate the subdivision approvals.42
35. See id. In analyzing the common law surrounding compatibility of office, the
Attorney General concluded that the two positions at issue did not present a situation
where one was subordinate to the other. See id.
36. See id. The Attorney General also noted, "In the event of a case-specific con-
flict ... the city attorney should, as always, be cognizant of the various provisions of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys, concerning conflicts of inter-
est." Id.
37. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 858 (McKinney 1986).
38. See 98 Inf. Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 45 (1998); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 856(4).
39. See Smith v. Deep River Planning and Zoning Comm'n, No. CIV.A.96-80581,
1998 WL 345399 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-19 (1989).
41. Oddly, the court stated, "Even if this court were to determine that he is, in
fact, a salaried municipal officer, this court cannot conclude that his minimal partici-
pation constituted 'material prejudice . . . ."' Id. at 4.
42. See id. The court stated "his presence and vote will not invalidate the result
and further that a majority vote need not be invalidated where the interest of a mem-
ber is general or of a minor character." Id. (quoting Murach v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985)).
1400
SURVEY OF ETHICS
IV. Bias and Allegations of Prejudgment
Bias and prejudgment are issues that also may disqualify individ-
uals from making land-use decisions. These allegations, however,
are often difficult to prove. For example, a 1998 Connecticut court
found that two zoning board members were not required to recuse
themselves from participating in the plaintiff's appeal because the
plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving bias or prejudice on
the part of the board members,43 although one of the board mem-
bers was a police officer who was responsible for having the plain-
tiff's car towed, and the other board member had erroneously
instructed the plaintiff that a fee was required to appeal the orders
of the zoning enforcement officer and further misinformed the
plaintiff to post a sign on the property at issue, notifying the public
of the appeal."a The court, however, found little or no opportunity
for the board members to exercise any bias against the plaintiff.
The court reasoned that both members had been subject to cross
examination by the plaintiff, had plausible explanations for the
contested meeting with the plaintiff and had little discretion in this
matter.45
In another 1998 Connecticut case, where a board member ques-
tioned throughout the lengthy proceedings whether the proposed
activities were permitted under the local regulations, the presiding
court found these expressions did not rise to the level of bias or
prejudgment necessitating disqualification.46 The fact that a board
member may have taken a tentative position on a matter does not
prove predetermination of the subsequent questions nor commit-
ment to denial of the application. Rather, the court urged future
plaintiffs to produce more tangible evidence of bias, but found
none here.47
43. See A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No.CIV.A.97-
0568209, 1998 WL 516158 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing Rado v. Bd. of Education,
583 A.2d 102 (1990)). The presumption of impartiality attaches to administrative de-
terminations, and the burden is on the party seeking disqualification to prove
otherwise.
44. See id. At various times during the pendency of the action before the zoning
board, both board members had resolved to recuse themselves, but then later decided
to participate in some of the proceedings.
45. See id.
46. "The law does not require that members of zoning commissions must have no
opinion concerning the proposed development of their communities. It would be
strange, indeed, if this were true." Phillips v. Town of Salem Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, No. 113120, 1998 WL 258332 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (quoting Furtney v.
Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319, 323 (Conn. 1970).
47. See id
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Oftentimes, allegations of prejudgment arise when a pre-elected
land-use official makes campaign statements that arguably reflect a
position relevant to a subsequent application. In 1998, for exam-
ple, where two planning board members actively supported a new
supermarket for the township during their pre-application cam-
paign as candidates for the township committee, the presiding
court found insufficient evidence to indicate that the members
prejudged the application before them, stating, "[e]xpression in
support of a general proposition during a prior political campaign
does not invalidate a subsequent decision by the campaigners act-
ing in their official capacity as planning board members."48
Comments made by officials also become ammunition for oppo-
nents of board actions in a 1998 New Mexico case concerning the
siting of a shelter for abused and homeless youth. Opponents of
the project challenged the decision of the city council to annex the
tract of land and to establish special-use zoning for the property to
allow for the proposed shelter. The opponents alleged, based on
statements a member of the council made, that the member was
biased in favor of youth issues such as these and that she prejudged
the matter,49 creating an appearance of impropriety and abolishing
any chance for the petitioner to receive a fair and impartial hearing
during the process.5" Although the court noted Siesta Hill's asser-
tion that "a public officer sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity is nor-
mally disqualified if an objective observer would entertain
reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality,"'" it believed
the petitioner presented no evidence that the Councilor had
prejudged the matter, finding that the statements were, in fact,
made after the counselor heard the petitioner's arguments.52 In
finding no conflict of interest and no appearance of impropriety,
the court further stated that council members need not be so insu-
48. Lincoln Heights Ass'n v. Township of Cranford Planning Bd., 714 A.2d 995,
1004 (1998).
49. See Siesta Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 954 P.2d 102
(1998). The petitioner cited to comments made by the Councilor that the issue was
"real cut-and-dried" and that she would "always vote in favor of youth issues." In
addition, the Councilor's children had attended a seven-week program run by the
agency requesting the zoning change. See id. at 108-09.
50. See id. at 108.
51. Id. at 109 (quoting High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque,
888 P.2d 475, 486 (1994)).
52. See id. The Court also noted that members of administrative tribunals are
entitled to hold views on policy matters, even if they may be relevant to the case
before the board. See id.
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lated from their community to the point that they must be de-
tached from every issue that comes before them.53
V. Miscellaneous
Several miscellaneous issues arose relating to land-use ethical
situations in 1998.
A. Who is the Client of the Government Lawyer?
Determining "who is the client" of a government lawyer is not
an easy task.54 Often, one may conclude that the client is the body
that retains the attorney, and it is to this body where the duties
owed by a lawyer to his/her client attach. Therefore, it is no sur-
prise to see bitter battles between executive and legislative
branches of local government who desire their own independent
legal counsel.55
A 1998 Pennsylvania court clarified that a zoning board itself,
not the borough solicitor, has the statutory authority to retain legal
counsel for the board.56 The court stated:
[t]he fact that counsel for a zoning board must be an attorney
other than a municipal solicitor underscores the importance of
permitting the board to select and employ its own legal repre-
sentation. Very often, conflict-of-interest considerations arise
where the governing authority of the municipality and the zon-
53. See id.
54. See REPORT OF THE D.C. BAR SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT LAW-
YERS (1988); Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC. 649; Fed.
Bar Ass'n Prof'l Ethics Comm. Op. 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71 (1973).
55. The disputes arise when the chief elected official claims that the corporation
counsel or municipal attorney represent the municipality as a whole, obviating the
need for the legislative branch to retain their own counsel. This argument is further
polarized and made to be political when the counsel is hired and fired by the chief
elected official, not by the legislative body, and further, where the legislative body
needs executive budget approval to retain their own counsel.
56. See Zoning Hearing Bd. v. City Council, 720 A.2d 166 (1998). The court easily
distinguished this case from Borough of Blawnox Council v. Olszewski, 477 A.2d 1322
(1984), finding that Blawnox involved board members retaining unauthorized in-
dependent counsel for their own personal goals, and hence was an ultra vires act. See
id. at 167. Furthermore, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Municipal Planning
Code that provides, in part:
the governing body shall make provision in its budget and appropriate funds
for the operation of the zoning hearing board .... The zoning hearing board
may employ or contract for and fix the compensation of legal counsel, as the
need arises. The legal counsel shall be an attorney other than the municipal
solicitor.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10617.3 (West 1997).
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ing board, have a different opinion, and the municipality is
forced to appeal the zoning board's decision. 7
Planning and zoning boards in rural municipalities often face the
greatest hardship in securing legal representation from a fiscal per-
spective. In 1998, although the Ohio Attorney General was mind-
ful of, and sympathetic to, this circumstance, 8 she commented that
a county prosecuting attorney may not provide official representa-
tion to a township board of zoning appeals 9.5  Reasoning that there
was no statutory duty for the county prosecutor to perform this
function, the Attorney General said that the prosecutor may not
assume the task voluntarily, "thereby devoting public resources to
a function not delegated to the prosecutor by statute."60 The "con-
flict of interest" issue was raised in the context that the prosecuting
attorney could be called upon to serve as counsel in a matter where
a legal duty of representation exists that could conflict with a rep-
resentation assumed for a board that is, in fact, not empowered to
call upon the attorney for representation.61
B. Resignation of Local Position As Part of
State Ethics Agreement
An interesting agreement was reached between the New York
State Ethics Commission and a state employee in 1998 that re-
quired the employee to resign his seat on a local planning board, in
addition to paying a fine, for receiving compensation in a private
engineering practice and appearing on behalf of clients before state
agencies.62 The agreement raises a unique question because the
State Ethics Commission's jurisdiction is limited to state employees
and activities relating to their state employment. Although the re-
57. Zoning Hearing Board, 720 A.2d at 168.
58. The Ohio Attorney General stated specifically:
You have stated that requiring the local boards of zoning appeals to hire
outside counsel when a decision is appealed to common pleas court could
present a financial hardship .... While we are sympathetic to your expressed
concerns, this is a matter that cannot be resolved by means of an Attorney
General opinion but, instead, must be addressed directly by the General
Assembly.
98 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 025 (1998).
59. See id.
60. Id. Members of planning and zoning boards are not township officers since
they are elected and not appointed. See id. (citing OHIO CONST. art. X, § 2). Also,
Ohio county prosecuting attorneys are under a duty to provide representation to
township officers. See id. (citing 92 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 080 (1992)).
61. See 98 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 025.
62. See In re Cukrovany (Disposition Agreement Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with New
York State Ethics Comm'n, Albany, N.Y.).
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signing individual was employed by the State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, it is not apparent from the discussion in
the published agreement why the State Ethics Commission or the
Department should be concerned with his membership on a local
planning board. The situation begs the question whether state em-
ployees working for agencies involved in some aspect of the land-
use planning or regulatory process should serve on local planning
and zoning boards at all.
.C. Appearances by a Governing Body of a Municipality
Before a Zoning Board
Generally, members of planning and zoning boards are ap-
pointed by either the chief elected official of a municipality, by a
local legislative body or by a combination thereof. Therefore, ap-
plicants before the zoning board may believe that the municipal
legislative body or the chief elected official is exerting undue influ-
ence or pressure over the zoning board with respect to a particular
application. The suspicion of influence is especially strong where
the municipal attorney appears before the zoning board to oppose
an application on behalf of the local government. Such was the
case in a 1998 New Jersey decision in which the applicant sought a
certification that his airstrip was a valid non-conforming use.63 The
township committee directed the town attorney to appear before
the zoning board to oppose the application and to present evidence
that the use was not a valid pre-existing, non-conforming use. 64
The presiding court concluded that the governing body had stand-
ing to oppose the application and that the appearance before the
zoning board did not present a reversible conflict of interest. The
court reasoned that the governing body had no power to review the
zoning board's determination, that a professional planner engaged
by the township had concluded that the proposed use would be
contrary to the public interest and a detriment to the township and
that, in appropriate cases, the appearance of the township's attor-
ney on behalf of the municipality, "provides a means by which the
63. See Paruszkewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 711 A.2d 273 (1998).
64. See id. at 275. The court noted that the Municipal Land-Use Law provides
direct authority in at least two situations for a township to appear before a zoning
board: 1) when the development of municipal property is at issue; and 2) when an
application involves land situated within 200 feet of municipally owned land. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-12 (West 1998).
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public interest is represented in proceedings of substantial public
importance. "65
Conclusion
The foregoing cases illustrate that legal and municipal ethics in
land-use planning continue to play a pivotal role in challenges to
land-use decision-making. The examples provided also serve to re-
mind municipal attorneys of the critical need for the continued ed-
ucation of municipal officials and the municipal bar concerning
these important ethical considerations. It is the continued educa-
tion, as well as stringent regulation by the judicial system with re-
spect to occurrences of conflict of interest, incompatibility of office
and bias, that will ensure land-use officials are faithfully serving
their communities (and not themselves) when making zoning and
planning decisions.
65. Id. at 279 (quoting Township of Berkeley Heights v. Bd. Of Adjustment, 365
A.2d 237, 238 (1976)).
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A MAN FOR ALL DECADES.
Honorable John F. Keenan*
When the Editors of this distinguished publication contacted me
requesting that I consider writing an article, they asked that the
subject be "(1) What decision, person, event or occurrence had the
greatest significance (legal or otherwise) to urban society in the
twentieth century? Or, in the alternative, (2) What is the greatest
challenge facing urban society in the twenty-first century?"
The answers to Question #1 would seem to be Brown v. Board of
Education; Fiorello LaGuardia, Robert Moses, Richard Daley, Ed-
ward I. Koch or Alfred E. Smith; World War II and, as to Question
#2, one might answer race relations or transportation. I thought I
would let others write articles responding to the two questions,
however, and for me to write a piece about a remarkable man who
has contributed more towards the improvement of our laws as they
relate to urban society than any other person I know. He is a col-
league of mine and his name is Whitman Knapp. He is a United
States District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
Judge Knapp's life spans all the decades of the century and his
distinguished legal career has extended for more than six decades.
He has done more for the law in this City and for law enforcement
here than anyone I have known. Whitman Knapp graduated from
Yale College in 1931 and from Harvard Law School in 1934. From
1937 to 1950, he was an Assistant District Attorney in the New
York County District Attorney's Office under Thomas E. Dewey
and the legendary Frank S. Hogan. While in the District Attor-
ney's Office, he prosecuted important felony cases and became
head of the Appeals Bureau where he argued the appeals and
wrote the briefs in some of the most important cases of that era.
Among the successful appeals argued by Judge Knapp were:
People v. Doubleday & Co.,1 Fay v. New York' and People v. Pe-
rez.3 The legal doctrines in those landmark cases may have been
changed over the following years, but they were three of the most
important cases of the mid-century.
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* United States District Judge, Southern District of New York.
1. 77 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1947), affd, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
2. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
3. 90 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950).
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The conviction in Doubleday rested upon a finding that the
story, "The Princess With The Golden Hair," in a collection enti-
tled Memoirs Of Hecate County,4 was obscene within the meaning
of the relevant New York statute. Judge Knapp successfully de-
fended the conviction in the Appellate Division and the New York
Court of Appeals. This was a major First Amendment case and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Judge Knapp's opponent in Doubleday was a most distinguished
leader of the New York Bar who argued for fifty minutes and re-
served ten minutes for rebuttal. Judge Knapp, on the other hand,
delivered this brilliant but brief argument:
May it please the Court. The statute upon which this judgment
rests is valid. A reading by the Court of the book will demon-
strate that the factual finding of obscenity was reasonable. I
therefore submit that the judgment should be affirmed.
He said this and sat down. An equally divided Supreme Court,
Justice Frankfurter abstaining, affirmed the unanimous New York
Court of Appeals decision after listening to Judge Knapp's argu-
ment. Appearently brevity is not only the soul of wit - it appears
also to be the essence of successful appellate advocacy.
The Fay case dealt with labor racketeering and extortion and the
Perez case was a murder trial with major issues relating to the ad-
missibility of custodial statements made by the accused and arrest
to arraignment delay. These are subjects which have impacted
upon and continue to affect the lives of citizens in our urban areas
up to the last year of the millennium.
After leaving the District Attorney's Office and becoming a
prominent private practitioner, Judge Knapp continued to make
great contributions to the public weal. From 1953 until 1954, he
served as Special Counsel to the Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor. The Waterfront Commission did more to clean-up
corruption on the New York docks than anyone imagined could be
done. The Academy Award-winning film, On The Waterfront,5
starring Marlon Brando, provides some idea of how rampant crime
was in the New York Harbor before the Waterfront Commission.
After his successful stint at the Waterfront Commission, he be-
came a member of the Commission that revised the New York Pe-
nal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure. The work of that
Commission resulted in the substantive and procedural statutes of
4. EDMUND WILSON, MEMOIRS OF HECATE COUNTY (Doubleday 1946).
5. Columbia Pictures Corp. (1954).
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the State of New York that define our criminal laws and the rules
that govern those laws to this day. While in private practice during
the 1950s, 60s and early 70s, he was a partner in the distinguished
firm of Barrett, Knapp, Shapiro & Simon but, as illustrated above,
he never abandoned the public sector.
In 1970, it had become apparent that there was a corruption
problem in the New York City Police Department and Mayor John
Lindsay concluded that. it was necessary to create a Commission to
determine the extent and nature of police corruption in the City
and to examine procedures for dealing with corruption and recom-
mending changes and improvements in the procedures.6 The
Mayor appointed Whitman Knapp as Chairman of this "Commis-
sion To Investigate Allegations Of Police Corruption. '7 "The
Knapp Commission," as it came to be known, with a small but elite
staff and with limited funding, uncovered more systemic corruption
in the New York City Police Department than the most cynical citi-
zen or newspaper reporter ever dreamt existed.
On August 3, 1972, after public hearings, the Commission issued
its initial Report.8 The first sentence of the Knapp Commission
Report summed it all up. "We found corruption to be wide-
spread." In a carefully-documented follow-up Report, dated De-
cember 26, 1972, the Commission called for an overhaul of the
Department's methods of dealing with corruption.9 This overhaul
created institutional methods for dealing with corruption, which
have largely freed the New York Police Department of the types of
graft and shakedown so common in other local law enforcement
agencies throughout the country and the world.
None of this could have been accomplished without the intelli-
gence, efforts and honesty of Judge Knapp. There are still "rotten
apples" in the New York City Police Department as there are in all
human institutions, but knowledgeable observers believe that the
New York City Police Department is largely free of the systemic
corruption which existed in 1970 when the Knapp Commission was
formed.
Whitman Knapp was appointed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York by President Richard
Nixon on June 30, 1972. Because of his devotion to the cause of
6. See Rep. Of the Comm'n to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and
the City's Anti-Corruption Proc. (Dec. 26, 1972) (Whitman Knapp, Chair).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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cleaning-up police corruption and his attention to that important
issue, however, he did not assume his judicial duties until Septem-
ber 20, 1972. From then until today, Judge Knapp has been, and
continues to be one of the brightest jewels in the crown of the
Southern District. He has presided over all manner of complicated
commercial, tort, employment and criminal litigation. Two of the
most important cases over which he presided were: United States v.
Coonan1° and United States v. Friedman.11
Coonan involved a murderous Irish-American gang that associ-
ated itself with the Mafia. The gang was known as "The Westies"
and they were responsible for scores of murders in this City. Fried-
man revolved around bribe taking by high-ranking City officials,
including the Borough President of Queens and the Chairman of
the Bronx Democratic Committee who had been a Deputy Mayor.
No cases tried during my time on the Southern District have been
more important to urban affairs than Coonan and Friedman. Both
cases were extremely complex and involved difficult legal issues.
Competent, but highly-charged, counsel represented the parties in
both cases. It is rare for the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit to praise a trial judge. But now Chief Judge Winter wrote in
affirming Friedman, "Given the length of the trial, the complexity
of the issues, and the vigor with which it was prosecuted and de-
fended, Judge Knapp conducted a remarkably fair and error-free
trial."' 2
Whitman Knapp was a great lawyer and he continues to be a
great judge. His contributions to the law and to urban life have
made New York a better place for all that live here. It is an honor
to serve with him.
10. 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming conviction), cert. denied sub nom.,
Kelly v. United States, 503 U.S. 941 (1992). See also United States v. Coonan 664 F.
Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (original order denying empanelment of anonymous jury);
United States v. Coonan, 671 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (revised order sequester-
ing jury); United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming Judge
Knapp's decision not to use special verdicts in an ongoing racketeering trial).
11. 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming Judge Knapp's trial rulings).
12. Friedman, 854 F.2d at 541.
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URBAN HOLISM: I-
THE EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN ATLANTA
Honorable William Campbell*
After experiencing decades of escalating crime and population
loss, Atlanta is undergoing a renaissance. The rate of violent crime
is the lowest it has been in many years and, for the first time in
thirty years, the city has experienced a positive growth in its popu-
lation.1 There are several reasons for Atlanta's turn-around. First,
Atlanta's holistic approach to development has improved the city
on a variety of fronts. Second, by using its Empowerment Zone,
Atlanta has leveraged private sector dollars to redevelop areas that
have been slow to rebound from decades of decline. Third, At-
lanta's community policing program has brought police closer to
citizens, consequently lowering crime. Lastly, by reinventing pub-
lic housing in Atlanta, the city has developed many mixed income
communities.
I. Holistic Approach
Atlanta uses a holistic approach to urban development. In other
words, no singular method or strategy dominates our plan to revi-
talize our inner city communities. In particular, this approach fo-
cuses on the interplay of public and private sectors in our City,
* Mayor, Atlanta 1993-present. Chair, United States Conference of Mayors'
Transportation and Communications Committee; Atlanta City Council, 1981. J.D.,
Duke University; B.A., cum laude, Vanderbilt University. Recipient, Bridges to To-
morrow Award, 1998. All sources cited are available by contacting the Mayor's Of-
fice at 55 Trinity Avenue, Suite 2400, Atlanta, Georgia 30335.
1. See, e.g., Research Atlanta, Inc., A Population Profile of the City of Atlanta:
Trends, Causes and Options, May 1997, at iii.
Many large cities have lost population and employment over the last 25
years and the composition of the remaining population has changed. Many
of the problems of cities result from the fact that cities are losing their mid-
dle class while poverty is becoming more concentrated .... The population
of the City of Atlanta declined by almost 19 percent from 1960 to 1994 even
as the region's population grew by over 154 percent, a pattern hardly unique
among American cities.
Id. See also Atlanta Regional Commission ("ARC"), 1998 Atlanta Region Outlook
Report (noting that the population of the City of Atlanta in 1990 was 416,397. In
1998, the population of the City was 430,111).
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remaining cognizant of the effect of one upon the other. For exam-
ple, consider the resurrection of the Martin Luther King Drive cor-
ridor in Southwest Atlanta, near the Atlanta University Center
(the largest complex of private Black educational institutions of
higher learning in the world). The City, through the Atlanta De-
velopment Authority ("ADA") and the Atlanta Empowerment
Zone ("AEZ"), will build the "Historic Westside Village" on fif-
teen acres near downtown in mid-summer of 1999. This $130 mil-
lion mixed-use development will contain a movie theater, business
offices, housing that includes three-story townhouses (ranging in
price from $95,000 to $175,000), a grocery store and a 136-room,
six-story hotel. Crucially, this project will create 2000 jobs for the
area.
Had the city attempted just a single development - a grocery
store for example - it might have failed because of a lack of fac-
tors necessary for development, such as a sufficient population
base, public safety and complementary businesses and services. By
taking a holistic approach, we are able to marshal the entire re-
sources of the city and create excitement for the development of a
new Atlanta for the Twenty-first Century.
II. The Atlanta Empowerment Zone
In 1994, President Bill Clinton created an exciting new initiative
known as Empowerment Zones. Central to the Empowerment
Zone concept is the notion of community involvement. The four
goals of the Empowerment Zone are to: (1) expand employment
and investment opportunities; (2) create safe and livable communi-
ties; (3) lift youth and families out of poverty; and (4) provide ade-
quate housing for all residents. In the five years since we started
implementing this program, the process of involving citizens has
not always been easy, but by staying the course we've created
something that reflects a shared vision.
A snapshot of Atlanta's AEZ2 looks like this: The AEZ repre-
sents 9.29 square miles near the heart of the City of Atlanta. The
working poor in these areas, barely make ends meet and have
under-utilized skills. Over one-fourth of all housing and business
facilities remain vacant and more than a half of the residents within
the AEZ are under-educated. In addition, AEZ youth are not ob-
taining high school diplomas at the same rate of non-AEZ youth.
In fact, only forty-four percent of the adults have a high school
2. See, e.g., City of Atlanta, Atlanta Empowerment Zone, 1994 Strategic Plan.
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education. AEZ's unemployment is seventeen percent, higher
than in surrounding communities. Median income is less than
$11,000 per year. Social problems, although similar to the larger
community, seem to escalate within the AEZ and resources are
often times inaccessible.
To positively impact this situation, we knew that it would take
more than the $250 million in grants and tax incentives the federal
government had slated to give us over a ten-year period. Through
leveraging, Atlanta transformed the federal grants into private
loans and grants. To date, we have leveraged close to a billion dol-
lars, created close to 800 jobs and provided $6.3 million in loans.
In the next three years, the zone is expected to create 4345 jobs
through a total of $39.4 million of investment in projects.
One of the City's most significant collaborations is the contract
with United Water Services of Atlanta for the private contract
management of Atlanta's water system. The concept of privatiza-
tion has been around for many years and so, after careful consider-
ation and analysis, Atlanta decided to privatize its water system
and soon will do the same for its sewer system. Privatizing the
water system not only created needed capital to reinvest into our
infrastructure, but it also helped hold down water rate increases for
our 1.5 million customers. In the process we also were able to en-
hance minority participation (minority investors own thirty-five
percent of the company). In addition, this agreement provides
more than thirty businesses with the chance to train and provide
employment opportunities in the Empowerment Zone, thus pro-
tecting city workers.
The commitments made by United Water Services to both the
City of Atlanta and to the residents of the AEZ illustrate how
privatization can serve to stimulate and facilitate economic devel-
opment in urban areas. These commitments include hiring workers
from the Zone, providing incentives for workers to live there and
funding a water institute at one of Atlanta's historically black col-
leges in that area.
I11. Community Policing
In Atlanta, we are building a city where people feel secure, sup-
ported and affirmed. We have done this best by bringing our po-
lice close to our people in a concept called community policing.
Key to our return to community and renaissance is the progress
we've made in public safety.
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We have put a significant portion of our city budget into public
safety. Public safety accounts for forty-nine percent of the General
Fund budget.3 In 1999, the city spent $195 million on public safety,
a four percent increase over 1998.4 This funding goes toward in-
creased patrolling in high crime areas as well as investments in
youth programs. In fact, we more than doubled the number of
children served by our recreation programs, serving some 35,000
children in 1999.
In 1998, our homicide rate was down to the lowest levels in thir-
teen years and the fifth lowest in thirty years.5 In addition, we have
decreased juvenile arrests by thirty percent.6 Fire deaths are down
by an amazing fifty percent since 1995 as a result of more fire pre-
vention education and the distribution of more than 70,000 smoke
detectors.7
We are enforcing all the City laws, because there are no vic-
timless crimes. Last year I toured a neighborhood in Southeast At-
lanta and could see that prostitution and drug trafficking were
operating in full disregard for the law. I immediately issued an ex-
ecutive order to impound the vehicles of those using cars while en-
gaging in criminal activity. Since we launched this crackdown, we
have impounded hundreds of cars and made more than five hun-
dred arrests. But more importantly, we communicated to residents
that if they stay in the city, we are willing to do all that is possible
to enhance the quality of in-town living.
IV. Mixed Income Communities
Five years ago, Atlanta had one of the worst housing authorities
in the country. For the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1994, the
Atlanta Housing Authority's ("AHA") Public Housing Manage-
ment Assessment Program ("PHMAP") score, as assigned by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, was 36 out
of 100. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1998, the AHA's
PHMAP score was 97 out of 100, earning HUD's High Performing
Agency Designation. This was largely due to our reinvention of
public housing by building new mixed income communities on the
land where public housing once existed and adding middle income
3. See, e.g., City of Atlanta, 1999 Budget.
4. See, id.
5. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.
6. See, id.
7. See, e.g., City of Atlanta, 1999 Budget.
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amenities like central air, dishwashers, swimming pools and new
schools and community centers.
Public/Private Partnerships form the core of the Atlanta Hous-
ing Authority's ("AHA") Olympic Legacy Program, a program
designed to revitalize neighborhoods and stimulate reinvestment in
the community. The Olympic Legacy Program repositioned five of
AHA's most distressed public housing communities into mixed in-
come communities with a full array of amenities and services.
Centennial Place, formerly Techwood/Clark Howell, the first
mixed income, mixed finance community in the country, includes
apartment homes reserved for public housing-eligible families.
One thousand and eighty-one public housing units were replaced
with nine hundred mixed income, mixed finance apartment homes.
In 1998, Centennial Place received the John Gunther Blue Ribbon
Award for Best Practices from HUD.
The $42 million HOPE VI Grant was leveraged into $125 million
of public and private investment. This enabled a new public ele-
mentary school, a new YMCA, a community center, a branch bank,
a hotel and a corporate suites facility to be built. Using HOPE VI
funds, AHA developed and implemented the nationally acclaimed
Work Force Enterprise Program designed to prepare public hous-
ing families for work, in some cases for the first time, and for fuller
employment and careers. As of February 1999, there are eighty-six
active trainees, forty-three of whom are currently working at an
average hourly wage rate of $7.24, and an average annual salary of
$14,087, for a gross annual salary of $605,751 with $63,604 gener-
ated in taxes. Fifty-four private and public employers participate in
the program.
Conclusion
Much of Atlanta's success is due to the holistic approach to de-
velopment. By understanding that redevelopment is complex and
must be approached on all public and private fronts, Atlanta has
been transformed. Indeed, the political, economic, and social sec-
tors of society are inseparable, each with an obligation to help our
cities. As mayor, I felt the moral obligation to help the hundreds
of thousands of residents who have not forsaken the city. By stay-
ing the course, they have inherited a city that is safer, more dy-
namic and, more importantly, a city that has returned to its
citizenry a renewed sense of community.
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SMART GROWTH:
A CATALYST FOR PUBLIC-
INTEREST INVESTMENT
Honorable Norman B. Rice*
Looking back, my leadership as mayor of Seattle was shaped by
three core principles: social equity, economic opportunity and envi-
ronmental stewardship. These principles, the result of an ex-
traordinary community collaboration, guide the development of
the Seattle into the twenty-first century. I believe the greatest
challenge facing urban society is maintaining our commitment to
these ideals as we seek to manage the significant growth in urban
America, while limiting the effects of the flight to suburbia, com-
monly termed "sprawl."
From 1990 to 1997, I had the honor of serving as Mayor of Seat-
tle, one of America's greatest cities. Seattle earns international ac-
claim on so many fronts: quality of life, economic vitality,
recreation opportunities and cultural life, to name but a few. It has
topped multiple lists in recent years of "America's Most Livable
Cities" and "Best Cities for Business."
The overall quality of life in Seattle has resulted in steady popu-
lation growth. Predictably, accompanying this population increase
has been traffic congestion, skyrocketing housing prices and a scar-
city of open space. And like many other urban centers, extensive
development on the city's outer fringes, coupled with slower in-
vestment in the urban core, threatens to jeopardize Seattle's future.
A solution to this problem is emerging in the "smart growth"
movement and the strategies it sets forth for sustaining the livabil-
ity of large urban centers into the twenty-first century.
I. Smart Growth
The overarching mission of this program, "smart growth" is to
create viable urban neighborhoods that address a multitude of
community needs in a convenient, cost-effective and environmen-
tally conscious way. Urban government can attain this goal
* Norman B. Rice was mayor of Seattle from 1990 to 1997. Recipient of the
National Neighborhood Coalition's 1999 Award for Outstanding Leadership on Be-
half of Neighborhoods, he is now President and Chief Executive Officer of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank of Seattle.
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through increased citizen participation in development decisions,
and a constructive dialogue about overall regional development
and its impact on individual neighborhoods. The results of imple-
menting these changes are compact, mixed-use urban develop-
ment, pedestrian and public-transit friendly neighborhoods, mixed-
income communities and open spaces.
Smart growth seeks to attract new investment, residents and jobs
to our urban neighborhoods by making these areas attractive to
work and live in, thus combating the decentralization of economic
and residential life away from city centers. Because smart growth
demands that society sacrifice many of the benefits afforded by
sprawl, such as low-density residential neighborhoods, dependence
on the automobile and the ability for middle- and upper-income
households to separate themselves from the problems of poverty
commonly found in city centers, it can foster social equity. Indeed,
by lessening the physical distance between rich and poor, smart
growth makes everyone partners in the prosperity of their urban
community. Consequently, the economic disparity between rich
and poor will lessen as well.
A. International District Village Square
Over the past two decades, Seattle's International District, which
is home to a large Asian population, was bruised by a number of
civic projects including the construction of sports stadiums and
highways. The neighborhood's perimeter had been particularly
hard hit. One notable eyesore was an empty lot where the county's
public transit authority once kept buses. Following extensive com-
munity dialogue, negotiations with city and county officials and the
resulting development of a complex financing package, this vacant
lot was transformed into International Village Square, a 112,000
square-foot, mixed-use facility.
The building combines seventy-five apartments for low-income
elderly, retail business and community organizations providing
multilingual and culturally appropriate services including health-
care and childcare. The site is easily accessible by public transpor-
tation. In addition, the site employs more than two hundred health
and human service professionals who speak forty-three different
languages and dialects. International Village Square is the largest
multi-ethnic project in the Pacific Northwest.
The importance of International Village Square is the example it
serves of community cooperation and smart growth. Sue Taoka,
executive director of the Seattle Chinatown International District
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Preservation and Development Authority captured the significance
of the project:
We want to reclaim this neighborhood's history of support for
individuals and families who immigrate to this country, by pro-
viding culturally familiar sights and sounds, goods and services.
Most of all, we want to ensure that the basic necessities - edu-
cation, health care, jobs and homes - that enable us all to live
in dignity, remain available regardless of a person's income ....
B. Holly Park
Holly Park was a public housing community built in the 1940s to
provide housing for defense industry workers during World War II.
The community spanned 110 acres and consisted of nine hundred
housing units laid out in a disjointed street grid that separated it
from the surrounding neighborhood. By the early 1990s, it had be-
come the city's most distressed public housing community, harbor-
ing severe poverty and crime and offering little hope of better lives
for the families who lived there.
In 1993, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
awarded a planning grant that energized the city government,
housing authority, neighbors and residents to transform Holly Park
into a vibrant, mixed-income community. Emerging from their col-
laboration was a plan to create NewHolly, an area of 1200 homes,
various community facilities, learning centers, a library and a new
college campus. In addition, there will be a Head Start program,
childcare, job training programs, small business loan funds and em-
ployment opportunities that will allow residents to earn living
wages.
Many of the principles of smart growth are represented in
NewHolly: mixed-income and mixed-use development, an in-
creased population density and accessibility to public transporta-
tion. The homeownership units are next to, and indistinguishable
from, the public rental housing. The apartments will be priced for
very low-income residents, as well as those with moderate incomes.
With the additional three hundred units of housing, as well as the
many other facilities sited on the property, this redevelopment in-
creased the density of land use. NewHolly also is located adjacent
to a proposed new regional transit center, which is convenient for
residents and a magnet for new development in the surrounding
neighborhood.
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II. Public-Interest Investment
Both of these projects demonstrate how the most successful
neighborhoods are those in which everyone accepts responsibility
and in which everyone is willing to invest money and time. The
innovation and community cooperation behind International Dis-
trict Village Square and NewHolly were very inspiring, but what
was equally noteworthy was how these two housing developments
were financed through public/private partnerships. Government
funding was absolutely essential in both projects, but so too was
the private investment provided through grants, low-income hous-
ing tax credits and loans.
For example, the enormity and complexity of NewHolly required
a blend of public and private financing. The anchor funding for the
redevelopment was a $48 million grant from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. The Seattle Housing Authority
is currently leveraging this grant with funding from state and local
government and extensive private investment from financial insti-
tutions, including loans, grants and tax credit equity. When the re-
development effort is complete, the Seattle Housing Authority will
have leveraged the federal grant with more than $160 million.
The International Village Square, too, serves as an example of
the power of using various funding sources. The Seattle Chinatown
International District Preservation and Development Authority de-
veloped the $19.5 million building. City, county and federal gov-
ernment contributed the bulk of the $7.1 million in public dollars
supporting the project. Tax-exempt bonds backed by the city will
provide another $9 million and the remaining $3.5 million was
raised through private donations.
Two decades ago, developments like these would have been fi-
nanced solely through government funds. Now, local governments
and local citizens and businesses alike can share in these endeav-
ors. The most exciting dynamic emerging from public/private part-
nerships today is the role of local financial institutions in
community change and development. Communities are engaging
local banks in the planning process and presenting them with
sound investment opportunities that benefit their business inter-
ests. Financial institutions, long the cornerstones of their commu-
nities, are embracing the opportunity to help their cities and towns
thoughtfully manage their development.
By recognizing the positive impact the project would have on the
neighborhood, a number of financial institutions supported Inter-
national Village Square with donations to the capital gifts cam-
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paign. Local banks invested heavily in NewHolly, providing
construction financing and permanent mortgages for families who
would become the first homeowners in the neighborhood's history.
Tax credit equity and grants from Fannie Mae and the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Seattle leveraged the sizable investments
from the local financial institutions.
Financial institutions also enrich these partnerships in other
ways. They provide fiscal reason and analysis to ensure that smart
growth developments make economic sense as well as fulfill a com-
munity's goals. The fundamental mission of smart growth is to
build sustainable communities, a goal plainly compatible with a
business whose profitability - and survival - hinge on making
long-term financial investments.1
Conclusion
The role of local financial institutions will evolve as we enter the
twenty-first century. Communities will rely more than ever before
on private sector investment, and local banks will be looked to pro-
vide financial support for community-inspired smart growth devel-
opment. The wave of consolidation among financial institutions in
recent years only heightens the importance of local lenders in plan-
ning for overall community development and participating in pub-
lic/private financing partnerships.
Building communities and successful cities requires that citizens
understand what they value most, define their own collective fu-
ture and actively participate in creating it. Smart growth and the
public-interest investment opportunities it generates foster this
style of community building and provide the tools to help our cities
manage urban sprawl, the biggest challenge now facing urban soci-
ety. It also enables communities to tap the full potential of their
citizenry - government, residents, businesses, banks and others -
in an effort to build prosperous partnerships for the twenty-first
century.
1. As communities seek out greater private investment for neighborhood rede-
velopment, however, they must overcome the one great myth about public/private
partnerships, namely, that the private sector foots the bill and the public reaps the
benefits. All partners in these endeavors must prosper, albeit at different levels, to be
a "partnership."
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REFORMING THE URBAN WORKPLACE:
THE LEGACY OF FRANCES PERKINS
Honorable Jeanine Ferris Pirro*
"I came to Washington to work for God, FDR, and the millions
of forgotten, plain common workingmen."'
Introduction
Growing up in Elmira, New York during the 1950s and 60s, peo-
ple frequently asked me about my plans for the future. From the
earliest age, I remember replying that I wanted to grow up to be an
attorney. Invariably, that answer led to another question: "But
don't you want to be a mommy?" While I was not averse to mar-
riage and parenthood, I possessed an innate sense that having both
a family and a career were not mutually exclusive. Looking back,
many young girls, not so many generations before me, believed
that life did not hold such possibilities for them.
Over the course of this century, many developments occurred to
change how society views women and how women view them-
selves. Not so many years before my birth, the nation recruited
women for the work force in large numbers to assist the war effort
during World War II. Only a few decades earlier, women won the
ability to vote in national elections.2
At the beginning of this century, individual laborers had little
control over their work environment; nor did most urban workers
have the financial means necessary in case of disability or retire-
ment. Well into the second quarter of this century, many urban
workers, particularly women and children, endured up to eighty-
hour work weeks for sweatshop-level pay, often under filthy, dan-
gerous conditions. The issues of the day, particularly to women,
were education, social services and working conditions for the
poor. Fittingly, an extraordinary woman championed many of
these issues: Frances Perkins a woman driven by the dogged con-
* Judge Pirro is a former Westchester County Court Judge, and is currently serv-
ing her second term as District Attorney of Westchester County, New York.
1. Frances Perkins - Pioneer of Social Security (visited June 3, 1999) <http://
www.ssa.gov/history/fperkins.html>.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend XIX (1920).
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viction that the welfare of workers - especially women and chil-
dren - was a matter of governmental concern.
Perkins not only became a role model for women, but she also
changed the work place for every American by leading a revolu-
tion that challenged the way government cares for its citizens.
Moreover, by the late 1930s, the legislation she helped enact, such
as the Social Security Act and the laws regulating working condi-
tions, changed the lives of urban children and women significantly.
Today, these laws are so long established and familiar to us as to
have become an unnoticed and unremarkable aspect of our society.
The safety net these laws provide protects workers from exploita-
tion and provides for them well into old age. Due to the breadth
and fundamental nature of Perkins' changes to the urban work-
place, she is, consequently, the most influential person to urban
America in the twentieth century.
I. Francis Perkins: Her Early Work
At the time of her appointment as labor secretary in 1933,3 Per-
kins had been investigating urban working conditions and making
strides towards improving the lot of workers for almost three de-
cades. Her phenomenal success in effecting the changes she sought
was largely the result of the fact that, in whatever area she hap-
pened to be seeking change, Perkins conducted first-hand investi-
gations in the field. These personal investigations became her
trademark and provided the basis for the detailed and vivid reports
she prepared that were strikingly effective in convincing city and
state officials to act on her findings.
Perkins initially encountered the technique of field investigation
while at Mount Holyoke College, where she attended from 1898-
1902.1 As part of a course in American colonial history, Perkins
visited textile and paper mills,' thereby observing first-hand the
conditions under which the workers labored. She was horrified at
her discovery: long hours, inadequate compensation and safety
hazards. Upon investigation, Perkins was appalled that there were
no effective laws regulating these conditions.6
3. See, e.g., Frances Perkins: Women's History - The Quest for Equality (visited
June 3, 1999) <http://www.worldbook.com/fun/whm/html/whmO86.htm> ("[Frances
Perkins] served as secretary of labor under President Franklin D. Roosevelt from
1933 to 1945.").
4. See GEORGE MARTIN, MADAM SECRETARY FRANCES PERKINS 46 (1976).
5. See id. at 50.
6. See id.
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After graduation, Perkins lived at Hull House and spent time
working at Chicago Commons, the first of Chicago's famous settle-
ment houses offering social and educational opportunities to the
underprivileged.7 To obtain reliable information about social con-
ditions, she personally visited the tenements and sweatshops that
comprised the everyday environment of the vast majority of those
living in the urban settings surrounding her.8
In 1907, Perkins left Hull House and took charge of a group in
Philadelphia that protected immigrant ministry girls who were ar-
riving daily in Philadelphia to seek work.9 These girls were often
preyed upon, cheated, robbed or led into prostitution. 10 Not con-
tent with simply housing these young women, Perkins acted to end
the oppressive conditions they faced. Perkins posed as a girl who
had just arrived in the city and was looking for a room and a job.
Based on her undercover experiences, Perkins filed reports chroni-
cling the working conditions of young women supporting them-
selves in a major American city. 1 Despite encountering frank
indifference from politicians and vigorous opposition, including a
physical attack on her by men who exploited the young women,' 2
Perkins managed to close down many of the worst offenders and
get protective local legislation passed. 3
In 1910, Perkins came to Manhattan where she served as execu-
tive secretary of the Consumer's League. 4 There, she investigated
the working conditions in varying shops and small service indus-
tries and lobbied for a fifty-four-hour work week for women. Her
detailed reports and testimony at public hearings about the
deplorable state of affairs she discovered led to new regulations
that eliminated some sweatshops and improved sanitary
conditions.
H. The Consummate Reformer
While Perkins was studying the causes of industrial accidents and
fires, a factory fire occurred that stunned the national conscience
7. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 63-65.
8. See, e.g., Gordon Berg, "Be Ye Steadfast" The Life and Work of Frances Per-
kins (Nov. 27, 1998) <http://www.dol.gov/opa/public/frances/frances.htm>.
9. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 65-68.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 66.
13. See, e.g., Gordon Berg, "Be Ye Steadfast" The Life and Work of Frances Per-
kins <http://www.dol.gov/opa/public/frances/frances.htm>.
14. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 77-103.
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into awareness of the deplorable working conditions faced by wo-
men. On March 25, 1911, a fire broke out in the Triangle Shirt-
waist Factory in New York City.15 Perkins, at a friend's house in
nearby Washington Square,16 watched in horror as six hundred
young women, some as young as thirteen, were trapped by the fire
in the upper floors of the factory.1 7 One hundred and forty-six wo-
men died in the fire; many jumped to their deaths to escape the
flames and others perished in stairwells and elevator shafts. Once
the flames were extinguished, others were found piled near the
doorways that had been kept locked. 8
The deaths stimulated a concern by officials over factory safety.
Consequently, New York City formed the Committee on Safety.1 9
Because of her experience in the field, the Committee hired Per-
kins and appointed her its executive secretary in 1912.
While on the Committee, Perkins became an expert on factory
safety, an expertise she on which drew throughout her career.2 ° In
Albany, Perkins, along with State Senators Robert Wagner and Al
Smith, successfully urged the state legislature to create a New York
State Factory Commission.21 The Commission appointed Perkins
its director of investigations. In that role, Perkins led Commission
investigators and members to sites where they viewed first-hand
the deplorable conditions of working women and children.22 These
surprise visits uncovered widespread violations of the child labor
15. See id. at 84-90.
16. See id. at 84-85. Perkins later called the incident a "never-to-be-forgotten re-
minder why I had to spend my life fighting conditions that would permit such a trag-
edy." See, e.g., Workers' Plight Was Perkins' Priority (visited June 3, 1999) <http://
www.naswdc.org/PiecesNASW/perkins.htm>.
17. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 84-86.
18. Ironically, one year earlier, workers from the company went on strike, as
members of the Garment Worker Union, seeking more sanitary and safer working
conditions, including unlocked doors and sufficient fire escapes. The factory re-
sponded by locking out the strikers and hiring replacements - the same young wo-
men who died in the fire.
Tragically, the factory owners were not held responsible legally. The factory own-
ers collected $64,925 from their insurance company for property damage in the law-
suit filed after the fire. Almost three years to the day of the fire, the owner of the
building, Joseph J. Asch, settled with the twenty-three individual suits for lives lost in
the fire, at a rate of $75 per life. See id., at 86.
19. See id. at 88.
20. See id. at 103-121.
21. See id. State Senators Wagner and Smith served as co-chairs of the investigat-
ing commission of the New York State Factory Commission.
22. Perkins once said: "No one except the man who has been exposed to noxious
gasses, dust, and fumes in a factory really knows what the dangers of factory life can
be." Bio of Frances Perkins by SSA (visited June 3, 1999) <http://www.ssa.gov/history/
fperkins.html>.
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laws. Investigators often caught employers who denied hiring
young children trying to hide them when they arrived. Both Sena-
tors Wagner and Smith, based on their observations during these
surprise visits, became vigorous advocates for new labor and wel-
fare legislation.
The Commission soon proposed, and the New York State legisla-
ture passed, a broad range of remedial legislation. Moreover, due
to her assistance, the Commission recommended reforms that re-
sulted in the passage of thirty-five laws in just two years.23
Although Perkins spent most of her time directing the Safety Com-
mittee's work in New York, she made frequent trips to Albany and
elsewhere in New York State on behalf of the Factory Commission.
During this period, there were no federal laws regulating labor, in-
dustrial standards of health and safety or welfare. As a result, New
York's legislation resulting from Perkins' investigations eventually
became the model for federal law on these subjects.
In 1918, Perkins' colleague from the Factory Commission, Al
Smith, became the governor of New York. He immediately ap-
pointed Perkins as a member of the New York State Industrial
Commission. 24 From this post, Perkins served as the de facto head
of the state labor department. In 1929, after Al Smith unsuccess-
fully ran for president, New York's new governor, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, officially conferred this title on Perkins, immediately
naming her the New York State Industrial Commissioner, a post
she held until 1933.25
I. Madame Secretary
When Franklin Roosevelt became president in 1933, he took
Perkins to Washington with him as his Secretary of Labor, making
her the first woman to hold a cabinet post.26 As a member of the
Cabinet, Perkins instituted dramatic changes. During her first hun-
dred days in office, in addition to reorganizing the Labor Depart-
ment and increasing its efficiency and effectiveness, she oversaw
the creation of a number of programs to provide immediate relief
to desperate citizens unable to find work. These included the Civil-
23. See, e.g., Workers' Plight Was Perkins' Priority (visited June 3, 1999) <http://
www.naswdc.org/PiecesNASW/perkins.htm>.
24. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 144.
25. See id. at 206. While serving in that capacity, Perkins was largely responsible
for expanding New York state's employment services, data-gathering operations and
investigating of factories. See, e.g., Workers' Plight Was Perkins' Priority (visited June
3, 1999) <http://www.naswdc.org/PiecesNASW/perkins.htm>.
26. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 242.
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ian Conservation Corps and the Federal Emergency Relief Admin-
istration.27 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
and the National Labor Relations Act also due to Perkins' unflag-
ging efforts to protect labor organizations and make minimum
wage, maximum hour and child labor laws a national concern.28 To
Frances Perkins, however, the highlight of her career came in 1935
with the passage of the Social Security Act.29 This Act changed the
economic and social structure of American life by assuring benefits
for those retired, unable to work and temporarily unemployed.3 °
Conclusion
Over the course of her illustrious career, Frances Perkins
changed the urban American landscape with her visions of fair,
safe and humane working conditions. When she died in 1965, Per-
kins left a legacy of labor reform. To publicly minded women, she
left a special legacy - an inspirational lifetime of personal success,
based entirely upon her unfailingly exemplary performance with-
out regard to her gender. That is why Frances Perkins was the per-
son most influential to the development of urban America in the
twentieth century.
27. See id. at 249 (Civilian Conservation Corps); id. at 257-58 (Federal Emergency
Relief Administration).
28. See id. at 387-95 (Fair Labor Standards Act), 381-86 (National Labor Relations
Act).
29. See id. at 340-56.
30. Interestingly, Perkins doubted the constitutionality of the new Social Security
scheme. As she grew worried over the fate of the proposed legislation during the
closing days of 1934. As fate would have it, she attended an afternoon tea party held
by then-Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Harlan F. Stone. At one point dur-
ing that afternoon Perkins found herself seated next to Justice Stone and, during their
small talk, he inquired as to the progress of her proposed Social Security bill. She
explained her concerns over the constitutionality of the proposed law, to which he
whispered, "the taxing power of the Federal Government, my dear, the taxing power.
You can do anything under the taxing power." Three years later, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act of 1935 under the federal taxing
power. See Frances Perkins, The Roots of Social Security (speech delivered at the
Social Security Administration Headquarters, Baltimore, Maryland, Oct. 23, 1962) re-
printed in Essay by Frances Perkins (visited June 3, 1999) <http://199.173.225.3/history/
perkins5.html>.
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A TRIAL JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE -
PROMOTING JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS WHILE
PROTECTING PRIVILEGE*
Honorable Marian Blank Horn**
Let me start this evening by saying how happy I am to be here
with you tonight. I feel fortunate to have been chosen to follow in
the proud tradition of Maureen McNamara and to deliver this lec-
ture in her honor. I take my place behind Ms. McNamara and the
other distinguished women who have preceded me.
Unlike some of my predecessors, however, I am made even
more humble by having to walk up the front steps into this build-
ing, the same way I did on my first day of law school as a terrified
1L. All my old insecurities flooded back into my consciousness. In
the audience are a number of my law school classmates, and my
husband who graduated two years ahead of me, also from the law
school. I suspect not one of us would have guessed I would be
lucky enough to be a federal judge and to be standing here with
you tonight. I also want to acknowledge one of my daughters, who
is in the audience. Of all the jobs I have held, and the brochure
announcing tonight's program is far too flattering, the most impor-
tant and the most enjoyable job on my resume is that of mother to
my three accomplished daughters.
For the students in the audience, I have to tell you, based on
everything I have seen and heard - and I have visited the law
school from time to time in the intervening years - this is a far
more user-friendly place than it used to be. I believe the strength
of today's Fordham Law School is due in large part to the leader-
ship of your Dean, John Feerick. I am proud to call him a friend
* The following lecture was presented at the Fordham University School of Law
as the Annual Maureen E. McNamara Memorial Lecture on October 6, 1998. The
goal was to offer an audience of students, faculty and practitioners a judge's
perspective on litigation, and also to discuss from a somewhat more academic
perspective a related legal issue. As a speech, it was never intended as an exhaustive
legal treatise, but rather as a way to spark interest in the topics covered and to lay a
foundation to further the practice of law. Moreover, to promote the delivery of her
remarks, the lecturer did engage in extemporaneous additions and deletions during
the course of the evening's presentation.
** Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims, Washington, D.C. The lecturer,
an alumnus of the Fordham University School of Law, acknowledges and is grateful
for the assistance of her law clerk, Andrew M. Goldfrank, a member of the New York
Bar and a 1996 Fordham University School of Law graduate.
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and one whom I admire. John Feerick exemplifies the best in law
school leadership. His commitment to the school, to the individual
student, to the community, and to the improvement of the practice
of law through teaching and doing is a model for all of us.
I am a judge on the United States Court of Federal Claims,
which is a federal trial court located in Washington, D.C.' I love
my current job, in part because each day is different and each day
is a combination of the practical and the academic. You never
know what will happen in the courtroom or in any phase of litiga-
tion. To sit on the court, one has to be appointed by the President
and confirmed by the United States Senate.2 It is a federal trial
court with nationwide jurisdiction, which handles civil suits brought
against the United States - no criminal matters. Many of the
cases involve large dollar claims and complex litigation. Our cases
include contract,3 tax4 and patent5 cases, takings cases under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,6 Native American claims,7
military and civilian employee pay cases,8 and vaccine compensa-
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, ch. 7 § 105(a), 96 Stat. 27, 28 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1994)). The court's name was changed in 1992 to the "Court of Federal Claims" by
the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 105-572, 106 Stat. 4506
(1992).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a), 172 (1994).
3. The principal statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims
is known as the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Pursuant to
this statute, the court possesses jurisdiction to entertain any suit for money damages
against the United States which does not sound in tort and which is founded upon the
United States Constitution, an act of Congress, an Executive Order, a regulation of an
Executive Department or any express or implied-in-fact contract with the United
States. See id.
4. See supra note 3. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction that is
possessed by United States District Courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1994),
to entertain tax refund suits. In order to obtain jurisdiction a taxpayer is required to
file a claim for a refund with the Internal Revenue Service. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)
(1994).
5. The court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United
States by the owner of a United States patent to recover compensation for the unau-
thorized use by or for the United States of a patented invention. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1994), 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1994).
6. See supra note 3.
7. Native American claims against the United States are grounded in statute.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 70s, 70v (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994).
8. Jurisdiction over military pay cases, for service members involuntarily retired,
separated or discharged, is found in the money-mandating provisions of the Military
Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Pursuant to the general principles delineated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906), federal civilian employees and former fed-
eral civilian employees may file suit in the Court of Federal Claims to seek monies
allegedly due to them arising out of their employment relationship with the United
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tion cases.9 We have a few other areas of assigned jurisdiction, but
these are the major ones.
Moreover, I have been fortunate in previous jobs to have had
the opportunity to travel, especially in the Pacific region, including
the former Trust Territories of the Pacific, and to help set up court
systems in vastly different cultures. This has given me an addi-
tional perspective on how courts run and how we might wish them
to operate.
When I was asked to do this lecture, I started by doing some
research on past lectures and on the goals of the lecture series. I
tried to select a topic which would be meaningful to the audience
and to which I could contribute. I have been interested in the de-
veloping law of privileged communications, and whether recent de-
velopments are to our benefit or detriment. Thus, I decided this
was an opportunity to review what was happening in the law of
privileged communications, a subject which is present in virtually
every case on my docket, either during discovery or trial.
Shortly thereafter, I left Washington for an out-of-town location,
to conduct the remaining two weeks of a seventeen-week govern-
ment contracts trial having to do with a major construction project
at a national landmark. After fifteen weeks of trial, all the lawyers
and experts involved in the litigation knew each other well. Our
greetings at the start of each trial segment had become friendly and
relaxed.
When I walked into court and welcomed everyone back, one of
the lawyers for the plaintiff said with a smirk, followed by a laugh:
"Big doings in Washington. We can all learn lessons about perjury
and useful tips for deposition and courtroom demeanor from our
Chief Executive." As he finished, I realized that the very next
thing I was about to do was to swear in a key expert witness. What
I am describing was a flash in the pan, informal moment - but, I
recognized that I needed to respond. I could not let the moment
pass and conduct business as usual after the comment that the at-
torney had made for all to hear. Current events had intruded into
our courtroom. It was not a partisan, political issue; it had become
States. The terms and conditions of their employment are governed by statutes and
regulations, and it is the statutes and regulations of Executive Departments that man-
date the payment of money which may form the basis of a federal employee's action
for pay. See Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981).
9. The jurisdiction of the court includes claims for compensation arising from
vaccination injuries under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1994).
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a serious practical problem. It was up to me to take charge and it
was necessary to remind everyone present of the seriousness of the
oath to tell the truth each witness must take before offering testi-
mony, and which is at the root of our system of fairness and justice.
I was compelled to offer a lecture on the consequences in my court-
room if I even suspected the possibility of perjury. I began, "Here
in this court we take perjury seriously." With a stern expression, I
continued to lecture for a few moments before I said "Mr. [Jones],
please take the stand. Raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?" I hoped that I had chosen the right words and communi-
cated how serious I was about the significance of sworn testimony.
Imagine in how many other courtrooms around the country similar
encounters or thoughts were intruding.
Later, during our next courtroom break, I called my liaison at
the law school, who had been wonderful to work with, but who,
politely, was breathing down my neck to finalize the topic for the
McNamara Lecture. In addition to addressing the law of privileged
communications, I decided to include discussion about the role of
trial judges to promote truth, fairness and morality in the court-
room, and the dangers to our judicial system if the sanctity of the
oath to tell the truth in legal proceedings is allowed to erode.
The topics of privilege and courtroom ethics are related. At
some point in virtually every case on my docket, whether during
discovery or at trial, both are involved. Moreover, the sanctity of
the oath to tell the truth and the recognized right of citizens to
preserve the privacy of certain types of communications, even dur-
ing litigation, are both fundamental to our system of justice. Like
so many lawyers and members of the public, I have been troubled
by the impact of current events on our system of justice. I was
being given an opportunity to think about issues and interact with a
sophisticated audience on topics of importance.
Tonight's discussion does not address the politics of recent
events. I know some of the principals in the drama and, like every-
one in this room, I have definite views on both the issues and the
personalities. What is important is that, as attorneys - and those
about to become attorneys - we support and enhance a system
which has worked well for this country. Our legal and judicial sys-
tem is not perfect. Although we each have personal gripes and
suggestions for reforms to improve the system, such as how to limit
litigation expenses and how to speed up the process, few of us want
a radical change in how we conduct the resolution of legal conflicts.
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As a society, we share the fundamental ethical and moral values
which form the basis for our system of laws, and we believe in our
legal system. The law students would not be enrolled here, nor
would the law professors be teaching, if they did not endorse the
system.
We must hold on fiercely to the ethical and moral values which
are embedded in our system of conflict resolution and adjudication
and upon which our organized and civilized society is based. Quot-
ing a source from 1894, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his collection
of lectures titled The Nature of the Judicial Process, pointed out:
"'Ethical considerations can no more be excluded from the admin-
istration of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws
than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live."' 10
We live in a chaotic world. Read the newspapers and you cannot
miss the worldwide turmoil. We also live in a far more pluralistic
and diverse society than our ancestors. In our modern, secular so-
ciety, the common denominator rules are often increasingly diffi-
cult to discern. We do not want the truth to become ephemeral,
malleable, or subjective. We do not want truth to become too
pragmatic, too subjective, or too situational. If one applies situa-
tional ethics, we are left with no basic, fundamental ethics. If
pushed to the extreme, we have ended our right to say we have a
system of truth and justice. In our legal system, the courts, based
on a framework of fundamental values and a dedicated search for
the truth, have provided the stability for conflict resolution.
Although litigants challenge individual decisions, even negative re-
sults are accepted by all but a few.
In the past, an oath was viewed as sacrosanct. Many thought
literally that God would strike you dead if you lied under oath.
Well, even if you do not believe that today, one still ought to be-
lieve that the oath to tell the truth is sacred. For some, perhaps,
the greater deterrent is the fear of prosecution for perjury." Re-
gardless, the goals which law students and attorneys are pursuing
become meaningless if people can come to a trial feeling justified
that it is permissible to lie or to shave the truth. At that point, we
endorse self-interest as the higher goal to the detriment of the
community.
10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921)
(quoting Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 605, 731, 734 (1914) (quoting JOHN FORREST DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 18 (1894)).
11. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622 (1994).
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The purpose of the legal system on which we all rely is to sort
out the rights of men, women, children and institutions, and to pro-
mote peaceful co-existence in society. Statutes and regulations are
developed, within the context of a fundamental sense of what is
right and wrong, to announce the applicable rules and to guide
these relationships. Long before judges get involved, citizens,
sometimes with the assistance of lawyers, try to establish relation-
ships in their business and private lives. For example, they enter
into contracts to develop commercial opportunities, to build
houses, and to seal marriages. The goal is to foster honest interac-
tions and to ensure consistency and predictability. All citizens can
then understand and rely upon the rules, thereby providing a uni-
form legal system, including a fair process for conflict resolution.
Judges and courts get involved when those relationships break
down. People go to court when they have irreconcilable differ-
ences. The vast majority of judges will urge you never to come see
them. Unfortunately, we have become a society too prone to liti-
gation. Business is way too good in the court system. Yet, despite
the litigious nature of our society, what is laudable about our sys-
tem of laws is that generally we do not resort immediately to guns
or other means of force to resolve disputes. The majority of our
citizens rely on peaceful means to resolve their disagreements. The
vanguards of protection for our judicial system and society are you,
the lawyers or soon-to-be lawyers. For society to succeed, every
one of you must bring to your jobs the highest ethical and moral
standards each and every day. If you do your jobs well, we judges
will see you and your clients, whether it be in the criminal or civil
system, far less frequently.
The role of a trial judge is more like that of the practitioner than
that of an appellate judge. As judges, we have all taken the same
oath, and on the federal level, have all gone through the same con-
firmation process. We all wear the same black robes and approach
our jobs, hopefully, with the same seriousness of purpose to uphold
the Constitution and the laws of the jurisdiction in which we sit.
Yet, when appellate courts speak, they do not always worry about
how their legal wisdom will impact the rest of us down in the
trenches. They are encouraged by our system to be legal purists.
Standing in the halls of the law school in which I got my start, I
am reminded of the many times that, as law students, we intently
debated the meaning of individual legal points for hours. We be-
came caught up in the minor nuances of a single sentence, often
without remembering that the cases we were intellectualizing in-
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volved real plaintiffs and real defendants. I still enjoy the intellec-
tual debate and have ample opportunity to exercise my intellectual
curiosity along with my research and writing skills as an adjunct
law professor, teaching third-year law students; during my tours as
a visiting fellow on university campuses, teaching on the under-
graduate level; and while crafting the complex bench trial and mo-
tion practice opinions we generate in our court.
However, I started my legal career as an Assistant District At-
torney here in New York City. I like it where the real people are. I
like the calculated chaos of the trial court. I like the unpredictabil-
ity of witnesses, who often bring excitement to cases by offering
insights and surprising testimony they may not have previously
shared with their attorneys. I welcome the puzzle-like challenge of
unscrambling the testimony and exhibits of lengthy and complex
cases. Frankly, I enjoy the challenges of the unpredictable and the
requirement to make on-the-spot decisions, such as momentary ev-
identiary rulings.
Perhaps I flatter myself, but I believe that the trial judge has a
key role in our society. The role of the trial judge is to be a combi-
nation gatekeeper and referee on the adjudicatory ballfield on
which claimants face off against each other. It is the mandate of
the trial judge to strip the emotions out of the case and to provide
guidance on how to resolve the issues in contention, sometimes
with the help of a jury and sometimes on his or her own. Ulti-
mately, the trial judge must take the panoply of facts and apply
them to a rational framework, either issuing jury instructions or, in
the case of a bench trial, by issuing final opinions.
If we, the trial judges, do our jobs well, we can resolve the cases
without the need for further adjudication. As trial judges, we can
meet our obligations by disposing of as many cases as possible dur-
ing pretrial proceedings, and by conducting supportable, focused
trials which result in decisions that reflect the absence of reversible
error. I know in my chambers, one of our goals is to issue well-
reasoned and well-written decisions, which fully find and articulate
the essential facts and recite and apply the applicable law, so that
the need for expending additional time and money on appellate
reviews or remands will be kept to a minimum. The losers should
be able to easily understand the basis of the decision. The hope is
that appeals will be lodged only when there is a clear legal issue on
which reasonable men and women can disagree. If the trial judge
does a proper job, even if an appeal is filed, the scope of the appel-
late review will be carefully delineated and minimized. Remands
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from an appellate court for arbitrary and capricious fact-finding are
a sure sign that the trial court has failed and not done its job well.
To promote a continued belief in and reliance on our legal and
judicial system, what is the role of the trial judge? As members of
the bar and under the additional governance of the Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics, trial judges need to be sure that we not only facilitate
the resolution of litigation, but that we also do so in ways which are
consistent with our moral and ethical obligations. In the search for
the truth, judges must remain the stalwart defenders of the funda-
mental values our justice system seeks to preserve.
There are tensions inherent in an adversarial system. Litigants
sometimes become consumed with winning; regardless of the
method. Judges must provide guidance to ensure that society's val-
ues are not eroded, even when, on occasion, to do so might impede
litigation. The need in the courtroom to balance the hunt for infor-
mation, as part of the search for the truth, against intrusion into
acknowledged privacy rights, which are also central to our society,
is an example of when judicial intervention is required. As a trial
judge, I have a hunger for information. I want to decide cases for
the right reasons. I do not want the parties to withhold relevant
information. I do not want to be fooled because one party has de-
liberately withheld critical information, because one party has been
able to hire better experts, because one party has had more finan-
cial resources for investigation, or because one attorney simply was
a better advocate. Missing important, relevant information is one
of a trial judge's biggest fears.
Almost each day, I find myself having to balance my need and
thirst for information, against the possibility of allowing inappro-
priate intrusions into areas society has traditionally and properly
considered private for good reasons, such as the right to avoid self-
incrimination, the right to the protection of trade secrets, or the
right for citizens to have privileged communications. Tonight I will
explore with you one such exemplary area of the law that fre-
quently arises during the pretrial discovery proceedings and at
trial, namely, the issue of privileged communications.
Historically, society has placed value on privacies such as the
right to consult an attorney without oversight, the privileges of gov-
ernment officials to deliberate and reach difficult decisions in pri-
vate, the right to seek certain types of medical assistance in private,
the ability to seek religious counseling in confidence, and the sanc-
tity of marital relations. The invocation of these rights in a court-
room falls under the term "privileged communications." A
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number of the recent challenges involving the law of privilege,
however, have suggested to some that we are approaching a
merger of necessity and law, and that we should be wary of al-
lowing our legal system of conflict resolution to become captive to
the needs of the moment. For example, some have questioned
whether a federal secret service agent should have been forced to
testify against a President, whom he or she is protecting in the in-
terests of national security.12 At the same time, a difficult dilemma
arises for an attorney representing a client. The attorney is obli-
gated to represent the client to the best of his or her ability. Thus,
an attorney may attempt to avoid privilege protection, attempt to
assert inapplicable privileges, or even attempt to create new privi-
leges to protect his or her client
It is the role of the courts to depoliticize the issues and to create
rational and positive rules of process for use in litigation, including
those in the area of privileged communications. These procedural
guidelines must make long-term sense and uphold our traditional
values. We need rules to conduct litigation, and we need predict-
ability regarding those rules. Appellate courts can help us to de-
fine the rules of privilege. Trial courts, such as the federal trial
court in which I preside, must apply those rules and continue to
identify issues which need further definition by appellate courts.
Regarding the rules of privilege, which I will review as defined in
the federal courts, one must start with the basic principal that no
one can exercise the privilege to lie. Even in a criminal proceed-
ing, a defendant has the right not to respond by invoking the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, but not the right
to lie. The obligation to tell the truth during the course of litigation
is not negotiable. The oath a witness takes, whether at a deposi-
tion, in an affidavit, or during a trial, must have meaning.
At the core of the current, and continuing, controversy sur-
rounding the evolving law of privilege is the idea that certain com-
munications should remain confidential and outside the purview of
litigation. "Privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for confi-
dence and trust."" 3 This principal is juxtaposed against the nor-
mally predominant rule that all relevant and vital evidence is to be
presented to the trier of fact in order to ascertain the truth.14 The
public's expectation that certain communications will remain in
12. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
13. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
14. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.
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confidence creates an absolute need for reliability and certainty in
the law of privilege and the ability to predict that particular discus-
sions will remain protected. As emphasized by the United States
Supreme Court: "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to
be certain but which results in widely varying applications, is little
better than no privilege at all."15
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 focuses on the doctrine of privi-
lege in the federal courts. It is a general rule which does not iden-
tify specific codified privileges, but which provides that privileges
will be recognized under the federal common law in light of reason
and experience.16 The United States Supreme Court, in Jaffee v.
Redmond, promoted the notion that the federal courts could define
new privileges, and stressed that Rule 501 "did not freeze the law
governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular
point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to 'continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges' ,,17 based
on "reason and experience."' 8
This recognition of the power of the federal courts to adopt new
confidential communication privileges, however, should not be in-
terpreted to suggest that the courts intend to embrace liberally var-
ious proposed privileges. In 1990, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that "although Rule 501 manifests a congres-
sional desire not to freeze the law of privilege but rather to provide
the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-
case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expan-
sively."' 9 This judicial resolve, coupled with the established legal
15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
16. See FED. R. EvID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
Id.
17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
18. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 (citing Hawkins v. United States, 359 U.S. 74, 79
(1958)).
19. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (citing Tram-
mel, 445 U.S. at 47); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating
that "these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth").
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hurdles that a newly created privilege must surmount, indicate that
the addition of new absolute privileges in the federal courts will not
be frequent.20 For example, the United States Supreme Court has
rejected a university's assertion of privilege for academic peer re-
view process files after finding no constitutional, statutory or his-
torical basis for the creation of a privilege;21 has rejected an
accountant/auditor-client work product privilege; 22 has rejected a
state legislator's speech and debate privilege;23 has rejected a "priv-ilege to the editorial process of a media defendant; ' 24 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has rejected a Secret Service protective function privilege.
A litigant who seeks to invoke a novel privilege in federal court
has the burden of establishing the privilege. This burden involves
demonstrating that the asserted privilege "promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence. "26
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "an asserted priv-
ilege must also 'serv[e] public ends.' "27 In addition to these signifi-
cant private and public interests, it is likewise important for a
federal court to consider the "reason and experience" of the states
in enacting or recognizing a privilege.28
The well-accepted privileges embraced by our society and en-
dorsed by the courts are rooted in goals in which our society places
special values; for example, the sanctity of marriage, the priest/pen-
itent relationship, the right to counsel, and the national security of
the country. Wigmore on Evidence has articulated four prerequi-
sites to establish a privilege against the disclosure of communica-
tions: (1) the communication must originate in a communication
that will not be disclosed; (2) the elements of confidentiality must
20. See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 195; United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373
(1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No.
98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, at *5 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998), affd sub nom. In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079.
21. See University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 195.
22. See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
23. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
24. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169.
25. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1078, affg sub nom. In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *5.
26. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
27. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
28. Id. at 12-13 ("We have previously observed that the policy decisions of the
States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege
or amend the coverage of an existing one.").
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be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation-
ship between the parties; (3) the relationship must be one which
the community believes ought to be fostered; and (4) the injury
from disclosure to the relationship would be greater than the bene-
fit gained for the correct disposition of the litigation.29
One privilege that warrants discussion is the attorney-client privi-
lege, which is not only one of the most frequently invoked privi-
leges, but also one of the oldest of the confidential communications
privileges.3 ° The United States Supreme Court has emphasized
that the attorney-client privilege's "purpose is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice."'3 1 This privilege is premised on the
rationale "that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends
and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client. ' 32 Commentators note that the attor-
ney-client privilege is both intellectually and contextually under-
stood by lawyers and judges, rendering these practitioners
sympathetic to applying and enforcing the doctrine.33
Under the attorney-client privilege, a client seeking legal advice
has a permanent protection from disclosure of confidential com-
munications with an attorney acting in her or his legal capacity.34
Likewise, it has been accepted for a long time that, except in lim-
ited circumstances generally in the criminal justice context, that the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client .3  The
privilege attaches once a client communicates with an attorney for
the purposes of seeking legal services or advice even if the lawyer
is not retained.36 The privilege, however, may not be invoked by a
client who hires an attorney to seek services or advice that a non-
lawyer could readily handle. The privilege "protects only those dis-
29. See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
30. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084
(1998) (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888)).
31. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
32. Id.
33. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, 2 FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 697-98 & n.14 (7th ed. 1998) (citing Developments in
the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985)).
34. See id. (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-92).
35. See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
36. See, e.g., In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Bevill, Bresler &
Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986).
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closures necessary to obtain informed legal advice. ' 37 For exam-
ple, "[a] business that gets marketing advice from a lawyer does
not acquire a privilege in the bargain; so too a business that obtains
the services of a records custodian from a member of the bar."
38
The attorney-client privilege may not be invoked by the client if
the communication is later disclosed to a third-party, not an agent
of the attorney from whom advice was sought, and if the client
either did not wish to keep the materials confidential or the client
did not take adequate measures under the circumstances to pre-
vent disclosure of the privileged communications. 39 An exception
to the general rule against invoking the privilege for disclosure to
third-parties is the "common-interest" doctrine which extends the
attorney-client privilege to multiple clients pursuing a common in-
terest, who are represented by separate attorneys and who jointly
compile communications that would otherwise qualify as privi-
leged.4" Any such "common-interest" client may invoke the privi-
37. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
38. In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1988).
39. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir. 1994); In
re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714,
723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); National Helium Corp. v. United
States, 219 Ct. Cl. 612, 614 (1979).
40. See, e.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1996), cert. denied sub nor. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 520 U.S.
1193 (1997); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir.
1989).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a recent decision
addressed the definition of common-interest in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Office of President v. Office of
Gen. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). The Office of the Independent Counsel, on be-
half of the grand jury, sought notes from meetings, held after the grand jury testimony
of Hilary Rodham Clinton, that were attended by the First Lady, members of the
White House Counsel's Office and the First Lady's personal attorney. See id. at 913-
14. The court suggested that the First Lady attempted to invoke the common-interest
doctrine by arguing that she and the White House were pursuing a common interest
that "involved Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity, her personal attorney, Mrs. Clin-
ton as a representative of the White House.... and the White House's official attor-
neys." Id. at 922. The court stated that:
there is lacking in this situation the requisite common interest between cli-
ents, who are Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity and the White House.
Mrs. Clinton's interest in the OIC's [Office of the Independent Counsel] in-
vestigation is, naturally, avoiding prosecution, or else minimizing the conse-
quences if the OIC decides to pursue charges against her. One searches in
vain for any interest of the White House which corresponds to Mrs. Clin-
ton's personal interest.
The OIC's investigation can have no legal, factual, or even strategic effect on
the White House as an institution. Certainly action by the OIC may occupy
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lege, unless it is waived by the individual who contributed the
confidential communication.41
Recent decisions have placed in the news headlines the question
of to what extent the attorney-client privilege applies in the context
of advice sought from government attorneys. In a civil action,
when the government is the client, and government officials make
confidential communications to government attorneys for the pur-
pose of eliciting legal advice as opposed to for policy-making pur-
poses, it appears that the government client may invoke the
attorney-client privilege.42
A government attorney-government client privilege, however,
does not appear to apply in the context of a criminal grand jury
proceeding because, "the strong public interest in honest govern-
ment and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-
served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege
applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of
public officials."43 Thus, "[a]n official who fears he or she may
have violated the criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney
in confidence should speak with a private attorney, not a govern-
ment attorney. 44
Society and the courts also have embraced a psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. The United States Supreme Court, in Jaffee v. Red-
mond, recognized that confidential communications to licensed
psychologists and psychiatrists, and even to "licensed social work-
ers in the course of psychotherapy," were entitled to protection
from testimony as privileged.45 The Supreme Court, however,
the time of White House staff members, may vacate positions in the White
House if any of its personnel are indicted, and may harm the President and
Mrs. Clinton politically. But even if we assume that it is proper for the
White House to press political concerns upon us, we do not believe that any
of these incidental effects on the White House are sufficient to place that
governmental institution in the same canoe as Mrs. Clinton, whose personal
liberty is potentially at stake.
Id. at 922-23. The court closed the discussion on common-interest by stating that "the
White House and Mrs. Clinton have failed to establish that the interests of the Re-
public coincide with her personal interests." Id. (noting White House's citation of
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977)).
41. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
42. See Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438
(1st Cir. 1992); Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514 (D. Del. 1980).
43. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913-14 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
44. Id.
45. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1996). The holding of the case appears
to apply solely to statements made for the purposes of therapy:
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qualified the invocation of the privilege when stating that "we do
not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give
way, for example, if a serious harm to the patient or to others can
be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.
4 6
A logical extension of this decision might be the validation of a
physician-patient privilege. In Jaffee v. Redmond, however, the
Supreme Court specifically distinguished the role of a physician
from that of a psychotherapist by suggesting that confidential com-
munications were not imperative to the physician-patient relation-
ship.47 Nonetheless, almost every state has legislatively approved
some form of a physician-patient relationship,48 despite the fact
that the doctor-patient privilege has not been recognized in the
federal courts.49
Dating back to medieval English roots, the federal courts also
recognize a marital privilege, but have rejected a parent-child privi-
lege. The marital privilege began as a spousal disqualification from
testifying on the theory that "since husband and wife were one, and
that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence,
the husband was that one."' 50 This rule evolved into a privilege that
Effective psychotherapy.., depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and
trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure
of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of
the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of
confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclo-
sure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for
successful treatment.
Id. at 10. In asserting that the privilege is in the public interest, the Supreme Court
stated:
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the
provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a
mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance.
Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 18 n.19.
47. Id. at 10 ("Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed
successfully on the basis of the physical examination, objective information supplied
by the patient, and the results of diagnostic testing.").
48. See. 2 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 731 & n.137 (citing Develop-
ments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1533 (1985)).
49. See, e.g., Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied
(1995) (rejecting federal physician-patient privilege and application of state privilege);
United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting federal physi-
cian-patient privilege and collecting cases).
50. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
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allowed either spouse, no longer considered one entity, to prevent
the other from giving adverse testimony unless both consented. 1
There are two recognized interspousal privileges that arise from
a marital relationship: the adverse testimonial privilege and the
confidential communications privilege. The basic premise of the
adverse testimonial privilege is to foster the sanctity and harmony
of the marriage relationship at the time that testimony is de-
manded. 3 In contrast, the confidential communications privilege,
which is intended to protect marital communications at the time
that they are made from one spouse to another, may be invoked by
either spouse, even if the other spouse is willing to give testi-
mony. 4 There are, however, several exceptions to the confidential
communications privilege, such as the crime-fraud exception.
Moreover, in the event that a spouse is prosecuted or sued for vic-
timizing a family member, in the case of both marital privileges,
there exists an exception that allows the testimony. 6 Despite the
similarities to the sanctity of the privileges adherent to the spousal
relationship, however, the federal courts uniformly have rejected a
parent-child privilege, thereby opening the door for a parent to tes-
tify against or about a child, and vice-versa, for a child to testify
about a parent. 7
The federal courts consistently have recognized a clergy-penitent
privilege. The case law regarding clergy-communicant communica-
tions, however, distinguishes between religious or pastoral counsel-
ing, as opposed to nonreligious counseling.5 8
51. See id. at 43-46.
52. See id. at 40.
53. Id. at 44.
54. See United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992).
55. See United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1986).
56. United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992).
57. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1150 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roe
v. United States, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997). In the wake of the Office of Independent
Counsel's various efforts to investigate the President, public concern arose over the
lack of a parent-child privilege after Monica Lewinsky's mother was subpoenaed to
testify before the grand jury. The concern resulted in a proposed bill in the in the
105th Congress, specifically H.R. No. 3577, that would have amended Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 to include a parent-child privilege. A similar bill was introduced in the
106th Congress into the House of Representatives on February 3, 1999 (H.R. 522).
The current proposed bill would not alter the common law approach under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, but would add a single codified privilege protecting the parent-
child relationship, to be titled Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
58. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding discussions during pastoral family counseling session were privileged), with
United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding conversations with
pastor regarding avoidance of tax liability were nonreligious and not privileged).
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To promote our fundamental belief in protecting free speech, the
federal courts have recognized a qualified journalism privilege. In
1972, however, the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v.
Hayes,59 held that a journalist must provide a grand jury with infor-
mation relevant to an investigation, including confidential sources.
In the federal court system, the holding of Branzburg v. Hayes has
been limited to the grand jury context.6" A journalist's privilege,
however, is qualified and "the absence of confidentiality may be
considered in the balance of competing interests as a factor that
diminishes the journalist's, and the public's, interest in non-disclo-
sure."6 1 For example, in Herbert v. Lando,62 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that this qualified privilege is outweighed in libel cases
because otherwise the privilege would be the equivalent of a re-
porter's or editor's immunity from suit.63
The federal courts also have recognized a number of different
government privileges, beyond the government attorney-govern-
ment client privilege discussed above. These include a state and
military secrets privilege, a deliberative process privilege, an execu-
tive privilege, and a law enforcement privilege. A number of these
privileges have been invoked during investigations by the Office of
Independent Counsel.
The courts have shown deference to privilege claims that are
premised upon state or military secrets in which national security is
implicated. 64 Moreover, when the a state secrets privilege is trig-
gered, the privilege is absolute, whether claimed in a civil suit or a
criminal prosecution.65 The privilege also may be invoked by those
for whom the exposure of state secrets is required for the purposes
of putting on a defense, thereby precluding the litigation or prose-
cution altogether.66
An Executive Branch agency or governmental entity may invoke
the deliberative process privilege that is intended to protect a gov-
ernment's decision-making process by precluding disclosure of
59. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
60. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied sub nom. Scarce v. United States, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994); Zerelli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
61. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993).
62. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
63. See id. at 169-71.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953); Bareford v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir.), opinion vacated in part (1992).
65. See Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1154 (1996); Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d at 1143.
66. See Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991).
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predecisional government communications.67 The deliberative
process privilege is designed so that
it protects creative debate and candid consideration of alterna-
tives within an agency, and, thereby, improves the quality of
agency policy decisions. Second, it protects the public from the
confusion that would result from premature exposure to discus-
sions occurring before the policies affecting it had actually been
settled upon. And third, it protects the integrity of the decision-
making process itself by confirming that "officials should be
judged by what they decided[,] not for matters they considered
before making up their minds.",
68
The courts routinely apply the privilege to shield intra-govern-
ment documents.69 Exercise of the privilege, however, does have
limitations so that a document only may qualify for protection
under the privilege if it is both predecisional and deliberative.7 °
Therefore, "purely factual material contained in deliberative mem-
oranda and severable from its context would generally be available
for discovery. "71
Moreover, when the deliberative process privilege is invoked,
the need to protect the intra-governmental information is balanced
against the citizen's need for the information.72 Some of the fac-
tors to be considered to assess the requisite balancing are:
(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the
availability of other evidence; (iii) the "seriousness" of the liti-
gation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in
the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future timidity by gov-
ernment employees who will be forced to recognize that their
secrets are violable.73
67. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-55 (1975); In re Sealed
Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
68. Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482
F.2d 710, 718 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975)).
69. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Providence Journal Co. v. United
States Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1992); Quarles v. Department of the
Navy, 893 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70. Quarles, 893 F.2d at 392.
71. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88.
72. See id. at 89.
73. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citations omitted); see also In re Subpoena Served upon the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and Sec'y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
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The privilege must be invoked by the head of an agency or de-
partment that controls the desired government information and
not by the government attorney that is litigating the case.74 The
logic of this requirement stems from the fact that the withholding
of government documents is at odds with the concept of open gov-
ernance and access to the government by the citizenry.
A Presidential privilege is also available in appropriate circum-
stances. The United States Supreme Court has held that there is a
presumptive, albeit qualified, privilege for Presidential communi-
cations made in confidence 75 and in the course of performance of
official duties by the Chief Executive.76
The rationale has been explained by the Supreme Court as based
on possible foreign policy involvement and implication of state
secrets,77 as well as on the Chief Executive's role in governmental
decision-making, in which there is
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objec-
tive, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
making. A President and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and mak-
ing decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.78
The invocation of the Presidential privilege by an occupant of
the White House was examined by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit and found to encompass
factual and deliberative communications. 79 Despite the unique
role and relationship of the Chief Executive, the court, however,
held that "the deliberative process privilege can be overcome by a
sufficient showing of need. ' 80 The fact that the evidence sought
was the sole source for a grand jury criminal investigation was
found to outweigh the White House's interest in confidentiality.8
This balancing is not dissimilar to that undertaken when consider-
ing the broader Executive Branch, governmental deliberative pro-
cess privilege.82
74. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 137 F.R.D. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
75. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 711 (1974).
76. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11.
78. Id. at 708.
79. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.
80. Id. at 737.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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The law enforcement privilege is intended to "prevent disclosure
of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the
confidentiality of sources, to protect witnesses and law enforce-
ment personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in
an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an in-
vestigation. ' '83 This privilege is qualified in that the state interest
must be balanced against an individual's right to mount an effective
defense.8 4 "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the de-
fense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a
cause, the privilege must give way."85 In an informant case, the
presumption of confidentiality is removed, instead the onus is
placed upon the government to establish that an informant ex-
pected the communications to be in confidence and his or her iden-
86tity anonymous.
Having briefly reviewed the law of privilege, we return to the
role of the trial judge who must utilize the privilege rules and
others which have been developed for use in court proceedings.
Let me offer a few thoughts on how judges can utilize those rules of
process, while at the same time promoting fairness and the search
for the truth.
First, the trial judge should be the role model in the courtroom
through his or her personal demeanor and work habits. The judge
must be courteous to all and treat everyone with respect. The
judge must ensure that lawyers are deferential to one another and
to the witnesses. Civility in the courtroom should not just be an
often-pronounced goal, it must become a reality. The judge also
must be willing to work as hard as the attorneys and everyone else
in the courtroom. For example, abbreviated trial hours or long
breaks for lunches protract trials and give a bad name to the pro-
fession. The judge must come into the courtroom, whether for pre-
trial proceedings or for trial, well-prepared to discuss the issues and
to receive the evidence. This includes familiarity with the facts of
the case and the applicable law. The parties will be able to tell if
the judge is prepared or not.
Second, judges should retain the formalism, the familiar prac-
tices and the efficiencies of the courtroom, although not as goals in
83. In re Dep't of Investigation v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted).
84. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
85. Id.
86. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 177, 181 (1993).
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and of themselves. Remember, fifty percent of the people who
come to court will lose. Those litigants are more likely to believe
that they have received a fair trial if the court follows comfortable,
predictable and established patterns. If courtroom practice be-
comes too informal or too uncontrolled, if the case takes too long,
or if those in the courtroom are not treated with respect, the loser
is more likely to believe that the trial was not fair.
Formalism, however, does not mean arrogance or stuffiness.
Lawyers and judges must speak plain English. An attorney who
liberally sprinkles his or her speech with Latin phrases or long un-
common words engages in a dangerous practice. As a judge, I
might get annoyed, but juries and witnesses may not understand or
be receptive to the unfamiliar words or Latin phrases and may dis-
miss the argument.
Third, in law school, and thereafter as lawyers, we are trained to
split hairs and play word games, for example, when we engage in
statutory construction or the interpretation of a contract. Lawyers
are proud of themselves when they can distinguish their case from
otherwise adverse precedent or statutes. If fairness and the better-
ment of society are our basic goals, the over-legalization and the
hairsplitting should be of concern to all. We should question
whether to teach our students to parse sentences the way one wit-
ness, a member of the bar, did during testimony. Without allowing
our personal politics to enter into our understanding, should we
not question ourselves when we are quibbling about the definition
of the words "is" and "was," as follows: "It depends upon what the
meaning of the word is means. If 'is' means 'is, and never has
been,' that's one thing. If it means, 'there is none,' that was a com-
pletely true statement."87 Fortunately, the average jury is not gen-
erally comprised of lawyers. Juries are excellent antidotes to our
profession because they often see beyond the legalistic word
games.
Many members of the public unfortunately see lawyers as the
ultimate pragmatists, who will say anything to protect a client.
Some attorneys are comfortable with that image as part of their
representational duties, some are not. If anyone testifying in my
courtroom were to play with the definitions of the words "is" and
"was," my ears would immediately perk up and I would be care-
fully assessing that witness's credibility. So, I think, would the av-
87. Videotaped testimony of William J. Clinton, President of the United States,
Washington, D.C., before Office of Independent Counsel Grand Jury, Segment 3
(Aug. 17, 1998), available in 1998 WL 644125.
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erage juror. There is danger in appearing too cute. Therefore,
even if ethics and morality fail to deter an attorney or a witness
from cutting fine lines, those same individuals should be fore-
warned that over-legalization and over-definition of words often
backfire on a witness.
Fourth, judges should not promote doing things the way they
have always been done merely for that reason. The technological
revolution has hit the courtroom. For example, we now have mod-
ern capabilities such as smart courtrooms, real-time reporting, the
ability to conduct electronic discovery without the exchange of pa-
per documents, teleconferencing of witnesses during depositions
and trials, and electronic filing. Technology should be used to facil-
itate and speed up trials within the formal and familiar context.
Judges have an obligation to promote fairness by keeping cases
on their docket moving. Litigation is expensive and generally
comes into court only after the issues have been percolating for a
considerable length of time. Each of us have those embarrassing
cases that for one reason or another have gotten bogged down for
too long. And, while judges are, "so to speak," on permanent re-
tainer, time is money for those involved in the litigation. Faith in
our legal system is eroded when the expectation is that going to
court is almost useless because it will take so long to resolve a dis-
pute through the judicial process. Moreover, if a trial takes too
long, it is harder and harder to bring the parties together for a pos-
sible settlement. Positions harden, so much money has already
been invested that a little more hardly matters, and attorneys' fees
sometimes become the problem. For example, even if the parties
want to settle at a late stage in the litigation, the attorneys may be
the last ones willing to bend.
The new technology can be a boon to those judges who are ready
to embrace it. Utilization of technology can make our system far
more efficient, and after an initial investment, less costly. For ex-
ample, I am involved in a large military contract litigation, with
millions of pages of documents which are classified for national se-
curity purposes. We are conducting paperless discovery by ex-
changing tapes of scanned documents electronic briefing. This
facilitates security protection, avoids exchanging an original and
two copies of millions of pages of written material, and, because of
research software, makes searching the documents far more
efficient.
Fifth, judges must take control of the courtroom. Judges have an
obligation to assure fair, expeditious litigation opportunities for all
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parties. Sometimes in our adversarial system this becomes a true
challenge for the judge. Hard-fighting adversaries can get carried
away, either on purpose or for effect, while playing to the judge
and/or the jury, or because they lose control. Often, there is a vast
disparity between the skill levels of litigators. A judge also has spe-
cial responsibilities with non-attorney pro se litigants, who have a
hard time understanding and complying with the rules we lawyers
have developed for the orderly processing of litigation.88 While be-
ing supportive of the pro se party, however, the judge also must
keep the proceeding moving and avoid tipping the balance of a
trial in either the direction of the plaintiff or the defendant. Judges
have to remind practitioners that winning is not everything, some-
thing many litigators lose sight of in the heat of battle. How one
wins also matters. Cases should be decided for the right reasons,
not, for example, because one attorney is more able or a better
actor than the other.
A controversial aspect of ensuring a fair trial is whether a trial
judge should intercede during testimony to create balance, for ex-
ample by assisting a counsel who is foundering as a result of his or
her own ineptitude, and missing the critical points with a witness.
Much discussion has been generated on this subject among mem-
bers of the bar. Most litigators fervently argue that in an adversary
system a judge has absolutely no business intervening, and that
plaintiffs and defendants have chosen their own lawyers. Unfortu-
nately, not all litigants can choose their own counsel. The econom-
ics of litigation are such that not everyone can afford equally
competent counsel of their choice. Assigned counsel, of course,
can be the most fervent counsel. Public defenders, legal aid society
attorneys, and even students in clinics, while often quite young and
less experienced, often do a better job than some members of the
private bar. Unfortunately, as a trial judge, I see vastly mixed
levels of competence.
As I said earlier, I happen to believe that my job as a trial judge
is to make sure that we decide cases for the right reasons. My law
clerks hear me repeat this phrase over and over. You have to re-
member that behind the attorneys - good, bad, or indifferent -
there are real plaintiffs and defendants who deserve, and should
get, the best the court system has to offer. Morally, I have trouble
sitting back and watching a trial conclude with what I feel is the
88. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (requiring that allega-
tions contained in pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972).
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wrong result. I am not suggesting that my judgment is perfect, but,
I do have an obligation to do the best job I can. Generally, there-
fore, in egregious situations, I gently try to help the process. One
of the harshest forms of intervention is for the judge to ask addi-
tional questions of a witness when, as a judge, you think the impor-
tant issues have not been reached or a witness is lying. Lawyers
often object. One solution is to offer the attorneys an opportunity
to ask additional questions after the judge has asked his or her
questions. On occasion, the insertion into the process is to inquire
of an attorney whether he or she objects to the admission of a doc-
ument. The reactions to bad lawyering can be instinctive and inad-
vertent. As a judge, you also try to control your body language,
but sometimes it is so painful to watch, that complete composure is
hard to accomplish. As a trial judge, you have to make hard, on
the spot decisions regarding both what to do and what not to do.
The general presumption is certainly not to interfere, but, some-
times I feel I have to or an injustice will be done.
Sixth, a good trial judge must be creative. Every day in a trial
court should be undertaken with an eagerness to approach new
challenges. Although there are helpful instruction books, there are
no form books for a good trial. The unexpected happens all the
time. Few requests for evidentiary rulings are the same. I have
been doing this job for a long time now, and virtually no two cases
present the same problems. That is probably why I enjoy my job so
much. I am on a train that goes a mile a minute, but it never goes
in a straight line. Using available tools such as docket management
techniques, pretrial motion practice, stipulations, test cases, and
both traditional and non-traditional alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), judges can speed up the resolution of cases. At the
same time, while eagerly searching for new conflict resolution tech-
niques, one also must be careful to use ADR and other techniques
wisely and only when appropriate. It is up to the judge to provide
the leadership so that naturally cautious litigators are willing to in-
vestigate and try new methods.
Seventh, while creativity to solve procedural problems is a vital
skill, an able trial judge must apply the law with intelligence and
consistency. One of the rules we operate under in the court system
is the law of precedential decisions. Blind adherence to precedent
is not what I am advocating. It is not the role of a trial judge,
however, to disregard existing case precedents. In our system, ap-
pellate courts, and most especially the Supreme Court, are dele-
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gated the primary responsibility to effect dramatic changes in the
law not based on statutory change.
As a lawyer, you study the judge assigned to your case. You try
to discern a pattern in his or her legal leanings and temperament.
You try to figure out in advance how the judge conducts proceed-
ings. If, after studying your assigned trial judge, you conclude he
or she takes each case on a fact-by-fact basis, does a good job of
applying the existing law and rules of procedure, and also runs a
tight courtroom, with high performance expectations, I personally
would consider that profile a compliment. I also would consider it
a compliment if the bar which appears before me cannot predict
the outcome of cases assigned to me because I am not labeled as a
plaintiff's or defendant's judge on any particular type of case or
issue. I want a reputation as a fair judge.
Eighth, the trial judge also has a duty to ensure that attorneys
who appear in his or her courtroom comply with their own ethical
obligations, such as the duties of diligence, confidentiality, conflict
of interest, knowing when to decline or to terminate representa-
tion, and knowing when a motion or claim is meritorious and, thus,
worth pursuing. As members of the bar and officers of the court, it
should go without saying that attorneys will act ethically. For ex-
ample, in a perfect world, judges could trust attorneys not to exer-
cise inappropriate privileges. Unfortunately, although most
lawyers do behave at the highest levels, some do not. For example,
as a judge, I should be able to expect candor toward the tribunal.
During discovery I will say to an attorney, "Mr. [Jones], if you tell
me as an officer of the court that the documents which have been
subpoenaed do not exist, I will have to take your word for it."
Sometimes I say it with a sinking feeling. As a judge, you hope to
trust attorneys to abide by the proper ethical boundaries. Judges
look to lawyers in their courtrooms to be truthful with the court, to
not merely be an advocate for his or her client, but also to do so
honestly and forthrightly.
When I attended law school at Fordham, we did not have re-
quired ethics and professional responsibility courses, nor was there
a related exam as a part of the bar examination in most states. We
did have a jurisprudence course, which was more of a history
course about some of the great religious and moral leaders. As a
former history major, I loved the class, but it did not focus on pro-
fessional responsibility, except by analogy. The students were ex-
pected to make the intellectual leap and apply the teachings to
their own lives. Nonetheless, once we graduated, I honestly be-
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lieve we would never have dared to do some of the things I now
see in the courtroom, and not infrequently.
Each judge has a scrapbook of horror stories. Among my exam-
ples, one attorney became more suspect than the clients he repre-
sented, some of whom it turned out did not even know the attorney
had filed a case on their behalf. Moreover, the attorney was con-
sistently late with required filings and failed to communicate with
his clients with respect to the pleadings filed and the status of the
cases. Another attorney directly contacted the court reporting ser-
vice and attempted to have the transcript altered by instructing the
reporter to change a negative statement to a positive one after she
received a copy of the daily transcript. The reporting service con-
tacted the court. Shortly thereafter, when we held a status confer-
ence, everyone in the room but the offending attorney
remembered the witness as having made a negative statement on
the stand. Her attempted fix required a great deal of audacity and
certainly lacked professional responsibility. The court has some op-
tions to try to ensure propriety, including putting the attorney and/
or the client under oath through affidavit or live testimony. And
there is also the possibility of imposing sanctions. Judges, of
course, are reluctant to impose sanctions, but they should not be
afraid to do so.
Unfortunately, also, too many attorneys come to court unpre-
pared without having reviewed the file or the relevant case prece-
dent. In my days as a litigator, I would have been too scared to do
that. Inadequate preparation happens more often for status con-
ferences or pretrial discovery motions than at trial; regardless, it is
unacceptable. Similarly, the quality of some of the briefs filed with
the court is embarrassing, with little evidence of intelligence or ef-
fort. The majority of attorneys do an adequate, and many do an
excellent job for their client. But those who do not give a bad
name to the practice of law and the system which responsible attor-
neys try to maintain.
In sum, it is critical for the courts to ensure that litigation contin-
ues to be a search for the truth and a promotion of the highest
ethical and moral values. One of the most basic tools on which we
rely is to put witnesses under oath. Every witness is asked to take
an oath that they will "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth." Sitting here tonight, none of us question the defini-
tion of perjury. We all readily understand the concept. We also all
agree that perjury is wrong, and agree on the critical importance of
the oath each witness takes at the start of testimony. No one has
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the privilege to lie. The expectation, at a minimum; should be that
in a courtroom - in fact, in all our relations with people - we
should be entitled to expect honesty. Anything less should cause
shock and chagrin. Although the role of the judge is often to de-
cide between two asserted truths offered by two opposing wit-
nesses, the expectation and the standard should be that both
witnesses are trying to testify in accordance with the oaths they
have taken, but have differences of opinion or different recollec-
tions of the events.
I am not so naive as to assume that everyone who comes to court
will tell the truth. However, I do not want to become as cynical
about our system as many lawyers and many members of the public
seem to have become. One attorney friend, who represents many
criminal defendants, recently told me "all my witnesses try to lie,
even to me, to help themselves." I never want to believe that every
witness potentially is violating the oath to tell the truth in his or her
own self-interest. Fortunately, on the whole, judges and juries are
surprisingly good at recognizing the lies and understanding the
truth. Let me give you one example from my private practice days.
I was part of a litigation team on a major construction accident
case. We prepared the night before trial. On the stand, one of our
principal witnesses, a senior corporate officer in the construction
company, did a complete reverisal of the testimony he had de-
scribed the night before. When we asked him why, he responded,
"I was watching the jury and I thought it would help my case." We
lost. The jury saw through it. Juries are generally comprised of
good, honest and perceptive people.
The oath to tell the truth, and, if necessary, the threat of perjury,
have been and should be promoted as the watchdogs of truthful-
ness in the courtroom. We cannot allow the expectation of truth-
fulness during discovery and trial to diminish. New York Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan coined a useful phrase, "defining devi-
ancy down,"8 9 which describes a process by which society tolerates
and comes to accept formerly unacceptable conduct. Conduct that
was previously considered negative, immoral or even criminal is
now considered normal, thus reducing the level of expectation for
appropriate, ethical and moral behavior. Gradually we make fewer
and fewer demands on members of the community. In other
words, we begin on a path of normalizing deviancy.
89. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17
(1993).
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As attorneys, we must refuse to allow erosion of our system by
ignoring the ramifications of perjury. Every bad image of the legal
profession and system becomes true if we allow perjury to go un-
punished and to become an acceptable norm dependant upon the
circumstances. The prohibition against perjury is not negotiable.
The expectation must remain that once a witness takes an oath of
truthfulness during any part of a judicial proceeding, that witness
must meet the obligations of that oath. The procedures we use in
the courtroom must have meaning, and violation of those proce-
dures must have consequences. To excuse perjury under any cir-
cumstances is to promote the image of attorneys as slick, greasy
operatives who have been taught to manipulate the truth and who
can talk others into, or out of, anything. It is also to destroy the
very core of our judicial system.
Practicing law should be fun. It should be an honor to be admit-
ted to the bar and to continue as part of a noble profession which
defines and promotes ethics and morality. You should be in this
profession not just to support yourselves and your families, but to
reward yourselves in other ways. You also should be in it for the
intellectual satisfaction the law can provide. I certainly have that
privilege. You also should be in it to make your community a bet-
ter place, whether on the job or through extra-curricular activities
in which you share your unique skills with others.
Every day, each of us must commit to further enhance a system
of laws that promotes an ultimate forum in which conflict resolu-
tion and a search for truth is the goal we uniformly applaud and
actively support. The accomplished lawyer must combine legal
proficiency and technical skill with humanity and morality. Our
commitment as lawyers and judges alike should be to accept re-
sponsibility for the proper and effective functioning of our legal
system and to defend its basic principles. We should never allow
the pressures of our profession to compromise our commitment to
a fair and ethical search for the truth.
I thank you all for allowing me to be with you tonight.
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HIV NAME REPORTING AND PARTNER
NOTIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE
Sonia Bhatnager*
Introduction
The World Health Organization estimates that new cases of full-
blown Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")' increase
by almost twenty percent worldwide each year, and that at the end
of 1996, 1.64 million people worldwide were suffering from AIDS.2
It also estimates that only one-fifth of the actual number of cases is
reported.' The nature of the disease is changing as well: advance-
ments in drug therapy and treatment are enabling infected individ-
uals to remain asymptomatic for years.4
Calls for epidemiological data that enable scientists to study the
disease and treat people with HIV infection have led to HIV name
reporting in some states.5 Other states have instituted partner noti-
fication programs in hopes of apprising contacts of their exposure
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000. B.A., History, Co-
lumbia College, Columbia University, 1997. The author would like to thank Professor
Elizabeth Cooper for her knowledgeable guidance, Alissa Brownrigg for her in-
sightful suggestions and Daniel S. Voloch for his selfless assistance. She would also
like to thank her family and friends for their continuous support and patience.
1. A case of AIDS was first defined as "illness in a person who 1) has either
biopsy-proven KS [Kaposi's Sarcoma] or biopsy- or culture-proven, life-threatening
opportunistic infection, 2) is under age 60, and 3) has no history of either immunosup-
pressive underlying illness or immunosuppressive therapy." U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Updates on Kaposi's Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infec-
tions in Previously Healthy Persons - United States, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 294 (1982). The definition was expanded in 1985 to include diseases such
as disseminated histoplasmosis, chronic isosporiasis and certain non-Hodgkin's
lymphomas. In 1987, another expansion occurred to the definition, which resulted in
diseases such as extrapulmonary tuberculosis, HIV encephalopathy and HIV wasting
syndrome being added. The latest revision takes effect as of January 1, 1993, which
"includes all HIV-infected adults and adolescents who have less than [sic] 200 CD4+
T-lymphocytes/pL or a CD4+ T-lymphocyte percent of total lymphocytes less than 14,
or who have been diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis, invasive cervical cancer, or
recurrent pneumonia." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, AIDS Surveil-
lance in the United States (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov> [hereinafter
CDC, AIDS Surveillance].
2. See AIDS Cases Rising Steadily Worldwide, TExAS HIV/STD UPDATE (Fall
1997) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/up97fal.htm>.
3. See id.
4. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
5. See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committees on
AIDS, Civil Rights, Health Law, Legal Issues Affecting People with Disabilities and
1457
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
to the virus and breaking the chain of transmission.6 Thirty-three
states and U.S. Territories provide for some form of partner notifi-
cation by statute.7 Although, as of June 30, 1998, thirty-one states
collect the names of HIV-infected people,' these names only ac-
count for a small percent of those suffering from AIDS nationally.9
New York, on the other hand, has the nation's highest rate of re-
ported AIDS cases.10 Thus, New York's decision to enact a name
reporting and partner notification law may significantly influence
other states with high seroprevalence levels to follow its lead,1 or
alternatively, to determine that the process does not work in those
areas.
On July 7, 1998, the New York State Senate enacted a name re-
porting and partner notification law that amended Article 21 of the
Sex and Law), Name Reporting of HIV Cases 1, 1 (1998) [hereinafter NYC Bar, Name
Reporting].
6. See infra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin &
James G. Hodge, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Trans-
mitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 14 (1998) (claiming that the goal of contact tracing is to "re-
duce disease transmission by locating and containing the spread of a given STD within
a certain population") [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil].
7. See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committees on
AIDS, Civil Rights, Health Law, Mental Health, Legal Issues Affecting People with
Disabilities and Sex and Law), Partner Notification and HIV 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter
NYC Bar, Partner Notification].
8. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 10 HIV/AIDS SURVEIL-
LANCE REP. 1 (1998). Connecticut and Texas required name reporting of children less
than thirteen years old, and Oregon required reporting for children less than six years
of age. The remaining twenty-eight states that have laws requiring confidential re-
porting by name of all persons infected with HIV are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id. at 7. Texas disposed of its unique identifier
system and adopted name reporting for all HIV positive individuals as of January 1,
1999. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. New York also has adopted name
reporting for HIV as of July 1998. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
9. See NYC Bar, Name Reporting, supra note 5, at 1-2.
10. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 8, at 1. In a sur-
vey conducted from July 1997 to June 1998 of Metropolitan areas in the U.S., New
York City had the highest AIDS annual rate per 100,000 population with a rate of
101.2. No other city had a rate over 100.0 per 100,000. Jersey City, New Jersey came
the closest with a rate of 72.2 per 100,000. See id. at 8. More importantly, however, is
the fact that out of the 665,357 AIDS cases reported to the CDC through June 1998,
New York State contributed to about 124,793 of them. See id. at 6. The CDC does
not have HIV infection rates for New York. See id. at 5.
11. See Lynda Richardson, AIDS Groups Stunned by Vote for Partner Notification,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at B3.
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Public Health Law by adding a new Title 111.12 The new law re-
quires physicians and other health officials to report individuals
who test positive for HIV, AIDS or other HIV-related illnesses to
the municipal health commissioner. 13 The law also mandates noti-
fication of contacts by the infected individual or physician.' 4 This
Note explores the consequences and benefits of partner notifica-
tion for HIV, focusing on its likely impact on New York State. Part
I details the meaning and history of partner notification in the
United States. Part II presents arguments for and against partner
notification. Part III analyzes the New York law and argues that a
unique identifier system in lieu of name reporting would assuage
fears of privacy, encouraging a more effective implementation of a
partner notification system. This Note concludes that HIV is a
public health problem that cannot be ignored and must be com-
bated aggressively, in a manner that simultaneously promotes test-
ing and stunts transmission.
I. Name Reporting and Partner Notification in
the United States and New York
Every state' 5 has implemented a policy of name reporting for
AIDS.16 The information collected by state health departments in-
cludes "demographics, diagnostic facility, patient risk history, labo-
ratory analysis, clinical status, and treatment/service referrals."' 7
At the national level, patient and provider identifiers are deleted
from the data so that reporting is done without the disclosure of
infected individuals' names.' 8 The national system of AIDS re-
porting had developed almost from the inception of the epidemic, 19
12. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130 (McKinney 1999).
13. See id. § 2130(1).
14. See id. § 2133(1).
15. See CDC, AIDS Surveillance, supra note 1 (describing that data is collected
from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, U.S. dependencies and possessions and
independent nations in free association with the United States (Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia).
16. See id. ("[B]y 1985 all states had regulations requiring physicians and other
health care providers to report AIDS cases directly to the local or health depart-
ment," which in turn, share their data with the CDC.); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin &
James G. Hodge, The "Names Debate": The Case for National HIV Reporting in the
United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 705 (1998) [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge, The
"Names Debate"].
17. Gostin & Hodge, The "Names Debate", supra note 16, at 705-06.
18. See id. at 706.
19. See id. at 696.
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and caused little uproar. 20 Early on in the epidemic, those identi-
fied as AIDS' carriers often were on the brink of death already,
thus privacy issues were of little concern. 21 However, this claim is
not true today for HIV-positive individuals, especially those who
are asymptomatic and may remain so for years.22 Accordingly, it is
no surprise that the trend towards expanding the name reporting
system to HIV infected individuals has resulted in conflicted emo-
tions, despite the benefits of gathering epidemiological data about
the epidemic. 23
The current push for partner notification, especially in New
York, can most likely be attributed to advances in effective drug
therapy and recent reports of individuals putting others at risk of
contracting the virus.2 4 In New York, a name reporting and part-
ner notification bill, introduced by Senator Velella and Assembly
Member Nettie Mayersohn, was enacted on July 7, 1998.25
A. Meaning and History of Partner Notification
in the United States
Partner notification can be viewed as a combination of three
concepts that sometimes overlap: "(1) contact tracing; (2) the duty
of the infected persons to disclose their infection to a sexual part-
ner; and (3) the duty of health care providers to warn of sexual and
other risks to the partners of their infected patients. 2 a6
1. Contact Tracing
The practice of contact tracing generally enlists the help of pub-
lic health authorities who interview infected individuals (referred
to as "index" patients) to assemble a list of their contacts that may
have been exposed to HIV.a7 With this information, the authorities
20. See American Civil Liberties Union, HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting: A
Public Health Case for Protecting Civil Liberties (Oct. 1997) <http://www. aclu.org/
issues/aids/namereport.html> [hereinafter ACLU, HIV Surveillance].
21. See id.
22. See CDC, AIDS Surveillance, supra note 1 (stating that HIV is the causative
agent for AIDS).
23. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
24. See Bill Laden, Albany Begins Drive to Lift HIV Confidentiality, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 1 ("[T]he recent case of Nushawn Williams, whom authorities suspect
may have infected numerous young women with HIV, has raised questions about the
privacy law and the legal rights of AIDS victims, and has propelled legislators to sug-
gest amendments to the law.").
25. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2130, 2133 (McKinney 1999).
26. Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 14.
27. See id.
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attempt to trace the contacts and notify them of their potential in-
fection.28 The name of the index patient is not disclosed but may
be deduced under certain circumstances, 29 such as where the noti-
fied individual has only had one contact. This process then contin-
ues with any identified contact who likewise tests positive for
HIV.3°
The first contact tracing program dates back to the syphilis epi-
demic of the early sixteenth century.31 Once syphilis was recog-
nized as a sexually transmitted disease, individuals infected with
the disease were banished from communities, quarantined in spe-
cial hospitals and/or banned from public places.32 Prostitutes, who
were viewed as the carriers of sexual contagion, such as syphilis,
were subjected to government-sponsored medical inspection
known as reglementation throughout Europe and the United
States.33 The Illinois Board of Health even had the authority to
hospitalize women on mere suspicion of infection and to place
signs on their doors warning "suspected VD. 34
Thomas Parran, the newly-appointed Surgeon General during
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's presidency, decreed his goal to be the
eradication of the syphilis epidemic.35 With the assistance of fed-
eral funding, Parran began a national contact tracing program,
which included contact notification.36 This effort "marked the first
time in the United States that formal case finding and contact trac-
ing were applied to a sexually transmitted disease on a national
scale."' 37 However, the advent of penicillin in 1943 and its promise
to cure syphilis stymied the role that contact tracing would play in
reducing infection rates.38 Penicillin diminished the urgency for
notification, leaving the success of contact tracing undetermined.39
Although contact tracing is mainly the responsibility of state
health departments, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 16.
32. See id. 16-17.
33. See id. at 17-19.
34. See id. at 19 (quoting Marvin S. Amstey, The Political History of Syphilis and
Its Application to the AIDS Epidemic, 4 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 16, 17 (1994)).
35. See id. at 21.
36. See id. at 21-22.
37. Id. at 22.
38. See id. at 22-23.
39. See David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting a Course to
Reconcile the Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context, 94
DICK. L. REv. 435, 466 (1990).
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tion ("CDC"), as part of the federal Department of Health and
Human Services, provide funding to these state offices.4 ° The
CDC, in turn, requires state health departments to implement part-
ner notification programs according to certain guidelines.41 The
guidelines include models denominated "patient referral," "pro-
vider referral" or the hybrid "conditional referral. 42
The patient referral model enlists the aid of the index patient,
who is asked to disclose her seropositive status to her sexual con-
tacts and/or to injection drug users ("IDUs") with whom she has
shared syringes.43 The index patient is assisted by the public health
authorities to the extent that she is provided with medical informa-
tion, which she may pass on to her contacts.44 These programs do
not guarantee notification of contacts and do not provide for confi-
dentiality of the index patient, as she personally notifies her con-
tacts of the exposure to HIV.45
Provider referral programs, on the other hand, place the respon-
sibility of contact tracing in the hands of public health officials once
an index patient has disclosed a list of her contacts.46 Counseling is
provided to the contact, preferably face to face, by the official. 47
The anonymity of the patient is maintained because her name is
not revealed to contacts.48 Obviously, however, the contact may
deduce the name in certain circumstances. 49 Although provider re-
ferral programs generally are more costly because of the height-
ened involvement of health authorities, they tend to ensure the
transmission of high quality information. 50 They also typically re-
sult in a higher rate of notification. In a study conducted in North
Carolina, which assigned participants to either a patient referral
group or a provider referral group, seventy-eight of 157 partners
were successfully notified in the latter group whereas only ten out
of 153 were notified by the patient referral model group."
40. See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 25-26.
41. See id. at 26.
42. Id.
43. See James T. Dimas & Jordan H. Richland, Partner Notification and HIV In-
fection: Misconceptions and Recommendations, 4 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 206, 206.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 27.
48. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 206.
49. See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 27.
50. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 206.
51. See Suzanne E. Landis, M.D. et at., Results of a Randomized Trial of Partner
Notification in Cases of HIV Infection in North Carolina, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101,
101 (1992).
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The third model, conditional referral, is a hybrid of the patient
and provider referral models.52 In this model, the index patient is
granted a limited period of time in which she may notify her con-
tacts before the health authority intervenes.53 As with the provider
referral model, the official does not disclose the identity of the in-
dex patient.54
2. Duty to Disclose
Partner notification sometimes denotes the "duty to disclose,"
whereby a duty exists to disclose one's sexually transmitted disease
to his/her sexual partner.55 Since the turn of the century, persons
aware of their infections have been responsible for disclosing con-
tagious conditions, such as whooping cough and tuberculosis, to
others with whom they were in contact.56 Today, in the context of
HIV/AIDS, the duty to disclose has been significantly extended.
In fact, the failure to disclose one's positive serostatus can result in
criminal -prosecution for putting others at risk for infection.57
Nushawn Williams, the man accused of having unprotected sex
with a teenage girl months after learning he was HIV-positive, was
charged with reckless endangerment in New York City. 8 By the
end of 1991, more than three hundred people had been prosecuted
for exposing others to HIV, and approximately fifty of those cases
resulted in conviction.59
3. Duty to Warn
The third component of partner notification, a physician's duty
to warn foreseeable third parties who may be endangered by the
patient, is based on the principle articulated in Tarasoff v. Regents
52. See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 27.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 14-15.
56. See id. at 36-37.
57. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-1(d) (West 1998):
Carriers who know of their status as a carrier of a dangerous communicable dis-
ease described in subsection (a) [includes AIDS and HIV] have a duty to warn or
cause to be warned by a third party a person at risk of the following:
(1) The carrier's disease status.
(2) The need to seek health care such as counseling and testing.
58. See Lynda Richardson, Man Faces Felony Charge of Exposing Girl to H.I.V.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at B4 (noting that Williams also was suspected of infecting
more than a dozen women and girls in upstate New York).
59. See LAWRENCE BURRIS & HARLAN L. DALTON, Criminal Law, in AIDS LAW
TODAY 242 (Harlan L. Dalton et al. eds., 1993).
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of the Univ. of California.60 The California Supreme Court deter-
mined that physician-patient confidentiality must yield to the inter-
ests of third parties in similar situations where a special
relationship exists between the patient and the individual responsi-
ble for warning.61 As of 1996, twenty-three states had adopted a
Tarasoff-type duty by way of either judicial decision, legislative en-
actment or both.62
This duty to warn was extended to HIV/AIDS cases in Reisner v.
Regents of the Univ. of California.63 In this case, the California
Court of Appeals determined that a physician, who failed to inform
his patient that she had received a tainted blood transfusion and
thus was infected with HIV, was liable to the patient's sexual part-
ner who later contracted the virus from the patient. 64  Like
Tarasoff, a special relationship existed between physician and pa-
tient in Reisner, and the physician's responsibility did not stop at
just treating his patient, but extended to informing her of her
contagion.
Physician liability also has been found where a third party, with
whom the physician has established no physician-patient relation-
ship, was injured by the physician's patient. In DiMarco v. Lynch
Homes - Chester County, Inc. ,65 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania found two physicians liable to a third party who had been
harmed as a direct result of the doctors' erroneous medical advice
to their patient.66 The court determined that a physician's duty re-
quired informing her patients of their disease or condition, not in-
60. 551 P.2d 334 (Ca. 1976). In Tarasoff, a California court imposed such a duty
on psychotherapists whose patient expressed an intent to kill his victim. Because the
patient was mentally unstable and had expressed a desire to kill a readily identifiable
individual, the physicians should have alerted the victim that she was in danger. See
id.
61. See id. at 343 (finding that a "special relationship" exists between a patient and
his/her doctor or psychotherapist such that affirmative duties for the benefit of third
persons may arise).
62. See Christine E. Stenger, Taking Tarsoff Where No One Has Gone Before:
Looking at "Duty to Warn" Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 471,
476 (1996).
63. 31 Cal. App. 4th 1195 (1995).
64. See id.
65. 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990). The physicians had given erroneous medical advice
to their patient concerning the contagious nature of her illness, which resulted in in-
jury to the third-party plaintiff. The physicians only were required to give correct
medical advice to their patient concerning the transmission of the hepatitis virus that
she may have contracted; they were not required to inform third persons, foreseeable
or not. See id.
66. See id.
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forming every possible third-party plaintiff.67 This scenario would
suggest that the physicians' duty is to inform, rather than to warn.
As long as the physician correctly informs her HIV-diagnosed pa-
tient concerning the modes of transmission, she should be free
from professional liability. Reisner emphasizes this duty to inform
by finding the physician liable to an injured third party for failure
to warn his patient, not for failure to warn the third party directly. 68
The reasoning in Reisner would not seem to require partner notifi-
cation; rather, it serves as a reminder to physicians about their pre-
existing duty to fully inform patients about their disease. 69
Although courts have laid down a tradition that requires physi-
cians to warn family members and others in close proximity to the
patient of the contagious nature of the patient's disease,70 these
cases are "generally characterized by the inability of the patient
either to adapt his conduct so as to avoid or minimize the risk of
infection or to communicate adequately to third parties the nature
of the risk."' 71 Moreover, these duty-to-warn cases generally in-
volved minor children or seriously debilitated people. 72 It thus fol-
lows that opponents of partner notification likely would respond
that this tradition does not apply to HIV because the index patient
is informed of her condition and the ways to control transmission
to others when she is diagnosed. 73
Furthermore, the foundation upon which the duty to warn has
been erected is factually distinguishable from that in the HIV situa-
tion. In Tarasoff, the physician was a psychotherapist and the pa-
tient a mentally deranged individual who had made explicit
comments about his intent to murder a readily identifiable wo-
man.74 However, in reality, the physician who diagnoses an index
67. See id.
68. See Reisner, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1195 (finding physician liability in an action by
a man who had contracted HIV through his girlfriend due to physician's failure to
inform his patient that she had received tainted blood in a transfusion and was HIV
positive).
69. See Stenger, supra note 62, at 502.
70. See Price, supra note 39, at 449 (citing Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612 (Ark.
1921); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928); Wojcik v. Aluminum, 183 N.Y.S.2d
351 (1959); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920)).
71. Id. at 450.
72. See id. at 449 (citing Davis, 227 S.W. at 612; Jones, 160 N.E. at 456; Wojcik, 183
N.Y.S.2d at 351 (1959); Simonsen, 177 N.W. at 831).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781(3) (McKinney 1999) (requiring
health officials testing patients to inform them of the nature of the disease, the possi-
bility of discrimination, and ways to curb transmission).
74. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 339 (Ca.
1976).
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patient with HIV is generally not a psychotherapist, nor is the in-
dex patient generally insane. More likely, the physician is a medi-
cal doctor who can explain the known routes of HIV transmission
and the ways to prevent it. The patient, through behavior modifi-
cation, can stop the chain of transmission, as can his/her contact via
protective measures. An individual who desires to kill another,
whether it be with a physical weapon or with a virus, differs greatly
from one who is infected with a virus and will take the necessary
precautions to prevent its transmission. Additionally, the duty to
warn applies to future harm that may occur to an individual from
the intended acts of another.75 Partner notification, however, at-
tempts to retrospectively warn those potentially infected by the vi-
rus, which in its own way may make a stronger case for partner
notification - the harm, e.g., exposure, has already occurred and is
no longer speculative.
Although many of the duty-to-warn cases do involve contagious
diseases such as hepatitis, HIV/AIDS can be distinguished from
those infectious diseases. Not surprisingly, the stigma associated
with HIV/AIDS is far greater than that associated with any other
infectious disease.76 "The privacy interest in one's exposure to the
AIDS virus is even greater than one's privacy interest in ordinary
medical records .... The potential for harm in the event of a non-
consensual disclosure is substantial. ' 77 Additionally, HIV/AIDS is
different in kind from diseases such as tuberculosis because of the
determinate role that behavior modification plays in transmission
of the former. Adhering to certain precautions can prevent the
spread of HIV, whereas tuberculosis is air-borne. 78 While incur-
able, 79 Hepatitis B also is different from HIV because vaccines ex-
75. See id. at 340.
76. See NYC Bar, Partner Notification, supra note 7, at 8; see also Herek &
Capitanio, infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77. Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990) (recogniz-
ing a constitutional privacy right in one's HIV status). See generally Gregory M.
Herek, Ph.D. & John P. Capitanio, Ph.D., A Second Decade of Stigma: Public Reac-
tions to AIDS in the United States, 1990-91 (1997) <http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rain-
bow/html/aids stigma-paper.html> (outlining the discrimination still faced by
individuals infected with HIV/AIDS today including employment discrimination and
equal treatment by health professionals arising from fear and stigma surrounding the
disease).
78. See Gostin & Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 686.
79. See Marc Kaufman, Hepatitis B Vaccine Effort Draws Fire; Critics Cite Reports
of Adverse Effects in Opposing Mandatory Inoculations of Children, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1999, at Z1l. The hepatitis B virus infects about 200,000 Americans annually.
At least 36 states, however, require the vaccine, which consists of a series of three
shots, before a child can register for school. See id.
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ist for Hepatitis B, capable of preventing. its spread for at least
fifteen years.8" However, both diseases are spread through blood
and other bodily fluids, and are found most frequently among
IDUs and people engaging in high-risk sexual activities in the
United States.81 Still, Hepatitis B, while more readily transmissi-
ble, is less likely to be fatal.82
B. Name Reporting and Partner Notification in New York
The new law enacted by New York in the summer of 1998 man-
dates that physicians and others authorized to order diagnostic
tests, as well as laboratories performing these tests, must report
any person testing positive for HIV, AIDS or HIV-related illness
to the municipal health commissioner.83 This commissioner must
then forward the information, which contains the identifying infor-
mation of the index patient and any contacts, to the municipal
health commissioner of the municipality where the disease oc-
curred.8s Although name reporting of HIV would serve certain ep-
idemiological benefits such as "facilitat[ing] the study of the course
of the disease and allow[ing] better targeting of resources and pre-
vention efforts, 85 many assert that it is a great deterrent to
testing."6
New York legislation continues to state that, in the case of con-
tacts residing outside of the municipality, the commissioner will
send the report to the particular contact's municipality, whose
commissioner will make a good faith effort to notify the contact.87
The commissioner will accompany notification with information re-
lating to HIV treatment and prevention,88 ensuring, at the very
least, that accurate information is disclosed.89 During the notifica-
tion process, the commissioner or authorized official is not permit-
ted to divulge the identity of the index patient or the identity of
any other contact.90
80. See Ron Geraci, Do You Have Hepatitis C?, MEN'S HEALTH, Mar. 5, 1999.
81. See Kaufman, supra note 79, at Z1l.
82. See Stenger, supra note 62, at 488; see also Ron Geraci, supra note 80 (stating
that most cases of Hepatitis B resolve themselves but almost 15% become chronic
and can cause cirrhosis or liver cancer).
83. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(1) (McKinney 1999).
84. See id. §§ 2130(2)-(3).
85. NYC Bar, Name Reporting, supra note 5, at 1.
86. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
87. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2131 (McKinney 1999).
88. See id. § 2133(2).
89. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 206.
90. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2133(3) (McKinney 1999).
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The law also stipulates that no criminal or civil liability will result
for any index patient's failure to cooperate in contact tracing, and
adds a safety provision for index patients threatened by domestic
violence.91 Other safety precautions are the ones given to health
officials who must report or notify partners: "Good faith reporting
or disclosure pursuant to this title shall not constitute libel or slan-
der or a violation of the right of privacy or privileged communica-
tion. '92 Furthermore, immunity from civil and criminal liability is
granted for good faith attempts at reporting.93 The physician also
is given the alternative of notifying contacts if she has notified the
patient of her intent and given the patient an opportunity to ex-
press a preference as to notification.94
Finally, the option of anonymous testing still is retained by the
new law. Section 2138 emphasizes that: "Nothing in this article
shall be interpreted to eliminate the anonymous testing option pro-
vided for in section twenty seven hundred eighty-one of this chap-
ter."'95 Unlike other infectious diseases, anonymous testing has
been available for HIV at publicly-funded sites in the United
States since 1985.96 In confidential testing, a person's name is
linked to the specimen, and the result of the test is recorded in the
medical chart with a name.97 Anonymous testing, on the other
hand, uses a unique identifier, rather than the patient's name, to
link the specimen with the test result, and the results are not re-
corded in the medical chart.98
II. The Debate Over Name Reporting and Partner Notification:
The Ramifications of Disclosure
It is no secret that name reporting and partner notification are
controversial and emotionally-charged issues. At the heart of the
debate, the welfare of unknowingly HIV-infected individuals is di-
rectly pitted against the privacy interest one has in her own seros-
tatus. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw clear lines between
91. See id. §§ 2136(3), 2137.
92. Id. § 2136(1).
93. See id. § 2136(2).
94. See id. § 2782(4)(a)(4).
95. Id. § 2138.
96. See A. B. Bindman et al., Multistate Evaluation of Anonymous HIV Testing
and Access to Medical Care, 280 JAMA 1416 (1998) (stating that as of October 1998,
forty states have publicly funded anonymous testing sites for HIV, and all fifty states
have publicly funded confidential testing sites).
97. See id.
98. See id.
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right and wrong. The following are arguments posited by propo-
nents and opponents of name reporting and partner notification.
A. The Benefits of Name Reporting and Partner Notification
Proponents of name reporting and partner notification ground
their argument in the changing face of the disease: once found pri-
marily in male homosexuals and IDUs, HIV has evolved. "[T]he
epidemic American society now faces is no longer a plague of un-
stoppable, deadly disease among predominantly gay persons, but a
potentially controllable chronic condition with increasing effects on
heterosexuals, women, and children."99 As HIV has affected more
of the American population, the push to decrease the spread of
HIV infection has increased considerably. The need for epidemio-
logical data to understand and control HIV is crucial, especially
considering the benefits that recent advances have already shown:
"From a public health and epidemiological perspective, the advan-
tages of tracking and profiling HIV are significant, as HIV marks
the beginning of the disease process rather than the end. In con-
trast, AIDS surveillance is triggered by events marking the late-
stage progression of disease."' °
1. Advances in Drug Therapy
The practices of name reporting and partner notification are fur-
ther justified by the recent success of drug therapies. Encouraging
trends in AIDS cases in the United States have been attributed
primarily to the effect of antiretroviral therapies on HIV-positive
individuals.10 1 AIDS deaths declined twenty-three percent in 1996
compared to 1995, indicating that the therapies are having a signifi-
cant impact on the rate of HIV progression.102 In addition, recent
studies varying antiretroviral regimens have shown significant im-
provements in mortality and AIDS-free survival for men and wo-
99. Gostin & Hodge, The "Names Debate," supra note 16, at 710.
100. Texas Department of Health Bureau of HIV and STD Prevention, Unique
Identifier Reporting for HIV Infection Surveillance (Nov. 1997) <http://
www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/stats.htm>.
101. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Update: Trends in AIDS
Incidence - United States, 1996, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 861 (1997)
[hereinafter USHHS, Update]. Antiretroviral therapy achieving maximum HIV sup-
pression generally includes a mixture of two nucleosides and protease inhibitor. See
HIV/AIDS Information Center, Compliance with HIV Treatment Guidelines Linked
to Physician Experience (July 2, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org>.
102. See USHHS, Update, supra note 101 ("From 1995 to 1996, deaths declined in
all four geographic regions . . . ; among men and women; among all racial/ethnic
groups; and in all risk/exposure categories ... ").
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men. 10 3 Individuals free of AIDS who took the less effective
regimen were nearly three times more likely to progress to AIDS
or die than those in the other group.'0 4 Antiretroviral agents also
have been known to reduce viral loads in individuals for periods of
months to years,1 °5 reflecting the strides medicine has made since
the beginnings of the epidemic.
Furthermore, recent reports indicate that a triple therapy regi-
men without protease inhibitors can effectively suppress HIV. 10 6 A
study was conducted in 173 drug-naYve HIV-positive individuals in
which eighty-seven received triple-drug therapy while eighty-six re-
ceived two-drug therapy.10 7 The results showed that triple-drug
therapy resulted in undetectable levels of the virus in eighty-six
percent of patients after sixteen weeks, while two-drug therapy
only resulted in undetectable levels of the virus in forty-three per-
cent of patients after the same week period.108 Thus, it has been
asserted that "'HIV has become a potentially manageable disease
on a multiple decade timetable."' 10 9 Advancements in medical re-
search have even created optimism about the development of a
vaccine.110
Treatment with zidovudine also has reduced the rate of perinatal
transmission of HIV. 11 Perinatal transmission accounts for virtu-
103. See Robert S. Hogg et al., Improved Survival among HPV-infected Individuals
Following Initiation of Antiretroviral Therapy, 279 JAMA 450 (1998) (attributing im-
provement of HIV-infected individuals to new antiretroviral therapy strategies that
included separating patients into two therapy regimens: ERA-I included zidovudine-,
didanosine-, or zalcitabine-based therapy and ERA-II included lamivudine or
stavudine).
104. See id. (noting that the ERA-II group showed marked improvements).
105. See Roy M. Gulick, HIV Treatment Strategies: Planning for the Long Term,
279 JAMA 957 (1998).
106. See HIV/AIDS Information Center, Triple Therapy Without Protease Inhibitor
Effectively Suppresses HIV (June 29, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org>. The triple
drug therapy consisted of a combination of the drugs abacavir, lamivudine and
zidovudine. See id.
107. See id. (stating the two-drug therapy group received lamivudine and
zidovudine only).
108. See id.
109. HIV/AIDS Information Center, Long-term Antiretroviral Compliance: Pa-
tients Can't Do It Alone (July 2, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org> (quoting Dr. Ste-
fano Vella of Italy).
110. See HIV/AIDS Information Center, Geneva Data Offer "Sobering" View of
HIV Treatment (June 30, 1998) <http://www.ama-assn.org>.
111. See Public Health Service Task Force Recommendations for the Use of Antire-
troviral Drugs in Pregnant Women Infected with HIV-1 for Maternal Health and for
Reducing Perinatal HPV-i Transmission in the United States (Jan. 30, 1998) <http://
hivinsite.ucsf.edu/medical/tx-guidelines/ 2098.37e2.htm>.
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ally all new HIV infections in children.' 12 "As of September 30,
1997, perinatal transmission of HIV accounted for 7310 (one per-
cent) of the 626,334 total AIDS cases in adults and children re-
ported to the CDC by state and territorial health departments." 113
New York State alone comprised twenty-seven percent of the per-
inatally transmitted infections." 4 A 1996 study showed that the
HIV transmission rate for infants receiving a placebo was 22.6%,
as compared with a 7.6% rate for infants receiving zidovudine."15
These differences amounted to a sixty-six percent reduction in the
risk of transmission."16 The Institute of Medicine has recom-
mended that HIV testing be universal and added to the standard
battery of prenatal tests. 11 7 Partner notification may apprise preg-
nant women of their exposure to HIV and potentially prevent their
children from contracting the disease.
Partner notification may help HIV-positive individuals make
better use of available drugs by informing them that they have
been exposed to the disease in hopes of getting them into treat-
ment before any symptoms of infection occur. "Early detection of
the virus is considered increasingly important since a new class of
AIDS drugs called protease inhibitors has proven effective in treat-
ing the disease in many people."1 ' 8 Research has indicated that
these new drug therapies are more effective if begun soon after
infection."19 Name reporting may help to develop even more effec-
tive treatments or improve those already available.
2. Cost Efficiency of Partner Notification
Proponents of partner notification also argue that money spent
on implementing such programs is money well spent. Colorado
112. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: Perinatally Acquired
HIVIAIDS - United States, 1997, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1086
(1997).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Status of Perinatal HIV Pre-
vention in the United States: CDC Statement Following the Release of the Institute of
Medicine Report (Oct. 14, 1998) <http://www.cdc.gov> (stating that the CDC has rec-
ommended since 1994 that all pregnant women be offered HIV testing as part of
prenatal care, and if infected, be offered an AZT regimen).
118. Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Bill in Albany to Track H.I.V. Gains Backing, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 19, 1998, at Al.
119. See American Civil Liberties Union, HIV Partner Notification: Why Coercion
Won't Work, ACLU REPORT 1, 2 (March 1998) [hereinafter ACLU, Why Coercion
Won't Work].
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health officials calculated that every dollar spent on HIV partner
notification saves $7.20 in clinical care costs for AIDS patients.12 0
This figure assumes that each partner who elects to be tested as a
result of notification will transmit HIV to one less partner and fifty
percent of those tested would develop AIDS. 1
Another way to understand the cost-efficiency of partner notifi-
cation is to analyze the increasing costs associated with HIV/AIDS
drug therapy and the subsequent economic benefits derived from
halting transmission to others. Several years ago, basic HIV ther-
apy amounted to an annual cost of $3000, whereas basic therapy in
1998, which currently involves four or five drugs, has risen to more
than $12,000 annually. 22
3. No Effective Alternatives
Many proponents of name reporting rally against non-name re-
porting systems, such as the unique identifier system used in sev-
eral states, which they view as ineffective in collecting data to study
the disease. Maryland's unique identifier system, in effect since
June 1, 1994, is a twelve digit number consisting of the last four
digits of an individual's Social Security number, date of birth, race/
ethnicity and gender.1 23 An evaluation of Maryland's system from
July 1994 through December 1996 found that twenty-nine percent
of 9971 laboratory reports entered into the system were missing a
portion of the unique identifier, usually the social security
number. 24 The Maryland system was also plagued by a fifty per-
cent rate of completeness, a large number of duplicate reports and
lack of HIV risk information.125
Texas also instituted a unique identifier system in March 1994,
but recently abandoned it in favor of HIV reporting by name,
120. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 207.
121. See id.
122. See David N. Rose, AIDS Drug Regimens that are Worth Their Costs, 279
JAMA 160 (1998).
123. See American Civil Liberties Union, The Maryland Lesson: Conducting Effec-
tive HIV Surveillance with Unique Identifiers, ACLU REPORT (Dec. 1997) <http:II
www.aclu.org/issues/aids/mdnamereport.html> [hereinafter ACLU, The Maryland
Lesson]. Texas's unique identifier system also used these same components. See
Texas Department of Health, HIV Reporting by Name: Why Texas is Changing (vis-
ited Mar. 11, 1999) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd>.
124. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Evaluation of HIV Case Sur-
veillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique Identifiers - Maryland and Texas,
1994-1996, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1254 (1998) [hereinafter CDC,
Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance] .
125. See id.
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which will be effective January 1, 1999.126 However, this change
will not affect the availability of anonymous HIV testing. 12 7 Texas'
decision to stop using the unique identifier system stems from in-
complete codes collected throughout the years: from a pool of
20,000 reports in the last three years, only forty-nine percent have
been complete. 128
4. Name Reporting is not a Deterrent to Testing
Studies have shown that name reporting and partner notification
are not significant deterrents to testing.12 9 One study conducted
last year revealed that there were no significant declines in the to-
tal number of HIV tests provided at counseling and testing sites in
the months immediately after implementation of HIV reporting
occurred in any of the six states studied, other than those expected
from previous trends. 13  In fact, the study found increases in Ne-
braska (15.8%), Nevada (48.8%), New Jersey (21.3%) and Tennes-
see (62.8%).131 Predicted decreases occurred in Louisiana and
Michigan (10.5% and 2.0%, respectively). 32 All six states showed
increases in testing of at-risk heterosexuals. 33 Only two states
showed minimal declines for men who have sex with men.13 4 Three
states had declines for IDUs.'35
126. See Texas Department of Health, HIV Reporting by Name Adopted in Texas
(visited Dec. 13, 1998) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/input.htm> ]hereinafter
TDH, HIV Reporting by Name].
127. See id.
128. See Texas to Switch from Codes to Names to Track HIV Cases, AIDS POL'Y &
LAw, Feb. 20, 1998, at 1, 11.
129. See A. K. Nakashima et al., Effect of H1V Reporting by Name on Use of HIV
Testing in Publicly Funded Counseling and Testing Programs, 280 JAMA 234 (1998)
(explaining studies that found name reporting and partner notification to be deter-
rents were flawed either because they targeted people seeking anonymous testing,
who were naturally more likely to be concerned about confidentiality than the aver-
age person, or conducted their studies before highly effective antiretroviral therapies
were available, or both).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. (chronicling increases for heterosexuals were as follows: Louisiana,
10.5%; Michigan, 225.1%; Nebraska, 5.7%; Nevada, 303.3%; New Jersey, 462.9%;
Tennessee, 603.8%).
134. See id. ("Declines in testing occurred among men who have sex with men in
Louisiana (4.3%) and Tennessee (4.1%) after HIV reporting; testing increased for
this group in Michigan (5.3%), Nebraska (19.6%), Nevada (12.5%), and New Jersey
(22.4%).").
135. See id. ("Among injection drug users, testing declined in Louisiana (15%),
Michigan (34.3%), and New Jersey (0.6%) and increased in Nebraska (1.7%), Nevada
(18.9%), and Tennessee (16.6%).").
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The Texas Department of Health ("TDH") conducted a study in
1996 and 1997 in which HIV prevention workers interviewed 615
Texans in three risk categories for HIV (men who have sex with
men, IDUs and high risk heterosexuals). 136 Eighty-five percent of
those interviewed said that they were likely to test for HIV in the
next year.'37 Seventeen percent expressed some concern about
named reporting of HIV test results, but only two percent cited
concerns over confidentiality or reporting as the most important
reason for delaying or avoiding testing. 38
Moreover, from a survey of 399 patients who had not been
tested for HIV, only eighteen cited discrimination and confidential-
ity concerns as factors in their decision, showing that despite wide-
spread misconceptions about partner notification, the deterrence
to testing is small.' 39 This survey also showed that ninety-one per-
cent of respondents believed that HIV-positive index patients
should apprise their sexual partners of their possible exposure to
HIV.
140
5. Allocating and Improving Scarce Resources
After abandoning its unique identifier system, TDH argued that
HIV reporting by name was necessary to "make sure that re-
sources get to the communities that need them most.' 141 TDH
uses AIDS case numbers to allocate HIV treatment resources, but
these numbers do not accurately reflect the people infected with
HIV. 41 Thus, communities with large numbers of asymptomatic
HIV individuals do not get the resources they need. 143 Addition-
ally, TDH has argued that it cannot get a reliable estimate on the
number of HIV infected individuals in Texas without HIV report-
ing.144 Without this number, improving HIV prevention and serv-
ices programs is difficult, especially considering the increasing time
lag between HIV infections and AIDS. 145 The subtle trends in in-
136. See Texas Department of Health, HIV Reporting by Name: The Impact on
HIV Testing (visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd>.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 206.
140. See id. at 208.
141. Texas Department of Health, HIV Reporting by Name: Questions & Answers
(visited Mar. 11, 1999) <http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd>.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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fection rates among different groups cannot be gauged without
data on HIV.146
B. Arguments Against Name Reporting and
Partner Notification
1. Threats to Confidentiality
Perhaps the most basic argument against name reporting and
partner notification is the potential breach of patient confidential-
ity and the degeneration of the doctor-patient relationship:
"Named reporting also by its nature requires a breach of the thera-
peutic relationship, because the physician, by law, must report con-
fidential information to the health department. ' 147  Partner
notification results in a similar breach, because although the physi-
cian does not disclose the name of the index patient, she still must
inform contacts of the index patient, not unreasonably resulting in
the index patient's fear of discovery.
In states requiring partner notification, the contours of what
would be the inner-sanctum of the doctor-patient relationship are
mandated by statute. Some states impose penalties on HIV posi-
tive individuals who fail to notify contacts,'148 and others authorize
physicians and public health officials to notify contacts, even with-
out the patient's consent. 149
The creation of databases containing the names of, infected indi-
viduals and their contacts increases the possibility of further
breaches in confidentiality. There already have been such
breaches, including the theft of a computer containing the names of
people with AIDS from a public health office in Sacramento, Cali-
fornia.150 State experts reviewing a backup computer tape found a
list of names and characteristics of about sixty AIDS patients that
146. See id.
147. See Gostin & Hodge, The "Names Debate," supra note 16, at 684.
148. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-3-3 (West 1994).
149. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-584 (West 1997):
A public health officer may inform or warn partners of an individual that
they may have been exposed to the HIV virus under the following condi-
tions: (1) The public health officer reasonably believes there is a significant
risk of transmission to the partner; (2) the public health officer has coun-
seled the protected individual regarding the need to notify the partner and
the public health officer reasonably believes the protected individual will not
inform the partner; (3) the public health officer has informed the protected
individual of his intent to make such disclosure.
150. See Richard C. Paddock, Thieves Steal Computer Containing Confidential List
of 60 AIDS Victims, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1987, at 3.
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dated back more than a year and should have been erased
earlier. 15'
There have also been leaks of information on computer discs
from the Pinellas County Health Unit in Florida, which may have
contained the names of approximately 4000 individuals infected
with HIV.115 The database contained telephone numbers, ad-
dresses, dates of birth and the manner by which individuals con-
tracted AIDS.a53 Investigation into this incident revealed the
practice of Florida's employees visiting hospitals and doctors carry-
ing laptops and discs containing the entire list of HIV-positive indi-
viduals for the county in which they worked.154 Opponents of HIV
partner notification fear that health officials privy to the HIV sero-
status of so many individuals will continue to compromise confi-
dentiality by leaking the information.
Disclosure of one's serostatus to others may also lead to domes-
tic violence. One study showed that forty-five percent of health
care providers serving HIV-positive women reported that they
have patients who feared domestic violence as a result of partner
notification. 15 5 One-quarter of these providers had patients who
actually had been assaulted by their partners upon notification.1 56
Additional breaches in confidentiality may come from the con-
tact who is notified by the physician or public health authority.
Although statutory requirements prohibit disclosure to non-privi-
157leged sources, the name of an index patient whose identity is
deducible by the contact may be leaked by that contact.1 58 In cer-
tain situations, it could be virtually impossible to determine where
a breach occurred, especially if it was perpetrated by an angered
151. See id.
152. See Sue Landry, AIDS List is Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at
1A.
153. See id.
154. See Sue Landry & Tim Roche, Lawsuit Filed Over AIDS List, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at 1A.
155. See ACLU, Why Coercion Won't Work, supra note 119, at 9 (citing Karen H.
Rothberg et al., Domestic Violence and Partner Notification: Implications for Treat-
ment and Counseling of Women with HIV, 50 JAMWA 3:87 (1995)).
156. See id. (citing Karen H. Rothberg et al., Domestic Violence and Partner Notifi-
cation: Implications for Treatment and Counseling of Women with HIV, 50 JAMWA
3:87 (1995)).
157. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2135 (McKinney 1999) ("All reports or
information secured by the department, municipal health commissioner or district
health officer.., shall be confidential except in so far as is necessary to carry out the
provisions of this title.").
158. See Price, supra note 39, at 469.
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contact. Not surprisingly, it would be difficult to enforce laws
prohibiting disclosure by contacts.
Opponents of name reporting and partner notification have ral-
lied behind programs such as anonymous testing and unique identi-
fier systems. Another system that would not breach confidentiality
but may pose other problems is the use of a unique identifier that is
not comprised of the last four digits of a patient's social security
number. 159 An example of this identifier is a word or phrase that
the patient chooses herself, similar to e-mail addresses used on the
internet.160 This identifier need not in any way be linked to the
patient, assuring perfect confidentiality. However, this system re-
lies completely on the patient's cooperation, making the collection
of a comprehensive pool of data in comparison with a name report-
ing system more difficult.
2. Stigma and the Inadequacy of Legal Protections
Mandatory name reporting and partner notification may be
more palatable to the general populace if the stigma surrounding
HIV/AIDS was not so strong. In a study conducted by Gregory M.
Herek, Ph.D. and John P. Capitanio, Ph.D. at the University of
California at Davis, it was demonstrated that the stigma of AIDS is
still alive and strong.16' The study examined attitudes towards peo-
ple with AIDS ("PWA") in the second decade of the disease.162 It
found that between one-third and one-fifth of the general public
holds negative feelings towards PWA, believes that they deserve
their illness, or even supports punitive measures to be taken
against them.' 63 The study further revealed that many misconcep-
tions around transmissibility of the disease still exist.' 64
Legal protections are necessary to stop discrimination against
PWA. Unfortunately, current protections are inadequate in ac-
complishing this goal. As illustrated by the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act ("ADA"), although a law may be able to prohibit
discrimination in theory, it cannot always control it in practice. For
159. See Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 1999) (citing Cathe-
rine Hanssens, Esq., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
160. See id.
161. See Herek & Capitanio, supra note 77.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. Of the 538 surveyed, roughly half thought transmission of HIV was
likely when two uninfected homosexual men had intercourse without condoms, when
a person shared a drinking glass with an HIV-positive person, was coughed or
sneezed on by a infected individual, or was bitten by an insect. See id. at tbl. 2.
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example, in Bragdon v. Abbott165 the Supreme Court recently de-
termined that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability for ADA
purposes, thereby prohibiting employment discrimination against
HIV-positive individuals. 166 Still, the Court cannot eliminate the
obvious social stigma attached to the disease. Even the ADA
working at full capacity cannot prevent a seropositive individual
from suffering discrimination in social situations and by loved
ones.
167
3. Name Reporting and Partner Notification Deter Testing
A common argument against name reporting and partner notifi-
cation programs is that they will deter people from voluntary HIV
testing. According to some, "while the goal of increased tracking
of HIV infection is to bring those with HIV into the public health
system and to obtain more accurate epidemiological data, name re-
porting will likely have the opposite effect. ' '168 Studies suggest that
a significant number of individuals tested anonymously for HIV
would not have undergone testing if their names would have been
reported to public health authorities. 69
Moreover, if the ultimate goal is to get people tested, treated
and engaged in less risky behavior as quickly as possible, then
name reporting and partner notification may have a deleterious ef-
fect.170 Research indicates that when anonymous testing is avail-
able, the average amount of time spent deciding to be tested can be
reduced by more than one half, from a mean of twelve months to a
mean of five months. 71 Moreover, more individuals return for
their results at anonymous testing centers than at centers that prac-
165. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
166. See id.
167. See ACLU, HIV Surveillance, supra note 20.
168. See id.
169. See id. (citing Susan M. Kegeles et al., Many People Who Seek Anonymous
HIV-Antibody Testing Would Avoid it Under Other Circumstances, 4 AIDS 585, 586
(1990) (observing that over sixty percent of individuals tested anonymously would not
have tested if their names were reported to public health officials); see also Gostin &
Hodge, Piercing the Veil, supra note 6, at 33 (citing Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Partner Notification and Confiden-
tiality of the Index Patient: Its Role in Preventing HIV, 17 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES 113, 113-14 (1990)).
170. See ACLU, HIV Surveillance, supra note 20 (citing Laura Fehrs et al., Trial of
Anonymous Versus Confidential Human Immunodeficiency Virus Testing, 2 LANCET
391 (1998)).
171. See id.
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tice name reporting. 172 The number of individuals failing to return
likely would increase where testing entailed not only name disclo-
sure to authorities, but also was followed by partner notification.
Additionally, fears of discrimination and stigmatization are so
strong that many travel across state lines to obtain anonymous test-
ing. 173 Performed in conjunction with name reporting, partner no-
tification appears to add barriers to an already emotionally-
charged situation. Partner notification is self-defeating if it acts as
a deterrent to testing. Fewer contacts will be notified if fewer peo-
ple are willing to be tested.
4. The Failure of Partner Notification to
Eradicate the Spread of Syphilis
Although sexually-transmitted, HIV/AIDS is different in degree
from other STDs. HIV/AIDS cannot be rendered non-infectious
like syphilis and gonorrhea, meaning that any partner notification
program for HIV/AIDS-infected individuals would have to con-
tinue throughout the person's existence, making it considerably
more expensive than those employed for other STDs. 74 Despite
the central role partner notification played in syphilis treatment
programs in the 1940s, it is unclear whether it had an effect on
reducing transmission.175 In fact, both syphilis and gonorrhea in-
fections have increased in the past twenty years, leading many to
question the effectiveness of partner notification measures.176
Even the CDC recognized this dilemma, attributing partner notifi-
cation's failure to control syphilis to the fact that syphilis affects a
large number of illegal drug users, rendering notification of con-
tacts difficult and sometimes impossible. 77 HIV infection also is
largely related to IDUs: The demographics of HIV are changing
from largely gay and bisexual men in the first decade of the epi-
demic to people of color and IDUs in the second decade. 178
172. See id. A study conducted in North Carolina showed that 30.3% of people
undergoing confidential testing did not return, as compared to only 8.2% of anony-
mously tested individuals. See id. (citing Irva Hertz Picciotto et al., HIV Test-Seeking
Before and After the Restriction of Anonymous Testing in North Carolina, 86 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1446, 1448 (1996)).
173. See id.
174. See NYC Bar, Partner Notification, supra note 7, at 3, 8.
175. See id. at 3.
176. See id.
177. See ACLU, Why Coercion Won't Work, supra note 119, at 6. (citing Centers
for Disease Control, Alternative Case-Finding Methods- in a Crack-Related Syphilis
Epidemic - Philadelphia, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 5:77 (1991)).
178. See id. at 2.
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In addition, the various risk factors that have been attributed to
the failure of partner notification efforts in controlling recent
outbreaks of syphilis - drug dependency, anonymous sex, nee-
dle-sharing partners, and the exchange of sex for drugs or
money - are all present among the fastest growing population at
risk for contracting HIV. 179
The circumstances surrounding HIV and syphilis are similar, sug-
gesting that partner notification may not effectively combat the
spread of HIV either.
III. Improving the New York Name Reporting and
Partner Notification Law
Many obstacles must be overcome before the New York Name
Reporting and Partner Notification Statute can be applied effec-
tively. Between the statute itself and the proposed regulations, a
definitive plan for instituting the law remains muddied and imprac-
tical. The following section analyzes the new law, suggesting vari-
ous changes to it while also supporting the implementation of a
unique identifier system in conjunction with partner notification.
A. Cost Efficiency of Partner Notification
Even if one assumes that the costs and resources associated with
partner notification are reasonable considering the results,18 ° one
cannot help but wonder whether available resources may be better
spent on medical research and providing access to health care. 181
"The CDC estimated in April 1987 that the cost of identifying, lo-
cating, counseling, and testing partners was $98 per HIV-infected
partner and $91 per HIV-seronegative partner. ' 18 2 New York,
however, is not just any state. One must recognize the many obsta-
179. Id. at 8.
180. See generally Andrew T. Pavia, M.D. et al., Partner Notification for Control of
HIV: Results after 2 Years of a Statewide Program in Utah, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1418, 1422-23 (1993) ("The benefits of partner notification for HIV exposure thus
appear to outweigh the potential risks and costs, but its precise role remains to be
determined.").
181. See ACLU, Why Coercion Won't Work, supra note 119, at 12 (Data from test
sites in Florida and New Jersey show that it cost $281,964 to locate 1035 partners (of
8633 that had been named), and 122 of those notified tested positive for HIV) (citing
Thomas A. Peterman, et al., HIV Partner Notification: Cost and Effectiveness Data
from a Multicenter Randomized Controlled Trial, XI INT. CONF. AIDS, Abstract
#Th.C.4626 (1996)).
182. Dimas & Richland, supra note 43, at 206-07 (stating that the difference in cost
stemmed from the need for additional post-test counseling for HIV-positive
individuals).
1480
HIV NAME REPORTING
cles in reporting infected individuals and notifying their partners in
urban areas with such high seroprevalence levels such as New York
City.183
Still, New York has posited that after several thousands of dol-
lars spent on updating laboratory materials and facilities to accom-
modate the increase in HIV reporting, the additional costs
associated with reporting and notification will be nominal: $5.00
per report for a health care provider to fill out the form, $8.00 per
interview with HIV positive individual, post-test counseling that
may be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement at an average rate of
$72.00 per session, and an estimated $100.00 for one hour of time
per partner notified by a physician.'8 4 These numbers then have to
be multiplied by the additional 11,000 newly diagnosed cases of
HIV that the state expects to report annually (9000 in New York
City and 2000 in the rest of the state). 185 Also added to these costs
must be the number of contacts notified. Another factor that must
be taken into account for New York City in particular is the diffi-
culty in locating partners of IDUs and other marginalized
groups, 86 such as people without places of permanent residence.
"[T]he fastest expansion [of HIV cases in New York] is among the
state's most disenfranchised: the poor, intravenous-drug users, peo-
ple of color, gay teenagers and runaway children.' 87 These peo-
ple, if attempted to be notified, will surely increase the costs per
notification.
The state must recognize that partner notification in New York
will necessarily be more expensive and less successful than in other
states, so that a basic weighing and evaluation of each tested indi-
vidual should be done. If it appears that the contacts named by the
index patient are not able to be located without undue costs, or the
information concerning their whereabouts is not forthcoming, a
health official may not want to incur the unexpected, additional
costs. This evaluation should be done on a case-by-case analysis so
that much needed funds that could be used for treatment are not
wasted on hopeless cases.
183. See Price, supra note 39, at 478; see also Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
184. See Regulatory Impact Statement, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amend-
ment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, ch. 163, at 7-10, (1999) (proposed
regulations, on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
185. See id. at 6.
186. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
187. Laurie Garrett, Hidden HIV / The Search is on for People Who Don't Know
They Carry the Virus that Causes AIDS, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1998, at C6.
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B. A Unique Identifier System
New York could achieve its twin goals of data collection and
partner notification without discouraging testing by instituting a
unique identifier system and eliminating name reporting. 188 As
noted earlier, this system has been instituted in Maryland, and until
recently, Texas.' 89 Although Maryland recognizes its problems
with incomplete reports, it notes that the percentage of complete
reports has been steadily increasing. 190 A pilot program, whereby
staff members are trained in the unique identifier system, has re-
sulted in a markedly improved 96.6% completeness rate.1 91 There-
fore, New York should ensure that health department employees
creating unique identifier numbers undergo training programs
when the system is initiated.
A unique identifier system's success is measured by more than
the completeness of the numbers reported. Its "ability to match
the [unique identifiers] of persons listed in the UI Registry with the
UI's of persons listed in the state's AIDS Registry and conse-
quently to be able to distinguish new cases of HIV infection from
previously reported AIDS cases" also mark a system's value. 92
Maryland's match rate was 76.5%, while that of Alabama and Ari-
zona, two states using HIV name reporting, had match rates of sev-
enty-nine to ninety percent.193  The seroprevalence rate of
Maryland, however, is approximately three times higher than that
of Alabama and Arizona, suggesting a higher case load; may have
been responsible for lower match levels.' 94 Because New York has
one of the highest seroprevalence rates in the U.S., 195 a unique
identifier system is feasible within the state only with better train-
ing, adequate staffing, and more resources proportionate to its ser-
oprevalence rate. If New York can lead the way in instituting an
efficient and effective unique identifier system, it should not be dif-
ficult for other states to follow.
After a series of public meetings revealed great opposition to a
name-based reporting system, Washington authorized a pilot pro-
188. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130 (McKinney 1999).
189. See TDH, HIV Reporting by Name, supra note 126.
190. See ACLU, The Maryland Lesson, supra note 123 ("While only 61% of UI's
reported in the first six months of the program were complete, approximately 77% of
the UI's reported in the last six months of 1996 were complete.").
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1482
HIV NAME REPORTING
gram using a non-name unique identifier system.196 The Washing-
ton system differs slightly from those used in Texas and Maryland
and promises to eliminate incomplete reports and assure confiden-
tiality by destroying records linking the individual to her identi-
fier. 197 In this new system, the individual's name and related
information would be sent to the health department, who would
then create the coded number and delete the individual's name
from the database, 98 rather than requiring the entity who does the
testing to complete these tasks. If the Washington system does
lead to more complete reports, New York also should tailor its pro-
gram similarly. By shifting the onus of creating coded numbers
onto the health department, the state does not need to rely on the
cooperation of private facilities, especially if cooperation is not
forthcoming.
Rather than employing the twelve digit number used in Mary-
land,199 New York should expand its system to include important
information such as risk behavior.2 °° This goal can be accom-
plished by encoding different behaviors and adding more digits to
the system. The addition of risk behavior and other information
may assist in locating trends among certain at-risk populations or
identifying other populations that are increasingly affected by the
epidemic, so as to maximize the infusion of resources where they
are needed most.
C. Non-cooperation by the Index Patient
As required by the New York Bill, the report sent to the com-
missioner at the state health department will contain information
identifying both the index patient and any contacts. 20 1 The first
obvious problem with this law and other partner notification stat-
utes is the hurdle posed by an index patient's refusal to cooperate
with the authorities. Although the index patient may be forced to
reveal her own name to obtain insurance reimbursement,2 2 she
196. See Washington State Moves Toward Study of Unique Identifiers, AIDS POL'Y
& L., Mar. 6, 1998, at 12.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
200. See generally CDC, Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance, supra note 124, at
1254 (noting the importance of including HIV risk information for an effective sur-
veillance system).
201. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130(3) (McKinney 1999).
202. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REcS., tit. 10, §§ 63.2-63.3(a)(1) (1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the
Fordham Urban Law Journal) ("[F]or purpose of insurance coverage, confidential, as
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cannot be forced to reveal the name of her sexual and/or needle-
sharing contacts. The law stipulates that no criminal or civil liabil-
ity will result for any index patient's failure to cooperate in contact
tracing. °3
This non-cooperation obstacle suggests that the process of part-
ner notification, at its essence, is voluntary or contingent on index
patient cooperation. That is not to say that coercive notification
may not occur. An individual ignorant of her rights under the law
may be unwillingly duped into cooperation. Even worse, she may
lie about her sexual history and characteristics, resulting in inaccu-
rate data. Thus, written informed consent20 4 is the key to managing
non-cooperation. Informed consent for HIV testing here means
that the patient who is to be tested must first be given pre-test
counseling, which includes explanations regarding the nature of the
disease and current treatment options, the possibility of discrimina-
tion, and ways to prevent transmission.2 °5 Most importantly, how-
ever, pre-test counseling includes notice of name reporting and
partner notification, and the availability of anonymous testing
sites.2 °6
In addition to these elements of informed consent, health offi-
cials and physicians should be required to inform patients of their
right not to disclose contacts, while always emphasizing the impor-
tance of contacting partners. This Miranda-like20 7 warning should
be built into the informed consent definition such that a failure to
give it to the individual about to undergo testing may result in pro-
fessional liability for the physician or center offering the test.
opposed to anonymous testing is required."). The reporting regulations apply to peo-
ple receiving confidential HIV-related information.
203 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2136(3) (McKinney 1999).
204. See id. § 2780(5). "Capacity to consent" is defined as:
an individual's ability, determined without regard to the individual's age, to un-
derstand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a proposed health care
service, treatment, or procedure, or of a proposed disclosure of confidential HIV-
related information, as the case may be, and to make an informed decision con-
cerning the service, treatment, procedure or disclosure.
Id.
205. See id. § 2781(3).
206. See id. § 2781(4).
207. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that
statements that were obtained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation
in a police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were
inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
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D. Defining "Contacts"
This problem of non-cooperation, in turn, creates another one:
the problem of defining the term "contact." The amendments to
section 2780(10) attempt to elaborate on the definition of
"contact":
identified spouse or sex partner of the protected individual, a
person identified as having shared hypodermic needles or syr-
inges with the protected individual or a person who the pro-
tected individual may have exposed to HIV under circumstances
that present a risk of transmission of HIV, as determined by the
commissioner.2 0o
This definition is neither exhaustive nor realistic. It does not take
into account the existence of sexually-inactive spouses or estranged
spouses, nor does it clearly delineate how far back the contact trac-
ing process must venture. It also does not set limits on the extent
of probing a health official or physician must undertake, such as
whether she must investigate claims of sexual inactivity by the in-
dex patient. The law's over-broad reach may extend into the realm
of marital privacy, an area upon which the Supreme Court has de-
clined to tread.20 9 Infringement on the privacy rights of one's sex-
ual partners also is prohibited.21 0
E. Notification of Contacts
"[T]he municipal health commissioner or the department's con-
tact notification assistance program staff ... [must make a] deter-
mination that the reported case or any other case merits contact
notification in order to protect the public health .... ,211 Factors to
be considered in this determination are the awareness of known
contacts and situations involving newly-diagnosed persons with
HIV.212 The first factor is obviously spawned out of convenience;
limited or no investigation is required prior to notification. The
second factor, on the other hand, does not seem grounded in any
logic. What the health official may think is a "new diagnosis" may
actually be a "newly discovered" one because of the difficulty in
208. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2780(10) (McKinney 1999).
209. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a zone
of privacy in the marital realm).
210. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the privacy
rights of married couples to unmarried couples under the Equal Protection Clause).
211. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS., tit. 10, § 63.8(a)(3) (1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
212. See id. § 63.8(b).
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predicting with certainty when a person first contracted the dis-
ease. Also, it would seem more efficacious to notify partners of
someone who has been HIV positive for a longer period because
there has been a longer period in which the person has been
infectious.
The New York law also requires health officials to notify the con-
tact in person unless circumstances prevent this method.213 While
the great expense of carrying out this requirement exhausts money
and resources that could be used in finding a cure or better treat-
ments,214 the in-person notification may be well worth the expense
in such an emotionally-charged situation. Moreover, providing the
contact with an opportunity to receive detailed advice on the im-
portance of getting tested and reducing risk behavior from an indi-
vidual trained to share accurate information is critical. After all,
partner notification serves little purpose in breaking the chain of
transmission if the notified individual does not then herself get
tested.
Many opponents of the law understandably fear health officials
knocking on a contact's door while neighbors look on or leaving a
message that the contact should get in touch with the local health
department. Thus, the state should consider a policy of notifying
contacts in neutral places, such as the physician's office or the local
health department. If telephone contact must be made, the health
official should never leave a message with a party other than the
named contact.
F. Special Cases Where Immunity Should be Granted
During the notification process, the commissioner or authorized
official is not permitted to divulge the identity of the index patient
or the identity of any other contact.21 5 In reality, the identity pro-
tection offered by the plan is a fagade in some circumstances where
the index patient's identity easily can be deduced. For example, if
the contact of an index patient only has engaged in sexual relations
with the index patient and has never injected drugs, the identity of
the index patient may be obvious to the contact. Under these cir-
213. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2133(4) (McKinney 1999).
214. See supra notes 182-155 and accompanying text.
215. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2133(3) (McKinney 1999); see also Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 63.1
(1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) ("In all
cases of contact tracing authorized in this Part, the name or other identifying informa-
tion regarding the protected person shall not be disclosed to contacts and the name of
contacts shall not be disclosed to other contacts.").
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cumstances, the statute should have an immunity provision, which
weighs the degree of exposure to the contact against the need for
confidentiality to the index patient on a case-by-case basis. Unless
the degree of risk is substantially likely to transmit the virus, immu-
nity should be granted to the index for nondisclosure. Of course,
the index patient should always be strongly encouraged to notify
on her own, despite the risk of discovery.
Another difficult scenario for partner notification proceedings is
where domestic violence plays a role. Physicians and other persons
required to report must indicate whether they have conducted a
domestic violence screen on each case.216 Statistics show that do-
mestic violence in relationships is prevalent,217 and partner notifi-
cation to an abusive spouse may aggravate the situation. As part of
the aforementioned HIV "Miranda" warning, the health authority
should initiate the inquiry into whether there exists a threat of do-
mestic violence for the individual being tested, rather than waiting
for the patient to offer the evidence him/herself. The health official
also should clearly explain that the threat of domestic violence may
excuse the patient from partner notification.218
Additionally, considering the difficulty in detecting domestic vio-
lence and the secrecy usually maintained around it by victims, the
state may want to defer domestic violence judgments to those pro-
fessionally-trained in such matters, rather than give just any physi-
cian or authorized testing facility such important discretionary
power. In the alternative, the state should train health officials in
domestic violence screening, and then defer to their discretionary
power.
G. The Physician's Role
Another problem associated with New York's law is the unwar-
ranted emphasis it places on the doctor-patient relationship,
presuming that there exists something inherently special between
216. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS., tit. 10, § 63.8 (a)(1) (1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
217. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
218. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS., tit. 10, § 63.8(c) (1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal) ("Where partner notification is otherwise merited, "if an indica-
tion of risk of domestic violence has been identified, the health official must be satis-
fied in his/her professional judgment that reasonable arrangements and referrals to
address safety of affected persons have been made if and when the notification is to
proceed.").
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provider and patient to warrant disclosure by that particular pro-
vider, as opposed to any other. By assigning such highly personal
responsibilities to physicians, the state may be relying upon a mis-
perception of the status of the professional relationship as it exists
currently. In today's managed care system, it is not uncommon for
an individual to lack a close relationship with her physician.219 In
fact, with the relatively recent advent of health care maintenance
organizations and preferred provider organizations, a patient may
see a different healthcare provider with every visit. The days of the
family doctor that cared for the patient from birth on is no longer a
reality for most individuals.
Also, the law does not explore the ramifications of disclosure
from the contact's perspective. Although the index patient may
have established a relationship with the physician, it is unlikely that
the contact also would know the physician. Mandating that the in-
dex patient disclose her risk practices with others, the law also
reveals risk practices of the contact, including sexual and/or drug-
related activity that the contact may want to keep confidential.
Despite confidentiality requirements, partner notification may in-
fringe on the contact's right to privacy and confidentiality.
220
The law addresses the issue of possible liability incurred by the
reporting individual or agency: "Good faith reporting or disclosure
pursuant to this title shall not constitute libel or slander or a viola-
tion of the right of privacy or privileged communication. '22' Fur-
thermore, immunity from civil and criminal liability is granted for
good faith attempts at reporting.222 This provision is essential to
eliminating any kind of fear a physician might feel concerning legal
action.
The amendment also changes section 2782(4) of the Public
Health Law, concerning the physician's authorization to notify con-
tacts: "A physician may disclose confidential HIV related informa-
tion ... [if] the physician has counseled the protected individual
[about notification] . . . and . . . the physician has informed the
protected individual of his or her intent to make such disclosure to
a contact .... 223 In this instance, the physician must give the
219. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW ch. 3.111, at 800 (3d ed. 1997)
(arguing that "[b]ecause subscribing to an HMO usually means being treated by an
HMO-affiliated doctor, HMOs are less likely to attract persons with chronic illnesses
already attached to a doctor").
220. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
221. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2136(1) (McKinney 1999).
222. See id. § 2136(2).
223. Id. §§ 2782(4)(a)(3)-(4)(a)(4).
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index patient an opportunity to express a preference as to the pro-
cess of disclosure.224
In the patient referral model, it may be difficult for health au-
thorities to ensure that contacts have been notified. Also, fewer
partners may be notified in this model in comparison to the physi-
cian referral model.225 Unfortunately, if the goal of partner notifi-
cation is to actually notify contacts, New York's provision giving
index patients an option over whether to personally inform con-
tacts or assign that responsibility to a health authority may be self-
defeating. Thus, it is important that the law requires public health
officers to take reasonable steps to inform contacts if notification
by the physician cannot be verified.226 In a unique identifier sys-
tem, however, the contact may even use a code name for herself
that has been prearranged, and/or refer to the index patient
through her unique identifier number.
H. Anonymous Testing Sites
Despite the enactment of the new law, anonymous testing sites
still are alternatives to confidential testing, which will be accompa-
nied by name reporting.227 Currently, the availability of anony-
mous testing is important because even with a system of non-
named reporting in place, some individuals will fear confidentiality
breaches. Although anonymous testing may create some initial
data errors,228 it may be the only way to encourage certain groups
to be tested and possibly conduct partner notification.
A multistate survey found benefits to anonymous testing, such as
a shorter time span between being tested anonymously and seeking
treatment than that of testing confidentially and entering the
healthcare system: "The mean time from learning they were HIV
positive to the diagnosis of AIDS was almost a year and a half
longer (529 days) for those tested anonymously than for those
224. See id. § 2782(a)(4).
225. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
226. See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS., tit. 10, § 63.80)(4) (1999) (proposed regulations, on file with the Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
227. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2138 (McKinney 1999). The option of anony-
mous testing may be more mirage than real under the revised law since a patient must
be tested confidentially in order to receive insurance reimbursement for HIV medical
treatment. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
228. See Bindman et al., supra note 96, at 1416 ("Because people who test HIV
positive anonymously cannot be individually identified, reporting systems that rely on
the results of anonymous testing are prone to measurement error. It can be difficult
to detect repeat tests, and the potential exists for duplicate reporting.").
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tested confidentially . "..."229 Earlier testing allowed patients to
receive the benefits of a longer period of medical treatment for
HIV.23 ° The same survey also showed that almost a quarter of
HIV-positive persons who had been tested voluntarily before being
diagnosed with AIDS had sought anonymous testing.23 a Thus, at
least for the present, the option of anonymous testing is crucial in
New York because it may alleviate many of the fears associated
with HIV testing.
Eventually, however, anonymous testing should be phased-out
to prevent data errors, which threaten to be substantial: "Anony-
mous testing appears to be on the upswing in New York. In 1992,
nearly 190,000 New Yorkers had an HIV test in a publicly funded
facility. In 1996, that number was less than 40,000. ' '232 These sta-
tistics can only mean either New Yorkers have switched to private,
anonymous testing or there has been a seventy-nine percent de-
crease in HIV testing.233 Once people are made to understand the
privacy protections of a unique identifier system, the elimination of
anonymous testing should not be so frightening. The unique iden-
tifier system would alleviate most confidentiality fears while still
maintaining accurate and comprehensive data.
Conclusion
The world soon will be entering the third decade of the HIV/
AIDS epidemic. Despite great advances in treatment, there is no
cure and AIDS remains an ultimately fatal disease. The New York
legislature's passage of a HIV name reporting and partner notifica-
tion law marks a monumental step in the history of the disease
because of the state's high seroprevalence level.2 34 Despite the
lofty goals set by advocates of partner notification,such as inform-
ing those who have been exposed to HIV with the hope that they
will then be tested and motivated into less risky behavior,235 draw-
backs still exist. The fear of stigmatization is still strong, as is the
possibility of discrimination.236 There is no doubt that some peo-
ple, whether few or many, will be deterred from being tested. 37
229. Id. at 1418.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Garrett, supra note 187, at C6.
233. See id.
234. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
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In order to achieve the twin goals of the collection of epidemio-
logical data for research purposes and the notification of partners
exposed to risk, the New York law needs to be modified. By re-
placing name reporting with a more refined system of unique iden-
tifiers, which include valuable factors like risk behavior, the first
goal may be achieved and patient security ensured. Modifying the
New York statute to include immunity provisions for certain pa-
tients and opt-out provisions for providers may also further these
goals. In the end, it appears that a unique identifier system in con-
junction with a compassionate system of partner notification may
be the best route for New York to take in its fight against AIDS.
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FEDERALISM FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE VALUES
OF FEDERALISM
Dennis M. Cariello*
The central issue of federalism, of course, is whether any realm
is left open to' the States by the Constitution - whether any
area remains in which a State may act free of federal
interference.'
Introduction
The American Republic consists of two governing bodies: the
national and state governments. 2 Each government exists individu-
ally to serve the people3 and together, the state and national gov-
* Presidential Fellow, Association of the Bar of the City of New York; J.D.,
Fordham University School of Law, 1999; B.A. (History), State University of New
York at Stony Brook, 1995. Senior Articles Editor, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL.
I would like to thank Andrea Fitz for her love and support, Robert J. Cosgrove for his
many insights on this topic, my grandparents, Lilly and Lester Manning, for their love,
support and generosity throughout law school and my mother Karen Faulkner for
making me who I am today. I would like to dedicate this Note to Brooke Bonomi and
Vincent Basileo, Rocky Point Jr. Sr. High School, and Professors Martin S. Flaherty
and Robert Kaczrowski, Fordham University School of Law. Their passion for Amer-
ican History and the Constitution is evident in every class they teach and is the source
for my love of the topic.
1. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-81 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) [hereinafter all citations are to this edition] ("In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among district and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con-
trolled by itself."); Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in VIII THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 63,
98 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) ("The ... powers of sovereignty are in this country
divided between the National and State Governments .... "); James Wilson, Speech
to the Pennsylvania Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 2
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 444 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2d ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES] ("[The people] can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted
circle, called state governments; they can also furnish another proportion to the gov-
ernment of the United States.").
3. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 294 (James Madison) ("The
federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.").
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ernments serve as a check on each other, ensuring that the people
are served.4 This arrangement, known as federalism, was the
Framers' unique contribution to political science and theory.
At its core, federalism is a cooperative form of government
where state and national governments are asked to provide citizens
with services. Federalism seeks to allocate responsibility to which-
ever government that can best perform that service.6 This policy
began with the Framers and serves as sound political theory rele-
vant to twenty-first century America. Since America's inception,
however, questions about federalism and the allocation of power
between the national and state governments have plagued the
nation.7
4. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 2, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton)
("[T]he general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general
government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 2, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton).
[T]he State legislature, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious
and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments
from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to
the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything
improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the
VOICE, but if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Id. Alexis de Tocqueville later noted:
It is an axiom of American public law that every power must be given full
authority in it own sphere which must be defined in a way that prevents it
[the power] stepping beyond it [its sphere]: that is a great principle, and
worth thinking about.
THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 247 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1959). Now,
more than ever, Americans look to both governments to provide essential services.
From 1985-90 twenty-one million Americans moved between states. In fact, as of
1990, only 61.8% of Americans lived in the state in which they were born. See Kristin
A. Hansen, Immigrants, Outmigrants, and Net Migration Between 1985 and 1990 and
Movers from Abroad, for States: 1990 (Oct. 1995) <http://www.census.gov/population/
socdemo/migration/net-mig.txt>.
5. See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977) ("The
genius of the Framers lay in devising a unique form of federalism-one in which a
national government was authorized to act directly on the people within the powers
confided to it rather than solely on the states, and was endowed with an amplitude of
powers which might or might not be used as the future would dictate."). See gener-
ally, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
524-32, 564 (1969) (discussing federalism).
6. See, e.g. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 295 (James Madison) ("[lit
is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can in the nature of things, be
advantageously administered.").
7. For a recent example, consider the recent debate over local "sanctuary" or
"non-cooperation" ordinances and the effect they have on a state's ability to provide
services for its citizens and the national government's ability to enforce immigration
policy. See Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Re-
stricting Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50 (1994) (re-
ferring to ordinances that restrict cooperation between local police and federal
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Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities as both "sanctuary ordinances"
and "non-cooperation ordinances"). Briefly, non-cooperation ordinances prevent lo-
cal officers and employees from giving the federal government information regarding
the status of aliens. See id. Many cities passed these ordinances to alleviate fears of
deportation for illegal and undocumented aliens who seek police protection, medical
services or education for their children. See Rudolph W. Giuliani, Public Address,
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 4 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 165 (1996) ("[New York City's non-cooperation ordinance,
Executive Order 124] create[s] a zone of protection for illegal and undocumented
immigrants who are seeking the protection of the police, or seeking medical services
because they are sick, or attempting to or actually putting their children in public
schools so they can be educated."). This policy, in turn, aids the general population.
As New York Mayor Giuliani noted:
If you do not create an area of protection for those 400,000 [illegal and un-
documented aliens in New York] people to report when they are victimized,
then not only do you increase the risk that they will be victimized again, but
that the next time the mugger seeks to victimize someone, that person might
not be an illegal or undocumented immigrant.
Id. at 167. Mayor Giuliani also added:
If you tell people "you are going to pay a very heavy penalty by reporting
crimes that are committed against you to the police," you deprive the police
of significant information they could use to catch criminals. And when you
are talking about as many people as we are talking about, it is a significant
part of the population in which the police enforce the law and protect all
citizens.
Id. For these reasons, many states and cities enacted these ordinances. See Bau,
supra note 6, at 52 & n.10 (listing jurisdictions with non-cooperation ordinances); Ali-
son Fee, Note, Forbidding States from Providing Essential Social Services to Illegal
Immigrants: The Constitutionality of Recent Federal Action, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 93,
100-02 & nn.47-48 (1998) (same). Despite the compelling policy reasons underlying
these ordinances, Congress twice attempted to revoke the ordinances. See H.R. 5255
102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 1607, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Giuliani,
supra note 6, at 168 ("As I have said, this idea [revoking non-cooperation ordinances]
has long been debated in Congress and there have been at least two other attempts to
revoke the order [New York City's Executive Order 124], both of which have been
defeated."). Both attempts failed. Eventually, however, Congress accomplished its
goal by passing § 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (1996) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or
in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an
alien in the United States."), and Section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). Section 642 provides:
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or
in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual.
b. Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or
local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful of any
individual:
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Part I of this Note explores the beginnings of federalism through
an examination of the history of "layered" government in America.
From Jamestown to the Articles of Confederation to the Constitu-
tional Convention and beyond, America has always operated
under two governments: one "national," the other "local." There-
fore, paying attention to America's history of layered government
should clarify the Framers' intent in making federalism a vital part
of the Constitution.
Part II reviews the conflict in the Supreme Court over federal-
ism. Specifically, this Part examines how the Court has dealt with
federalism vis-A-vis congressional powers.8 The discussion will
clarify the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate a cohesive test
for federalism concerns covering a variety of congressional powers.
Part III then proposes a method for resolving federalism dis-
putes. This method calls for an allocation of authority into the
spheres intended by the Framers. The proposal specifically looks
to the values of federalism to help distinguish between national
and local interests and, thus, allocate authority. Such a test is easily
applicable to all federalism concerns and is sound public policy for
America in the twenty-first century. This Note concludes that revi-
sions consistent with those prescribed in this Note are necessary to
increase the effectiveness of the state and national governments
alike.
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such infor-
mation from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Maintaining such information.
(2)Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local
government entity.
8 U.S.C. § 1373.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798-99), the Hartford Convention (1814-
15), the Nullification Crisis (1831-33), the northern response to the Fugitive Slave Act
(1850-52), the Civil War (1861-65) and Reconstruction (1868-70) are just a few of the
conflicts between the national and state governments over the allocation of power
and responsibility. See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review,
Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and
the United States, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1229, 1242-55, 1295-97 (1990) (discussing the Vir-
ginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Hartford Convention, the Nullification Crisis,
the northern response to the Fugitive Slave Act, the Civil War and Reconstruction).
8. This Note does not concern any of the problems of federalism as it coexists
with the federal courts, the executive branch or the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor
does this Note consider the effect later historical developments should or have had on
Constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Consti-
tutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 837
(1986) ("Because they believed that national citizenship was primary and state citi-
zenship derivative, the congressional framers of the fourteenth amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 also believed that Congress possessed primary authority to
secure the civil rights of United States citizens.").
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I. Background
The history of inter-governmental relations between England
and the colonies greatly influenced the Framers. As a result, they
conferred upon the national government many of the same powers
held by England in the colonial system. Likewise, the powers re-
tained by the states are strikingly similar to those held by the colo-
nies. Moreover, because the Framers were so influenced, the
Constitution may be viewed as a return to the principles of layered
government under the colonial system - principles disregarded
while America was governed under the Articles of Confederation.
Accordingly, understanding the relations between England and her
colonies can better illustrate the Framers' intentions when they bal-
anced power between national and state government.
A. America's Infancy, 1606-1700
1. Early Colonial Autonomy
The American colonies were a completely "new species of colo-
nizing, of modern date, and differing essentially from every other
species of colonizing that is known."9 While dependent on Eng-
land,' ° the early colonies enjoyed a great deal of autonomy." Two
factors influenced this relationship. First, the nature of the colo-
nies greatly shaped their relationship with England. The great dis-
tance from England to the American Colonies made control
impracticable.' 2 More importantly, the colonies operated for spe-
cific purposes - to cultivate the land and promote trade for the
good of themselves and England. 3 Consequently, as England re-
ceived the economic benefits from her colonies, strict control of
colonial life was unnecessary.
Second, the character of the American colonialists also influ-
enced the relationship with England. The monarchy encouraged
private adventurers (either through chartered companies or indi-
9. JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES,
1607-1788 9-10 (1986) [hereinafter GREENE, PERIPHERIES].
10. See id. at 10.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 8.
13. See id.
14. "English officials thought of [the colonies] ... as a series of economic units
intended to contribute to the prosperity of England and to provide it with a solid
claim to a portion of the vast riches of the New World." JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTI-
ATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY 43 (1994) [hereinafter GREENE, AUTHORITIES].
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vidual lord proprietors) to settle colonies by granting them exclu-
sive title to large areas of land, extensive self-governing powers
and, often, special economic considerations.1 5 The resulting Amer-
ican colonists were an adventurous, individualistic people, moti-
vated by profit or, the pursuit of freedom. The colonists brought
with them English traditions of law and governance, which put a
high value on both individual liberty and local autonomy. 16 As a
result, the American colonists were predictably "jealous of [their]
autonomy and resistant to local interference."'"
During the early years of the colonies, England, preoccupied
with affairs at home and unsure of proper colonial policy, paid little
attention to her colonies.1 8 The colonists, therefore, were left to
15. See generally GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 10-11 (noting this Eng-
lish colonizing strategy). Moreover, as early as 1579, the younger Richard Hakluyt
conceived of colonial self-government, for when recommending the occupation of the
Magellan Strait he concluded:
But admit that we could not enjoye the same long, but that the English there
would aspire to governement of themselves, yet were it better that it sholde
be soe then that the Spanyard shold with the tresure of that countrey tor-
ment all the contries of Europe.... But we myght kepe the cuntry as well as
the Spanyards doe, and use traffique with them.
THE ORIGINAL WRITINGS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE Two RICHARD HAKLUYTS
143 (E.G.R. Taylor ed., 1935).
16. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 11; Mark A. Kishlansky, Commu-
nity and Continuity: A Review of Selected Works on English Local History, 3 WILLIAM
AND MARY QUARTERLY, 31, 140, 146 (1980); KENNETH R. ANDREWS, TRADE, PLUN-
DER AND SETTLEMENT: MARITIME ENTERPRISE AND THE GENESIS OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE, 1480-1630 17 (1984). Tudor England, for example, was "a largely self-gov-
erning society-under the crown." Id. at 16-17. The Tudor monarchs freely extended
franchise to English boroughs up until the reign of Charles II. See LEONARD WOODS
LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 180 (2d ed., 1934). During and after
the reign of Charles II, however, only twice was such local representation granted, to
the borough of Newark (by the King) and the town and city of Durham (by Parlia-
ment). See id.
17. ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 16-17. From 1628, the time the House of Burgess
reconvened in Virginia, until 1776 elective government was a permanent feature in
the colonies. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 172. Edmund Burke summarized the
situation: "The settlement of our colonies was never pursued upon any regular plan;
but they were formed, grew, and flourished, as accidents, the nature of the climate, or
the dispositions of private men happened to operate." Id. (quoting 2 EDMUND
BURKE, AN ACCOUNT OF THE EUROPEAN SETrLEMENTS IN AMERICA 288 (1757)).
18. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 173. Indeed, Jack Greene remarked:
[T]he failure of develop any central agency in England for colonial adminis-
tration, the distractions of the Civil War, the refusal of the colonists to abide
by regulations they opposed, and the lack of adequate enforcement machin-
ery prevented either crown or Parliament from establishing effective con-
trols over the colonies, despite sporadic attempts by one or the other to do
SO.
GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note 14, at 45.
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define their own civil liberties and laws. 9 In Massachusetts Bay,
for example, the Body of Liberties of 164120 guaranteed all citizens
due process 21 and equal justice. 22 It also ensured freedom of
speech,23 assembly24 and movement.25 The Body of Liberties also
extended fairly liberal criminal procedure protections26 and estab-
lished criminal laws, such as prohibiting violence against married
women by their husbands27 and protecting animals from cruelty,28
as well as listing capital offenses.29
19. In 1625, after assuming control over Virginia after the courts vacated the char-
ter of the Virginia Company, the crown asserted its jurisdiction over all colonial plan-
tations and declared its intent to provide "one uniforme Course of Government" for
all of them. A Proclamation for Settlinge the Plantations of Virginia, May 13, 1625,
reprinted in 18 FOEDERA, CONVENTIONES, LITERAL, ACTA PUBLICA, REGIS ANGLI-
CAE 72-73 (Thomas Rymer ed., 1726), quoted in GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note
14, at 45. This intention, however, was not fully carried to term, undermining its
effectiveness.
20. See A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collinie in New England
reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 1606-1775 73 (William Macdonald ed., 1906).
21. See id. 1 at 74.
No mans life shall be taken away, no mans honour or good name shall be
stayned, no mans person shall be arested, restrayned, banished, dismembred,
nor any ways punished, no man shall be deprived of his wife or children, no
mans goods or estaite shall be taken from him, nor any way indammaged
under Coulor of law, or Countenance of Authoritie, unlesse it be by virtue or
equitie of some expresse law of the Country warranting the same, estab-
lished by the generall Court and sufficiently published ....
Id.
22. See id. 2 at 74 ("Every person ... shall enjoy the same justice and law, that is
generall for the plantation, which we constitute and execute one towards another,
without partialitie of delay.").
23. See id. 12 at 75.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Among them, Massachusetts Bay provided for grants of bail, granted the right
to challenge jurors, prevented double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishments
and required a heightened burden of proof in capital cases. See id. TT 18 at 76 (bail),
30 at 78 (challenge jurors), 42 at 80 (double jeopardy), 46 at 80 (cruel and unusual
punishments), 47 at 80 (requiring two witnesses in a capital case).
27. See id. 80 at 85.
28. See id. 92 at 87.
29. See id. 94 at 87 (including among them: "worship of any other god, but the
lord god"; "[I]f any man or woeman be a witch"; blasphemy; murder, whether pre-
meditated, in the heat of passion or by "poysoning or other such divelish practice[s]";
stealing; kidnapping; lying for the purpose of "tak[ing] away a man's life"; and trea-
son). Also in New England, Rhode Island established extensive regulations on inter-
nal matters. See Code of Laws adopted by the First General Assembly of "The
Incorporation of Providence Plantations" in 1647, reprinted in THE EARLIEST ACTS
AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647-
1719 12-55 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977) (providing for "relief for the poor," requiring
licenses for "Ale Houses," outlawing "fraudulent dealing," "trespass by man or
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In Virginia, the House of Burgess produced the Virginia Code of
1662.30 This code covered most issues of colonial life. For exam-
ple, it provided for marriage licenses, for replacement ministers
and regulated the height of fences Virginian planters. It also regu-
lated the cost doctors could charge for surgery, prohibited cruelty
to servants, levied taxes on tobacco and other products and pre-
vented any person from "having any commerce or trade with any
Indian for beaver, otter, or any other furs except those commis-
sioned by the governor." 31
William Penn, as proprietor of Pennsylvania, established a colo-
nial government in 1682 - balancing power between the elected
assembly and the proprietor's council.32 This government operated
for seventeen years until 1699, when, faced with unhappiness in his
colony, Penn, the Assembly and the Council completed the Char-
ter of Privileges of 1701, the most famous of the colonial constitu-
tions. The Charter provided for an enhanced freedom of religion,
yearly elections to an annual assembly, the right to counsel in crim-
inal trials, required licenses 'for tavern owners and other "houses of
public entertainment," and intestacy laws.33
Interestingly, New York's colonists did not have a large role in
defining their laws and civil liberties. In 1665, Governor Nicolls
drafted an extensive body of laws, covering topics ranging from
capital offenses and juries to property laws and marriage regula-
tions.34 These laws, based on the codes used in New Haven and
Massachusetts, were presented to delegates from the Long Island
towns at Hempstead in March of 1665. After incorporating minor
beast," "rape," "buggery," "adultery and fornication," "touching whoremongers"
(sodomy), "witchcraft," "robbery," "burglary," "murder," and "manslaughter").
30. See 2 THE STATUTES-AT-LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, 41-148 (W.W. Henning ed., 1619-1792), reprinted in HAWKE, U.S. COLO-
NIAL DOCUMENTS 137-43 (1996) (various selections).
31. HAWKE, supra note 30, at 143. The Maryland Assembly likewise, provided sim-
ilar laws. See CHARTER OF MARYLAND (1632), reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS, supra
note 20, at 53-58. Maryland also provided for extensive religious liberties. See MARY-
LAND TOLERATION ACT (1649), reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS, supra note 20, at 105
("Be it Therefore ... enacted ... that noe person or persons whatsoever within this
Province ... professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies
troubled, Molested or discountenaced for or in his respect of his or her religion nor in
the free exercise thereof . . ").
32. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1682), reprinted in SELECT
CHARTERS, supra note 20, at 192.
33. See THE CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES (1701), reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS,
supra note 20, at 224.
34. See THE DUKE'S LAWS 1665, 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 5-100
(1894), reprinted in HAWKE, supra note 30, at 168-71.
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revisions, the delegates reluctantly accepted the code,"5 becoming
the only colony to have its internal code provided for it.36
2. Limitations on Colonial Autonomy
England's lassie-faire attitude towards the American Colonies
soon ceased. After the restoration of Charles II in 1660, Parlia-
ment issued various instructions to the royal governors to limit the
authority of colonial assemblies. 37 Parliament also established a se-
ries of acts designed to more precisely define the economic rela-
tionship between England and her colonies. The acts specifically
sought to eliminate colonial trade with rival foreign powers and to
subordinate the economies of the colonies to that of England.38
The Navigation Acts of 166039 and 1663,40 for example, afforded
England increased control over commerce in the colonies. The
1660 Act provided that all imports and exports to and from British
holdings must be transported in British or colonial vessels 41 and
that these exports were to be exported only to England or its hold-
ings. 2 The 1663 Act tightened this control by requiring all foreign
exports destined for the colonies to be shipped by way of Eng-
35. See HAWKE, supra note 30, at 168.
36. Of interest is the case of Carolina, which, when presented with the Fundamen-
tal Constitutions of Carolina of 1669, rejected the program. Drafted by the Earl of
Shaftsebury and John Locke, this government, as John Adams would attempt to do
for both Massachusetts and all the United States, tied power to property. See 1 THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 187-205 (William L. Saunders et. al., eds.
1886-1914), cited in HAWKE, supra note 30, at 156.
37. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 13-17.
38. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING passim (1939) (discussing
this point). Indeed, a report of royal commissioners sent to investigate the New Eng-
land colonies suggested to reduce the colonies to "an absolute obedience to the King's
authority." 5 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND THE
WEST INDIES, 1661-68 75 at 25 (W. Noel Sainsbury ed., 1964) (1880).
39. 12 Car. 2, ch. 18.
40. 15 Car. 2, ch. 7.
41. See 12 Car. 2, ch. 18.
42. See id. British control extended over "sugars, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigoes,
ginger, fustick, or other dying wood, of the growth, production or manufacture of any
English plantations in America, Asia, or Africa .... " Later Acts would extend such
control over naval stores, hemp, rice, molasses, beaver skins, furs and copper ore. See
OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICA REVOLUTION 11
(1951). Later the Sugar Act of 1764 would include coffee, pimento, whale fins, coco-
nuts, raw silk, hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes. See id.
1501
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
land,4 3 thereby ending the burgeoning colonial foreign import-ex-
port trade and making England the colonies' sole marketplace."
During this period, England possessed great authority over inter-
empire commercial matters. England not only controlled the flow
of commerce, but also what products entered its stream by impos-
ing tariffs and import bounties. For example, through various im-
port bounties, England encouraged the colonists to grow their own
hemp 45 and make their own tar,46 thus building up the naval-stores
industry. Due to its control over inter-empire trade, England en-
joyed great power over foreign relations and maritime laws as well.
Only the King, however, as the embodiment of the central govern-
ment, held authority over inter-empire trade, foreign relations and
maritime law,47 a view recognized by both colonist and King
alike.48
43. See 15 Car. 2., ch. 7.
44. As late as 1676, however, Edward Randolph would report that, when he in-
structed colonial leaders in Massachusetts Bay to enforce the Navigation Acts, he was
told that the "'laws made by your Majesty and your Parliament obligeth' Massachu-
setts residents 'in nothing but what consists with the interests of that colony."'
GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting A. BERRIEDALE KEITH, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE 104-05 (1930).
45. Bounties of £6 per ton were placed on hemp. See 3 Anne ch. 10.
46. A 33% import bounty was placed on all foreign tar and pitch. See 5 W. & M.
ch. 5.
47. Indeed, the colonists apprehended Parliament's trade laws, considering them a
violation of their rights and liberties. This was because the colonists were not repre-
sented in Parliament and, thus, Parliament did not represent the whole empire in the
way the King did. See 1 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 272 (Lawrence Shaw Mayo ed., 1936). As
Thomas Hutchinson, the former governor of colonial Massachusetts, and an authority
on colonial history commented:
[The colonists] apprehended them [Parliamentary trade laws] to be an inva-
sion of the rights, liberties and properties of the subjects of his Majesty in the
colony, they not being represented in parliament, and according to the usual
sayings of the learned law, the laws of England were bounded within the
four seas and did not reach America. However, as his Majesty had signified
his pleasure, that these acts should be observed in the Massachusetts, they
had made provision by law of the colony, that they should be strictly at-
tended to from time to time, although it greatly discouraged trade, and was a
great damage to his Majesty's plantation.
Id.
48. King Charles II, after the passage of the Navigation Acts, sent a letter to Mas-
sachusetts saying, "[w]e are informed that you have lately made some good provision
for observing the acts of trade and navigation, which is well pleasing to us." THOMAS
HUTCHINSON, HUTCHINSON PAPERS 521 (Burt Franklin ed., 1967). Hutchinson ex-
plains, "[t]his is very extraordinary, for this provision [the "good provision" referred
to] was an act of the colony declaring that the acts of trade should be in force there."
Id. Here, King Charles II, the King responsible for one of the largest expansions of
English power at the expense of colonial autonomy, recognized that colonial acquies-
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In 1675, Charles II created the Lords of Trade ("Lords"), a per-
manent committee of the Royal Privy Council. For a decade, the
Lords worked to secure colonial obedience to royal authority and
the Navigation Acts and limit colonial autonomy.49 At the urging
of Lords, the Privy Council voided numerous colonial acts.50 The
Lords tightened control over the King's governors51 and also
worked to reduce the influence of the colonial assemblies. 52 In ad-
cence to Parliament's authority was not obligatory. Indeed, John Adams cited this
letter as evidence of royal recognition of the lack of authority Parliament had over the
colonies. See John Adams, Novanglus, To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachu-
setts-Bay, Mar. 6, 1775, in 2 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 319 (Robert J. Taylor et. al.,
1977) ("Had he [the king], or his ministers an idea that parliament was the sovereign
legislative over the Colony? If he had, would he not have censured this law [the
Massachusetts law] as an insult to that legislature?").
49. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 13-14; LABAREE, supra note 16, at
222.
50. See, e.g., 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS (Leo-
nard W. Labaree ed., 1935). For example, in Virginia, the Lords voided fifteen acts of
the Virginia Assembly from 1676 to 1682. See id. at 159-60 (voiding eleven acts of the
Virginia Assembly: An Act of Free Pardon, An Act of Attainder, An Act of Inflicting
Pains, Penalties, and Fines upon Great Offenders, An Act for the Relief of Such
Loyal Persons as Have Suffered Loss by the Late Rebels, An Act Limiting Times of
Receipt and Payment of Public Tobaccos, An Act Regulating Ordinaries and the
Prices of Liquors, An Act Disposing of Amercements upon Cast Actions, An Act
Concerning Servants Who Were out in Rebellion, An Act for Laying of Parish Levies,
An Act for Delivery of Stray Horses, etc., and An Act for Signing Executions on
Judgments in the Assembly); id. at 161 (voiding two acts passed by the Virginia As-
sembly: An Act Prohibiting the Exportation of Any Iron, Wool, Woolfells, Skins,
hides, or Leather and An Act for Encouragement of the Manufactures of Linen and
Wollen Cloth in 1683); id. at 165 (voiding the proceedings of Virginia Assembly re-
pealing the pardon of "Nathaniel Bacon the younger and his accomplices"). In addi-
tion, New Hampshire, see id. at 165 (requiring that the New Hampshire Assembly
repeal all laws in that colony from 1682-86), and New York, see id. at 201 ("Repeal of
New York 'Charter of Liberties and Privileges"' in 1686-88) also suffered significantly
at the hands of the Lords.
51. The Lords did so by insisting upon more frequent and detailed reports on colo-
nial activities and expanding the scope of the royal instructions given to the gover-
nors. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 13-14; LABAREE, supra note 16, at
222.
52. From 1678 to 1689, the Lords drafted directions to the Royal Governors for
limiting the colonial assemblies. From 1678 to 1689, the Lords drafted directions to
the Royal Governors for limiting the colonial assemblies. See 1 ROYAL INSTRUC-
TIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, supra note 50, at 88-167. Some limitations
on the colonial assemblies included: "Biennial Summons of Virginia Assembly"
(obliging Virginia to call the assembly but "once in two years unless some emergent
occasion shall make it necessary, the judging whereof we leave to your discretion")
(Va., 1676); "Assemblies in Emergencies: Jamaica and Virginia" (excepting colonial
laws passed during invasion, rebellion or urgent necessity, from transmitting them to
England) (Va., 1679-82); "Disqualification of Beverley and Hill in Virginia" (disquali-
fying Col. Robert Beverley and Col. Edward Hill from public service, because they
are "persons of evil fame and behavior) (Va., 1679-82); "Assemblymen to be Elected
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dition, to increase the crown's influence throughout the colonies,
the Lords prevented the creation of any more private colonies and
attempted to convert those existing private colonies into royal col-
onies. 53 Perhaps the most ambitious attempt on colonial political
by Freeholders Only" (requiring all member of the assembly be freeholders) (Va.
1676-1761; Md. 1691-1715; NH, 1692-1776; NC, 1730-54; SC, 1720-76); "Council and
Assembly Not to Meet in Taverns", (NH, 1682-86); "Not to Reenact Laws" (prohibit-
ing reenacting any law, presumably that was voided by the Privy Council) (Va., 1682-
1728); "Laws Disallowed to be Void" (declaring all laws passed by colonial legisla-
tures but not approved by the Privy Council to be void) (NY, 1686-88, New England,
1686-89). See id. The Lords also persuaded the Virginian and Jamaican assemblies to
make the governors partially dependent on the crown for revenue, thus increasing
both gubernatorial dependency on the crown, and, consequently, willingness to en-
force royal prerogative over the colonists' desires. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra
note 9, at 14. Virginia was the only mainland colony to do so. The other colonies
refused as such a vote would deprive them of "the greatest Security of their Rights
and Privileges: Viz. Their Power of Deprivation, which is the greatest Check against
... absolute Government." Id. (quoting Votes and the Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the Colony of New-York, June 24, 1749-August 4, 1749 14-17 (New York,
1749)). In addition, theoretically, Royal Governors initiated all colonial legislation.
See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 218 ("The [governor's] commission empowered the
governor, by and with the advice and consent of council and assembly, 'to make, con-
stitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace, welfare, and
good government."). Practice, however, did not bear this out. Royal Governors com-
monly consented to legislation as it originated in the colonial assemblies. See
LABAREE, supra note 16, at 219. To remedy this, the Lords attempted to apply Poyn-
ing's Law to Jamaica (in 1678) and Virginia (in 1679). See 1 ROYAL INSTRUCrIONS TO
BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, supra note 50, § 199 (Royal Instruction for incorpo-
rating "Poyning's Method" to Virginia and Jamaica). The American version of Poyn-
ing's Law (Poyning's Law was originally applied to Irish Assembly, see LABAREE,
supra note 16, at 219, provided that all legislation, save for cases of invasion or other
dire emergency, be framed by the governor, then sent to England for revision and
approval by the Privy Council. Only then, now under the great seal, would the assem-
bly be called to consent to the bill. See 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLO-
NIAL GOVERNORS, supra note 50, § 199; LABAREE, supra note 16, at 219.
Virginia failed to see the significance of this innovation. See LABAREE, supra note
16, at 221 (noting that the House of Burgess in Virginia passed the provisions with few
amendments). The Jamaica Assembly, however, opposed the measure vehemently.
See 10 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL, 1677-1680, supra note 38, 596,
600, 601, 786, 794, 814, 815, 827, 961, 1001, 1117, 1188, 1265, 1361; 1 AcTs OF THE
PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES 1613-1680 TT 1201, 1202, 1257, 1274
(W. L. Grant & James Munro 1908). During the three years this measure remained in
force, the Jamaica Assembly passed no bills that did not originate with them. In late
1680, the Lords of Trade acquiesced, restoring initiative to the assembly in Jamaica.
See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 222 & n.6 (citing Powers to the Earl of Carlisle for
making laws, Nov. 3, 1680, and Instructions to Governor Carlisle, Jamaica, Nov. 3,
1680). These changes were made for Virginia in the next governor's instruction as
well. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 222.
53. Thus, upon its recommendation, the New Hampshire towns were separated
from Massachusetts Bay in 1679 and made a royal colony. Although Charles II
granted Pennsylvania to William Penn in 1681, the Lords secured a series of limita-
tions and regulations into the Pennsylvania charter. The Lords also assaulted the
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life occurred when the Lords briefly unified the colonies, creating
the Dominion of New England, which stretched from Maine to
Pennsylvania, in an effort to ease enforcement of royal
instructions.54
3. The Colonies Fight Back
In light of these attempts to reign in the colonies, the colonial
assemblies attempted to claim individual and collective rights from
the crown. Virginia, for example, attempted to obtain a new char-
ter in 1675-76. 55 The Charter of Liberties, enacted by the first New
York Assembly in 1683 and manifestos adopted in Massachusetts,
New York and Maryland in 1688-89 articulated rights the colonists
felt they possessed that England could not disturb. Predictably,
England and the Privy Council routinely denounced these acts, go-
ing so far as voiding the New York Charter of Liberties. Inspired
by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, the legislatures of Virginia,
New York, Massachusetts, South Carolina and Maryland passed
imitations of Parliament's 1689 Declaration of Rights.56 Indeed,
despite England's attempts to the contrary, the colonists made it
clear that they intended to define their civil liberties.57
4. Summary of the Early Colonial Period
Early on, colonists sought to preserve their personal liberties and
to govern themselves. The colonists routinely established internal
laws and civil liberties, levied internal taxes and regulated internal,
or "intra-colony," commerce. The colonists repeatedly fought
charters of private colonies in the English courts, resulting in the forfeiture of the
Massachusetts Bay and Bermuda charters. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9,
at 15.
54. The Dominion lasted from 1684 to 1691 and proved disastrous. First, the Do-
minion destroyed the colonists' own attempt at unification, the New England Confed-
eration of 1643. The Confederation, borne of a limited desire for cooperation and the
need to address the problems made obvious by the Pequot War of 1637, was between
the colonies of Connecticut, New Haven, Massachusetts and Plymouth. See Articles
of Confederation of May 19, 1643, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 26-28
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 3d ed. 1947). The Massachusetts Charter enacted after
the dissolution of the Dominion required all legislation passed by the assembly and
approved of by the governor, be approved of by the king in council-who within
three years of the passage of the act, could disallow the legislation. Laws not disal-
lowed within three years remained in force. See HERBERT EUGENE BOLTON AND
THOMAS MAITLAND MARSHALL, THE COLONIZATION OF NORTH AMERICA 344
(1942).
55. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 16.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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English encroachment on these local areas, especially intra-colo-
nial political culture or territorial changes. England, on the other
hand, controlled the external areas of inter-empire trade, foreign
relations and Maritime laws. This rule was accomplished by royal,
rather than parliamentary, fiat. These early examples of colonial
authority established the American understanding of layered gov-
ernments, an understanding the Framers would later rely on when
creating the new government under the U.S. Constitution.
In the coming half-century, however, the colonial paradigm
shifted. The King no longer conducted the day-to-day regulation of
the colonists; instead, after the Glorious Revolution, Parliament
emerged as England's governing body. Consequently, colonial
friction increased because Parliament, which the colonists did not
recognize as a sovereign entity, began to legislate on subjects for-
mally under the province of the King. The colonists were further
angered by this new system because Parliament often legislated on
matters traditionally of colonial concern. With the existing colonial
model thus threatened, and Colonial America clinging to its past,
the colonists had cause to charge toward revolution. As fate would
have it, however, circumstance and a prolonged period of "salutary
neglect" temporarily minimized confrontation between England
and her colonies.
B. Eighteenth Century America, 1700-1763
1. Early Expansions of British Authority
Under King William, British influence over trade in the Ameri-
can colonies grew. Motivated by complaints from British
merchants of piracy and smuggling, the crown created the Board of
Trade ("Board") to succeed the defunct Lords in 1696.58 The
Board continued the policies taken up by the Lords a decade ear-
lier. The Board drafted the instructions to the royal governors, ex-
amined colonial legislation, examined the accounts of the colonial
treasuries and nominated new governors. 59 The Board also con-
ducted all aspects of colonial administration, except for the execu-
tion of its policies. Together with the Privy Council 60 and
Parliament, England thereby tightened its grip on the colonies.
58. See, e.g., GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 16; BOLTON & MARSHALL,
supra note 54, at 347. Interestingly, among the Board's first non-ministerial officials
was John Locke. See id..
59. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 55, at 347.
60. The Privy Council remained responsible executing of English law in the colo-
nies. See id.
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During the reigns of William and Anne, Parliament passed vari-
ous trade laws designed to subrogate colonial commercial enter-
prises to that of the motherland. The Navigation Act of 1696
required that all ships carrying colonial imports and exports be
English ships manned by English ship-masters and a crew at least
three-fourths English. It also granted greater powers to Customs
officials and called for trials under the authority of the Act to be
done either by a jury of English or Irish natives, hence effectively
precluding jury trials in America, or in the Admiralty Courts which
did not provide for jury trials.61 The Woolen Act of 1698 restored
the English monopoly over manufactured goods by forbidding the
export of woolen products to the colonies.6 z Seven years later, rice,
molasses and various naval stores (tar and pitch) were included in
the list of articles shipped solely to England.63 In 1710, Parliament
reorganized the post-offices for the empire, a regulation that was
previously left to the colonies. Finally, under the rule of Queen
Anne, chartered colonies were disallowed and a few formerly
chartered colonies shifted to royal control.
2. Fortune Smiles on the Colonists
Beginning in 1721, coinciding with the ascendancy of England's
first minister, Sir Robert Walpole,64 colonial administration was re-
laxed. Three factors contributed to this situation. First, Sir Wal-
pole, in practice, returned to the lassie-faire colonial administration
that characterized the first half of English colonization in
America.65 Second, day-to-day administration of colonial affairs
61. This last provision is of particular importance because juries were generally
sympathetic to those who violated English trade laws and often acquitted them. See
BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 348.
62. See id at 349.
63. See id.
64. Sir Walpole served as minister from 1721-1742. See GREENE, AUTHORITIES,
supra note 14, at 62.
65. See id. As one writer put it, Sir Walpole sought to ensure the colonists had "a
Government . . . as Easy & Mild as possible to invite people to Settle under it."
JOSHUA GEE, THE TRADE AND NAVIGATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 98 (1729), quoted in
GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note 14, at 62. Moreover, Sir Walpole's style of gov-
ernance led him to avoid conflict wherever possible. See SEITLEMENTS TO SOCIETY,
1584-1763 231-32 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1966) (quoting Charles Delafaye, a subordinate
to Sir Walpole, addressing South Carolina Governor Francis Nicholson, Jan. 26, 1722
("One would not Strain any Point where it can be of no Service to our King and
Country, and will Create Enemys to one[']s Self.")); GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra
note 14, at 67 ("Walpole's tende[d] to let the colonies proceed on their own without
interference by the administration except in such matters as were of serious concern
to powerful interest groups in Britain .... ").
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shifted from the Board of Trade to the secretary of state for the
southern department. 66 By 1724, the Duke of Newcastle was ap-
pointed to that position and, in his twenty-four year reign,67 proved
to be a lax colonial administrator, 68 as well as inefficient and cor-
rupt.69 Lastly, a lack of support in England for strict enforcement
of colonial policy, 70 combined with a willingness to compromise
with the colonies on economic measures where possible,71 contrib-
66. See GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note 14, at 62.
67. See id.
68. For example, after repeated instructions and entreaties from the Board of
Trade failed to force the Massachusetts House of Representative to establish a perma-
nent revenue to provide salaries for crown officers, the Board threatened, in 1729, to
turn to Parliament. The administration, led by the duke of Newcastle, was not eager
to bring "things to that extremity" and thus, the Massachusetts house stood firm and
the Board was forced to back down. See 36 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, 1728-29,
supra note 38, 582, at 311-14; 643, at 338-40; 792, 793 at 412-414.
69. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 349-53. Specifically, the Duke
regarded the colonial policy as a means to reward supporters. As a result, while many
of his gubernatorial appointments were excellent officials, others were corrupt or in-
capable. In addition, the Duke also attempted to regulate the entire of the colonies
himself.
70. From 1734 to 1749, Parliament considered strengthening royal political author-
ity in the colonies on three separate occasions and failed to do so. See GREENE, Au-
THORITIES, supra note 14, at 67 (noting that the House of Lords failed to transform a
proposal to "prevent any colonial law from taking effect until they had been approved
by the crown" into a bill to be voted on and that the House of Commons, in 1744 and
then again in 1749, failed to enact clauses that would have given royal instructions the
effect of law in the colonies, despite that both bills that included these measures origi-
nally were passed).
71. Noted historian Jack Greene explains:
Whenever colonial interests coincided with those of some influential group
in Britain, the colonies could count on a favorable response to their requests.
Thus, the rice growers of Carolina combined with rice traders in Britain in
1730 to persuade Parliament to permit the direct exportation of rice from
Carolina to southern Europe, and South Carolina indigo planters joined with
woolen manufacturers in 1748 to secure a bounty to encourage the produc-
tion of Carolina indigo.
GREENE, AUTHORITIES, supra note 14, at 65. James Oglethorpe summarized the pre-
vailing ideal in the House of Common in 1732:
[I]n all cases that come before this House, where there seems to be a clash-
ing of interests between one part of the country and another[,] ... we ought
to have no regard to the particular interest of any country or set of people;
the good of the whole is what we ought only to have under our considera-
tion: our colonies are all a part of our own dominions; the people in every
one of them are our own people, and we ought to shew an equal respect to
all.
Jan. 28, 1732, reprinted in 4 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE BRITISH PARLIA-
MENTS RESPECTING NORTH AMERICA 125 (Leo Francis Stock ed., 1924-41).
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uted to this period of "salutary neglect."72 Fittingly, colonial resist-
ance to British policies increased as well.73
72. By 1701, royal governors complained of the situation in the colonies. Jamaica
Governor William Beeston wrote that the members of the lower house of the Jamaica
legislature believed "that what a House of Commons could do in England, they could
do here, and that during the sitting all power and authority was only in their hands."
Beeston to Board of Trade, Aug. 19, 1701, 19 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS 1701,
supra note 38, at 424-25. Barbados Governor Robert Lowther wrote in 1712 that the
colonists "have extorted so many powers from my predecessors, that there is now
hardly enough left to keep the peace, much less maintain the decent respect and re-
gard that is due to the Queen's servant." Lowther to Board of Trade, Aug. 16, 1712,
27 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS 1712-14, supra note 38, at 29. The situation deterio-
rated so much that, by 1752, South Carolina Governor James Glen would comment:
Governors are to do their utmost to enforce the observance of the laws, but I
am afraid all they can do is very little. In England, indeed, if the laws of
trade are not punctually observed, it must generally be owing to the negli-
gence or connivance of officers .... But here we have few or no officers,
and those I believe never attend either the loading or unloading and ship,
and it is not possible they should attend all. . . Some years ago I was as-
sured that there was very little illegal trade carried on here, but I presume
they have meant it comparatively with regard to some other provinces, for I
am now convinced and know for certain that there is very considerable ille-
gal trade in this province, injurious to the fair trader, highly hurtful to the
king's revenue, and destructive to the manufactures of Britain; and I see it a
growing evil.
Comment by South Carolina Governor James Glen to the Board of Trade (1752),
reprinted in HAWKE, supra note 30, at 265-66. In 1752, the Board of Trade asked the
colonial governors to comment on the Board's instructions to them. See id. at 265.
The instructions in question were:
Article 1: You shall inform yourself on the principle laws relating to the
plantation trade, [here follows a list of the ninety-four acts of navigation and
trade relative to the colonies].
All which laws you will herewith receive: and you must take a solemn oath
to do your utmost that all the clauses, matters, and things contained in the
before-receited acts and all other acts of Parliament now in force or herein-
after shall be made relating to our colonies or plantations be punctually and
bona fide observed, according to the true intent and meaning thereof.
Id. at 265.
73. For example, while individual colonists acquiesced to the navigation acts, they
did so selectively. Merchants in the middle colonies and New England, for example,
explicitly violated the Molasses Act of 1733 because they felt it discriminated against
them in favor of West Indian sugar interests. As Caleb Heathcote, Surveyor-General
of Customs, lamented:
[F]or while they [the colonists] have a power (as they imagine) of making
laws separate from the crown, they'll never be wanting to lessen the author-
ity of the King's officers, who, by hindering them from a full freedom of
illegal trade, are accounted enemies to the growth and prosperity of their
little commonwealths.
Caleb Heathcote to Board of Trade, Sept. 7, 1719, reprinted in DIXoN RYAN Fox,
CALEB HEATHCOTE, GENTLEMAN COLONIST 188 (1926). The colonial assemblies in
particular resisted British attempts to limit their authority. Governors complained
the assemblies "extorted so many powers from [their] predecessors that there" was
"hardly enough left to keep the peace, much less to maintain the decent respect and
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3. Focusing the Debate
Although governmental relations between England and her
American colonies were generally amicable during this period,
problems did arise. Particularly, disputes surfaced between the co-
lonial assemblies and the colonial governors, problems that un-
earthed the fundamental question for this period, namely "On
what foundation did the assemblies rest? ' 74 Did the assemblies
rest on, as New York Justice William Smith said in 1734, the right
"to choose the Laws by which we will be governed" and "to be
governed only by such Laws, '75 or by the King's prerogative
alone?
The debate centered on the validity of royal limitations on the
assemblies. Over the next seventy years, the colonial assemblies
and governors wrangled over the authority to extend representa-
tion to new districts,76 to make qualifications necessary to vote and
regard that is due to the Queen's servant." Sir William Beeston to Board of Trade,
Aug. 19, 1701, 19 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, 1701, supra note 38, at 424-25; Rob-
ert Lowther to Board of Trade, Aug. 16, 1712, 27 id. at 29; Board of Trade to king,
Aug. 10, 1721, 32 id. at 386-87; Samuel Shute to king, Aug. 16, 1723, 33 id. at 324-30.
Caleb Heathcote, Surveyor-General of Customs reported the situation to the Board
of Trade:
I need not acquaint your Lordships, that notwithstanding they have oft re-
ceived commands for sending home their laws, it has hitherto, in this govern-
ment, been wholly neglected; and they nevertheless presume to put them in
execution, though many thereof are repugnant not only to the laws of Great
Britain, but even to the express words of their charter.
Caleb Heathcote to Board of Trade, Sept. 7, 1719, reprinted in DIXON RYAN Fox,
CALEB HEATHCOTE, GENTLEMAN COLONIST 188 (1926). All royal officials, however,
did not look at this with disdain. As the governor of Rhode Island noted, "the various
circumstances of the time and place and people doe often make it necessary to enact
and establish Laws different [from], though not repugnant, to the Laws of England."
Governor and Company of Rhode Island, Reply to Charges, Feb. 1, 1706, 23 CALEN-
DAR OF STATE PAPERS, 1706-08, supra note 38, at 33-35. Robert Raymond told the
Board of Trade that the colonists' "religion, liberties and properties should be inviola-
bly preserved to them" through the assemblies. Robert Raymond to the Board of
Trade, Aug. 17, 1713, 27 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, 1712-14, supra note 38, at 222.
74. See generally LABAREE, supra note 16, at 179-217 (discussing this point).
75. Joseph Murray, Mr. Murray's Opinion Relating to the Courts of Justice in the
Colony of New-York 7, 15 (1734), quoted in GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at
39.
76. See LABAREE, supra note 16, 179-88. Who had authority to extend representa-
tion to new districts was an issue of paramount importance during the colonial period.
Indeed, Jefferson gave voice to this grievance in the Declaration of Independence:
"He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people,
unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a
right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 5 (U.S. 1776). English precedent was inconclusive; early on, the
Tudor Monarchs extended representation to towns and boroughs. Under the Stuarts,
Parliament exercised this power. After the Restoration of Charles II, however, the
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be elected,77 to fix the meeting places of the assemblies,78 to select
monarchy granted the borough of Newark representation. Three years earlier, Parlia-
ment granted representation to the county and city of Durham. These were the only
precedents the Americans had to follow. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 180. If the
extension of franchise was a power of the assembly, then, so the colonists contended,
the assemblies existed as a natural right. If, however, the crown, as represented by
the governors in America, was the only body who could properly extend representa-
tion to new towns, the colonial assemblies would exists by royal prerogative. See id. at
179. Two colonial examples, one from New Hampshire, and the other from Massa-
chusetts, are noteworthy, yet inconclusive. In New Hampshire, pursuant to royal in-
struction, Governor Benning Wentworth ordered five new delegates from new towns
and districts. See 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, supra
note 50, § 162. The New Hampshire Assembly refused to grant them seats. Through-
out the next seven years, Governor Wentworth refused to nominate a speaker for the
assembly, thus preventing the assembly from passing any new laws or collecting any
taxes. By September 1752, a beaten New Hampshire Assembly admitted the new
delegates and ended the struggle. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 179-83. Earlier, in
1742, Governor Shirley of Massachusetts suggested that the new frontier towns be
organized into "precincts, parishes, or villages with all the officers and privileges of a
township except that of sending representatives." Id. at 185 (quoting Shirley to the
Board of Trade, Oct. 18, 1742). Later, further instructions would commend Shirley
for this policy. The policy, however, clearly infringed on the rights of assembly
granted in Massachusetts' charter of 1691. This, Professor Labaree has commented,
may explain for the failure in enforcement of this instruction in Massachusetts. In-
deed, Governor Shirley himself approved bills for the full incorporation of three
towns in 1754, with representatives. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 184-85. Later, in
1767, due to the new settlements in the west, numerous acts from the assemblies of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina were sent to the Privy
Council, increasing the number of communities eligible to send representatives, rap-
idly increasing the size of the colonial assemblies. See id. at 186. The Privy Council
denied every such act. See 5 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 1766-1783, supra note 52,
29-30, 32-35, 40. Further, in 1767, the Privy Council sent every governor a circular
letter forbidding them from assenting to any act increasing the size of the assemblies.
See Constitution of Assembly Not to be Altered by Act, reprinted in LABAREE, supra
note 16, at 107 (forbidding the governors from assenting to any increase in the size of
the assembly).
77. See id. at 188-90. While the British and colonists agreed that franchise and the
right to be elected ought to be limited to freeholders-those with tangible land stakes
in the community-the property qualifications varied. By 1767, the Board of Trade
attempted to regulate the property qualifications in all thirteen colonies. See, e.g.,
Circular instruction, approved Aug. 26, 1767, cited by LABAREE, supra note 16, at 189
& n.38; 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, supra note 50,
§§ 154 ("Assemblymen to be Elected by Freeholders Only") (requiring that freehold-
ers only may vote), 159 ("Qualifications of Electors and Elected in Georgia") ((re-
quiring Georgia assemblymen to be: non-Catholic ("no person shall be capable of
being elected a representative ... who is a Popish recusant"), twenty-one years old
and have a freehold estate of five hundred acres) (also requiring the same of voters,
except the freehold requirement was only fifty acres)), 163 ("Constitution of the New
Jersey Assembly I" (requiring that freeholders that are elected representatives have
one thousand acre freeholds and that all voters have one hundred acre freeholds), 164
("Constitution of the New Jersey Assembly II" (in addition to the first instruction,
this provision extended franchise to men with a personal estate of £50 sterling and the
right to be elected to those with a personal estate of £500 sterling).
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speakers for the assemblies, 79 to extend privileges to assembly-
78. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 190-99. Two examples are illustrative. The
first involves instructions to the governors of New Jersey that required the meeting of
the assembly alternatively at Perth Amboy in East Jersey and Burlington in West
Jersey. See id. at 190-91 & n.39 (discussing Instructions to Cornbury, and Instructions
to Lovelace); 1 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, supra
note 50, § 148. In 1709, an act of the West Jersey representatives and Lieutenant
Governor Ingoldsby required all future sessions of the assembly to meet in Burling-
ton. Governor Hunter, who arrived the next year, could not decide which to follow:
the instruction or the act. The act, although signed by Queen Anne, had not arrived
in signed form, so Governor Hunter followed the instructions. By 1715, the act was
signed and received by Governor Hunter, which gave rise to a new question: should
Hunter follow the act, now signed by Queen Anne, or the new instructions issued by
King George I (King George I actually reissued the prior instructions)? In an impor-
tant decision, the Board of Trade decided that Hunter should follow the act rather
than the new instruction. As a result, royal authorities recognized that colonial legis-
lation approved by the king was granted the same force as an act of Parliament. See
LABAREE, supra note 16, at 190-93. The other notable controversy occurred in Mas-
sachusetts. A provincial elections act of 1698 repeatedly referred to the assembly as
summoned to meet in the townhouse of Boston. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 193.
In 1721, the question of where the assembly was to meet arose. The representatives
insisted that the act required the governor to convene all assemblies there. The gov-
ernor asserted "Boston" was merely illustrative and that the meeting place might be
freely altered. The question arose again in 1728, and on each occasion no final settle-
ment was reached. In 1769, with the presence of regular troops in Boston, Governor
Bernard chose to convene the assembly to Harvard College in Cambridge. The colo-
nists objected strenuously. With the Boston Massacre in 1770, the formerly conserva-
tive majority in the assembly became distinctly hostile to the British desires.
Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson later told the representatives that the assembly
would convene in Cambridge because it was the king's desire and his commission as
Lieutenant Governor required his to act in accordance with royal instructions. The
colonists responded by pointing to their charter which granted the governor "full
power and authority" to adjourn, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly. Thus, the gov-
ernor's authority was not subject to royal instructions. After an address by Hutchin-
son in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, that body replied with an
address, likely the work of Samuel Adams. In it, the paper asserted that the colonists
have a right to dispute what was in the public good and "withstand the abusive exer-
cise of a legal and constitutional acts of the crown." House of Representatives to
Hutchinson, July 31, 1770,3 HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHU-
SETTS BAY, supra note 47, at 388. The paper held "that whenever instructions cannot
be complied with, without injuring the people, they cease to be binding." Id. at 390.
In 1772, Hutchinson compromised: he returned the assembly to Boston, but did so
without implicating the king's right to instruct governors. In 1774, however, Parlia-
ment passed the Boston Act and the Massachusetts Government Act and Secretary of
State Dartmouth ordered the removal of the assembly to Salem. The colonists ob-
jected, but without result. As Professor Labaree notes, "[n]o more sweeping chal-
lenge than this was made to the system of royal government in the provinces before
the actual expulsion of the governors upon the outbreak of the Revolution." See
LABAREE, supra note 16, at 198.
79. See id. at 199-203. As the colonists quickly pointed out, only in 1679 did royal
approval of a speaker of the House of Commons become more than a formality. See
id. at 199. This method of controlling the legislature was, however, widely employed
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men 80 and to adjourn the assembly.8" These examples show that the
colonists, as they did earlier when facing Poyning's Law,82 failed to
recognize authority in Parliament to limit local political bodies with
respect to their operation within the state.
English officials and Loyalists considered the colonist' right to an
assembly to be a policy choice.83 Thus, the colonists legislated at
England's whim. Most colonists, however, rejected this position.
Some viewed the colonial charters as contracts with the King.84
in America. See id. at 200. Such sentiments illustrate the growing self-consciousness
of colonial assemblies and their feelings of equality with Parliament. See id. 207.
80. See id. at 203-10. Privileges often included access to the governor's person,
freedom of debate and vote in the assembly, and freedom from arrest during the
term. See id. at 203. Most assemblymen enjoyed these privileges, giving rise to colo-
nial sentiment that "this house [the colonial assembly] has the same inherent rights in
this province, as the House of Commons has in Great Britain." Massachusetts House
of Representatives to Hutchinson, July 31, 1770, 3 HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 47, at 392. Such comments are illus-
trative of the increasing self-awareness of the colonial assemblies and their feeling of
equality with Parliament. See LABAREE, supra note 16, at 207.
81. See id. at 207-17. The importance over this issue is evident; the Declaration of
Independence complains:
He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly for opposing with manly
firmness his invasions of the rights of his people. He has refused for a long
time after such dissolutions to cause others to be elected; whereby the legis-
lative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large
for their exercise; the state remaining in the meantime exposed to all the
dangers of invasion from without and convulsions within.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 8.
82. See supra note 52.
83. See GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 34. One New York Loyalist even
taunted by "prerogative ... alone.., you are ruled.... the Royal Pleasure... is your
Magna Charta." Id. "Without any Regard to the Magna Charta," another writer con-
tended, the colonists might "be Ruled and Governed by such wayes and methods, as
the Person who wears [the] ... Crowne ... shall think most proper and convenient."
Id. at 35.
84. Edward Rawson, when justifying the overthrow of the Dominion of New Eng-
land, called the charters the "Original Contract[s] between the King and the first
Planters" by which the King promised them that "if they at their own cost and charge
would subdue a Wilderness, and enlarge his Dominions, they and their posterity after
them should enjoy such Privileges as are in their Charters expressed." EDWARD RAW-
SON, THE REVOLUTION IN NEW ENGLAND JUSTIFIED 42-43 (1691), quoted in GREENE,
PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 36. Patrick Henry also used this argument in 1763. At
the time, tobacco was the medium of exchange in Old Dominion, Virginia. The Vir-
ginia clergy were paid 17,000 pounds of tobacco annually. The Burgesses passed acts
in 1755 and 1758 allowing debts to be redeemed at two pence per pound of tobacco-
effectively reducing the ministers' yearly income. The King disallowed these laws in
1759 and the ministers brought suit to recover their losses. In one such suit, brought
by Reverend James Maury in 1763, Patrick Henry argued that the acts of 1758 were
acts of general utility consistent with the original compact upon which government
was based. Thus, the King, by disallowing this act, became a tyrant and forfeited his
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Other colonists viewed their rights in terms of natural law.85 The
New York Assembly, for example, viewed the rights they desired
as "Rights and Privileges inherent in Us, in common with ... his
Majesty's Free-born Natural Subjects."86 Other Colonists argued
that both British and American traditions supported the colonial
assemblies and their claims to full legislative power.87
Whether by contract, natural right or custom, the colonists be-
lieved in the authority of their assemblies. Consequently, the co10-
right to obedience from his subjects. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at
429.
85. The Pennsylvania Assembly took this view when it initially refused to contrib-
ute to England's wars with Spain and France because doing so violated the religious
beliefs of the Quakers, a right protected in its charter:
That as very many of the Inhabitants of the Province are of the People called
Quakers who, tho' they do not condemn the use of Arms in others, yet are
principled against it themselves; a law to compel them to arm would not only
be a Breach of that fundamental One for Liberty of Conscience, comprised in
the Charter of Privileges granted by the first Proprietor, and since [illegible]
Times confirmed by Acts of Assembly, but would in Effect be to commence
Persecution against them.
That as the greater Part of the Assembly are principled against Fighting,
They cannot make any law exempting those of the same Principles, and com-
pelling others of different Persuasions to bear Arms, without being charge-
able with Partiality and [illegible] consistency.
1 THE AMERICAN MAGAZINE 13 (Jan. 1740-41) (reporting the proceedings of the As-
sembly of Pennsylvania, Jan. 5, 1740) (emphasis added). Eventually, the Pennsylvania
Assembly, only after much pressure from its Governor, did contribute to the war
effort. See id. at 64 (reporting the proceedings of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, July
7, 1740) (noting that upon reading a threatening message from the Pennsylvania Gov-
ernor, the Assembly voted "That a Sum of Money, such as the House should thereaf-
ter agree upon, be given to the Crown").
86. GREENE, PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 34. Another colonist argued the in-
habitants of "America have a just Claim to the hereditary Rights of British Subjects."
Id. at 36. These inherent, or hereditary rights, as one colonial writer defined them,
included "to have a Property of his own, in his Estate, Person and Reputation; subject
to Laws enacted by his own Concurrence, either in Person or by his Representatives."
Id.
87. Joseph Murray of New York relied on British tradition, declaring that the co-
lonial assemblies derived "their Power or authority.., from the common Custom and
Laws of England, claimed as an English-man[']s Birth Right, and as having been such,
by Immemorial Custom in England." Joseph Murray, Mr. Murray's Opinion Relating
to the Courts of Justice in the Colony of New-York 7, 15 (1734), quoted in GREENE,
PERIPHERIES, supra note 9, at 39. He continued "and tho' the People" of the colonies
could not "claim this by Immemorial Custom here, yet as being part of the Dominions
of England, they are intitled to the like Powers and Authorities here, that their fellow
Subjects have, or are intitled to, in their Mother Country, by Immemorial Custom."
Id. On the other hand, James Knight, a former attorney general of Jamaica, relied on
American custom to give colonial assemblies their legitimacy. He announced that the
assemblies had authority to exercise "Legislative power in its full[est] extent," in part
because over a long period of time the assemblies had "in Fact Exercised a Legislative
Power in almost every Instance, wherein it is possible to be Exercised." Id. at 39-40.
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nial understanding was that England, the central authority, could
not place limits on the colonial governments, insofar as they acted
within their colony. To be sure, when an assembly-acted outside its
authority, the offending colonial act was voided. Yet, the colonists
understood that layered government, under the colonial model, re-
quired each layer to have complete autonomy within their defined
scopes of authority. Indeed, each layer was nearly sovereign within
their respective scopes of authority.
C. A Seven Year Itch: Prelude to the Revolution, 1763-70
Throughout the middle of the eighteenth century, England
waged wars against the Spanish and French in an effort to protect
her colonies. In America, the colonists helped this effort from
1754-1763 during the French and Indian War. During this time,
England exercised its war-making authority to request both troops
and money contributions from the colonies, each a proper exercise
of the power of the central government in the colonial scheme.
The eventual defeat of the French, and the subsequent 1763 Peace
of Paris, posed questions about what England should do with the
western lands and how England would pay its staggering war debts.
England's solutions, however, only opened the door to tougher
questions.
1. Problematic Solutions
England sought to finance its war debts through taxing the colo-
nies and tightening its control over colonial trade.88 Importantly,
these acts came from Parliament, a representative body, rather
than the crown. For the colonists, who generally believed they
owed allegiance to the crown alone, this violated a basic concept of
government.
Almost immediately after their passage, the colonists took strong
stances against the acts. For example, a Massachusetts committee
led by James Otis drafted and sent a memorial to the colony's
agent in England, instructing the agent to repeal the Sugar Act and
88. Not all of the ensuing trade regulations passed during the next seven years
were negative. For example, to stimulate the fur trade the old duties were abolished
and new duties, an import duty of one pence a skin and an export duty of seven pence
per skin were imposed. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 430. Also, pro-
tectionist bounties were paid on hemp, flax and indigo. By allowing Georgia and the
Carolinas to ship without restriction to the south, the rice trade was stimulated. Fi-
nally, duties on whale fins were repealed outright. These beneficial measures, how-
ever, were more than negated by long line of oppressive Acts. See, e.g., 4 Geo. 3, ch.
15 (Sugar Act); 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (Stamp Act); 5 Geo. 3, ch. 33 (Quartering Act).
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then-proposed Stamp Act.89 In the Carolinas, New York, Connect-
icut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and Rhode Island various
committees were established to draft instructions for their respec-
tive colonial agents in England to complain of the laws of trade.90
The colonists complained, not only of Parliament's lack of au-
thority over the colonies, but continued to assert that the people of
England possessed no authority over internal colonial matters.91
For example, the Virginia House of Burgess passed the Virginia
Resolves that declared the people of Virginia "have without inter-
ruption enjoyed the inestimable right of being governed by such
laws respecting their internal polity and taxation ... and that the
same hath never been forfeited but hath been constantly recog-
nized by the kings and people of Great Britain."92 Benjamin
Franklin, when testifying before the House of Commons in 1766,
distinguished between "internal taxes," which were "forced from
the people without their consent, if not laid by their own represent-
atives," and the "external tax" used to regulate imperial com-
merce.93 Hopkins also addressed this issue:
89. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 432.
90. See 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805
45-61 (Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds., 1983). Stephen Hopkins wrote
this pamphlet with the approval of the Rhode Island legislature. He also served in the
First and Second Continental Congresses and helped write the Articles of Confedera-
tion. See id. at 45. Rhode Island Governor Stephen Hopkins summed up the colonial
position in The Rights of the Colonies Examined:
In an imperial state, which consists of many separate governments each of
which hath peculiar privileges and of which kind it is evident the empire of
Great Britain is, no single part, though greater than another part, is by supe-
riority entitled to make laws for or to tax the lesser part; but all laws and all
taxations which bind the whole must be made by the whole .... Indeed, it
must be absurd to suppose that the common people of Great Britain have a
sovereign and absolute authority over their fellow subjects in America, or
even any sort of power whatsoever over them; but it will still be more absurd
to suppose they can give a power to their representatives which they have
not themselves.
91. Id. at 57-58.
See, e.g., id. at 50 ("[E]ach of the colonies has a legislature within itself to take care
of its interests and provide for its peace and internal government . . ... "); Robert
Bland, An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies, reprinted in id. at 79 ("[The
Colonies] were respected as [ ] distinct State[s], independent, as to their internal Gov-
ernment . . ").
92. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761-65 360, lxvii, fron-
tispiece (J.P. Kennedy, ed. 1907), reprinted in SOURCES & DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-88 AND THE FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 17 (Samuel Elliot Morison ed., 1977).
93. Benjamin Franklin, Examination before the Committee of the Whole of the
House of Commons, February 13, 1766, in 13 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
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[T]here are many things of a more general nature, quite out of
the reach of these particular [colonial] legislatures, which it is
necessary to be regulated, ordered, and governed. One of this
kind is the commerce of the whole British empire, taken collec-
tively, and that of each kingdom and colony in it as it makes a
part of the whole. Indeed, everything that concerns the proper
interest and fit government of the whole commonwealth, of
keeping the peace, and subordination of all the parts towards
the whole and one among another, must be considered in this
light. Amongst these general concerns, perhaps money and pa-
per credit, those grand instruments of all commerce, will be
found also to have a place. These, with other matters of a gen-
eral nature, it is absolutely necessary should have a general
power to direct them, some supreme and overruling authority
with power to make laws and form regulations for the good of
all, and to compel their execution and observance.94
These views reflected the general understanding of the Colonists,
that "things of a general nature" were separate from "internal po-
lice" and that a central body could only rightfully control the
former.
On October 7, 1765, nine colonies95 sent delegates to the New
York Stamp Act Congress.96 On October 19, the Congress
adopted a declaration of grievances, arguing, among other things,
that the Stamp Act violated the colonists' rights as Englishmen.
Specifically, delegates argued that they could not be taxed by any-
one but their representatives,97 and that the right to a jury trial, a
127, 139 (Leonard Labaree ed., 1959). He continued: "a right to lay internal taxes was
never supposed to be in Parliament." Id. at 127.
94. Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies Examined in AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL WRITING, supra note 90, at 45-61. While conceding Parliament possesses this
role, Hopkins concludes "justice and [ ] the very evident good of the whole common-
wealth" requires American representation in Parliament on all matters "by which
their rights, liberties, or interests will be affected." Id. at 51. He also argues that as a
prudential matter, it behooves the empire to grant American representation:
Had the colonies been fully heard before the late act had been passed, no
reasonable man can suppose it ever would have passed at all in the manner it
now stands; for what good reason can possibly be given for making a law to
cramp the trade and ruin the interests of many of the colonies, and at the
same time lessen in a prodigious manner the consumption of British manu-
factures in them?
Id. at 51-52.
95. Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and New Hampshire failed to send dele-
gates. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 436.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 437.
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fundamental right of all Englishmen, could not be infringed upon.98
The delegates, however, were unable to persuade Parliament. Par-
liament repealed the Stamp Act in February 1766, only after the
testimony of Benjamin Franklin, the support of William Pitt and
protests from English merchants and manufacturers who were los-
ing business through colonial boycotts.99
2. Different Solutions, Identical Problems
The colonial celebration over the defeat of the Stamp Act was
short lived. In June 1767, Parliament passed the Townshend Reve-
nue Act, the most serious threat yet to colonial autonomy.1°° Du-
ties were imposed on tea, glass, red and white lead, painter's colors
and paper.10 1 Writs of assistance were declared legal and the Quar-
tering Acts were strengthened. 10 2 Further, Parliament passed the
infamous Tea Act.0 3 The colonists, however, would not passively
acquiesce to such authority.
Through various means, the colonists displayed their displeasure.
First, the colonists drafted several responses to the Townshend
Acts. The most famous was John Dickinson's "Farmer's Letters,"
which asserted that while Parliament had authority to regulate im-
perial trade, Parliamentary regulation of internal trade was a seri-
ous threat to American liberty. 04 In response to the Quartering
Act, the New York Assembly refused to comply with Governor
Moore's request for provisions for troops. After months of bicker-
ing between the Governor and Assembly, the Governor prorogued
the Assembly in December 1766 and, in June 1767, Parliament sus-
98. The Stamp Act extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to cover all
actions under the Stamp Act. 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12. And, similar to its forerunner the
Article III courts, the admiralty courts had jurisdiction over matters throughout the
colonies. However, unlike the Article III courts, the admiralty courts were not con-
strained by personal jurisdiction/venue concerns. Thus, while actions brought under
the Stamp Act in the admiralty courts afforded defendants jury trials, trials of Georgia
defendants were often brought in courts in Maine-predictably resulting in defend-
ants who did not show up for trial. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 436.
99. See id. The repeal of the Stamp Act can be found in 6 Geo. 3, ch. 12.
100. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 438.
101. See 7 Geo. 3, ch. 46.
102. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 438-39.
103. See 7 Geo. 3, ch. 56.
104. "Once admit that she [England] may lay duties upon her exportations to us,
for the purpose of levying money on us only, she then will have nothing to do but lay
duties on the articles which she prohibits us to manufacture, and the tragedy of Amer-
ican liberty is finished." BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 440 (quoting
Dickinson).
1518
FEDERALISM FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM
pended the New York Assembly. 105 Predictably, however, the
greatest response of all came from Massachusetts. From 1767-
1770, James Otis, Samuel Adams and other Bostonians protested
the Townshend Acts, held a series of town meetings and drafted
numerous letters and petitions to the King and his ministers.1 6
By March 1770, the presence of English troops in Boston sym-
bolized all that was wrong with the current system for the colo-
nists.10 7 Difficulties between the soldiers and townspeople became
increasingly more frequent. On March 5, citizens pelted a sentinel
with snowballs. When the sentinel called for assistance, a soldier
was knocked down and a guard fired shots at the crowd, killing and
wounding several citizens."0 8 The Boston Massacre, as it became
known, symbolized English intrusions against colonial rights. It
also became the rallying cry of the revolution.
D. Revolutionary Rhetoric, 1770-1781
1. Solidifying the Colonial Position
Late in 1774, Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania presented a plan
of union to the Continental Convention. 0 9 This plan created a
Grand Council, a body made of both American and English repre-
sentatives. 10 This plan provided for regulating "all the general po-
lice and affairs of the colonies, in which England and the colonies,
or any of them, the colonies in general, or more than one colony,
105. See 7 Geo. 3, ch. 59.
106. See Circular Letter from the Select Men of Boston, to the Select Men of sev-
eral towns in the Province, calling a Convention at Boston, on September 22, 1768, in
3 HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETrS BAY, supra note 47,
at 356; Resolves of the Assembly, that no laws imposing taxes, and made by any
authority in which the people had not their representatives, could be obligatory, &c.
&c. July 8, 1769, in id. at 361; Massachusetts Circular Letter, Feb. 11, 1768, in SELECT
CHARTERS, supra note 20, at 330; see also BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at
440-41.
107. Of course, the troops were there because Britain closed Boston Harbor. In
the spring of 1768, the English warship Romney was anchored in Boston harbor. On
the same day, John Hancock's sloop, Liberty, arrived with an illegal shipment of
Maderia wine. The Liberty's crew locked up the customs collector while the cargo was
being landed. Soon after, the Liberty was then seized and moored under the guns of
the Romney. A riot then ensued; the houses of two customs officials damaged and the
boat belonging to the controller burned. By September 1768, two English regiments
arrived in Boston. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 441.
108. See id. at 443. Interestingly, John Adams and Josiah Quincy defended those
soldiers involved in the matter, obtaining an acquittal for all but two soldiers-the
two soldiers convicted receiving light sentences.
109. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent Than Real: the Revolutionary
Commitment to Federalism, 45 KANSAS L. REV. 993, 1005 (1997).
110. See id.
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are in any manner concerned.""' Further, the plan compromised
away the local right won by past generations by conferring to the
Grand Council authority over "civil and criminal matters.
1
"
2
The First Congress rejected this plan and, on October 22, had
any mention of the plan expunged from the record." 3 To be sure,
the events during 1760-1770 solidified the colonists' distrust for
English authority. By February 1774, for example, every colony
except Pennsylvania created a standing committee of correspon-
dence to watch over Parliamentary action, report on such actions
to the colonial Assemblies and discuss any constitutional questions
raised." 4
The First Congress stated the colonial position and beliefs in the
Declaration of Resolves." 5 In it, accompanying a laundry-list of
grievances, Congress articulated the American conception of the
proper relationship between governments:
Resolved, That ... as the English colonists are not represented,
and from their local and other circumstances, cannot be repre-
sented in British parliament, they [the colonists] are entitled to a
free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial
legislatures, where their right of representation can alone be
preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject
only to the negative of their sovereign, in such a manner as has
been heretofore used and accustomed. But, from the necessity
of the case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both coun-
tries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the
British Parliament as are bona fide, restrained to the regulation
of our external commerce, for the purposes of securing the com-
mercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country
and the commercial benefits of its respective members; exclud-
ing every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a rev-
enue on the subjects in America without their consent.'16
John Adams, a few months later, embraced this philosophy:
111. Galloway's Plan of Union, September 28, 1774, in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CorNI-
NENTAL CONGRESS 50 (Worthington C. Ford, ed. 1904).
112. Id. at 118.
113. See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS supra note 111, at 49-51
("They not only refused to resume the Consideration of it [Galloway's Plan], but di-
rected both the Plan and Order to be erased from the Minutes, so that no vestige of it
might Appear.").
114. See BOLTON & MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 446-47.
115. See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS supra note 111, at 63-73.
116. Id. at 68-69. Congress, in the same resolves, declared:
That the power of making laws for ordering or regulating the internal polity
of these Colonies, is, within the limits of each Colony, respectively and ex-
clusively vested in the Provincial Legislature of such Colony; and that all
1520
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America has all along consented, and still consents, and ever
will consent that parliament, being the most powerful legislature
in the dominions, should regulate the trade of the dominions.
This is founding the authority of parliament to regulate our
trade upon compact and consent of the colonies ... not upon the
principle that parliament is the supreme and sovereign legisla-
ture over them [the colonies] in all cases whatsoever.' 17
These works illustrates the general colonial understanding of
layered government. That a "national body" should regulate gen-
eral matters, such as inter-empire trade was widely accepted. Like-
wise, internal matters were to be left to the individual colonies.
2. An Early Brush with Statehood
On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress signed the Declara-
tion of Independence, thus establishing the American nation. Dur-
ing the ensuing Revolution, the new states showed the Continental
Congress a great deal of deference. The national body controlled
all matters dealing with the progress of the revolution. Addition-
ally, no state drafted its own constitution without prior permission
from Congress." 8
Yet, the Revolutionary experience also appealed to a strong
sense of statehood. The Declaration of Independence, for exam-
ple, proclaimed the "Thirteen United States of America,"119 were
"Free and Independent States [and] they have the full power to
statutes for ordering or regulating the internal polity of the said Colonies, or
any of them, in any manner or in any case whatsoever are illegal and void.
Id. at 67.
117. John Adams, Novangalus, To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-
Bay (Mar. 6 1775), in 2 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 48, at 307-08. Adams
continued: "And therefore I contend, that our provincial legislatures are the only
supreme authorities in our colonies. Parliament, notwithstanding this, may be al-
lowed an authority supreme and sovereign over the ocean, which may be limited by
the banks of the ocean, or the bounds of our charters." Id. at 313. Adams, then
summed up his position:
There has been, from the first to last, on both sides of the Atlantic, an idea,
an apprehension that it was necessary, there should be some superintending
power, to draw together all the wills, and unite the strength of the subjects in
all dominions, in case of war, and in the case of trade.
Id. at 321. Although, Adams denied the power of war to the general government,
noting that it was only necessary if the local governments were unprepared for war-
something he supposed not to be the case in the future America. See id. at 322.
118. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 164 (1996). Indeed, until the general resolutions of May 10 and
15, 1776, no state drafted a constitution without receiving individual permission from
Congress. See id.
119. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1 (U.S. 1776).
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levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce,
and to do all other acts and things independent States may of right
do."' 120 Later, the Paris Treaty of 1783 listed each state separately
and granted each state international recognition. 121
As a result of this entrenched sense of statehood, the new states
faced many interstate difficulties.122 New Yorkers and New Hamp-
shirites eagerly questioned each other's loyalty. 23 Pennsylvanians
feared the mounting Connecticut forces would be used in the dis-
pute over Wyoming.' 24 Carter Braxton of Virginia pointed to sev-
eral troubles. Connecticut, for example, sent "eight-hundred Men
in Arms: to enforce its claims in the Wyoming Valley of Penn-
sylvania," thus causing "heartburning & Jealousy between these
People." In addition he reported that "New York is not without
her Fears & Apprehensions from the Temper of her Neighbors,"
and "even Virginia is not free from Claims on Pennsylvania nor
Maryland from those on Virginia.' '1 25
120. Id. 32.
121. See Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365-92
(1899) (discussing this point).
122. The case of Vermont is but one illustration of the territorial conflicts between
states in the young republic. In 1764, New York and New Hampshire asked the Brit-
ish Privy Council to settle the contest for jurisdiction over the area between the Hud-
son and Connecticut rivers; the Privy Council decided in favor of New York. See
PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, JURISDICTIONAL CON-
TROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787 127 (1983). The Vermont indepen-
dence movement was born from the subsequent challenges to the Privy Councils
decision on behalf of settlers and speculators holding New Hampshire titles. See id.
In 1777, Vermont was formally created when representatives of approximately
twenty-eight towns in the New Hampshire Grants declared independence from New
York and adopted their own constitution. See id. Vermont, thus, existed, yet as its
own entity from 1777 to 1791, when it was formally admitted to the union. See id.
123. See ONUF, supra note 122, at 9 ("[The] Tories... to a man, through the whole
State, are.., in favour of the government of New-York.") (quoting ETHAN ALLEN,
ANIMADVERSARY ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF VERMONT 5 (1778)). Not to be
out done, New Yorkers circulated rumors of negotiations between England and Ver-
mont. See, e.g., ONUF, supra note 122, at 9 (citing THE PUBLISHED RESOLUTIONS OF
THE TOWN OF GUILFORD, March 12, 1782 (Vermont Historical Society, Montpelier,
James Phelps Scrapbook).
124. See Letter from Eliphat Dyer to William Judd, July 23, 1775, reprinted in 1
LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO CONGRESS: 1774-1789 654-55 (Paul H. Smith ed.,
1996).
125. Letter from Carter Braxton to Landon Carter, April 14, 1776, reprinted in 3
LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO CONGRESS: 1774-1789, supra note 124, at 520-23. A
report of the time concurred in this estimation: "The uncertainty of the Boundaries
between Virginia and Penn[sylvani]a is the Cause of Great uneasiness." Letter from
George Ross to Lancaster Committee of Correspondence, May 30, 1775, reprinted in
1 id. at 421-22. Because of these problems, Braxton advised, in his Address to the
Convention of Virginia, Congress should "have power to adjust disputes between Col-
onies, regulate affairs of trade, war, peace, alliances, &c." See ONUF, supra note 122,
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As illustrated during this period and the following decade, the
young America ignored its traditions and localized power to dan-
gerous levels. Such circumstance would force the states into a
competition without any national guidelines. It would, however,
take a decade of disunity before the young nation would learn from
its history.
E. The Articles of Confederation, 1781-1787: Ignoring the
Lessons of the Past
The Articles of Confederation'26 exemplified a weak central gov-
ernment and a strong sense of state sovereignty. Article II ex-
at 8 (quoting Carter Braxton, Address to the Convention of Virginia, 23-24 (Philadel-
phia 1776); Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), June 8, 1776)).
126. The Articles of Confederation, of course, was not the first attempt of the colo-
nies to unify. The New England Confederation of 1643, borne of a limited desire for
cooperation and the impression made by the Pequot War of 1637, created a loose
association between the colonies of Connecticut, New Haven, Massachusetts and
Plymouth. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (U.S. May 19 1643), reprinted in Doc-
UMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY supra note 54, at 26-28. Of course, The Dominion of
New England was England attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to unite its colonies under
one central government. See COLBOURN H. TREVOR, THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
READINGS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 205-210 (1966). Over the next sixty-five
years, various attempts were taken to unify the colonies, including those by Robert
Livingston in 1701 and Daniel Coxe in 1722, see id. at 215, and William Penn in 1697.
See Penn's Plan of Union, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY supra
note 54, at 39-40. Interestingly, Penn's plan provided:
That their [the central colonial body] business shall be to hear and adjust all
matters of complain or difference between province and province. As 1st,
where persons quit their own province and go to another, that they may
avoid their just debts, though they be able to pay them; 2d, where offenders
fly justice, or justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the provinces
that entertain them; 3d, to prevent or cure injuries in point of commerce;
4th, to consider the ways and means to support the union and safety of these
provinces against the public enemies.
Penn's Plan of Union, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY supra note
54, at 39-40. In 1754, both the colonists, meeting at the Albany Congress, and the
English Board of Trade proposed plans at unification. See TREVOR, supra note 126, at
215-27 (reprinting the Board of Trade Plan and Benjamin Franklin's Plan, and a dis-
cussion of the other various plans for unification). Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan
of Union granted to the "Grand Council" the powers to: regulate Indian trade and
affairs; make laws for new settlements prior to granting the settlements governments
of their own; build forts for the defense of any of the colonies; and lay and levy taxes
duties and imposts. Interestingly, Franklin discussed the "free rider" problem as a
reason for consolidating the colonies under one colonial government. See Benjamin
Franklin, Reasons and Motives for the Albany Plan of Union, in 5 THE PAPERS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, supra note 93, at 399 (noting that a problem of dis-unification is
that "one assembly [will be] waiting to see what another will do, being afraid of doing
more than its share, or desirous of doing less"). Finally, in 1774, Joseph Galloway
advanced the last significant plan for colonial unification before independence. Simi-
lar to Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan, this plan failed by one vote, mostly because
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pressed this position best: "Every State retains its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.' 1 27 A new era of dual-gov-
ernment was at hand, and the states were the senior authority.
The individual states retained the right to regulate commerce 128
and the right to tax.1 29 All final lawmaking decision rested with
them while congressional resolutions remained mere recommenda-
tions that states could enforce if each so chose. Moreover, states
usurped many "national" powers reserved to the Congress under
the Articles. Many states provided for armies, imposed embargoes
and, in some cases, carried on separate diplomatic relations in
Europe.
Yet, when compared to similar republican confederations
throughout history, the Articles of Confederation achieved a great
deal of unity. The Articles provided for the equality of all citizens
of all states in privileges and immunities, 3 ° the reciprocity of extra-
dition and judicial proceedings among the states,'13 and the elimi-
nation of travel restrictions and discriminatory trade restrictions
between the states. 32 Importantly, the Articles recognized that the
general government should control matters of war and foreign pol-
icy and they conferred substantial power upon Congress in Article
9 on those subjects. 33
1. A Thirteen-Headed Monster
The Articles of Confederation had varying authority in the indi-
vidual States. In some states, "the Confederation is recognized by,
and forms a part of the [State] constitution. In others however it
has received no other sanction than that of the Legislative author-
ity."'1 34 The arising problems were obvious: first, acts repugnant to
the colonists refused to accept that their legislature would be "an inferior and distinct
branch of the British legislature." Galloway's Plan of Union, September 28, 1774, in 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 49-51.
127. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 2 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1781).
128. See id. at art. 4.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at art. 9.
134. James Madison's Notes, April 1787, reprinted in 24 LETTERS OF THE DELE-
GATES TO CONGRESS: 1774-1789, supra note 124, at 265.
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the Articles of Confederation remained in force; second, the states
could act contrary to the Articles without recourse.135
Because of this lack of national influence and authority, the
states experienced many problems. Easily the most pervasive
problem dealt with state creditor and debtor laws. Simply put,
states whose citizens were primarily debtors passed laws favorable
to debtors (e.g., permitting payment of debts in devalued currency
such as paper money). Such pro-debtor provisions were looked
upon as attacks against the sanctity of contracts.
Under the Articles, states could not guarantee their own territo-
rial integrity. 136 For example, Massachusetts, Virginia, and North
Carolina (areas including the future Maine, Kentucky and Tennes-
see) all experienced separatist movements. 37 Vermont success-
fully wrested independence from New York and attracted towns in
New Hampshire to it.' 38 In addition, there was a movement to
form a new state from Delaware and the eastern shores of Mary-
land and Virginia.139 Similarly, disputes over the western lands (be-
tween the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River)
caused strife between the states with claims to such lands, as well as
between those states without such claims. 4 °
Without a cohesive national commercial policy, the states en-
gaged in highly competitive trade practices that caused a myriad of
problems. Delaware, for example, due to its competitive disadvan-
tages to Pennsylvania, struggled to compete commercially. 14 1 Simi-
larly, New Jersey, in addition to being ravaged by the
Revolutionary War, 42 unsuccessfully attempted to compete with
New York and Pennsylvania for trade. 43 Even strong commercial
states like Virginia faced commercial difficulties under the Articles.
Maryland, due to its location on the Potomac River, levied heavy
taxes on ships navigating the river that were destined for Northern
135. See id. at 268.
136. For an exhaustive discussion of this area, see ONUF, supra note 122, passim
(discussing the turmoil created by the myriad of territorial disputes during the period
before the Constitution).
137. See id. at 8-20 (discussing the multitude of interstate territorial conflicts during
the period under the Articles of Confederation).
138. See id.
139. See RAKOVE, supra note 118 at 165 (discussing various territorial conflicts).
140. See, e.g., ONUF, supra note 122, at 8-20.
141. See generally PATRICK T. CONLEY AND JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THE CONSTITU-
TION AND THE STATES 25-26 (1988).
142. See id. at 58.
143. See id.
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Virginia.144  Virginia, in response, threatened Maryland-bound
ships that entered the Chesapeake Bay with taxes as well. 145
2. Early Solutions
Initiatives existed to remedy these problems. In 1781, and again
in 1783, Congress entertained measures to increase its authority
over commerce.146 In response to the situation in Virginia, George
Washington invited Maryland and Virginia delegates to his Mount
Vernon home to discuss the problems.147 Moreover, the delegates
recommended holding annual conferences on commercial dis-
putes.148 As a result, Pennsylvania and Delaware sent delegates to
the following year's convention. On the heels of this success, Con-
gress considered expanding its commercial powers for twenty-five
years. 49 Again, due to a lack of unanimous support, the motion
failed.' 0
Virginia suggested that all the states form a commission "to con-
sider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations
may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent
harmony."' 5 During the proceedings of this commission, the com-
144. See id. at 202.
145. See id. Perhaps James Madison best articulated the problems with the United
States under the Articles. See James Madison Vices of the political system of the U.
States, (April 1787), reprinted in 24 LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO CONGRESS: 1774-
1789, supra note 124, at 265. Of the greatest concern for Madison was the young
nation's inability to effectively implement any national policy, the cutthroat competi-
tion ongoing among the states and the difficulties the states encountered while experi-
menting with democracy. See id. (listing the following "vices" of the states: "Failure
of the States to comply with the Constitutional requisitions"; "Encroachments by the
States on the federal authority"; "Violations of the law of nations and of treaties";
"Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other"; "Want of concert in matters
where common interest requires it"; "Want of Guaranty to the States of their Consti-
tutions and laws against internal violence"; "Want of sanction to the law, and of coer-
cion in the Government of the Confederacy"; "Want of ratification by the people of
the Articles of Confederation"; "Multiplicity of the laws in several States"; "Injustice
of the laws of the States"; and "Impotence of the laws of the States").
146. See CONLEY & KAMINSKI, supra note 141, at 26. Thus, these measures would
allow Congress to lay import duties.
147. See id. at 203.
148. See id. The Maryland legislature suggested that Pennsylvania and Delaware
send delegates to the conference as well.
149. See id. at 26.
150. See id.
151. Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia Proposing a Joint Meeting of
Commissioners From the States to Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan for Reg-
ulating Commerce, Jan. 21, 1786, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION
OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 38 (Charles C. Tansill, 1927) [hereinafter
"DOCUMENTS"].
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missioners 152 agreed that the problems of the Union did not con-
cern trade alone.153 The New Jersey Commissioners thought that,
because commercial interests were so intertwined with other pow-
ers, this commission should expand its scope and examine other
areas. 154 In the end, the commission suggested that the States ap-
point commissioners "to devise such further provisions as shall ap-
pear to them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.' '1 55
Ironically, what the Americans learned under the Articles of
Confederation was that the balance of power between the central
and local governments was more efficient under the colonial sys-
tem. Even from thousands of miles away, by having England exer-
cise control over external matters, the colonies avoided the
problems the states faced under the Articles. The lack of central
control of interstate commerce, a defect complained of by most
states at the time, caused a host of problems. Similarly, whereas
the Privy Council adjudicated matters of territorial integrity, there
was no such body under the Articles. Consequently, the states en-
gaged in fierce competition among one another.
152. The commissions were: Alexander Hamilton and Egbert Benson of New York,
Abraham Clarke, William C. Houston and James Schuarman of New Jersey, Tench
Coxe of Pennsylvania, George Reed, John Dickinson, who was unainmously elected
Chairman, and Richard Bassett of Delaware and Edmund Randloph, James Madison
and Saint George Tucker of Virginia. See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy
Defects of the Federal Government, Sept. 11, 1786, in id at 39.
153. See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Govern-
ment, Sept. 14, 1786, in id. at 41. Early on it was noted:
That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the object of their appointment,
empowering their Commissioners, "to consider how far an uniform system in
their commercial regulations and other important matters, might be neces-
sary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several States
and to report such an Act on the subject, as was ratified by them would
enable the United States in Congress assembled, effectually to provide for
the exigencies of the Union.
Id. Although the commissioners noted that such was beyond the scope of their au-
thority, they agreed "[t]hat there are important defects in the system of the Federal
Government" that should be addressed at a Convention. Id. at 42.
154. See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Govern-
ment, Sept. 14, 1786, in id. at 42.
[T]hat the power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive extent, and
will enter so far into the general System of the federal government, that to
give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise
nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of
the Federal System.
Id.
155. See Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Govern-
ment, Sept. 14, 1786, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 151, at 42.
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F. The Constitutional Convention, 1787
Born of a desire to remedy the defects in the Articles of Confed-
eration, 56 Congress commissioned a Convention "for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.' 57
Accordingly, the Convention identified both the goals for the
new government,'158 as well as the defects with the old one. 159
These became the principles underlying the new government.
One of the fundamental goals for the new government was to
retain the advantages of the states while procuring the "various
blessings" of a general government. A number of instances show
the predilection of the delegates towards preserving the states.160
156. See Report of Proceedings in Congress, Feb. 21, 1787, in id. at 44-45.
That it be recommended to the States composing the Union that a conven-
tion of representatives from the said States respectively be held at - on -
for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union between the United States of America and reporting to the United
States in Congress assembled and to the States respectively such alterations
and amendments of the said Articles of Confederation as the representatives
met in such convention shall judge proper and necessary to render them
adequate to the preservation and support of the Union.
Id.
157. See id. at 46.
158. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 18 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Randolph told the Convention that the new gov-
ernment should:
secure I., against foreign invasion: 2., against dissentions between members
of the Union, or seditions in particular states: 3., to p[ro]cure to the several
States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was i[n]capable: 4., to
be able to defend itself against incroachment: and 5. to be paramount to the
state constitutions.
1 id. at 18.
159. 1 id at 19. Randolph told the delegation:
[T]hat the confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion;
congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by th[eir]
own authority... that the federal government could not check the quarrels
between states, nor a rebellion in any not having constitutional power Nor
means to interpose according to the exigency ... that there were many ad-
vantages, which the U.S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the
confederation - such as a productive impost - counteraction of the commer-
cial regulations of other nations - pushing commerce ad libitum ... that the
federal government could not defend itself against incroachments from the
states.., that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified,
as it was in many of the states.
1 id. at 19.
160. Even such an ardent nationalist as James Wilson observed:
that by a Nat[iona]l Government he did not mean one that would swallow
up the State Governments as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He
was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter.... [States] were abso-
lutely necessary for certain purposes which the former could not reach. All
large Governments must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions.
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Likewise, the Convention expanded national authority to ad-
dress the problems faced by the states under the Articles - most
often parroting the powers commonly wielded by England. For ex-
ample, the Convention voted to grant powers to the national body
necessary to preserve harmony between the States161 and thought
it wise for the general government to protect the governments of
the states, such that it may suppress rebellions in the states and
protect against foreign invasions. 62
1. Setting the Boundaries
Although the delegates generally understood the principle of
dual-government, defining the boundaries of the national and state
powers became increasingly difficult. 163 Roger Sherman attempted
to define the jurisdiction, suggesting that Congress should:
make laws binding on the people of the United States in all
cases which may concern the common interests of the Union;
but not to interfere with the Government of the individual
States in any matters of internal police which respect the Gov-
1 id at 322-23. John Dickinson of Delaware noted "one source of stability is the
double branch of'the Legislature. The division of the Country into the distinct States
formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be
maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States." 1 id. at 86. Indeed,
James Madison would "preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury." 1
id. at 490. General Pinckney "wished to have a good national Gov[ernmen]t and at
the same time leave a considerable share of power in the States." 1 id. at 137. Rufus
King suggested that Congress provide a bill of rights for the states, as between the
layers of government. 1 id. at 493 ("As the fundamental rights of individuals are
secured by express provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like security
be provided for the Rights of the States in the National Constitution.").
161. See 1 id. at 54.
162. See 2 id. at 47-48. Luther Martin thought that the states should suppress rebel-
lions themselves, although this was quickly dismissed. See 1 id. at 48.
163. Such difficulties eventually doomed the proposed provision that the national
government should legislate "in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individ-
ually incompetent." 1 id. at 53. Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Rutledge objected to the vague-
ness of incompetent and required Mr. Randolph to elaborate. "Mr. Randolph
disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declar-
ing he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he
did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination." See
1 id. at 53. After this elaboration, the delegation unanimously voted for the clause,
with Connecticut divided. On July 16, however, the vote was retaken, now with a
frame for what the houses of Congress and the rest of the government would look
like. Again, two delegates objected to the term "incompetent" and this time the mo-
tion failed, with the vote ending in a tie. See also 2 id. at 17 ("Mr. Butler calls for
some explanation of the extent of this power: particularly of the word incompetent.
The vagueness of the terms rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to be
formed."); see 2 id. at 17 ("Mr. Rutlidge, urged the objection started by Mr. Butler
.. ." .
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ernment of the such States only, and wherein the general wel-
fare of the United States is not concerned.'
64
Although this resolution failed,165 the national and state govern-
ments eventually possessed separate and distinct jurisdictions, simi-
lar to those Sherman proscribed. 66
Indeed, many of the Delegates agreed with Sherman's concept
of layered government.167 John Dickinson "compared the pro-
posed National System to the Solar System, in which the States
were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely about their
proper orbits.' 68 The Committee of Eleven recommended to the
Convention that the general welfare provision not interfere with
the State's "internal police.' 1 69 Oliver Elseworth thought that the
"Nat[iona]l Gov[ernmen]t could not descend to the local objects
164. 2 id. at 25. James Wilson seconded the amendment, as "better expressing the
general principle." 2 id. at 26. Roger Sherman elaborated on this point:
The objects of the Union he thought were few: I. defence ag[ain]st foreign
danger. 2. ag[ain]st internal disputes & a resort to force. 3. Treaties with
foreign nations 4 regulating commerce & drawing revenue from it. These &
perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confederation of States neces-
sary. All other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands
of the States.
1 id. at 133.
165. See 2 id. at 25 (the resolution failed by a vote of seven to two). Perhaps more
interesting is the ensuing debate, in particular the early understanding of "internal
police" to mean more than criminal enforcement. Moreover, Gouverneur Morris cat-
egorized issuing paper money as part of the "internal police" as understood by the
States. See 2 id. at 26 (he noted that such a power "ought to be infringed"). Roger
Sherman continued, noting that the levying of taxes on trade was also an internal
police power. See 2 id. at 26.
166. See 1 id. at 133 (Roger Sherman "was for giving the General Gov[ernmen]t
power to legislate and execute within a defined province.").
167. In particular, George Mason noted that the "General Government could not
know how to make laws for every part-such as respect agriculture [etc]." 1 id. at
160. James Wilson observed that "War, Commerce and Revenue were the great ob-
jects of the General Government. All of them connected with money." 2 id. at 275.
As Wilson later explained:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects,
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to
the government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its
operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be con-
sidered as belonging to the government of the United States.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, 424. Such was the common view of the delegates.
George Mason, for example, said that the "General government could not know how
to make laws for every part-such as respect agriculture &c." 1 FARRAND, supra note
158, at 160. Roger Sherman later related this point to why the national government
was not given authority to establish a university: "it was thought sufficient that this
power should be exercised by the States in their separate capacity." 3 id. at 362.
168. 1 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 152-53.
169. 2 id. at 367.
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on which this [domestic happiness] depended. It could only em-
brace objects of a general nature," such as "national security."' 7 °
Although the Convention failed to accept any provision explicitly
protecting state police powers,171 later clarifications by the dele-
gates show this to be their actual intention.172
2. Negative on State Laws
Perhaps the most illuminating debate on national and state au-
thority took place when James Madison proposed to grant the na-
tional government a "negative" over improper state laws. 173 Not
surprisingly, this national legislative veto was derived from the co-
lonial experience under England.174 Madison himself referred to
this power as "a negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative
act of States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative.' 1 75
Madison likened it to the British example where "harmony & sub-
ordination of the various parts of the empire" were maintained
thanks to "the prerogative by which means the Crown, stifles in the
birth every Act of every part tending to discord or encroch-
ment." 176 This, however, was one instance when the Framers re-
jected the ways of the past.
Certainly Madison garnered some minimal support for the provi-
sion. Charles Pinckney, for example, supported the provision from
the beginning.'77 The veto, however, was vigorously attacked. Mr.
Williamson argued that the negative should not extend to the
170. 1 id. at 492.
171. Even though the Convention held a vote on such a provision twice. See 2 id. at
25, 630.
172. See, e.g., infra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
173. 1 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 164-65. Madison thought it necessary to give
this power over all state laws because "[a] discrimination [between categories of laws]
w[ouljd only be a fresh source of contention between the two authorities." 1 id. at
165. The "negative" on state laws resembled the kingly perogative over colonial laws,
as it served as a federal veto power over state laws.
174. 1 id. at 164 (Mr. Pinckeny noted "that under the British Gov[ernmen]t the
negative of the Crown had been found beneficial . . ."); 1 id. at 168 (Mr. Madison
observed "[tihis was the practice [the negative] in Royal Colonies before the Revolu-
tion and would not have been inconvenient; if the supreme power of negativing had
been faithful to the American interest, and had possessed the necessary
information.").
175. Letter to George Washington, Apr. 16, 1787, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 383-84 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
176. 2 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 28.
177. On June 8, Mr. Pinckney moved that the national legislative veto extend to
"all Laws which they [the members of the national legislture] sh[oul]d judge to be
improper." 1 id. at 164.
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state's internal police.' 8  Elbridge Gerry thought that a
"Nat[iona]l. Legislature with such a power may enslave the States.
Such an idea as this will never be acceded to."' 79 Even the staunch
nationalist Governor. Morris opposed the power "as likely to be
terrible to the States, and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative au-
thority should be given to the Gen[era]l Government.' 180 Ulti-
mately, despite two votes on the subject, the negative on state laws
failed to become part of the Constitution.181
This debate more than illustrates that the Framers rejected be-
stowing open-ended national authority as a means for controlling
the states. It also shows that the Framers intended to restrain the
states by granting the union sufficient powers, over which it was
supreme. 82 Indeed, Governor Morris stated just that proposi-
tion.183 Moreover, recall that the Committee of Detail replaced the
original Virginia Plan,'84 and its broad categories of national pow-
ers, with a detailed list of powers that the national legislature
would exercise. 85 Consideration of such evidence strongly exhibits
that the Framers intended the allocation of authority to serve as
the limit on the state governments.
178. 1 id. at 165.
179. 1 id. at 165 ("Mr. Gerry c[oul]d not see the extent of such a power, and was
ag[ain]st every power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance ag[ain]st
unreasonable acts of the States w[oul]d reclaim them .... He had no objection to
authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures.").
180. 2 id. at 27.
181. 1 id. at 168. This vote was taken twice and each time the Convention rejected
the proposal. Ste 1 id. at 168; 2 id. at 28.
182. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. The Virginia Plan provided that the national government "legislate in all Cases
for the general interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation." 2 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 25.
185. See Draft IV, in 2 id. at 142-44; see also Note, John C. Hueston, Altering the
Course of the Constitutional Convention: the Role of the Committee of Detail in Estab-
lishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765-83 (1990) (discuss-
ing the Committee of Detail's role in defining the powers of the national legislature).
Historian Clinton Rossiter writes: "The most important contribution of the committee
of detail was to convert the general resolution on the law-making authority of the
proposed government to a list of eighteen specific powers of Congress .. " CLINTON
ROSsITER 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 208 (1966).
1532
1999] FEDERALISM FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM
3. Forming the Senate
A number of resolutions on the formation of the Senate further
illustrate the intended separateness between governments. The
best example was the institution of per capita voting. Previously, as
well as in the Constitutional convention, delegates voted in bloc
fashion, meaning each State possessed one vote, regardless of the
delegates a State sent to the convention. Governor Morris and Ru-
fus King, however, moved for providing each Senator with a sepa-
rate vote-per capita voting.186 The motion passed with only
Maryland, Luther Martin's State, disapproving. 18 7 Thus, the States,
as a political body, would have much less influence in the Senate,
than they possessed in previous conventions.
One hotly debated topic during the Convention concerned the
payment of Legislators, particularly of Senators. 88 The debate,
however, ultimately centered on the role of the Senate in relation
to the States. If the several states were to compensate their respec-
tive Senators, then the Senate would serve to represent the
states.18 9 Alternatively, if Senators were paid out of the national
treasury, then the Senate would be regarded as a national body.190
The Convention resoundingly voted to pay all federal legislators
out of the national treasury. 191 In so doing, the Convention seems
to have desired that the Senate not represent the States, despite
state selection of Senators. 92
Finally, the Convention discussed the selection process for Sena-
tors, specifically, "that the members of the second branch ought to
be chosen by the individual Legislatures.' 1 93 During this discus-
sion, Mr. Sherman noted that if the States selected one branch of
186. 2 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 94. Luther Martin opposed the motion, on the
grounds that it departed from "the idea of the States being represented in the second
branch [the Senate]." 2 id. at 94.
187. See 2 id. at 95. This provision was brought up again on August 9, and was
agreed upon without debate on the merits of the provision. See 2 id. at 233-34.
188. See 2 id. at 287-92.
189. See 2 id. at 292 (Mr. Luther Martin noted "[a]s the Senate is to represent the
States, the members of it ought to be paid by the States.").
190. See 2 id. at 292 (Mr. Carrol countered Mr. Martin's comment noting, "[t]he
Senate was to represent and manage the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advo-
cates of State interests. They ought then not to be dependent on nor paid by the
States.").
191. See 2 id. at 292.
192. But see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), re-
printed in 24 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 500, 504 (Paul Smith ed., 1996)
("The Senate will represent the States in their political capacity; the other House will
represent the people of the States in their individual capacity.").
193. 1 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 150.
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the government, they would have an interest in the national gov-
ernment, thus promoting harmony between the two govern-
ments. 94 Colonel Mason articulated another reason for giving the
States a voice in the composition of the national legislature:
The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of de-
fending themselves against encroachments of the National Gov-
ernment. In every other department we have studiously
endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the
States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And
what better means can we provide than the giving them some
share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of the Na-
tional Establishment.'95
James Wilson disagreed, observing that the government rested
on the people at large. Thus, because the government was meant
for individuals, the Senate should not become a body representing
the States.196 Mr. Pierce had a different understanding. He looked
to allow the state legislatures to select Senators because then "the
Citizens ... would be represented both individually [in the House
of Representatives] and collectively [in the Senate]. 197 This, in
turn, would create dissension in Congress. Despite Wilson's obser-
vations, the delegates twice voted in favor of allowing the states to
appoint senators.1 98
194. See 1 id. at 150 Sherman later added that the character of Senators would
likely be better if chosen by the State legislatures than if chosen by the people. See 1
id. at 154. Pinkney "thought the second branch [the Senate] ought to be permanent
and independent and that the members of it would be rendered more so by receiving
their appointment from the State Legislatures." 1 id. at 155. Sharman admitted that
the States and National Governments "ought to have separate and distinct jurisdic-
tions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other." 1 id. at
i50. Thus, allowing the states to select Senators would ensure that the governments
would support each other.
195. 1 id. at 155-56.
196. See 1 id. at 405-06. By allowing the State legislatures to select Senators, ar-
gued Wilson, the government would then rest on different foundations. See 1 id. at
405-06.
197. See 1 id. at 137.
198. The first vote was unanimous, see 1 id. at 156, the second by a nine to two vote.
See 1 id. at 408. Based on the debates, one cannot be sure if the Senate was the states'
voice in the national government or not. That the states were permitted to select their
Senators shows intent of the Convention to grant considerable influence over national
policy to the states. Measures like per capita voting work to strengthen the indepen-
dence of individual Senators, decreasing Senator's dependence on their home states.
Additionally, paying Senator's wages from the national government's treasury in-
creases senatorial allegiance to the national government at the states' expense. The
importance of this bears on whether the Framers intended for the national political
process to work out federalism concerns, or whether the Supreme Court should medi-
ate such disputes. See Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
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4. The Final Document
The final draft of the Constitution granted to the national gov-
ernment various powers, most of which relate to the defects of the
Articles of Confederation. For example, one of the nation's great-
est deficiencies under the Articles was the lack of a national com-
merce authority. The new commerce power extended to Congress
the powers to lay imposts, excises and duties.1 99 Similarly, the Con-
stitution conferred to Congress the power to coin money and regu-
late its value, thereby answering the problem of the various paper
money laws throughout the states.2°
The Articles permitted the states to maintain their own militias
and ratify treaties, thus indicating a lack of a national foreign policy
power. The Constitution rectified these defects by providing for a
national military and foreign policy power. The Constitution also
confered the power to Congress to punish piracies, felonies on the
high seas and offenses against the laws of nations - all crimes that
effect the nation as a whole, rather than its constituent parts.
Moreover, all the objects of the general government were those
that affected the nation as a whole. While the delegation rejected a
proposal for the national government to create universities, 20 1 it
supported a proposition to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts. ' 2 2 This illustrates a line of demarcation the delegates
observed between management and funding. While creating a uni-
versity was a local act, as it would necessitate management within a
state, supporting science and the arts implies funding, an act that
does not require management on the level of a university.2 °3
The Supremacy Clause, however, remedied the most obvious de-
fect in the Articles. It protected the pursuits of the national gov-
ernment, thereby preventing the states from legislating on general
matters. Any state attempts to legislate on matters proper for the
national government would stand only at the whim of the national
government.
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
199. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
200. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
201. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 158, at 616. Although the only debate on the
subject suggested that Congress had the power to do so within its other powers-
although ths was only the view of Gouverneur Morris. See 2 id. at 616.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
203. The only example of the Constitution granting Congress a power that would
require "management" of a local institution was the power to establish post offices.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1999] 1535
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison discussed the
now completed debates:
[T]he great objects which presented themselves [in the conven-
tion] were 1. to unite a proper energy in the Executive and a
proper stability in the Legislative departments, with the essen-
tial characteristics of Republican Government. 2. to draw a line
of demarkation which would give to the General Government
every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the
States every power which might be most beneficially adminis-
tered by them. 3. to provide for the different interests of differ-
ent parts of the Union. 4. to adjust the clashing pretensions of
the large and small States.2 °4
He described the second object, partitioning power between gov-
ernments, as "the most nice and difficult. '2°5 As this discussion
shows, while the delegates differed as to the importance of
states,20 6 the grand majority sought to balance governmental power
between the states and national government.20 7 This debate over
the role of the states, however, was far from over when the Con-
vention closed; it was in fact, just getting under way.
G. The Ratifying Conventions, 1787-1789
Perhaps the most hotly contested issue in the ratification conven-
tions was the role of the states and the national government in this
new federal system. The Antifederalists feared what this new,
strengthened national government would do to the states.20 8 Most
204. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 24 LET-
TERS OF THE DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 124, at 500, 501.
205. 24 id. at 502.
206. "A few contended for the entire abolition of the States; Some for indefinite
power of Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States: some
for such a power without a negative: some for a limited power of legislation, with such
a negative: the majority finally for a limited power without the negative." 24 id. at
502-03.
207. See, e.g., 24 id. at 507 ("In the extended Republic of the United States, The
General Government would hold a pretty even balance between the parties of the
particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently restrained by its dependence on
the community, from betraying its general interests.").
208. Surprisingly, the role of the new courts, and how the courts would impact on
the states, was a heavily debated topic. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 57,
319, 446, 539-46 (speeches of Henry in the Virginia Convention); 3 id. at 66-67, 517,
546,-49, 570-72 (speeches Pendleton in the Virginia Convention); 3 id. at 247, 443
(speeches of Nicolas in the Virginia Convention); 3 id. at 468 (speech of Randolph in
the Virginia Convention); 3 id. at 521-29 (speech of Mason in the Virginia Conven-
tion); 3 id. at 532-36 (speech of Madison in the Virginia Convention); 3 id. at 551-55
(speech of Marshall in the Virginia Convention); 2 id. at 109 (speech of Holmes in the
Massachusetts Convention); 2 id. at 112 (speech of Gore in the Massachusetts Con-
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of the Antifederalists scoffed at this balance between governments,
relying largely on the doctrine of imperium ad imperio: the impos-
sibility of having two sovereigns rule one country. The Federalists,
however, conceived layered government differently.
vention); 2 id. at 113-14 (speech of Dawes in the Massachusetts Convention); 2 id. at
144 (speech of Thatcher in the Massachusetts Convention); 2 id. at 469, 480, 486-94,
517, 518 (speeches of Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention); 2 id. at 517 (speech of
Smile in the Pennsylvania Convention); 4 id. at 136-38, 154, 155, 164 (speeches of
Spencer in the North Carolina Convention); 4 id. at 140, 144 (speech of Spaight in the
North Carolina Convention); 4 id. at 141, 150 (speech of Johnston in the North Caro-
lina Convention); 4 id. at 143, 151, 166 (speeches of Bloodworth in the North Carolina
Convention); 4 id. at 143 (speech of McDowell in the North Carolina Convention); 4
id. at 145-47, 152, 165, 170-72 (speeches of Iredell in the North Carolina Convention);
4 id. at 151, 162, 172 (speeches of Maclaine in the North Carolina Convention); 4 id. at
156-59 (speech of Davie in the North Carolina Convention). In particular, sixteen of
the seventy-nine suggested Amendments to the proposed Constitution were proposals
for changes in the Judiciary Article. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 55 (1923-24). The Virginia
ratification agreement contained a proposed amendment suggesting' that "those
clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers, be not inter-
preted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress; but that they be
construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the
case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 661. North Carolina suggested that amendment, verbatim, in its rati-
fication agreement. See DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 1050 (Meyer ed. 1923). South Carolina proposed a
similar proposition: "This convention doth also declare that no section or paragraph
of the said Constitution warrants a construction that the States do not retain every
power not expressly relinquished by them, and vested in the general government of
the Union." Id. at 1023. Two states (Pennsylvania and Maryland) had substantial
minorities who favored such amendments as well. See HORACE A. DAVIS, THE JUDI-
CIAL VETO 69-113 (1914). This illustrates the fear of many early-Americans that en-
croachment on state powers was inevitable. Passages in state amendments to the
Constitution alluding to construction of the Constitution illustrate the fear that the
Federal Judiciary, in granting great deference to Congress, as a fellow member of the
national government, would expand Congress' powers at the expense of the states.
Many thought that the new Federal Judiciary would work to subvert the states and
reinforce national supremacy. So penned Robert Yates, writing under the pseudonym
"Brutus":
That judicial power will operate to effect in the most certain but silent and
imperceptible manner what is evidently the tendency of the Constitution - I
mean, an entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers
of the individual States. Every adjudication of the Supreme Court, on any
question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general govern-
ment, will affect the limits of the State jurisdiction. In proportion as the
former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be re-
stricted. That the judicial power of the United State will lean strongly in
favor of the general government, and will give such an explanation to the
Constitution, as will favor an extension of its jurisdiction, is very evident
from a variety of considerations.
in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 295 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., UMI ed. 1989) (1892).
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James Wilson, in his speech on November 26, 1787,209 described
the interplay between the state and the proposed national govern-
ment.21° He told the Pennsylvania Convention:
It was easy to discover a proper and satisfactory principle on the
subject [the proper line between the national and state govern-
ments]. Whatever object of government is confined in its opera-
tion and effects within the bounds of a particular state, should
be considered as belonging to the government of that state;
whatever object of government extends in its operation or ef-
fects beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be consid-
ered as belonging to the government of the United States. 11
He later explained his position in his lecture on the History of Con-
federacies, while a professor of law at the college of Philadelphia in
the winter of 1790-91.212
In this kind of republic [the United States], the rights of internal
legislation may be reserved to all the states, of which it is com-
posed; while the adjustment of their several claims, the power
of peace and war, the regulation of commerce, the right of en-
tering into treaties, the authority of taxation, and the direction
and government of the common force of the confederacy may
be vested in the national government. 13
The Federalist Papers took this position as well:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.
214
Madison explained that "it is only within a certain sphere that the
federal power can in the nature of things, be advantageously ad-
ministered. 215 Moreover,
[t]he powers delegated in the proposed constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which are to re-
209. Historians often say that but for this speech, the Constitution would not have
been adopted. See PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788 758
(John B. McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1970).
210. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 533 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
211. 1 id. at 535.
212. See 1 id. at xvii.
213. 1 id. at 312.
214. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 323 (James Madison).
215. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 295 (James Madison).
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main in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The
Former will be exercised principally on external objects as war,
peace, negotiations and foreign commerce .... The powers re-
served to the States will extend to all objects which, in the
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of
the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity
of the State.216
Hamilton agreed with this proposition. He explained that this allo-
cation of powers provides state and national leaders with enough
power to oppose the other's abuse of power.2 17
Madison added an interesting twist to the notion of layered gov-
ernment. Where earlier periods saw fighting and disobedience be-
tween governments, due to perceived encroachments on each
other's spheres of authority, Madison proposed that the jurisdic-
tion of both governments might change. 218 He anticipated that,
although commerce, war, and foreign affairs were amongst the gen-
eral concerns of 1787, local objects could one day become matters
of a "general concern." Conversely, objects once general may de-
volve to make state control beneficial. This aspect of federalism
may be the most original innovation of the Framers.
H. A Summary
Federalism, a system of layered government that divides author-
ity among levels of government, has existed throughout America's
history. Generally speaking, the central body, be it the King or the
national government, must control matters of general interest.219
216. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 2, at 303. In the Virginia Convention
Madison repeated, "The powers of the general government relate to external objects,
and are but few, but the powers in the State relate to those great objects which imme-
diately concern the prosperity of the people." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
259.
217. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 2, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton).
218. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 295 ("If... the people should in the
future become more partial to the federal than the State governments ... the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due.").
219. Interestingly, from 1789 to 1792 Congress exercised its authority over the fol-
lowing matters in the general interest: Oath of Affirmation, see Act of June 1, 1789,
ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23; establishment of the Department of War, see Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch.
7, 1 Stat. 50; Northwest Territory government, see Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8 1 Stat. 50;
Indian Negotiations, see Act of Aug. 20, 1789, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 59; Judiciary, see Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Naturalization of Citizens (limited naturalization to
whites only) Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103; Patents, see Act of Apr. 10, 1790,
ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Piracy, see Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112; Copyrights, see
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version in various sections of 17
U.S.C.); Presidential Electoral College, see Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239;
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The individual colonies or states, on the other hand, must represent
matters of local interest. This paradigm existed under the colonies,
and clearly influenced the Framers' version of federalism. This is
evident through comparing the colonial jurisdictions with the antic-
ipated constitutional ones.
Perhaps the great innovation to federalism was the idea these
jurisdictions are not permanent. Indeed, the Framers intended that
the jurisdictions change with time as the needs of the people de-
mand. Lastly, the Constitution should not be viewed as favoring
central government or local government; the Constitution is merely
a return to the wisdom of the ages before the Articles of Confeder-
ation, an age when governments acted upon objects best suited to
their particular advantages.
II. Congressional Federalism in the Courts
Prior to 1937, the Supreme Court used federalism as the means
for invalidating a myriad of national laws. 2 ° The New Deal, how-
ever, changed federalism forever. Cases such as NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co.,221 United States v. Darby2 22 and Wickard v. Fil-
burn,223 refused to limit the national legislative power due to feder-
alism concerns. As Professor Laurence Tribe remarked, "[f]or
almost four decades after 1937, the conventional wisdom was that
federalism in general - and the rights of states in particular -
provided no judicially - enforceable limits on congressional
power. "224
Federal Pension Claims, see Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243; Presidential
federalization of the militia, see Act of May 2, 1792, c. 28, 1 Stat. 269.
220. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1888) (precluding
application of federal antitrust laws to production); Hammer v. Duggenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 272 (1918) (invalidating federal laws regulating the use of child labor) (overruled
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 68, 78 (1936) (invalidating federal subsidies for agriculture); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 because the act regulated production and not commerce); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (invalidating provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 because the regulated activities were indi-
rectly connected to interstate commerce); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act because Congress did
not have the power to establish a compulsory retirement and pension plan, because it
had no reasonable relationship to commerce).
221. 301 U.S. 1, 27 (1937).
222. 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941).
223. 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942).
224. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 (2d ed. 1988).
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For the next thirty years, Congress was permitted to regulate
nearly every human industry. This became strikingly clear in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,225 where the Court upheld
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause.226 There, despite the original
objective for the Act,227 the Court found that "the applicability of
Title II is carefully limited to enterprises having direct and substan-
tial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people .... "228 To
wit, the Court allowed Congress to regulate race relations under
the Commerce Clause, even though Congress did not consider the
regulation to be commercial.229
A. National League of Cities v. Usery
After Heart of Atlanta, federalism hit an all-time low. Indeed,
the Supreme Court read into a law a commercial intent regardless
of Congress' original intention. Yet, federalism lay dormant rather
than dead. In 1976, Justice Rehnquist revived federalism in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery.230 And although Usery was later
overturned, it is known as the Supreme Court case most responsi-
ble for the judicial rebirth of federalism.23'
At issue in Usery was a 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act extending minimum wage and maximum hours provi-
225. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
226. See id. at 242-44.
227. See id. at 250 (quoting the Senate Commerce Committee) ("[T]he fundamen-
tal object of Title II was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."').
228. Id.
229. Congress did note that it thought this regulation was permissible under the
Commerce Clause, just that it was not commercial in nature. See id. (noting that
Congress thought its moral objective could be achieved "by congressional action
based on the commerce power of the Constitution").
230. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). This opinion did not come as a complete shock however.
The Supreme Court had issued a series of decisions that trumpeted the virtues of
federalism. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) ("There are ...
State activities and State-owned property that partake of uniqueness from the point
of view of intergovernmental relations."); Maryland v. Writz, 392 U.S. 183,201 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the wage guarantees in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act did not apply to state employees previously exempted from the Act); Ore-
gon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (holding that Congress could not establish a
minimum voting age in state elections due to federalism concerns); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Courts' decision in Hans
v. Louisiana ... offers impressive authority for the principle that the States as such
were regarded by the Framers of the Constitution as partaking of many attributes of
sovereignty quite apart from the provisions of the Tenth Amendment.").
231. See John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment
Since United States v. Darby, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 445, 487 (1996-97).
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sions to the majority of state and local employees.232 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that "Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in the federal system. '233 Hav-
ing announced this principle, Rehnquist bounded it within, the
"traditional-state functions" test.234 Thus, where federal legislation
"directly displace[s] the States' freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions[,]" it is not
within congressional authority. 35
In an important concurrence, Justice Blackmun, who would later
author the opinion overruling Usery, indicated that he understood
that the majority "adopted a balancing approach. ' 236 This ap-
proach, he continued, should not disrupt national authority over
areas where the national interest was paramount to the local
232. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 837-38.
233. See id. at 843 (quoting Fry 421 U.S. at 547, n.7).
234. Traditionally, States held nearly exclusive jurisdiction over areas concerning
the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, but defining the scope of these state
powers was very difficult. Compare Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City,
538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (W.D.Mo. 1982) (regulating ambulance services is a tradi-
tional governmental function); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
1978) (licensing automobile drivers is a traditional state function); Amersbach v. City
of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating a municipal airport is
a traditional governmental function); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d
1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981) (performing solid waste disposal is a traditional governmen-
tal function); and Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-46
(1st Cir. 1982) (operating a highway authority is a traditional governmental function)
with Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S 678 (1982) (holding that
the state-owned Long Island Railroad did not constitute a traditional governmental
function); Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp.
1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980) (issuing industrial development bonds is not a traditional
governmental function); Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (regulating intrastate natural gas sales is not a traditional govern-
mental function); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (regu-
lating traffic on public roads is not a traditional governmental function); Hughes Air
Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of California, 644 F.2d 1334, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1981) (reg-
ulating air transportation is not a traditional governmental function); Puerto Rico Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1977) (operating a telephone system is not a
traditional governmental function); Pub. Serv. Co. of North Carolina v. FERC, 587
F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979) (leasing and selling natural gas is not a traditional gov-
ernmental function); Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 671, 680-
681 (11th Cir. 1982) (operating a mental health facility is not a traditional governmen-
tal function); and Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465,
1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (providing in-house domestic services for the aged and
handicapped).
235. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976). Rehnquist noted
that traditional state functions included "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation." Id. at 851.
236. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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one.237 The principle dissent, on the other hand, accused the ma-
jority of "usurp[ing] [ ] the role reserved for the political process"
by discovering a limitation on Congress' commerce authority in the
Tenth Amendment.238  Furthermore, this dissent rejected any and
all restraints on the congressional commerce powers due to
federalism.239
B. Garcia v. San Antonio v. Metropolitan Transit Authority
Over the next nine years, the Supreme Court chiseled away at
what Usery tried to accomplish.24 ° In 1985, however, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority241 overruled Usery and
seemed to destroy federalism. Justice Blackmun, a member of the
Usery majority, now writing for the Court, declared it was not the
province of the federal courts to enforce the Tenth Amendment.242
He labeled the "traditional state functions" test impossible to apply
and pointed to the disparate holdings of the lower courts as
proof.24 3 He further argued that judicial attempts to label one
237. See id. ("I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it...
does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where the state facility compliance with
imposed federal standards would be essential.").
238. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Vile, supra note 231, at 488 (dis-
cussing Brennan's opinion).
239. "[T]here is no restraint" declared Justice Brennan, "based on state sovereignty
requiring or permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution;
our decisions over the last century and a half have explicitly rejected the existence of
any such restraint on commerce power." Usery, 426 U.S. at 858. Justice Stevens,
agreed, saying he could not "identify a limitation on ... federal power that would not
also invalidate federal regulation of state activities that I consider unquestionably per-
missible." Usery, 426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Association, Inc.
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding a federal regulation requiring states to either comply
with federal strip mining standards or to submit to a federal mining plan). Hodel at-
tempted to institute a three-part test for invalidating the exercise of federal commerce
powers. First, the challenged statute must regulate the "States as States." Second, the
federal legislation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state
sovereignty." Lastly, state compliance with the federal legislation must directly im-
pair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." Id. at 287-88. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that Congress could regulate interstate railways, despite
a state owning and operating the railroad), FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)
and EEOC v. Wyoming 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding the application of the 1974
amendments to the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1957, which prevented
the use of mandatory retirement ages for employees prior to their seventieth birthday,
to the states) for other cases in this line.
241. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
242. See id. at 550-52.
243. See id. at 538-39.
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function as "traditional" and others as "non-traditional" "invite[d]
an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. 2 44
Importantly, Justice Blackmun relied on the writings of Profes-
sor Herbert Wechsler 245 in arguing that the constitutional scheme
protects the states through the political process. Justice Blackmun
noted many of the political safeguards inherent to the federal sys-
tem,246 including the states ability to direct large portions of federal
revenues into state treasuries247 and federal assistance to state and
local governments minimize the burdens that the States bear under
the Commerce Clause.248 These safeguards, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued, show that federalism is being protected by the current sys-
tem,249 and judicial enforcement is unnecessary.
244. Id. at 546.
245. See Garcia 469 U.S. at 554 ("[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limita-
tion that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the
'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result."); Herbert Weschler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selec-
tion of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See also, JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS, 171-259 (1980)
(discussing the "political safeguards of federalism"); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300 (1978) ("[T]he conventional wisdom was that, since 1937,
there have been no judicially enforceable limits on congressional power which derive
from considerations of federalism.").
246. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (citing to Wechsler and the institutional
safeguards).
247. See id.
248. See id. at 553. Justice Blackmun lists: the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C § 824(f);
the National Labor-Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(20); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(E); the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, which contain express
exemptions for states and their subdivisions. See id.
249. Indeed, the federal government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the
States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the preroga-
tives of their governments." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
46, supra note 2, at 292 (James Madison)). The national representatives would infalli-
bly bring a "local spirit" and favorable attitude towards the states with them to Con-
gress. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 296 (James Madison). As a result,
Congress would be "disinclined to invade the rights on the individual States, or the
prerogatives of their governments." Id. at 219. See also Wechsler, supra note 245, 559-
60 ("Federal intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for congres-
sional determination in our system as it stands .... The Court makes the decisive
judgment only when-and to the extent that-Congress has not laid down the resolving
rule."); CHOPER, supra note 245, at 171-259. Professor Wechsler's theory, based
largely on Madison's FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46, asserts that despite the rise of the
national party system and the direct election of Senators, see Wechsler, supra note
245, at 546 ("Indeed, the problem of the Congress is and always has been to attune
itself to national opinion and produce majorities for action called for by the voice of
the entire nation.") the "crucial role" of the States in composing the national govern-
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell complained that the ma-
jority "effectively reduced the Tenth Amendment to meaningless
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 251
Powell was equally disturbed with the Court's willingness to end
ment adequately protects the states from federal encroachment. See id. (noting that
members of each branch are chosen, in one way or another, by the States); see also
CHOPER, supra note 245, at 176. Weschler places emphasis on facts such as: the Sen-
ate consists of representatives of the States, see Wechsler, supra note 245, at 546
("Representatives no less than Senators are allotted by the Constitution to the
States."), the States create the voting districts and voter qualifications for elections of
members of the House, see id. at 548 ("Even the House is slanted somewhat in the
same direction [towards the States], though the evidence is less severe.... It is due
rather to the states' control over voter qualifications, on the one hand, and of district-
ing on the other."); see also CHOPER, supra note 245, at 177, and the electoral college
casts votes for the presidency on the basis of state units. See Weschler, supra note 245,
at 552-53 (noting the role of the electoral college, as an arm of the States, in selecting
the President); see also CHOPER, supra note 245, at 177-78. He contends that, due to
these factors, States "are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and
opinion, the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical determi-
nants of national as well as local politics." Weschler, supra note 245, at 542-43. Thus,
states are adequately protected in the federal system without the help of the federal
courts.
Although not relied on by Justice Blackmun, Professor Jesse Choper, who agrees
with a Weschlerian processed-based protection of federalism, also argues that the
Court's difficulty in identifying state viewpoints weighs against judicial enforcement
of federalism. See CHOPER, supra note 245, at 181-84. When opinions of federal rep-
resentatives differ from the opinion of other federal representatives from the same
state, the "state's view" is difficult to ascertain. See id. at 181. Even more confusing is
when States split over support of legislation that supposedly violates the Tenth
Amendment. See id. at 182.
250. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554. Notably, Garcia may be the best illustration of the
political process at work protecting federalism. Nine months after Garcia was de-
cided, Congress enacted amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). See
John E. DuMont, State immunity From Federal Regulation-Before and After Garcia;
How Accurate was the Supreme Court's Prediction in Garcia v. SAMTA that the Polit-
ical Process Inherent in Our System of Federalism was Capable of Protecting the States
Against Unduly Burdensome Federal Regulation?, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 391, 396 (1993).
The States and Congress worked to create an amendment, providing an exception for
States and their political subdivisions to the controversial overtime requirement at
issue in the case. See id. This exception is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 207.
251. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell further argued that the
majority "propound[ed] a view of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of
the States" and that:
The Court recasts the language [of the Tenth Amendment] to say that the
States retain their sovereign powers 'only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers
to the Federal Government.' This rephrasing is not a distinction without a
difference; rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is
free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's traditional sovereign
power, and to do so without judicial review of its action.
Id. at 574-75.
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judicial protection of federalism. 2  Also in dissent, Justice
252. See id. at 567 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("This Court has never before abdi-
cated responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged action on the
ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look out for their own interests
through the electoral process."). See generally Zoe Baird, State Empowerment After
Garcia, 18 URB. LAW. No. 3, 491, 502 (1986) (Just as "[m]ediating inter-branch con-
flicts is at the core of the judiciary's work," "resolving federalism questions of all sort
is a steady part of what federal judges do."). Wechsler's theory is often challenged on
a number of grounds. Under the Wechsler model, absence of vocal opposition from
state government permits Congress to pass legislation that wholly encroaches on State
authority. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW 301,
334 (1988) (noting that Congress never once discussed the substantial fiscal impact
placed on the states as a result of the Superfund amendment to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)). The ambi-
guity over the role of the states as players in the national government, even at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, seriously undermines this theory. See supra
notes 186-198 and accompanying text. In addition, various changes have occurred
from the time of the adopting of the Constitution, changes that make reliance on
FEDERALIST Nos. 45 and 46 equally dubious. For example, the Framers originally
provided that Senators would be elected by state legislatures. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3. Yet, even this system was never able to insure the preservation of state interests.
Senators had been paid out of the federal treasury and served six-year terms. See THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 1787-1801, S. Doc. No. 64 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1961);
see also, Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466
n.170; 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 60; Diamond, The Federalist on Federal-
ism: Neither a National nor a Federal Constitution, but a Composition of Both, 86
YALE L.J. 1273, 1281-82 (1977). Senators votes had been conducted per capita rather
than through State "bloc voting" (where each State casts one vote for the State). See
id. Virtually all limitations on reelection have been eliminated and, early on, States
lost the right to recall their Senators. Consequently, after a number of state legisla-
tures tried to instruct their Senators, Senators simply refused to comply. See THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, supra note 237, at 162-72. These Senators took the position
that they were "constitutionally bound to act in accordance with the general interests
of the Union" and could not follow the instructions of the state legislatures. Id. at 164
(quoting Letter from Senators Benjamin Hawkins and Samuel Johnson to the North
Carolina legislature (Feb. 22, 1791)). Finally in 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment
removed the remaining control the state governments held over its Senators, provid-
ing for the direct election of Senators by the people. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
In addition, federal election requirements have eroded State control over elections,
undermining the political safeguards of federalism. Direct selection of candidates in
the primary system challenges the electoral college as a viable protector of federalism
as well. See William Denny, Breakdown of the Political Safeguards of Federalism: A
Response to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 3 J. LAW & POL.
749, 759 (1986). Candidates now compete for party support, rather than state sup-
port. See id. These party-minded candidates, owing little to state alliances, are more
inclined to follow the "party line", in an effort to win future party support. See id.
Such practice is just one of the many indicia that the importance of the states as states,
in national politics, has greatly diminished.
A historical example illustrates the problems with Wechsler's contention that insti-
tutional safeguards will always protect the states. In 1986, Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982)
(amended 1986) [hereinafter "Superfund"]. Superfund permits lawsuits in federal
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O'Connor shared this concern, declaring that federalism "requires
the Court to enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the
States to complement the judicially crafted expansion of the inter-
state commerce power. "253
C. New York v. United States
Federalism, however, would recover in the subsequent years. In
New York v. United States, 25 4 Justice O'Connor invalidated the
"take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985255 that required states without provisions
for waste disposal to take title and assume all liability for such
waste. 6 Justice O'Connor held this provision unconstitutional be-
cause Congress was attempting to "commandeer[ ] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program. ' 257 This action would conse-
quently interfere with the accountability of the state officials. 8
court to recover cleanup costs from "any person" (elsewhere in the statute, "person"
includes "state") who owned or operated a hazardous waste site. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21). A subsequent modification clarified the amendment, providing that "a
unit of government caused or contributed to the release or threatened release in ques-
tion, then such unit is subject to the provisions of CERCLA, . . . including liability
under section 107 and contribution under section 113." H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 185-86. This modification, though important, went unnoticed and
was not mentioned at any point in the floor debates on the conference bill. See 132
CONG. REP. S14895-14938 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986); 132 Cong. Rep. H9550-54, H9562-
9634 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986); 132 CONG. REP. H9551 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986). Despite
the serious financial burdens placed on States under this Act, the possible justifica-
tions and ramifications of the provision were never debated. Moreover, if States are
adequately protected by the system, as is suggested, the system should, at minimum,
have considered the States' interests in this case.
253. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J. dissenting); She also cautioned that the
commerce power should not become a means for swallowing the states. See id. ("As a
result [of increases in the national commerce power], there is a real risk that Congress
will gradually erase the diffussion of power between State and Nation on which the
Framers based their faith in the efficiency and vitality of our Republic.").
254. 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992).
255. § 5(d)(2)(C), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
256. See New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54.
257. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
258. See id. at 168.
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accounta-
bility of both state and federal officials is diminished .... But where the
Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may by state officials
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decisions. Accountability is thus diminished when, due
to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with
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Due to the importance of holding our state officials politically ac-
countable, not even unified state acquiescence to Congress could
permit this provision.259
The dissenters, on the other hand, focused chiefly on the general
agreement of the states to the bill. 6° Moreover, the law "resulted
from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of rem-
edies to the waste problem. They sought not federal preemption or
intervention, but rather congressional sanction of interstate com-
promises they had reached. ' 261
D. United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez,262 the Supreme Court affirmatively
limited congressional commerce power.263 Specifically, the Court
found the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not have the required
"nexus with interstate commerce" ,2 4 and did not "substantially af-
fect[ ] interstate commerce".265 Moreover, "[t]he Act neither regu-
lates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. "266
Justice Rehnquist, discussed three legitimate categories within
which Congress may legitimately legislate under the Commerce
Clause:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' com-
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal
legislation.
Id.
259. See id. at 181-82. Justice O'Connor explained:
[t]he Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of the States for the ben-
efit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even
for the benefit of the public officials governing the States .... Where Con-
gress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state
officials.
Id.
260. See id. at 189-90.
261. Id.
262. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
263. See id. at 555-568.
264. Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)).
265. Id. at 561.
266. d. at 551.
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merce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.z67
Under this formula, the legislation in question fell into the last cat-
egory. The Court characterized the law as a criminal statute "[hav-
ing] nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. "268
Consequently, the Court rejected the government's contention
that, as the majority put it, Congress could regulate "all activities
that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce" and "any activity that it [Congress]
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citi-
zens . "269
In an important concurrence, Justice Kennedy, taking up the
torch lit by Justice Powell in his Garcia dissent, focused on and
explicitly refuted the process-based protections of federalism.70
Although he noted that Professor Wechsler's interpretation of fed-
eralism is a reasoned one,271 Justice Kennedy concludes that feder-
alism is vital to the American government, and the Court must be
active in the face of violations of federalist principles. 72 Indeed,
the Court's duty to declare "what the law is," 2 73 for Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor, compelled the Court to resolve the difficult
constitutional question of federalism role in American
government.274
The principle dissent, written by Justice Breyer, argued that the
"substantial effects" test unduly restricted congressional power and
that "the question of degree (how much effect) requires an esti-
267. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
268. Id. at 561.
269. Id. at 564.
270. See id. at 575-79.
271. See id. at 577 ("To be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from The
Federalist Papers is that the balance between national and state power is entrusted in
its entirety to the political process.").
272. See id. at 578 ("[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitu-
tional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for [the Court] to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales
too far.").
273. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177
(1803)).
274. See id. at 578:
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to respect the constitu-
tional design, the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure
and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.
Id. (citations omitted) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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mate of the 'size' of the effect that no verbal formulation can cap-
ture with precision. 27 5 To wit, Justice Breyer opted for a rational
basis test: "[w]e must ask whether Congress could have had a ra-
tional basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection be-
tween gun-related school violence and interstate commerce. "276
Consequently, after noting the connection between education and
commerce2 77 and citing numerous studies on the effects of gun vio-
lence in schools,278 Justice Breyer concluded Congress would have
a rational basis for determining that this law was connected to com-
merce and, thus, valid.
E. United States Term Limits v. Thornton
Much of federalism jurisprudence deals with infringements on
"state's rights" by the national government. In United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,279 however, Arkansas amended its Consti-
tution to impose term limits on its members of Congress,28 ° thus
interfering with the "rights" of the national government. 1
Through its interpretation of history,282 the majority rejected Ar-
kansas' claim that this amendment was an exercise of its reserved
powers under, the Tenth Amendment.283 The Court claimed that
"the power to add qualifications is not part of the 'original powers'
of sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the
States. '284 Additionally, the majority continued, even if the states
originally possessed this power, the "Framers intended the Consti-
tution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for members of
275. Id. at 615.
276. Id. at 618.
277. See id. at 620 ("Education, although far more than a matter of economics, has
long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy.").
278. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619.
279. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
280. See id. at 783-84 (citing ARKANSAS CONST. amend. 73).
281. Recall the discussion of England's attempts to control the colonial assemblies
and the colonial elections. See supra notes 52, 76-82 and accompanying text. The
right to control elections became synonymous with the body holding the election:
states were to control state elections, the national government to control national
elections. This situation was noted in 1970, when the national government tried, via
statute, to lower the voting age to eighteen in all elections, national and state. See
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (discussing the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970), overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. Indeed, Mitchell re-
lied on Colonial history in invalidating that section of the amendment. Id. at 124-25.
282. The Court undertook a lengthy discussion of the Framers' intent, focusing on
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, the State Ratification Debates, and various letters of the
Framers on the subject. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 801-822.
283. See id. at 800.
284. Id.
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Congress . . . thereby 'divest[ing]' States of any power to add
qualifications. "85
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, pointed out that "the Na-
tional Government is and must be controlled by the people without
collateral interference by the States." '286 He then likened his posi-
tion to that taken in McCulloch v. Maryland:287 the actions of a
single state should not interfere with properly exercised national
powers, because in doing so, one state would affect all the states.288
Reconciling this stance with his prior opinions on the importance
of the states in the federal system, Justice Kennedy noted that both
governments, national and state, are equally sovereign and must
operate within their respective spheres of sovereignty, free from
interference by the other.2 89
The dissenters first argued that "where the Constitution is silent,
it raises no bar to action by the States or the people."" 9 Further,
as they viewed the situation, the states inherently possessed the
power at issue as, "the notion of popular sovereignty that under-
girds the Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but rather
tracks them."2 9 ' Lastly, the dissenters argued that the qualifica-
tions for members of Congress, as listed in the Constitution, were
minimum requirements and that the Framers intended that Con-
gress not add to these qualifications.2 92 Accordingly, the dissenters
saw no reason for barring states from imposing restrictions on who
may run for national office.
F. Printz v. United States
Printz v. United States2 93 explored whether the national govern-
ment could impress upon the states a duty to enforce a national
law. 94 In this case, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act 295 required local Chief Law Enforcement Officers ("CLEOs")
285. Id. at 800-01.
286. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 841.
287. 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
288. See id. at 430-32; Thornton, 514 U.S. at 840-42.
289. See id. at 841 ("That the States may not invade the sphere of federal sover-
eignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that the Federal
Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes
upon matters reserved to the States.")
290. Id. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 849.
292. See id. at 868, 869.
293. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
294. See id. passim.
295. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994 & Supp. 1997).
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to receive and evaluate permit applications2 96 and to report, upon
request, their reasoning for rejecting any application.297 Predict-
ably, the Court affirmed its holding that "[t]he Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program. 2 98
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first discussed the history
of congressional legislation that required state actors to perform
national duties.2 99 Justice Scalia further noted that each duty so
performed by the states at the behest of the national government
was of a judicial nature.3 °° Thus, there was no prior example on
which Congress could rely for requiring the CLEOs to implement
national policy. 30'
Justice Souter, in dissent, relied heavily on The Federalist No.
27.302 There, Hamilton explained that the national government will
have "authority... when exercising an otherwise legitimate power
• . . to require state 'auxiliaries' to take appropriate action.
'30 3
Such language, according to Justice Souter, is strong evidence that
the national government could require state officials to enforce na-
tional law and that the provision at issue was valid.30 4
G. Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.
Recently, the pendulum has swung away from the states and to-
ward favoring congressional authority. A series of cases coming
under the Spending Clause has afforded Congress greater author-
ity. This increase in national authority, however, has come at the
expense of that most local of concerns, namely education.
In Cedar Rapids Community School v. Garret F.,305 the Court
held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
30 6
("IDEA") required a public school to provide a disabled student
296. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) (IV) (Supp. 1997).
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C) (Supp. 1997).
298. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
188 (1992)).
299. See id. at 2370-79.
300. See id. at 2371.
301. See id.
302. See THE FEDERALIST No. 27, supra note 2, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton).
303. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2403-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. Although, Justice Souter continued to agree with the Court's holding in New
York v. United States, as there, the regulation attacked the legislative function of the
states. See id. at 2404.
305. 119 S.Ct. 992 (1999) (holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act required continuous nursing services for a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic who
needed such services).
306. § 602(a)(17), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(17); C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4).
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with continuous nursing service.3°7 Generally, as a condition of re-
ceiving federal funding, the IDEA requires schools to provide "re-
lated services" to disabled students, in order to provide disabled
students with "free appropriate public education. '30 8 Schools,
however, are not required to provide "medical services;" thus, the
case turned on what whether the services in issue were "related" or
"medical."
The majority considered whether the nursing service was a "re-
lated service" under the statute. 3°9 The Court looked to various
regulations defining "related services ' 310 and noted that the term
"related services" broadly encompasses those supportive services
that 'may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education. '"311 Further, the Court noted the similari-
ties between the services at issue in Irving Independent School Dist.
v. Tatro312 and those at issue here.313 Consequently, the Court
found the services were "related" and, thus, the school was re-
quired to provide them.
Importantly, for federalism purposes at least, the Court dis-
missed the school district's "multi-factor test" that focused on the
burden the proposed service would place on the school district.314
Noting that the proposed test "is not supported by any recognized
source of legal authority, ' 315 the Court made short work of the pol-
icy concerns brought up by the school district: "The District may
have legitimate financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to
interpret existing law. "316
The crux of the dissent rested largely on federalism.317 Because
the law at issue, wrote Justice Thomas, "condition[ed] an offer of
federal funding on a promise by the recipient," pursuant to the
Spending Clause it "amounts essentially to a contract between the
307. Garret F, 119 S. Ct. at 997.
308. Id. at 996 (discussing the lower court's decision).
309. See id.
310. See id. at 997-98.
311. Id. at 997.
312. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
313. Garret F, 119 S. Ct. at 998 ("While more extensive, the in-school services Gar-
ret needs are no more "medical" than was the care sought in Tatro.").
314. Id. The school proposed a test "which the outcome in any particular case
would 'depend upon a series of factors, such as [1] whether the care is continuous or
intermittent, [2] whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, [3]
the cost of the service, and [41 the potential consequences if the service is not properly
performed.'" Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner 11).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 999.
317. See id. at 1000-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Government-and the recipient of funds." '318 Thus, the state receiv-
ing funding must have "voluntarily and knowingly accept[ed] the
terms of the 'contract"' 319 As a result, Spending Clause legislation
should be interpreted narrowly, "in order to avoid saddling the
States with obligations they did not anticipate. 3 20 Here, the dis-
sent argued that the proper result, considering the federalism con-
cerns underlying Spending Clause jurisprudence, was to require
schools provide handicapped children health-related services con-
sistent with what school nurses can perform as part of their "nor-
mal duties."'321 This would lighten the burden placed on schools322
and was consistent with the Spending Clause jurisprudence. 323
H. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Building on the increase in Spending Clause authority gained in
Garret F., the Supreme Court recently implied a private right of
action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972324
("Title IX"), for inaction by a school when one student sexually
harasses another student.325 In so holding, the Court recalled the
wisdom of Pennhurst:26 that Spending Clause legislation must ex-
hibit a clear intent by Congress to require state to comply with any
particular condition.327 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
also noted that "a recipient of federal funds may be liable.., for its
318. Id. at 1002 (quoting Gesber v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 276 (1998).
319. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 1002 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Hald-
erman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.")).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1003.
322. The dissent noted that the cost of the services required by the respondent
would cost a "minimum of $18,000 per year." Id. at 1003.
323. See id. ("This [majority's] approach disregards the constitutionally mandated
principles of construction applicable to Spending Clause legislation and blindsides un-
wary States with fiscal obligations that they cold not have anticipated.").
324. 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 209 U.S.C. § 1682.
325. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1669 (1999) ("We must
determine whether a district's failure to respond to student-on-student harassment in
its schools can support a private suit for money damages.").
326. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
327. Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1670.
In interpreting language in spending legislation, we thus "insts[t] that Con-
gress speak with a clear voice," recognizing that "[t]here can, of course, be
no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if a State is
unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascer-
tain what is expected of it."
Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 24-25).
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own misconduct."3 ' The Court, however, found :that a school
board's decision not to act, in the face of known student-on-student
sexual harassment, rose to this level of misconduct and was action-
able in federal court.329
Mindful of the burden this could place on the nation's school
system, the Court announced that the "deliberate indifference"
standard should apply to this case. 330 This test, already employed
in Gesber v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist.,331 would elimi-
nate the risk of being liable "'not for its own official decision but
instead for its employees' independent actions.' ",332 Cognizant of
likely criticisms, Justice O'Connor noted that "[s]chool administra-
tors will continue to enjoy the flexibility they require so long as
funding recipients are deemed 'deliberately indifferent' . . . only
where the recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof is
clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. '333
The dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy, vigorously attacked
the majority opinion for "eviserat[ing] the clear-notice safeguard of
our [the Supreme Court's] Spending Clause jurisprudence, '334 and
the issuing a heavy blow to federalism. 335 Justice Kennedy first
noted that although Congress could pursue objectives outside its
enumerated powers through the Spending Clause,336 the safeguard
against federal intrusion into state affairs is that "when Congress
imposes a condition on the States' receipt of federal funds, it [Con-
328. Id. at 1670.
329. See id. ("Here, petitioner attempts to hold the [School] Board liable for its
own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student harassment in its
schools.").
330. See id. at 1671-73 (discussion of "deliberate indifference" standard and its
implications).
331. 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998).
332. Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1671 (quoting Gesber v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998)).
333. Id. at 1674.
334. Id. at 1677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
335. See id. at 1692 ("As its holding makes painfully clear, the majority's watered-
down version of the Spending Clause clear-statement rule is no substitute for the real
protections of state and local autonomy that our constitutional system requires. ...
Federalism and our struggling school systems deserve better support from this
Court.").
336. See id. at 1677 ("Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objec-
tives outside of 'Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields" by attaching conditions to
the grant of federal funds.") (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 207 (1987);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
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gress] 'must do so unambiguously.' ,,337 Otherwise, states will be
unable to "guard against excessive federal intrusion into state
affairs. " 3 38
The dissent attacked the majority on both legal 339 and policy
grounds.34 ° Moreover, the failings of the majority's standard for
liability, namely, its broad scope,34' lack of clarity,342 and low
threshold for requiring a trial,343 all worked to subject school dis-
tricts to "limitless liability."' 344 Most problematic of all for Justice
337. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)). Indeed, Justice O'Connor, in her South Dakota v. Dole dissent, noted the
rational for this rule:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the gen-
eral welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal
Government, is that the Spending Clause gives 'power to the Congress to
tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a
parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are
self-imposed.'"
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 207, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
338. Davis, 1999 S.Ct. at 1677 (U.S. 1999).
339. See, e.g., id. at 1678.
Schools cannot be held liable for peer sexual harassment because Title IX
does not give them clear and unambiguous notice that they are liable in
damages for failure to remedy discrimination by their students. As the ma-
jority acknowledges, Title IX prohibits only misconduct by grant recipients,
not misconduct by third parties.
Id. See also id. at 1679 ("It is not enough, then, that the alleged discrimination occur
in a 'context subject to the school district's control.' The discrimination must actually
be 'controlled by' -- that is, be authorized by, pursuant to, or in accordance with,
school policy or actions.") (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 1672); id. at 1686
("[R]espondents have made a cogent and persuasive argument that the type of stu-
dent conduct alleged by petitioner should not be considered 'sexual harassment,'
much less gender discrimination actionable under Title XI."); id. ("In reality, there is
no established body of federal or state law on which courts may draw in defining the
student conduct that qualifies as Title IX gender discrimination.").
340. See, e.g., id. at 1682 ("The practical obstacles schools encounter in ensuring
that thousands of immature students conform their conduct to acceptable norms may
be even more significant than the legal obstacles.").
341. See id. at 1688 ("The majority's test for actionable harassment will ... sweep in
almost all of the more innocuous conduct it acknowledges as a ubiquitous part of
school life.").
342. See id. (noting that while the majority attempts to limit liability to "known"
acts of student harassment, this begs an obvious question: "known to whom?").
343. See id. at 1688 ("[T]he majority's test, in fact, invites courts and juries to sec-
ond-guess school administrators in every case, to judge in each instance whether the
school's response was 'clearly reasonable.' A reasonableness standard, regardless of
the modifier, transforms every disciplinary decision into a jury question.").
344. Id. at 1689("The limitless liability confronting our schools under the implied
Title IX cause of action puts schools in a far worse position than businesses.").
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Kennedy was that, while "this case is about federalism, ' 345 the ma-
jority ignored this consideration entirely.346
Part II Conclusion
The last sixty years of the federalism in the Supreme Court has
been confusing. Congressional authority vis-A-vis the states has
contracted, expanded, and contracted again, all the while Garcia,
the case that explicitly stated that federalism did not bar congres-
sional authority, remains relevant law. Comparing "congressional
federalism" to other federalism concerns, such as Article III feder-
alism, only magnifies its inconsistencies.347
345. Id. at 1691.
346. See id. ("Yet the majority's decision today says not one word about the federal
balance. Preserving our federal system is a legitimate end in itself.").
347. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. Rav. 499 (1995)
(discussing the inconsistencies between Commerce Clause federalism and Article III
federalism). It should be noted that this Note does not tackle three other major areas
of federalism. First, federalism as it exists in the Article III courts is largely character-
ized by grand limitations on national authority. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (reestablishing Eleventh Amendment "sovereign immunity" as
a bar to suits against states in federal courts); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(limiting the reach of the federal courts through the absention doctrine); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (same); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 491 (1941) (same); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (establishing
the primacy of state law in federal forums); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
(requiring federal courts to dismiss cases if an adequate and independent state ground
in state law exists for recovery); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875)
(same); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (recognizing frustration caused in
state courts by federal habeas corpus review and subsequent conctitutional com-
mands); McKleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (holding that federal habeas
corpus review of state convictions frustrates the sovereign power of a state to punish);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976) (limiting the ability of federal courts to hear
allegations of abusive police practices by local police departments due to federalism
concerns); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 493 (1987)
(noting that the court has recognized the broad bar against suits against state govern-
ments "without exception... for almost a century"); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984) (holding that sovereign immunity is a limitation
on suits against a state). Conversely, federalism as it operates against the Treaty
Clause may be characterized as a non-issue. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920) (noting that a valid treaty is binding over all the states, regardless of Tenth
Amendment concerns); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (noting that while some
amendments may override a treaty, the Tenth Amendment does not); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 1999 WL 155689 (U.S. 1999) (noting that
"treaty rights are irreconcilable with state sovereignty"). Somewhere in the middle,
which government may create and enforce these rights is also a question. See, e.g.,
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment
did not permit Congress to enact measures to prevent constitutional violations); Lo-
pez v. Monterey County, 119 S. Ct. 693 (1999) (federalism and voting rights).
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Perhaps the one constant in the midst of this confusion is the
Supreme Court's formalistic approach. In all recent cases, the
Court systematically outlines major premises from which it de-
duces minor ones, eventually arriving at a conclusion.348 The prob-
lem with this approach is that, because the Constitution is
ambiguous as to the allocation of power between government, the
major premises the Supreme Court conjures up are little more than
arbitrary guidelines. Thus, it is impossible to achieving any clear
premises for reasoning. 349 As Part III of this Note discusses, em-
ploying a functional approach, one that maximizes the benefits of
the federal union, can solve this problem.
IH. A New Method for a New Millenium
Federalism is based on certain values. Throughout America's
history, both as a colony and a country, objects of a grand scope
have always been allocated to the central government, while issues
of local concern have been left to the subordinate units. James
Madison discussed this point, noting "it is only within a certain
sphere that the federal power can in the nature of things, be advan-
tageously administered. '350 Moreover, Madison gave federalism
definition; by explaining that some governmental units can "advan-
tageously administer[ ]" object in one sphere, he prescribes allocat-
ing responsibility over a sphere to the government that can
"advantageously administer[ ]" it. This is both wise public policy
and true to the Framers' intent.
Armed with this insight constitutional analysts are left at square
one. Indeed, how is it determined which governments can "advan-
tageously administer[ ]" which objects? To answer this question,
the benefits of federalism must be analyzed.
I
A. What Are the Values of Federalism?
As Justice O'Connor points out, federalism has both sociopoliti-
cal and economic benefits:
This federalist structure ... assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogene-
ous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experi-
348. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis,
13 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 959 (1997).
349. See infra notes 409-411 and accompanying text for an illustration of this
problem.
350. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 295 (James Madison).
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mentation in government; and it makes government more re-
sponsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry.351
Federalism is theory of decentralization in government. 2 As such,
it shares a number of the economic benefits of decentralization.353
Indeed, one of federalism's greatest benefits is that it is a means to
efficient management. 4
The essence of federalism, as a political concept, differs from
mere decentralization. In a federal system, the subordinate units
of government operate within a prescribed area that the central
authority may not invade.35 5 Equally important, the leaders of the
subordinate units draw their power from sources independent of
the central authority. 6 The point of granting such independence
351. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
352. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a Na-
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-12 (1994); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Econom-
ics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 555, 557 (1994); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political
Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 1, 4 (1995). Decentralization is a policy choice, spreading decision-making
authority between smaller sub-units to gain a multitude of advantages, such as in-
creased efficiency. See id. Federalism, as a political concept, is a structuring principle
for a government that divides and allocates power over particular issues to political
sub-units. See id. Thus, federalism is merely a method of decentralization.
353. Aside from the various social science studies conducted on the effects of de-
centralization, the Supreme Court has recently discussed the "values of federalism."
See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-791 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Courts and commentators
frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the develop-
ment of new social, economic, and political ideas .... [F]ederalism enhances the op-
portunity of all citizens to participate in representative government .... [O]ur federal
system provides a salutary check on governmental power."); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The States were to retain authority over those local con-
cerns of greatest relevance and importance to the people.... [P]roduc[ing] efficient
government and protect[ing] the rights of the people."); New York, 505 U.S. at 157
(cataloging the benefits of the federal structure); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear.").
354. See, PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1962); ERNEST DALE, ORGANIZATION, 104-30 (1967); MANFRED KOCHEN & KARL
W. DEUTSCH, DECENTRALIZATION: SKETCHES TOWARD A RATIONAL THEORY
(1980); WILLIAM J. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1968).
355. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 352 at 911; WALTER BENNETT, AMERICAN
THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 10 (1964); DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
A VIEW FROM THE STATES 2 (3d ed. 1984); CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 224-26 (4th ed. 1968); RICHARD H. LEACH, AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM 1-10 (1970).
356. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 352, at 911.
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is to allow disagreement amongst the subordinate units. Each unit
thus may subscribe to different value systems, consequently leading
to experimentation. 7 Additionally, this independence serves to
check the power of the national government by limiting its jurisdic-
tion, just as the Framers intended. 8
1. The Sociopolitical Benefits of Federalism
Generally, because social tastes and preferences differ, most
often along geographic lines,35 9 a basic shortcoming of unitary
forms of government is an "insensitivity to varying preferences
among the residents of the different communities. '360 Where
governmental units are small, however, legislators can more
adequately respond to local preferences.36' Many modern schol-
ars recognize this increase in responsiveness as one of the
greatest values of decentralized government.362 This increased
357. See id. at 912; Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ethics of Federalism in POWER Di-
VIDED 51, 52 (Harry N. Scheiber & Malcolm Feely eds., 1989).
358. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 323 (James Madison) ("In
the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first di-
vided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdi-
vided among district and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.").
359. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founder's Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987). Economists and sociologists have documented the
impact of various government policies upon migration patterns of demographic sub-
sections of society. For surveys of the literature see Richard J. Cebula, A Survey of
the literature on the Migration-Impact of State and Local Government Policies, 34 PUB.
FIN. 69 (1979); JOHN J. WALLIS & WALLACE E. OATES, Decentralization in the Public
Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government, FISCAL FEDERALISM:
QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 5 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988).
360. WALLACE D. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, 11 (1972). See Gordon and Tul-
lock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19, 21 (1969); RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 600 (3d ed. 1986).
361. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (noting that federalism assures "that a decentral-
ized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society . .. ."); see also McConnell, supra note 359, at 1491-1511 (noting the three
objectives of dual sovereignty: "(1) to secure the public good, (2) to protect private
rights, and (3) to preserve the spirit and form of popular government") (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 2, at 80 (James Madison)); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1988) (noting the three main advantages of federalism are its
check on the national government, its ability to draw citizens into the political process
and the political and cultural diversity it fosters).
362. See, e.g., George Stigler, Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government, in
Joint Economic Committee, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., Federal Expenditure Policy for Eco-
nomic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted By Panelists Appearing Before the
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, 213 (1957) ("[A] good political system adapts itself to
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responsiveness, in turn, better satisfies the desires of the popu-
lace.363
Consequently, the desire to satisfy the populace compels juris-
dictions to compete with one and another in an effort to win citi-
zens, valuable tax dollars and jobs.364 This economic reality yields
increased social experimentation. Charles Tiebout's economic the-
ory of jurisdictional competition addresses this situation.365 Ac-
cording to the "Samuelson condition," public goods366  are
allocated efficiently when the sum of a citizen's marginal rate of
substitution of income for the good equals the marginal cost of an
additional unit of the good. 367 Nevertheless, this condition is not
easily met. With private goods, market competition exerts down-
ward pressure on producers' marginal costs, and market prices pro-
vide concrete information about consumers' rates of
substitution. 68 With public goods, however, no obvious market
forces exert such pressure on governmental producers' marginal
the differing circumstances and mores of different localities . . . .") (cited in LeBoeuf,
supra note 352, at 558-59, n.10); OATES, supra note 360 at 11 (1972).
363. See Charles M. Tiebout A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956); Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism
Debate, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1996) ("This American diversity also possesses a
strong regional aspect. States (and the regions in which they cluster) differ in many
important ways .... It is this regional heterogeneity that out political institutions in
general, and the system of federalism in particular, were meant to preserve."); Steven
Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United
Sates v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 775 (1995).
364. Professor Tiebout showed that, like the conventional market place for goods
where buyers reveal their preferences for various goods by their willingness, or re-
fusal, to pay the going price, citizens indicate their preferences for public goods and
policies in a similar manner. See Tiebout, supra note 363, at 416-24. The mechanism
that allowed this "market-type" preference-revelation system to occur was the citi-
zens' right to move freely among jurisdictions. Thus, as social utility is maximized in a
unrestrained market, so too will social welfare be maximized, where citizens can move
between jurisdiction, each offering different social policies. See LeBoeuf, supra note
352, at 559-60 and VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
137-61 (1991) for a further discussion of the Tiebout model.
365. See Tiebout, supra note 363, at 416-24.
366. This includes both goods conventionally provided by local government and
public services.
367. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-88 (1954). This material is discussed at length in William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in the Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 207 (1997).
368. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 367, at 207.
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costs. 369 Nor does an obvious mechanism force taxpayers to truth-
fully reveal their rates of substitution.37 °
The Tiebout model claims to satisfy the "Samuelson condition"
by identifying the machinery that disciplines governmental produ-
cers and matching citizen preferences with levels of public goods
provision and taxation.371 Simply, Tiebout explains that citizens,
unhappy with the policies of their state, may move to another state
capable of better providing for their desires and needs. 372  This
competition amongst jurisdictions allows citizens to decide what
public goods and rights are desirable and at what cost.3 7 3
This "responsiveness-competitiveness" model illustrates the role
of voice and exit in government. Individuals seek governments
that respond to their needs, or voice.374 If their government does
not respond, citizens may exercise their exit option and relocate to
another jurisdiction that will. 375 Conversely, governments may se-
lect membership by resisting some voices and being more respon-
sive to citizens who have remained or recently entered.376
369. See id.
370. Taxpayers will not state their rates of substitution accurately because of the
"free-rider" problem that arises in cases of collective political action. An actor, for
example, will overstate her demand if she believes that her level of payment will re-
main unchanged, with the additional cost of providing the good falling on others. See
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 367, at 207, n.16, (citing Theodore Groves, Incentive
in Teams, 41 ECONOMETRICA 617, 624 (1973)).
371. Note here the assumptions Tiebout makes before applying his model. Tiebout
assumes: (1) a large number of communities exist and the public goods of each reflect
the range of public goods available; (2) mobility is free for all relocating actors who
choose a jurisdiction based on a taxes-public goods balancing; (3) perfect information
is available, as to each jurisdiction's public goods offerings; (4) every jurisdiction is of
optimal size, that is, having the number of residents for which the public goods can be
produced at the lowest average cost; (5) communities below optimal size will try to
attract new citizens to reduce the average cost of producing goods and services; and
(6) there are no externalities, monopolies or spillover effects across jurisdictions. See
Tiebout, supra note 363, at 419. Understandably, such questionable assumptions have
brought criticism, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive
Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON
LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23, 28 (1983) (characterizing the theory
as "simply not very robust"), although a great deal of empirical research appears to
support the thesis. See Cebula, supra note 359; WALLIS & OATES, supra note 359.
372. See LeBoeuf, supra note 352, at 561.
373. But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 352, at 918 ("There is something a bit
fanciful in the image of people choosing a place to live the way shoppers choose their
favorite breakfast cereal .... ").
374. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970); Rubin &
Feeley, supra note 352, at 917.
375. See id.
376. See id.
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Inevitably, the consequence of this economic benefit is an in-
crease in social experimentation.377 In particular, states, due to
their small size, are better equipped to experiment because experi-
mentation is best conducted on a small scale.378 State governments
have blazed trails with new social and economic reforms, such as
women's suffrage,379 unemployment insurance,38 ° minimum wage
laws, 38 1 child labor laws, 382 accident-insurance plans that benefit
victims of on-the-job accidents 383 and prohibitions against employ-
ment and housing discrimination.384 As these theories are tested,
more desirable techniques are discovered, allowing jurisdictions to
adopt the successful policies, thus increasing efficiency throughout
society.385
377. As Justice Brandeis observed, each of the states "serve as a laboratory" that
may "try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(observing the unique phenomenon of "the making of social experiments that an im-
portant part of the community desires [ ] in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several States . . . ."); LeBoeuf, supra note 352, at 561 ("Just as the competitive firms
engage in experimentation and innovation in providing private goods, so too will com-
petitive jurisdictions experiment with various methods of providing public goods.").
But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovationl 9 LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (suggesting that local politicians will be
loathe to experiment with social policies).
378. See LeBoeuf, supra note 352, at 562. Most central governments, for example,
cannot determine which subordinate jurisdiction should attempt experiments. See
DAVID N. KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF Mu'LTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT 23
(1984); LeBoeuf, supra note 352, at 562. Equally important is the threat of disaster
posed if the central government implements the experiment and it fails - bringing
misery to all citizens.
379. See Act of Jan. 21, 1891, ch. 100 § 4, 1890-1891 Wyo.Sess.Laws 394 (Wyoming
grants women the right to vote).
380. See Unemployment Ins. Act of Jan. 28, 1932, ch. 20, 1931-1932 Wis.Laws 57;
Act of June 1, 1933, ch. 186, 1933 Wis.Laws 448; Act of June 2, 1933, ch. 194 Wis.Laws
491 (Wisconsin codifies unemployment insurance).
381. See Act of June 4, 1912 ch. 706, 1912 Mass., Acts 780 (Massachusetts enacts
minimum wage laws for women and minors).
382. See Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Gov-
ernment Capability, 23-24 (1985) (noting that state governments have experimented
with "sunset legislation, zero based budgeting, equal housing, no-fault insurance ...
gun control, pregnancy benefits for working women, limited access highways, educa-
tion for handicapped children, auto pollution standards and energy assistance for the
poor.").
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See Wallace E. Oates, Decentralization of the Public Sector: An Overview, in
DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS 43, 53 (R. Bennett ed.,
1990); OATES, supra note 360, at 12.
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Decentralization through federalism provides greater citizen
participation in government and increases accountability among
elected officials. As the physical distance between legislators and
their constituents decreases, the familiarity between them in-
creases. This results in citizens becoming more aware of their
elected officials.386 Citizen participation in government also in-
creases. 387 This situation, in turn, yields further benefits: enhanced
voter confidence in the political process,388 minimized influence of
interest groups and political action committees 38 9 and increased di-
versity among elected officials.39°
2. The Economic Benefits of Federalism
In addition to the economic gains realized by the Tiebout Model,
by creating separate spheres of authority for the central and
subordinate governmental units, federal governments have the
ability to realize economies of scale. Central governments, for ex-
ample, are better suited to perform governmental functions where
386. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 2, at 291 (Madison):
The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thir-
teen and more States,... with all county, corporation, and town officers, ....
having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must
exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number an influence, those of every
description who will be employed in the administration of the federal
system.
Id.; LeBoeuf, supra note 352, at 564 ("[P]hysical proximity nonetheless continues to
promote some sort of closeness between citizens and legislators. Additionally, as the
ration of citizens to representatives falls, the citizens become more aware of the activi-
ties of their elected officials.").
387. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575-77 & n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Participation is
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a governmental
activity at the local level, or in regional organizations.") (quoting Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, Citizen Participation in the American Federal
System 95 (1980)).
388. See Merritt, supra note 361, at 7-8.
389. See F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for the
Top, 5 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 153 (1997) ("The relative clout of entrenched inter-
est groups is weaker at the local level, where it is easier to organize dispersed voters.
In contrast, voters are more dispersed at the federal level, and interest group clout is
more likely to be overpowering."). This explains why public sector wages are higher
in larger jurisdictions. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 21 (1995).
390. The relatively high proportion of women holding positions in state and local
government illustrates this increased diversity. In 1992, women held approximately
22% of the seats in the state legislature almost double the proportion in Congress..
See WORLD ALMANAC BOOK OF FAcTS, 337 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1997); id. at 111-
18. That newcomers can participate in government at the state level at double the rate
of the national offices tends to suggest that state governments are more receptive to
citizen participation, which adds new ideas and solutions to the political landscape.
See Merritt, supra note 361, at 7.
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the average cost lessens with the greater number of citizens for
which the function is performed.39' Similarly, the average cost of
performing a service remains constant or goes up in proportion to
the increase in citizens receiving the service.392 Factoring such con-
siderations of scale into determining government responsibilities
increases efficiency throughout government.
Federal governments also reduce cross-boundary externalities.
For example, if country A generated pollution that imposed costs
on country B, the two might bargain in the Coasean sense, attempt-
ing to internalize the externalities.393 Thus, Country B could pay
Country A's polluters not to pollute. Problems arise in the first
instance due to the costs of negotiating the agreement, identifying
the cross-boundary cost and enforcing the agreement. In federal
governments, however, a central government acts to coordinate
such efforts and work to limit interstate difficulties. 394
Because federalism separates power between multiple jurisdic-
tions, there is a limit as to how much power each jurisdiction can
amass between both subordinate jurisdictions and between the
central and subordinate governments. The benefit of these mutual
constraints is the limitation of the monopolistic tendencies of gov-
ernment.395 Suppose, for example, it is just as efficient for the
subordinate governments to perform the function as it is for the
central government. In such instances, subordinate units should be
given the authority to provide the service, on the ground that com-
petition between the subordinate governments will benefit the
country in ways that centralizing the service will not. Now, if a
subordinate unit abuses its monopolistic position, for example, by
imposing a confiscatory tax, citizens can migrate to another
subordinate jurisdiction with a more reasonable tax. This correc-
tive migration is not nearly as possible when responding to bad
391. See Thomas S. Ulen Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalsim, 6 GEO.
MASON U. L. REV. 921, 924-30 (1998). For example, collecting national taxes or pro-
viding for a national defense are functions properly placed in the hands of the central
government. See id. at 929.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. Indeed, the Framers actively thought of such consideration at the time. James
Madison observed such problems in the United States under the Articles of Confed-
eration, problems he sought to remedy in the Constitution. See James Madison, Vices
of the political system of the U. States (April 1787), in 24 LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES
TO CONGRESS: 1774-1789, supra note 124, at 265 (discussing the "Trespasses of the
States on the rights of each other" and "Want of concert in matters where common
interest requires it"). Years earlier, Benjamin Franklin commented on the free-rider
problem in America. See supra note 126.
395. See Ulen supra note 391, at 939-34.
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policies taken, by the central government. Indeed, it is far more
likely for a citizen to migrate from Illinois to Ohio to avoid a bur-
densome Illinois policy than it is to leave the United States over a
similarly burdensome national policy.
All of these factors are designed to increase efficiency and maxi-
mize social utility. Social utility most often is maximized when
smaller governmental units implement policy.396 For example, Or-
egon, in response to local desires, enacted legislation granting its
citizens the right to physician-assisted suicide.397 Considering the
heated debate around the topic, a federal law permitting this action
would anger millions of citizens. However, because the law only
affects Oregonians, at most 49% of Oregon could be upset with the
law. Thus, social utility and the public good are maximized
through jurisdictional differences by limiting the citizenry upon
which policy affects.
Most importantly, federalism makes government more efficient.
Nobel Laureate James Buchanan demonstrated mathematically
that centralized decision-making over local projects results in local
government spending more than it would freely choose to spend.398
Moreover, policy makers in local government are simply more
aware of the costs of their policies, as the flow of information im-
proves.399 Thus, policymakers and citizens alike are more likely to
weigh the benefits of any program against its actual cost.40 0 Once
in place, monitoring the effects of policies is easier and enforce-
ment costs are lower as government downsizes.4°'
B. Functional Analysis v. Formal Analysis
Federalism's two greatest benefits are that each government may
serve as a check on the other one and that the union of central and
subordinate governments yields the benefits of both unitary and
396. As Richard Henry Lee, writing under the pseudonym "Federal Farmer" noted,
"one government and general legislation alone, can never extend equal benefits to all
parts of the United- States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different
states, by which a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded." Richard
Henry Lee, Letter I (Oct. 8, 1787) THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY
PAPERS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 839, 847 (E.H. Scott ed.,
1894).
397. 13 OR. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 (Supp. 1998). This legislaion is commonly known
as the "Death with Dignity Act."
398. See JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
135-40 (1962).
399. See McConnell, supra note 359, at 1509-10.
400. OATES, supra note 360, at 13.
401. See McConnell, supra note 359, at 1504.
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decentralized governments. Consequently, in a functional analysis
of federalism, the focus must be on allocating tasks to state or na-
tional governments based promoting these values. Simply, because
some tasks are better accomplished on a national scale while others
are better handled at the state of local level, courts should inquire
as to the "utility" of one government regulating a matter over an-
other, while, at the same time, maintaining the socio-political bene-
fits of federalism.4 °2 In this manner, federalism would seek to let
the each level of government do what it does best.
In so doing, a court should evaluate the economic and socio-
political gains, via the entire nation, of promoting either local or
national authority in the questioned area. Moreover, the base-line
inquiry must be whether the problem complained, which provoked
the questioned law's passage, is a "national" problem. In so doing,
responsibility will be allocated to the government where the most
gains, nationally, can be realized, thereby, realizing the advantages
of both national and state governments. By approaching questions
with the formal analysis, however, the crucial policy goals of feder-
alism become secondary matters. As a result, a constitutional pol-
icy is disregarded and the nation suffers as a whole.
As proof, consider the Violence Against Women Act of 1994403
("VAWA"). This Act, recently invalidated by the Fourth Circuit on
federalism grounds,40 4 was a "response to the problems of domestic
violence, sexual assault, and other forms of violence against wo-
men." 40 5 The controversial provision extends a federal substantive
right to "[a]ll persons within the United States ... to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender. '40 6 To enforce this right,
the law creates a private cause of action against any "person...
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender ' 40 7 and al-
lows any victim of such a crime to obtain compensatory damages,
402. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM 386-87 (1993).
The argument from utility had provided a rationale for the division of au-
thority between the colonies and Westminster when the prerevolutionary de-
bate turned to the federal option. Reflecting the way economists think.., it
was and has continued to be a sensible and practical premise for deciding
what functions should be assigned to central and to local governments.
Id.
403. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1999).
404. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820
(1999).
405. Id. at 827.
406. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
407. Id.
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punitive damages, and injunctive, declaratory or other appropriate
relief.40 8
Now under traditional, formal, Supreme Court review, the
Fourth Circuit invalidated the VAWA. The formal Supreme Court
approach would first announce that the Constitution dictates that
Congress may only legislate in areas that substantially affect com-
merce. One should question the validity of this premise. Why is it
that the constitutional grant of power to regulate commerce40 9 is
limited to objects that "substantially affects" commerce? The Con-
stitution says nothing on the matter, and historical evidence is
rather ambiguous on what included "commerce. '410 Thus, one en-
counters the first flaw in the Court's reasoning.
Next, the formal approach would look at VAWA and, perhaps
comparing it to the Gun Free School Zone Act, declare that it has
nothing to do with commerce. Again, one should question the ap-
plication of the substantially affects commerce "principle" to this
situation. It is plausible for Congress to find that the effects of gen-
der violence could deter commerce. The necessary nexus may be
the psychological effects of gender violence on one's ability to
travel or purchase goods. Likewise, the power imbalances inherent
to relationships marred by gender violence could restrict the
abused partner's access to income, again potentially affecting inter-
state commerce.
Lastly, just as the Fourth Circuit did, the formal approach would
declare the law void on federalism grounds. Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning follows the formal model perfectly:
[T]o sustain section 13981 as a constitutional exercise of the
Commerce power, not only would we have to hold that congres-
sional power under the substantially affects test extends to the
regulation of noneconomic activities in the absence of jurisdic-
tional elements, but we would also have to conclude that vio-
lence motivated by gender animus substantially affects interstate
commerce by relying on arguments that lack any principled limi-
408. See id.
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
410. Justice Thomas aptly demonstrated that some viewed manufacturing and agri-
culture as wholly distinct from "commerce" and thus not under the purview of the
Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590-94 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring). But see Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, (Dec. 5, 1791),
reprinted in POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 161 (Andrew M. Scott ed., 1959) (not-
ing that the United States should encourage manufactures to improve its domestic
and foreign commerce, and hinting that Congress should make labor policies).
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tations and would, if accepted, convert the power to regulate
interstate commerce into a general police power.4 n
It is interesting to note the lack of discussion on how this law actu-
ally affects federalism. The policy rationale underlying VAWA, as
it relates to federalism is never discussed. Further, the court never
even considered if gender abuse has risen to levels beyond which a
state can effectively rectify the situation. Thus, to remedy this de-
fect, the proposed test has as its underlying purpose to find what
types of problems should be handled nationally and at the state
level, and allocating responsibility accordingly.
C. Putting the Test to the Test
Continuing with the VAWA example, a functional analysis would
first consider the national gains for allowing this law. VAWA
grants citizens a remedy for a heinous wrong, a wrong that the
states might not compensate victims for specifically. In addition,
granting a federal remedy will uniformly address this wrong, thus
making recoveries across the nation relatively equal. Note, how-
ever, that few of the typical benefits for large government action
are realized. Cross-boundary externalities, for example, will most
likely not be decreased, as it is unlikely that defendants under this
law would move to one jurisdiction on the basis that it did not have
the law. Economies of scale are certainly not realized, as the costs
for trials based on this new cause of action, both in terms of court
costs and other litigation expenses, will not go down proportion-
ately to the increase in people taking advantage of the law.
Next, a court should consider the gains for localizing this matter.
Because safety and other social concerns change based on the
needs of particular jurisdictions, it usually makes sense to leave
both the creation of a new tort and a new crime to the states. Resi-
dents and local officials, for whom monitoring this law will be more
efficient, for example, will be able to better value the gains and
weaknesses of the policy, as compared to national lawmakers.
Such monitoring could permit changes in the permitted value of
the award, or perhaps to explicitly include attorney's fees. In addi-
tion, a jurisdiction might think its rape and assault laws sufficient,
while still another locale might wish to make this remedy available,
but lower the burden of proof, thus making recovery easier. All in
all, local officials will be able witness the effects of the law and
address problems with it much faster, thus increasing accountabil-
411. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 838.
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ity and efficiency in government throughout the nation. Addition-
ally, because the costs for enforcing this law grow in proportion to
the size of its citizenry, it makes more economic sense to allocate
such responsibility to local government, both to enact such cost-
inducing legislation, and to enforce it.
This test is an easily applied mechanism to achieve the Framers'
goal: to let the national government legislate over national con-
cerns and permit the states to control matters of local concern.
Thus, the test attempts to answer whether gender abuse has
evolved, from what was once a local problem, to an issue of na-
tional concern. Based on the brief exposition of economic and
socio-political benefits derived from VAWA, the answer seems to
be no. Yet, one must consider the effect this problem has on the
nation as a whole. If there is evidence that the combined effects of
gender violence affects the nation, much like, even in the absence
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the effects of racial discrimination
affect the entire nation, then Congress may have the proper basis
for the law.
In the end, laws must succeed or fail not due to a lack of a nexus
with interstate commerce, but due to their connection to the na-
tional interest. As a result, state governments will be more proac-
tive, forced to perform their constitutionally prescribed task of
providing for local concerns. Likewise, the national government
will be responsible for performing its intended objectives, without
interfering in matters best left to the states. The benefits of feder-
alism will be realized as a result, the Framers' vision better effectu-
ated and the nation will be better off as a whole.
Conclusion
As America enters the new millennium, it should reevaluate the
structure of its government. To best maximize the utility of the
current structure, the Supreme Court should employ a functional
test emphasizing the values of federalism. To its credit, this test
retains the Framers' vision by dividing powers among local and na-
tional entities. Importantly, this division can change over time.
Additionally, this test can be applied to all federalism concerns,
thus yielding its greatest benefit - uniformity in the Court's feder-
alism jurisprudence. Consequently, the Court should adopt such a
test and support the purposes of federalism, thereby safeguarding
its values.
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MORE TREES PLEASE: UTILIZING NATURAL
RESOURCES IN THE URBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF
NEW YORK CITY
Vivian D. Encarnacion*
Introduction
Trees are an invaluable commodity to any community, capable
of increasing the value of property1 and also enhancing the physical
terrain of a neighborhood, thereby attracting more residents and
visitors.2 Aside from aesthetic appeal, trees also serve an impor-
tant role in the ecological system by cleansing the air,3 reducing
pollution,4 mitigating extreme temperatures,5 conserving energy6
and preventing excessive stormwater runoff.7 In recognition of
these benefits, many urban environmental strategists desire to in-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., History, Po-
mona College, 1993. I would like to thank Professor Schmudde of Fordham Law
School and Ms. Alissa Brownrigg for their invaluable input on this Note. I also would
like to thank my loving husband, Anthony, for his support throughout this process.
1. See Steve Goldman, Preserve a Tree, Add Value to Property, LEDGER (Lake-
land, Fla.), Apr. 19, 1997, at 12L ("Properties with saved and transplanted trees have
proven to sell or rent faster and better than properties without trees.").
2. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 53-0301(5) (McKinney 1997) ("Improved
and expanded urban tree programs for planting and maintenance of trees and associ-
ated vegetation in urban areas would make urban areas more pleasant and healthful
places to live, work and visit[.]").
3. See Janine Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air: CITYgreen Software Program,
103 AM. FORESTS 34 (1997) ("[T]rees clean our atmosphere ... by storing carbon.").
4. See Lynn MacDonald, Global Problems, Local Solutions: Measuring the Value
of the Urban Forest, 103 AM. FORESTS 26, 26 (1996) ("[T]rees absorb and store carbon
and remove numerous other particulates from the air."). See also Kyle Niederpruem,
Group Says City that Values Trees Has It Made in the Shade, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS,
Mar. 17, 1998, at C05 ("If the [tree] canopy was increased to just 10 percent, the
pollution benefits would increase annually by over 1,100 percent[.]").
5. See Gary Moll & Cory Berish, Atlanta's Changing Environment, 102 AM. FOR-
ESTS 26 (1996) (noting that Atlanta's downtown and airport temperatures soared up
to twelve degrees higher than the surrounding tree-laden areas).
6. See Dora Ann Reaves, Tree Planting Goes Online, POST AND COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), July 2, 1998, at 1 (CITYgreen program helped Dade County, Flor-
ida, determine that "its trees provide $5.3 million in direct summer energy savings.").
7. See Johns Hopkins, Deluged: Value of Urban Trees, 103 AM. FORESTS 24
(1997) ("[A] tree is like a huge straw: It draws water through its roots and facilitates
evaporation through its leaves. The physical barriers it provides - its roots and fallen
branches - regulate the flow of runoff, reducing the water's speed and spreading out
its flow.").
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corporate trees and other vegetation into their cities' develop-
ment.8 However, given the limited space available for additional
housing, a city will opt for increased development at the expense of
its urban greenery.9
In an urban setting such as New York City, where the growing
population is clustered on so few square miles, open space for fu-
ture development is at a premium. 10 To meet the demands of the
expanding urban community, the City has received approval from
the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and De-
velopment and the City Council to condemn several of its existing
green spaces to build affordable housing.11 Not surprisingly, this
move prompted an impassioned response from those communities
benefiting from the green sites and from several environmental
groups. These concerned New Yorkers formed the New York City
Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens (the "Coalition") to en-
join the condemnation and prevent the construction of residential
units over their garden plots. 2 The Coalition sought help from the
judicial system, demanding environmental impact review of the
proposed construction and compliance with all applicable land use
laws. 3
The First Department of New York's Appellate Division af-
firmed the lower court's dismissal of the Coalition's petition for an
injunction. 4 According to the Appellate Division, the Coalition
8. Although local public policymakers rank natural resources, growth and devel-
opment as their highest priorities, almost half of these officials do not use geographic
information system ("GIS") data as part of urban environmental management. A
GIS survey can be used for comprehensive planning, zoning and subdivision review as
well as drainage and floodplain management. See Corporations Go Green: Global
ReLeaf Forest Projects of Mobil Corp. and American Forests, 104 AM. FORESTS 3
(1998).
9. See Douglas Martin, City Takeover Looms for Gardens on Vacant Lots, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1998, at 1. See also Taft Wireback, City Considers Tree Ordinance,
Traffic Changes, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, NC), May 27, 1998, at B1 (Council-
man Earl Jones stated that he wanted his city to stay "green and beautiful... [b]ut at
the same time, I don't want to do anything that could stifle development."); Maria
Saporta, Development Concerns Often Winning Out Over Trees, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 18, 1998, at 8E ("[M]etro governments all too often are willing to give
permission to cut down trees so they won't obstruct development.").
10. See New York City Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens v. Giuliani, 670
N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (1997) (noting that the City program sought to reclaim garden lots
for the needed development of low cost housing).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 656-57.
13. See id. at 660-61.
14. See New York City Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens v. Giuliani, 666
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1998).
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lacked standing to bring the action because it could not demon-
strate a "legally cognizable injury."' 5 Even if the Coalition could
bring such a suit, the Appellate Court indicated that the case would
not survive on its merits. 6 Because the Department of Housing
Preservation and Development determined that the project would
not have a significant impact on the environment, it designated the
proposed construction as a "Type II ' ' 17 action under the State Envi-
ronmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), 8 and stated that the
action would not require an environmental impact assessment, nor
would it violate existing land use regulations. 19
The issue of whether the Coalition had standing to sue New
York City runs deeper than the statutory qualification to challenge
a municipality's action. The Coalition's attempted injunction raises
questions concerning the City's environmental strategy for further
urban development. Will the City continue to construct housing at
the expense of its scarce green spaces if the development qualifies
as a "Type II" action under SEQRA? In zoning and planning ap-
propriate land use, has the City forgotten the purposes set forth in
its Urban Forestry Program some twenty years ago? 20 How can the
City meet the housing needs of continued urban growth while also
preserving the maximum benefits from natural resources?
Although the City's action did not qualify for classification as a
"Type I" action,2' are there other less onerous methods of assuring
increased environmental consideration in development decisions?
This Note contemplates some of the foregoing questions and
proposes potential solutions to New York City's green space issues.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See infra note 18.
18. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney. 1997). In compiling the
rules and regulations for SEQRA, the legislature defined certain classes of actions as
"Type II," which the legislature determined would not have a significant impact on
the environment or which it could otherwise be precluded from environmental review
under SEQRA. Pertinent to the 1997 Coalition v. Giuliani case are actions which
consist of "replacement, rehabilitation or reconstruction of a structure or facility, in
kind, on the same site, including upgrading buildings to meet building or fire codes."
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(c)(2) (1998).
19. See Giuliani, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
20. See N.Y. ENvTrL. CONSERV. LAW § 53-0301(1) (McKinney 1997). The legisla-
ture found and declared that: "It is the purpose of this [law] to promote a compre-
hensive urban forestry program to assure positive benefit from urban trees planned
and managed with adequate recognition of the physical, biotic and social surround-
ings in which they are encouraged to grow and provide their benefits." Id.
21. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. The replacement or reconstruc-
tion in kind of buildings which previously existed on a site as "Type II," not "Type I"
actions. See N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 617.5(c)(2).
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Part I provides an overview of the environmental impact of trees as
well as New York City's current policies with respect to environ-
mental conservation and urban development. Part II examines al-
ternate policies implemented by other cities and communities to
meet the challenges of increased development and their environ-
mental impact. Part III proposes solutions to New York City's
green space issues, suggesting reliance on the incorporation of
trees and other natural resources into urban planning instead of
following the recommendations by SEQRA for the preparation of
the lengthy environmental impact statement ("EIS")2 2 for certain
activities. Finally, this Note concludes that the development of an
urban forestry program will effectuate the benefits inherent in an
urban forest most successfully.
I. Overview
A. Benefits of Preserving Trees in an Urban Community
Research continually reveals that trees benefit urban communi-
ties in a number of ways. First, with respect to air quality, trees
remove damaging pollutants from the atmosphere and replenish it
with oxygen.2 3 Through the process of transpiration and photosyn-
thesis, trees sequester grams of ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen di-
oxide and carbon monoxide every hour, amassing several tons of
carbon storage each year. 4 This carbon sequestration process in
turn reduces the harmful effect of these noxious gases that cause
global warming as well as lung-related ailments .2  Researchers also
have been able to quantify the value of this carbon removal
through the use of a carbon storage and sequestration model called
UFORE-C.26 In fact, utilizing the figures economists employ to es-
timate the effect pollutants cost society, one research ecologist was
22. The requirements for the preparation of an EIS are contained in N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 1997). For rules regarding the content of an EIS,
see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.9 (1998).
23. See E. Gregory McPherson & David J. Nowak, Value of Urban Greenspace for
Air Quality Improvement: Lincoln Park, Chicago, 2 ARBORIST NEWS 30-32 (1993);
David J. Nowak, Urban Forest Structure and the Functions of Hydrocarbon Emissions
and Carbon Storage, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH NATIONAL URBAN FOREST CON-
FERENCE 48-51 (P.D. Rodbell ed., 1992).
24. See Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air, supra note 3.
25. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Scientists Are Turning to Trees to Repair the Green-
house, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1998, at F4.
26. See Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air, supra note 3; see also Rowan A.
Rowntree & David J. Nowak, Quantifying the Role of Urban Forests in Removing
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, 17 J. ARBORICULTURE 269-75 (1991); David J. Nowak,
Atmospheric Carbon Reduction by Urban Trees, 37 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 207-17 (1993).
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able to compute carbon sequestration into a tangible "dollar
value. "27
Carbon sequestration, however, is not the only role trees play in
the urban ecosystem. Researchers also have found that trees alter
the urban ecosystem by decreasing air temperatures.28 Studies in-
dicate that a ten percent increase in tree canopy cover results in a
one to two degree Fahrenheit reduction in air temperature.29 In
addition, a one degree decrease in temperature will reduce the pos-
sibility of smog by six percent. 30 Furthermore, increased tree can-
opy coverage protects urban dwellers from the harmful effects of
ultraviolet radiation ("UV"). 31
Nevertheless, researchers have recognized some drawbacks in
utilizing trees to mitigate the effects of UV.32 For example, trees
can become a public hazard if they interfere with above- or below-
27. Nowak, Atmospheric Carbon Reduction, supra note 26. One economist cau-
tions against reliance on "dollar values" to emphasize the importance of urban for-
estry programs. See, e.g., John F. Dwyer, The Role Economics Can Play as an
Analytical Tool in Urban Forestry, in URBAN FOREST LANDSCAPES: INTEGRATING
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 88, 88-90 (Gordon A. Bradley ed., 1995). Ac-
cording to his view, public decisionmaking with respect to urban forestry involves
more than "estimates of the monetary value of urban trees and forests." Id. at 89. It
entails the "emotional attachment" of the community to its trees as well as the "net
benefit" expected from tree planting programs. Id. at 89, 92 (For more on the emo-
tional ties people feel with their urban landscape, see John F. Dwyer et al., The Deep
Significance of Urban Trees and Forests, in ECOLOGICAL CITY 137, 137-49 (Ruther-
ford H. Platt et al. eds., 1994)). In his opinion, the role of economics in promoting
urban forestry should be expanded to encompass not only "dollar values" but also a
framework for evaluating changes in urban forestry programs in context with other
public initiatives. See id. at 96.
28. See C.S.B. Grimmond & T.R. Oke, Comparison of Heat Fluxes From Summer-
time Observations in the Suburbs of Four North American Cities, 34 J. APPLIED METE-
OROLOGY 873-89 (1995); E. Gregory McPherson, Cooling Urban Heat Islands with
Sustainable Landscapes, in ECOLOGICAL CITY 151, 155-56 (Rutherford H. Platt et al.
eds., 1994).
29. See Nancy Anne Dawe, Sprinting Toward Sustainability: Tree Planting Pro-
grams in Atlanta, GA, 102 AM. FORESTS 22 (1996). See also McPherson, Cooling
Urban Heat Islands, supra note 28, at 158 (showing in a study that vegetation consist-
ently lowered wall surface temperatures by about seventeen degrees Celsius and re-
duced air-conditioning costs by twenty-five to eighty percent).
30. See Moll & Berish, supra note 5.
31. Excessive exposure to UV can lead to skin cancer, cataracts and immune sys-
tem disorders. If pollutants are allowed to reduce the ozone level, these problems are
intensified. One study shows that trees reduce UV by twenty-five to forty percent in
sunny locations between street trees. In the shade, UV is reduced fifty-five to eighty
percent. See R.H. Grant & G.M. Heisler, Solar Ultraviolet-B and Photosynthetically
Active Irradiance in the Urban Sub-canopy: A Survey of Influences, 39 INT'L J. Bi-
OMETEOROLOGY 201-212 (1996).
32. See McPherson, Cooling Urban Heat Islands, supra note 28, at 162.
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ground utility lines.33 In addition, increased tree planting can am-
plify the amount of pollen that affects allergy sufferers, and also
can constrain the use of scarce water supplies. 34 Furthermore, can-
opy coverage can trap some harmful pollutants and serve to reduce
beneficial "country-city air flow."35  Despite these potential
problems, however, researchers believe that careful planning and
proper selection of trees will minimize the possible damaging im-
pacts of an urban forest.36
Strategic planting of trees also can increase a city's energy effi-
ciency. 37 Research conducted since the mid-1980s has quantified
the energy saving potential of urban forests.38 According to the
Energy Information Administration, household heating and cool-
ing cost consumers $180 billion in 1987.39 Studies have found that
a twenty-five foot tall tree could save ten to twenty-five dollars an-
nually on these energy costs alone. °
Because trees release cool vapor into the air during photosynthe-
sis, the need for artificial cooling devices is reduced 1.4  In fact, ac-
cording to one study, the air-conditioning savings from a deciduous
tree near a well-insulated home ranged from ten to fifteen percent,
while an eight to twelve percent savings was reported during peak
cooling periods.42 Landscape vegetation around individual build-
ings also can result in heat savings of five to fifteen percent and
cooling savings of ten to fifty percent.43
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. "Country-city air flow" describes the pattern of air currents that travel
between the suburban and urban areas.
36. See id.
37. See Gary Moll, Urban Ecosystems: Breakthroughs for City Green, 101 AM.
FORESTS 23 (1995) (energy savings could double if trees were planted in vacant strate-
gic locations); MacDonald, supra note 4 (adding one mature tree in the right location
at each home will increase energy savings).
38. See E. Gregory McPherson et al., Energy-Efficient Landscapes, in URBAN
FOREST LANDSCAPES: INTEGRATING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 150, 153-54
(Gordon A. Bradley ed., 1995); G.M. Heisler, Energy Savings with Trees, 12 J. AR.
BORICULTURE 113-25 (1986); E. Gregory McPherson & Rowan A. Rowntree, Energy
Conservation Potential of Urban Tree Planting, 19 J. ARBORICULTURE 321-31 (1993);
E. Gregory McPherson, Using Urban Forests for Energy Efficiency and Carbon Stor-
age, 92 J. FORESTRY 36-38, 40-41 (1994).
39. See McPherson et al., Energy-Efficient Landscapes, supra note 38, at 151.
40. See id. at 152-53.
41. See MacDonald, supra note 4.
42. See McPherson et al., Energy-Efficient Landscapes, supra note 38, at 152-53.
43. See id. at 153.
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Moreover, scientists have recognized that trees also can serve as
a tool in the reduction of stormwater runoff." The incorporation
of trees and other vegetation costs five to ten times less than using
solely manmade stormwater infrastructures. 4' The leaves on trees
keep large quantities of rain and snow from falling to the ground
and tree roots absorb excess surface water, thereby stabilizing
ground soil.46 Street trees provide the greatest annual benefit in
avoiding stormwater runoff by diverting 327 gallons of water com-
pared with the 104 gallons averted by park trees.47
Irrespective of such obvious benefits, some critics view the utili-
zation of trees to combat the greenhouse effect with skepticism.
Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund be-
lieves, for instance, that the carbon sequestration power of trees
can produce many benefits, but warns that if the sequestration pro-
ject is implemented poorly, it actually could do more harm to the
ecosystem and exacerbate the greenhouse problem.48 The head of
climate programs at the Sierra Club likewise holds tree sequestra-
tion proposals with reservation. He believes one would need to
plant enough trees to cover the area of Australia in order to offset
U.S. industrial emissions.49 Advocates of natural resource use do
agree that trees can handle only a fraction of the greenhouse gas
problem, but point out that failure to replace "hard-scape" with
some tree cover contributes to permanent environmental
predicaments.50
44. See Benyus, Click Here for Cleaner Air, supra note 3.
45. See Hopkins, supra note 7.
46. See id.
47. See E. Gregory McPherson, Net Benefits of Healthy and Productive Urban For-
ests, in URBAN FOREST LANDSCAPES: INTEGRATING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPEC-
TIVES 180, 188 (Gordon A. Bradley ed., 1995).
48. See Cushman, supra note 25 (noting that improperly placed trees can increase
building energy use and power plant emissions and that care and removal of trees will
expend some fuel use which also emits carbon dioxide into the air); see also USDA
Forest Service, Current Research: Tree Influences on Carbon Dioxide (visited Mar. 20,
1999) <http://svinet2.fs.fed.us/ne/syracuse/unit.html#air>.
49. See Cushman, supra note 25.
50. "Hard-scape" refers to roads, sidewalks and other concrete or asphalt areas of
a city. See Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air, supra note 3. Permanent environmen-
tal hazards include poor air quality, depletion of the ozone layer, inefficient energy
use and unmitigated urban air temperatures.
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B. New York City's Current Policies and Goals
New York State adopted its environmental conservation law,
SEQRA, in 1975.5' SEQRA was modeled after the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). 52 Both SEQRA and
NEPA contain similar provisions regarding the content of an EIS
and which agencies would enforce compliance with the act.53
SEQRA allows various "lead agencies" to determine whether or
not a particular action requires an EIS.54 This policy has resulted
in inconsistent and unpredictable treatment of proposed activity.
For example, while one lead agency may require an EIS for single
family home construction, another may not require an EIS for a
large industrial project, a venture that ostensibly would have a sig-
nificant impact on the environment.
The New York State legislature has attempted to correct these
incongruities and provide some predictability in the process
through numerous amendments to SEQRA.56 The state now
designates some activities as warranting automatic preclusion from
environmental assessment review while insisting on an assessment
51. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 612, § 2, amended by 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 228, § 4.
Shortly after enactment of SEQRA, New York City promulgated the City Environ-
mental Quality Review ("CEQR"), 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5, app. A (1997). CEQR resulted
from Executive Order No. 91 of 1977, which was superseded by 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5
(1997), in recognition of the city's continuing policy that "environmental, social and
economic factors be considered before governmental approval is given to proposed
activities that may significantly affect [the] urban environment." 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5,
app. A. Authorization for CEQR stems from N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-
0113(3) (McKinney 1997).
52. § 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1995). NEPA sets forth the require-
ments for a detailed statement whenever major Federal actions will have a significant
effect on the quality of the human environment. SEQRA duplicates each of these
requirements and adds a few additional requirements of its own. See N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(f)-().
53. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (all agencies of the Federal Government are author-
ized to oversee the integrated use of natural science and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decisionmaking as well as the preparation of a detailed state-
ment on the environmental impact of proposed actions); cf. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 8-0109(2) (agencies, including any state and local municipalities, are responsi-
ble for the preparation of an EIS on any action that may have a significant effect on
the environment).
54. "Agency means a state or local agency." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 617.2(c) (1998). A "state agency means any state department, agency, board, public
benefit corporation, public authority or commission." Id. § 617.2(ah). A local agency
includes "any local agency, board, authority, district, commission or governing body,
including any city, county and other political subdivision of the state." Id. § 617.2(v).
55. See Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, Possible Ways to "Reform"
SEQRA, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1998, at 3.
56. See id.
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for certain activities by classifying as either "Type II" or "Type I"
actions.57 For example, the maintenance or repair of an existing
structure involving no substantial changes qualifies as a "Type II"
action, legislatively precluded from environmental assessment re-
view.58 SEQRA, however, requires an assessment for any "Type I"
action, such as the adoption of a municipal land use plan.5 9
Even these modifications to SEQRA have failed to provide the
assurance of preclusion from review sought by some developers
whose projects ostensibly qualify as "Type II" activities. A trial
court still can invalidate an EIS it finds "arbitrary and capricious"
even though courts generally accord great deference to lead agen-
cies' judgments on the EIS' adequacy.6' Furthermore, most "Type
II" actions with respect to development involve changes to existing
facilities or construction of nonresidential structures with only a
limited allowance for new construction. 61 Because the significant
effort necessary to prepare an EIS may be squandered in these
ways, developers in areas such as New York City may choose to
forego certain construction activities if they must prepare an EIS.62
SEQRA is not the only measure the New York State legislature
has enacted to inject an environmental focus in municipal planning.
In 1978, the State added a tree conservation provision to its general
57. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 617.5 and 617.4, respectively.
58. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(c)(1). CEQR contains a list
of its own "Exempt Actions," which are less numerous than those posed by SEQRA.
Compare 43 R.C.N.Y. § 6-04 (1997), with N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 617.5. Exempt actions under CEQR include those necessary on a limited emer-
gency basis and certain modifications to projects classified as "Type I" which occur
after 1977. See 43 R.C.N.Y. §§ 6-04(a), (b) and (h). Nevertheless, "Type II" actions
under SEQRA are included within CEQR's exemption list by legislative fiat. See
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a)(2) ("An agency may not designate as
Type I any action identified as Type II [under SEQRA].").
59. See N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(b)(1). CEQR has similar
"Type I" actions. See 43 R.C.N.Y § 6-15 (1997).
60. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3; see also South Bronx Clean Air Coa-
lition v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 630 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1995); People for West-
pride, Inc. v. Board of Estimate, 568 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1991).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 617.5(c)(1), (4) and (7).
There does exist "Type II" activity that permits new development, however, the struc-
ture must be either a reconstruction "in kind" and on the same site or construction of
a single-, two- or three-family residence. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§§ 617.5(c)(2) and (9).
62. "[Flew developers want to bet on whether their EISs are thrown out by errant
trial-level judges. Thus they either pay the insurance of preparing a massive EIS that
covers almost every conceivable issue, or they quietly forgo the pleasure and invest
their money in something that does not require SEQRA review." Gerrard & Bose,
supra note 55, at 3.
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municipal law.63 The legislature found a "direct relationship be-
tween the planting of trees, shrubs and associated vegetation in suf-
ficient number in populated areas and the health, safety, and
welfare of communities, 64 and empowered the legislative body of
any county, city, town or village to promulgate any specific rules or
regulations that protect and conserve trees and related
vegetation.65
Despite the enactment of this law, New York City has not
adopted any rules or regulations providing for the planting of trees.
Instead, it has created a limited protection of trees which may be
affected by construction or which lie on public property.66 To date,
the City has not brought any proceeding against a person who may
have violated these laws. For the most part, environmental conser-
vation of the City's urban forest rests on its local version of
SEQRA,67 which restricts or permits development activity based
on its classification as either a "Type I" or "Type II" action.68
C. "Type I" and "Type Hi" Actions under SEQRA
"Type I" development projects involve the construction of resi-
dential units in excess of 2500 where a connection to the public
water and sewage system is required. 69 A "Type I" classification of
a development project may entail the preparation of an EIS.7 ° An
EIS involves a detailed description of the proposed activity along
with its short- and long-term environmental effects.71 There are
several other requirements for completion of the EIS, including
63. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-b (McKinney 1986).
64. Id. § 96-b(1) (emphasis added).
65. See id. § 96-b(2).
66. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 18-107 (1997) (mandating that trees removed dur-
ing construction must be replaced with 21h to 6 inch caliper trees at the remover's
expense); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-1030 (1997) (mandating that trees outside the
street line may not be disturbed or removed without permission from the commis-
sioner of parks and recreation); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-148 and 10-149 (1997)
(imposing a fine of up to $15,000 and imprisonment of not more than one year on any
person, firm, corporation or agent who unlawfully cuts trees on city property).
67. See Richard L. Schaffer, Reflections on Planning and Zoning, in PLANNING
AND ZONING NEW YORK CITY: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW 239, 248-50
(Todd W. Bressi ed., 1993).
68. A "Type I" action indicates that the project or action will more likely require
the preparation of an EIS while a "Type II" action (or "Exempt Action" under
CEQR) has been determined to not have a significant impact on the environment or
is otherwise precluded from environmental review. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGs. tit. 6, §§ 617.4 and 617.5, respectively; see also R.C.N.Y. § 6.04.
69. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(b)(5)(v).
70. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a)(1).
71. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(b).
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studies on issues such as energy conservation and solid waste
management.72
Once the lead agency determines that the EIS adequately covers
all potential types of environmental impact, or that it will issue a
negative declaration under SEQRA, there is no guarantee that the
project will continue unchallenged.73 A developer may still face
legal obstacles from the community which can delay the project for
months or years at the developer's expense." One commentator
has suggested the elimination of EISs for proposed structures in
New York City.75 Alternatively, if a developer's plans do not
threaten the environment according to SEQRA and are classified
as one of the "Type II" actions, the potential delay and cost of liti-
gation may be prevented.
Designation of an activity as "Type II" under SEQRA, however,
will not shield it from a private legal challenge. Pursuant to New
York law, a party can challenge an agency's determination that a
specified action does not require an EIS or that the action is ex-
empt under SEQRA.76 Courts, however, are reluctant to sustain a
challenge to a "Type II" designation because the legislature has
declared that such a designation is "'not subject to review under
SEQRA.' ',77 A party must demonstrate "injury in fact" or some
"actual legal stake" in the matter to bring an action before the
court. 7 8
Furthermore, regulations stipulate that an agency "may not des-
ignate as 'Type I' any action identified as 'Type II.'" 79 Therefore,
no environmental review will ensue for "Type II" activities
although there may exist measures to improve the local environ-
ment. For example, the in kind replacement of buildings, irrespec-
72. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0109(2)(h) and (i).
73. See Hoffman v. Town Bd. of Queensbury, 680 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1998) (concerning
an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul town board's resolution of negative decla-
ration for proposed subdivision).
74. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3 (indicating that an erroneous trial
court decision over the adequacy of an EIS can delay a project for months or years,
making the project "extremely costly").
75. See Peter D. Salins, Zoning for Growth and Change, in PLANNING AND ZON-
ING NEW YORK CITY: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW 164, 179-81 (Todd W.
Bressi ed., 1993).
76. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1994); see also, e.g., King v. County of
Monroe, 679 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1998) (holding that landowner had standing to challenge a
county's negative declaration of a proposed sports complex).
77. Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens v. Giuliani, 670 N.Y.S.2d 654, 661
(quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(a)).
78. Id. at 659.
79. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a)(1).
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tive of any intervening use of the property, is a "Type II" activity.8"
Where communities have utilized the property for several years as
garden lots, adverse environmental contingencies may flow from
converting the natural landscape into concrete and asphalt.81 If the
conversion qualifies as a "Type II" activity, however, SEQRA will
not require an environmental impact assessment nor make sugges-
tions on ways to preserve the benefits conferred by the garden
lots. 82
Consequently, a petitioner must demonstrate that the proposed
activity is either a "Type I" action or an "Unlisted" action that ex-
ceeds certain threshold requirements.83 While "Unlisted actions"
do not carry the presumption that they will have a "significant ad-
verse impact on the environment and may require an EIS," an
agency must make a determination of significance by "comparing
the impacts which may be reasonably expected to result from the
proposed action."85
Although New York City's population will approach close to 7.5
million people by the year 2000,86 it has not adopted any other en-
vironmental review strategy. The City Planning Commission in-
tends to change its local version of SEQRA in an effort to
eliminate separate review by each lead agency of every action and
to develop procedures to conduct "meaningful environmental re-
views of proposed areawide rezonings."87 Aside from these initia-
tives, the City appears content to rely on the current environmental
safeguards for its urban planning and development.
80. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(c)(2).
81. This was the.argument advanced by the Coalition for the Preservation of Gar-
dens in the 1997 Coalition v. Giuliani case. The Coalition contended that the use of
the vacant lots as community gardens for periods ranging from five to ten years essen-
tially re-characterized the nature of those lots. Therefore, the proposed condemna-
tion of the lots for residential development would "present serious environmental
consequences requiring review under SEQRA" even though SEQRA classifies such
action as "Type II." Coalition v. Giuliani, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
82. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5 (stating "Type II" actions are
not subject to SEQRA review, hence will not require EISs nor any other environmen-
tal conservation efforts).
83. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a)(1).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See CITY AND THE WORLD: NEW YORK'S GLOBAL FUTURE 102-03 (Margaret
D. Crahan & Alberto Vourvoulias-Bush, eds., 1997); New York City Department of
Planning, Population Projections for the Year 2000, Technical Report 1.
87. Schaffer, supra note 67, at 250.
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II. Various Responses
A. Alternate Policies Implemented by Other
Cities and Communities
New York City is not the only community faced with the formi-
dable task of urban environmental development. Several cities and
communities nationwide have attempted to address the needs of
their growing populations' infrastructure while preserving their ur-
ban forests.88 For example, in preparation for the 1996 Summer
Olympics, Atlanta, Georgia faced an environmental crisis. By con-
verting sixty-five percent of its urban forest into a "built environ-
ment, ' 89 Atlanta created a palpable "urban heat island."90 The
Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games ("ACOG") feared that
the increased air temperature and accompanying humidity would
result in "bad experiences and major emergencies for the 15,000
athletes, trainers and Olympic officials" expected that summer.91
Although the city planned to counterbalance the urban heat island
effect with increased air conditioner use, it realized that these
measures were temporary and limited, at best.92
Recognizing the need to develop a sustainable strategy which
would not drain the municipal coffers, Atlanta took advantage of a
recently developed program called CITYgreen to devise a solution
to its problem.93 Analyzing data taken by a Landsat satellite from
1972-1993, the CITYgreen program highlighted the fact that rapid
deforestation had produced more pollution, reduced water quality
and resulted in more expensive summer cooling bills.94 ACOG uti-
88. See, e.g., Moll & Berish, supra note 5 (Atlanta responded by utilizing CI-
TYgreen software); MacDonald, supra note 4 (Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Austin,
Texas conducted UEA of their cities); Jennifer Radcliffe, Committed to Saving Trees:
Keller Joins Area Cities in Preservation Effort, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec.
4, 1998, at 1 (Keller, Texas enacted a strict tree preservation ordinance).
89. A "built environment" consists of buildings, roadways and other improve-
ments that replace the natural landscape. See Moll & Berish, supra note 5.
90. "Urban heat islands" result from a city's reduction in its tree canopy coverage.
As urban infrastructure needs increase, natural resources are removed for the sake of
developing buildings and roadways. These structures create "heat islands" that ad-
versely affect air quality and drain utility resources because they absorb the sun's heat
and retain it longer than natural resources would. As a result, air temperatures in-
crease which in turn increase smog and air pollution. See id. The structure of urban
heat islands is explained in McPherson, Cooling Urban Heat Islands, supra note 28, at
152-55.
91. Dawe, Sprinting Toward Sustainability, supra note 29.
92. See id.
93. See Moll & Berish, supra note 5.
94. See id.; see also Michelle Robbins, Thinking Sustainably: Sustainable Ecosys-
tems, 102 AM. FORESTS 7 (1996).
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lized the CITYgreen data to influence the construction of Centen-
nial Olympic Park, the largest urban green space developed in over
a quarter of a century.95 The environmental analysis also acted as
an impetus for the Atlanta Regional Commission to pass and en-
force new tree conservation ordinances. 96
Prior to 1995, however, cities had few analytical tools to quantify
the environmental impact of their development.97 Although most
planners intuitively knew that trees and other natural resources
play a vital role in the urban environment, they could not place an
actual value on natural resource use.98 Developed in response to
this problem, the CITYgreen program utilizes computerized land-
use planning software to enable every community to determine the
value of its local ecosystem. 99 Without a sufficient cost-benefit
analysis like that made possible by CITYgreen, many city officials
simply could not justify creating a budgetary allowance for natural
resources.
100
Atlanta was among the first communities to utilize the CI-
TYgreen software program. 01 Studies revealed that a tree canopy
increase of only ten percent would yield a one to two degree reduc-
tion in air temperatures. °2 CITYgreen models also demonstrated
how Atlanta could reduce stormwater runoff which contributed to
an increase in flooding and poorer water quality. 0 3
In light of CITYgreen's notable success in Atlanta, other com-
munities have employed the computerized mapping tool.104 Mil-
95. See Nancy Anne Dawe, Atlanta: Positive Energy, Positive Future? Georgia, 103
AM. FORESTS 22 (1997) (noting that satellite images showed the dramatic tree loss
and temperature build-up between 1972 and 1993).
96. See Dawe, Sprinting Toward Sustainability, supra note 29.
97. See Moll, Urban Ecosystems, supra note 37.
98. Gary Moll, Vice President of Urban Forestry at American Forests stated, "In-
stinctively, we knew that paving paradise and putting up a parking lot was a bad idea,
... but now, with scientific and engineering data, we can prove it." Janine Benyus,
Saving For a Rainy Day: Forests and Trees as Helpers in Fighting Floods and Pollution,
104 AM. FORESTS 24 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
99. See Moll, Urban Ecosystems, supra note 37.
100. See Helping Cities Save the Green: Desktop Geographic Information System
CITYgreen, 103 AM. FORESTS 10 (1997).
101. See Moll & Berish, supra note 5.
102. See Dawe, Sprinting Toward Sustainability, supra note 29.
103. "Runoff from developed areas typically causes water flow to increase
[thereby] increasing the risk of flooding, more sediment in the water, and reduced
water quality." Moll & Berish, supra note 5.
104. See Urban Ecosystem Analysis & CITYgreen: Success Stories from Cities and
Individuals (visited July 5, 1999) <http://www.amfor.org/ufc/cgreen/success.html>. CI-
TYgreen was developed by American Forests, a nonprofit citizen conservation organ-
ization founded in 1875.
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waukee, Wisconsin and Austin, Texas used CITYgreen to perform
an Urban Ecosystem Analysis ("UEA") of those cities.1"5 CI-
TYgreen enabled these communities to visualize definitive "what
if" scenarios from the loss or addition of urban trees.10 6 Moreover,
CITYgreen provided "dollar values" to increased canopy
coverage.10
7
In addition to its use of CITYgreen, Atlanta also enacted one of
the state's most stringent tree ordinances. 0 8 The executive direc-
tor of the Atlanta Regional Commission believed that the City no
longer could afford to take its trees for granted. 0 9 State Represen-
tative Mark Burkhalter likewise supported the drafting of legisla-
tion that would require each Georgian county to enact tree
preservation laws." 0 Unfortunately, Atlanta's existing ordinance
has never been enforced."' Unless local authorities make enforce-
ment a "budget priority," even the strictest ordinances may prove
ineffective." 2
B. Environmental Conservation Ordinances
1. Effective Ordinances
Communities in Texas are experiencing less resistance to the en-
actment and enforcement of the state's environmental protection
ordinances than other urban communities, such as Baltimore,
Maryland and Chicago, Illinois." 3 One of Texas' fastest growing
105. See MacDonald, supra note 4.
106. See Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air, supra note 3.
107. To compute this "dollar value," David Nowak, research ecologist with the U.S.
Forest Service's Northeastern Forest Experiment Station, multiplies the tons of pollu-
tants removed through canopy coverage by the figure economists use to estimate the
effect pollutants cost society: $6750 per metric ton ("pmt") for nitrogen dioxide and
ozone, $1650 pmt for sulfur dioxide, $950 pmt for carbon monoxide and $4500 pmt for
particulate matter smaller than 10 microns. See id. Carbon sequestration is valued
according to the price for carbon dioxide emission credits traded on the commodities
market. See id.
108. See Editorial, Things Looking Up for Atlanta's Trees, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Dec. 2, 1998, at 22A. The ordinance requires "inch-for-inch replacement of trees de-
stroyed by developers and builders or contributions to a tree bank for planting in
other areas of the city when that's impossible." Id.
109. See Saporta, supra note 9.
110. See Editorial, Things Looking Up, supra note 108. The mandate to create tree
ordinances will not stipulate what the ordinances must contain, but will allow local
officials to design them to suit local needs. See id.
111. See Saporta, supra note 9.
112. Editorial, Things Looking Up, supra note 108.
113. Compare Radcliffe, supra note 88 (stating tree preservation ordinances en-
acted in Tarrant County to ensure leafy community remains green), and Vikas Bajaj,
Seeing Green: Laws Increasingly Require Builders to Consider Trees, DALLAS MORN-
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cities, Keller, passed a tree preservation law without encountering
the friction that traditionally exists between developers and conser-
vationists.114 The ordinance that the Keller City Council approved
obliges developers to obtain the City's permission before cutting
down trees. 15 Residents who own more than five acres of land
also must seek city permission before removing their trees.1 1 6 Vio-
lations of the ordinance subject a developer or resident to fines of
$100 per diameter inch of the tree illegally removed."7 While at
least one resident expressed dismay over the inclusion of residents
in the city ordinance," 8 city planners believe the ordinance will en-
sure that their leafy communities remain "leafy." 119
Another Texan community won a significant environmental vic-
tory defending its water pollution control ordinance. 20 In Quick v.
City of Austin,'121 developers challenged an ordinance that prohib-
ited home construction surrounding the City's watershed area.' 22
The City maintained that the strictures it placed on converting its
natural resources to an "impervious cover "123 were rationally re-
lated to the protection of its water quality. 24 The Texas Supreme
Court agreed, upholding the ordinance despite its determination
that the ban on development would have the effect of significantly
lowering property values in the area.2 5 Two developers, however,
ING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1999, at 35A (noting that developers, residents and city planners
worked together to craft tree ordinance), with Richard O'Mara, The Shrinking Can-
opy: Asphalt Covers More of Baltimore Every Year, Making Summers Hotter, Air
Fouler, Costs Higher, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 29, 1997, at 1D (reporting that Bal-
timoreans do not like trees because they are too "messy"), and Gary Washburn, Red
Tape May Grow on Trees, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1998, at 1 (describing how residents
protested proposed ordinance which would require homeowners to plant trees).
114. See Bajaj, supra note 113.
115. See KELLER, TEX., ORDINANCE No. 935 §§ I(D)-(E) (1998).
116. See id. § 1(F).
117. See id. § 1(R)(1).
118. A Keller resident, Raymond Nolte, raised a potential constitutional challenge
to the city's dictation of what property owners could do with their own property. This
constitutional challenge could rest on issues of governmental taking, equal protection
or due process. See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
119. Radcliffe, supra note 88.
120. See AUSTIN CITY CODE OF 1992, ch. 13-7, art. I, § 13-7-36.1 (1992).
121. No. 96-1154, slip op., 1998 WL 236304 (Tex. May 8, 1998).
122. See id. at *1.
123. "Impervious cover" consists of non-porous material on the natural landscape,
such as brick, concrete or asphalt. See O'Mara, supra note 113.
124. See Quick, 1998 WL 236304, at *9 (finding that under federal law, the city is
required to monitor pollutant constituents in the water that result from runoff).
125. "[Tlhe fact that the Ordinance severely impacts some property values does not
make it invalid, arbitrary, unreasonable, inefficient, or ineffective in its attempt to
control water quality." Id.
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testified that compliance with the ordinance actually saved them
money because the impervious cover limitation decreased the need
for stormwater retention facilities.126
The city of Austin also has conducted a UEA to increase its en-
ergy savings by expanding tree planting in appropriate locations. 127
A city's tree canopy coverage is essential to the effectuation of car-
bon sequestration. 128 According to the UEA, proper placement of
the tree canopies in Austin could absorb thousands of tons of car-
bon each year, yielding an annual benefit of $5.3 to $9.2 million. 129
As a result of the UEA's cost-benefit analysis, the City's Office of
Environmental Quality proposed the implementation of planting
programs. 30
As early as 1989, communities around Washington, D.C. recog-
nized the need for sustained planting programs.13 1 Despite the fact
that tree ordinances existed in areas such as Takoma Park and Al-
exandria for several years, local officials pushed for greater tree
protection. 32 In response to the disappearance of its shade trees, a
Maryland delegate introduced a bill in the Maryland General As-
sembly to protect trees on state highway rights-of-way. 133 Coupled
with Washington, D.C.'s aggressive tree-planting program, local
communities hoped to profit from the many benefits that their
trees provide.13 1
The benefits of an urban forest likewise have not escaped the
attention of cities in Louisiana. Although New Orleans has never
formed a comprehensive policy to protect its natural resources, a
local environmental group has rallied the citizenry behind a pro-
posed tree ordinance. 35 If passed, the ordinance would require
persons involved with construction and maintenance projects to
126. See id. at *8.
127. See Urban Ecosystem Analysis, supra note 104.
128. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
129. For information relating to the computation of the annual benefit, see supra
note 107.
130. See Urban Ecosystem Analysis, supra note 104.
131. See Editorial, Save Our Trees, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1989, at C8.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. (discussing benefits such as energy savings, increased property values,
noise abatement and air pollution control).
135. See James Cohen, Support Ordinance That Would Protect City's Trees, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 18, 1998, at B6. The ordinance is supported by New Orleans Citizens
for Urban Trees. See id.
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obtain permits from the City's Department of Parks and Parkways
before removing trees. 36
Baton Rouge has the distinction of being known as a "Tree City,
USA."'1 37 Its Tree and Landscape Commission has operated for
several years to implement tree planting programs. 138 Both Baton
Rouge Green, a grass-roots environmental group, and the Louisi-
ana Urban Forestry Council have educated residents about the role
trees play in their lives and the continued importance of incorpo-
rating trees into the planning process.139 Baton Rouge treats its
trees as a necessary part of the city's infrastructure and plans its
urban forest "just as a community plans for development, roads
and bridges."' 4 °
Not many communities plan their urban forests with the same
enthusiasm with which they plan other infrastructures. For exam-
ple, in an attempt to reorganize Indianapolis' development depart-
ment and re-evaluate municipal priorities, its mayor discontinued
development of a tree conservation ordinance in 1992.' 11 No fur-
ther developments have occurred since this temporary cessation in
drafting the ordinance despite a county health department report
revealing that residents placed a high priority on trees and green
spaces.142 The city of Indianapolis replaces only one in four trees
lost on public property. 4 3 Urban forester John Parry lamented
that "trees removed for development [often] fail to be replaced."' 44
Currently, there are no plans to enact protective measures in
Indianapolis.
136. See id. The proposed ordinance also provides for enforcement, "giving the
proper officials the right to issue citations to those violating the city's tree ordi-
nances." Id.
137. In order to garner the label of a "Tree City," a municipality must "spend at
least $2 a resident on urban forestry[,] . . .have a legally designated individual or
group in charge of a tree program and an arboreal ordinance." Rachel Melcer, Econ-
omies Really Do Grow On Trees, Towns Discover: Nature's Forgotten "Infrastructure"
Gets Ringing Endorsement, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1997, at 1.
138. See Bob Souvestre, Trees Make Major Contribution to Landscape, Quality of
Life, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 30, 1998, at 10H.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See Clarke Kahlo, The Public's Interest in Tree Protection, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Jan. 19, 1997, at B4.
142. See id. (noting that residents ranked the importance of flowers, trees and
green spaces more highly than good school systems or a good economy).
143. See Niederpruem, supra note 4.
144. Id.
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2. Enforcement of Ordinances
Even cities that have protective ordinances in effect may be un-
able to enforce them or may refuse to enforce them where they
stifle development. 145 In Orland Park, Illinois, despite the city's
stringent tree protection ordinance, a developer removed 100-year-
old oak trees in a preservation area without incurring a fine.146 Or-
land Park's attorney believed that the fine would not be upheld in
court because the developer's annexation agreement predated the
village's ordinance.147 In a compromise with the village, the devel-
oper agreed to replace some trees with smaller and younger
ones.
148
Still other communities with active tree protection laws encoun-
ter resistance from the ordinances' beneficiaries. Expenditures
aimed at maintaining Chicago and its suburbs as "Tree Cities" have
"drawn flak" from area residents who believed that the money
should be appropriated to other programs. 49 Similarly, some Bal-
timore residents expressed an outright dislike for their trees and
did not react when its arboreal department was repositioned to a
less influential office within the city.150 Counties in Virginia gener-
ally require that developers leave a stand of trees as a buffer be-
tween a housing development and an office park, but most have
not mandated that landowners replace trees lost to home construc-
tion, notably the largest source of tree loss.'
5
'
145. See, e.g., Darlene Gavron Stevens, Builder Isn't Fined For Axing Old Oaks:
Orland Park Doubts Penalty Enforceable, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1999, at 1 (stating that
the Orland Park, Illinois ordinance was not enforceable against development projects
that predate its enactment): David Karp, Tree Rules May Be Pruned for Builders, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Tampa, Fla.), June 7, 1998, at 1 (reporting that Tampa, Florida
will not enforce existing ordinance to encourage development).
146. See Stevens, supra note 145. The 1998 village ordinance imposes a fine on
developers of $200 per diameter inch of illegally chopped trees. The developer in
question did not have to pay what amounted to a $50,000 penalty because the "trees
he cut were in the way of development and that some were on slopes that needed to
be graded." Id.
147. See id.
148. See id. Despite this concession to the village, at least one resident was ap-
palled at the removal. Resident Bob Loeb stated, "I'll be dead by the time those trees
grow to be the same size as the ones we lost." Id.
149. Melcer, supra note 137 (noting that some residents indicated that they would
rather see the money used for "police, roads, schools or other, more concrete
services").
150. See O'Mara, supra note 113 (stating that residents who claimed a dislike for
trees found them "messy, with their leaves and all" and resented their attraction of
birds because "everybody knows what birds do").
151. See Rex Springston, If a Tree Falls... We'll All Feel It, and It Won't Be Cool,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1998, at E-1.
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3. Legal and Constitutional Challenges
In communities where tree ordinances do dictate the manner in
which a landowner must alienate her property, the law may face
either invalidation or a constitutional challenge. 152 For example,
the South Carolina Supreme Court invalidated the city of Spartan-
burg's tree protection ordinance, reasoning that the city lacked au-
thority to enforce it. 153 As enacted in 1962, South Carolina's local
planning and zoning ordinance did not stipulate protection for its
urban forest. 54 As a result, the city could not enjoin a developer
from cutting trees and shrubbery.1 55 In 1988, however, the General
Assembly amended the ordinance to provide specifically for the
"landscaping and protection and regulation of trees."'1 5 6 Conse-
quently, municipalities can promulgate regulations pursuant to this
amendment enabling them to enforce tree protection ordinances
without fear of invalidation. 157
When it affects private property, a tree ordinance may be consid-
ered an uncompensated taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 158 An actual physical taking need not occur to create
an unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain. 59 If an ordinance
denies an owner all economically viable uses of her property and
the government cannot demonstrate a rational relationship be-
tween the regulation and the goal thereof, then an unconstitutional
taking has occurred.160 Accordingly, a property owner must be
compensated for the taking.161
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-165.
153. See Dunbar v. City of Spartanburg, 221 S.E.2d 848 (1976).
154. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-710 (Law Co-op. 1998).
155. See Dunbar, 221 S.E.2d at 850.
156. 1988 S.C. Acts 590.
157. See Code 1976 § 6-7-710.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation").
159. See, e.g., Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46, 57 (N.J. 1982) (finding
that a taking occurs when an ordinance restricts property use so that the land cannot
"practically be utilized for any reasonable purpose") (quoting Morris County Land
Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (N.J. 1963)).
160. See Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ga.
1994) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116, reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1178 (1995); see
also Stacy Plotkin Silber, Afforestation Under Maryland's Forest Conservation Act and
Selected County Codes: Viability of this Land Use Regulation Pre- and Post-Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 4 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 53, 61 (noting that "government action be-
comes a regulatory taking where the ordinance does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interest ... or denies an owner an economically viable use of his land").
161. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding
that landowner who purchased two residential lots and was subsequently banned from
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Even where a municipality demonstrates a legitimate purpose
for an ordinance, it still may violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.162 A court may deter-
mine that an ordinance applicable only to a select group or person
abridges that group's or person's equal protection and due process
rights, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 163 However, an ordi-
nance may single out a group without violating the equal protec-
tion or due process clauses if it has "some fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation and furnishes a legitimate
ground of differentiation.' 1 64 Absent a showing that the ordinance
presents a significant detriment to the landowner and that it is not
substantially related to public health goals, the landowner cannot
overcome the presumption that the ordinance is constitutionally
valid.165
4. Ordinances in Decline
Communities with constitutionally valid and strictly enforceable
ordinances may find that they nevertheless conflict with the city's
future development goals. For instance, Tampa, Florida has con-
sidered amendments that will retract many aspects of its existing
tree ordinance to encourage continued urban development. 66 The
revised ordinance will make it easier for developers to cut down
trees without any requirement to replace those below a certain
building homes thereon per the state beachfront preservation laws was entitled to
compensation for the loss in value of the lots).
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
163. See Sheerr, 445 A.2d at 70-71. By making the ordinance applicable to only one
developer, the ordinance in Sheerr failed to treat similarly situated landowners
equally under the law. As enforced, the law would extract a public benefit from one
landowner which had not previously existed. The landowner had no notice of the
township's decision to impose a unique conservation burden on him. This results in a
deprivation of his right to due process under the law. See id. at 60-65.
164. Parking Ass'n of Ga., 450 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Bailey Investment Co. v.
Augusta-Richmond County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 345 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. 1986)).
165. See id. at 202. But see Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md.App. 1996)
(holding that the denial of a rezoning application resulted in an unconstitutional regu-
latory taking through application of the "rough proportionality test" set forth in Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1995)); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643
N.E.2d 470 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995) (holding that a statute
requiring owners to provide renewal leases to nonprivate hospitals constituted a regu-
latory taking through application of the Dolan test).
166. See Karp, Tree Rules, supra note 145; see also Ivan J. Hathaway, Council Talks
About Trees, HCC, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at 1.
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size.167 Tampa officials believe that the revised tree ordinance will
"encourage development in poor areas." '168 The Tampa Federation
of Garden Clubs, however, has urged that the Tampa City Council
actually increase the replacement requirement for trees of all
sizes. 169 Even club members who agree that there exists a need to
encourage urban development do not approve of protection for the
City's "grand trees" only.171
Most recently, Tampa's City Council voted unanimously to "give
a developer a break" with respect to its existing tree replacement
rules despite the protests of local environmental groups.1 71 While
counsel for the developer of a large shopping center claimed that
conforming to the existing ordinance created an economic hardship
for her client, the Director of Florida Consumer Action Network
saw no financial detriment. 72 The director felt that the city could
ill afford to replace its own trees and that developers should bear
the cost if they want to "take valuable habitat and turn it into a
parking lot."'1 73 Instead of the required replacement of 1400 trees,
the developer only would need to replace 1000, saving him several
thousand dollars. 174 Under the existing ordinance, each uprooted
tree must be reimbursed with $125. The revised ordinance will re-
quire a developer to pay only sixty-three dollars to the replacement
fund if she or he is unable to replace uprooted trees. 75
167. See Richard Danielson, Critics Say Tree Rules Cut Too Deep, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Tampa, Fla.), Nov. 13, 1996, at 1B (reporting that the Mayor proposed elimi-
nation of requirement to replace trees of less than 12 inches in diameter); Michele
Drayton, Some Say City Tree Code Needs Pruning, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 31, 1996, at 1
(stating that the city will exempt developers from the ordinance with respect to land-
scaping parking lots).
168. Drayton, supra note 167.
169. See Richard Danielson, Council Resists Tree Proposal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Tampa, Fla.), Nov. 15, 1996, at 3B.
170. The "grand trees" are those oak trees in the Tampa area with a diameter wider
than 11 inches. One member of the Tampa Federation of Garden Clubs quipped that
a failure to replace smaller trees will result in no "grand trees" for the future. She
would modify the ordinance to require a proportional replacement of trees between
five and eleven inches, as well as the grand oaks. See Ivan J. Hathaway, City Tree
Defenders Oppose Easing Replacement Rules, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996, at 1.
171. David Karp, Developer Gets a Break on Tree Replacement, ST. PETERSBURG
TiMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at 8.
172. See Karp, Tree Rules, supra note 145. Staff director Bill Newton exclaimed,
"These developers' saying they can't afford to replace trees is outrageous.... We
can't afford to not replace our trees." Id.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
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Ironically, Tampa's Mayor Greco stressed his commitment to en-
vironmental protection despite his administration's endorsement of
the changes in the tree ordinance. 176 He claimed that during his
tenure in office his administration has "worked to buy and preserve
green space throughout the city" and that environmental conserva-
tion efforts will continue after his reelection. 177 Despite a recent
meeting between Greco and environmental groups to discuss the
city's future conservation policies, environmentalists remain skepti-
cal of his commitment to their preservation concerns. 171 The envi-
ronmentalists' concern appears to be justified by Mayor Greco's
assertions that the projects he set in motion while working as de-
veloper, prior to taking office, would not be affected by the city's
current protective ordinances.179
In another Florida community, the city commission passed an
ordinance that would allow apartment dwellers and single-family
home owners to remove trees without a permit.180 The city com-
missioner felt that the new law would benefit areas where tree
roots have caused problems with utility lines. 8' The director of the
county's Department of Natural Resource Protection, however,
urged the city of Deerfield Beach to repeal this new policy and
maintain its prior strict ordinance.182 Despite the county's strong
suggestion that the city follow a more conservative tree preserva-
tion policy, the city emphatically stated that it did not "cut down
trees indiscriminately" and did not need county authorities to stick
"their noses into the city of Deerfield Beach.' 83
Without any interference from outside authorities, the city of
Springfield, Illinois enacted a new tree ordinance that permitted
176. See Editorial, Greco Moves on Environment, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 4, 1999, at 12.
177. Id.
178. Mayor Greco worked as a developer in the region for several years before
taking office. He has negotiated several development projects which would be af-
fected by the city's protective ordinances. Although he claimed that he was powerless
regarding development projects approved before he became mayor, he still did not
promise the environmentalists he would take action with respect to their on-going
concerns. The Mayor did, however, agree to meet with the group in the future for
further discussions. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Lisa J. Huriash, City, County Clash: Tree Laws Have Them Seeing Red
Over Green, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), June 14, 1998, at 3.
181. See id.
182. Under the old policy, owners of multi-family homes could not remove trees
without a city permit. Single-family homeowners could remove trees so long as they
kept at least three trees and fifteen shrubs on their property. See id.
183. Id.
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removal instead of preservation. 184  For example, if a resident
deemed a tree a "nuisance," she could remove it at her own ex-
pense.'85 A local horticulturist resigned from the tree commission
in protest of the proposed ordinance, noting that residents could
remove trees even on their neighbors' land and replace them with
mere "seedlings.' 1 86 This ordinance surely jeopardizes Spring-
field's status as a "Tree City."' 87
Although Los Angeles does not permit residents to uproot "nui-
sance" trees, the city has engaged in an unofficial policy which may
have the same deleterious effects.' 88 According to one report, the
Street Tree Division has lopped off tree tops in its urban forest as a
grotesque form of "tree-trimming."' 89 Once trees are "topped,"
they often no longer grow and may become breeding grounds for
harmful insects. 190 One commentator noted that while the City of-
ficially did not condone the practice of "topping," its Environmen-
tal Quality and Waste Management Committee had done very little
to prevent this activity.' 9'
C. Other Proposed Environmental Strategies
At least two commentators have proposed a revision to SEQRA
to serve the objectives of environmental protection. 92 According
to the proposal, New York would create a new bureaucratic entity
called the "New York State Environmental Review Board.' 93
This Environmental Review Board ("ERB") would review only
those actions where its participation was specifically requested and
only with respect to positive or negative declarations of environ-
184. See Lisa Kernek, Tree Expert Quits City Panel Over 'Insane' Ordinance, STATE
J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), May 31, 1997, at 1.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id. There are reports that the proposed ordinance may be shelved. In-
stead of the controversial ordinance, the city proposed allowing homeowners to re-
move only those "nuisance" trees from a designated list of "undesirable" tree
varieties. See Lisa Kernek, Tree Ordinance Cut Short, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield,
Ill.), June 17, 1997, at 1. Furthermore, removal would be permitted for only those
trees contiguous to the homeowner's property. See id.
188. See Editorial, Branchless Policy: L.A. Can't See the Urban Forest for the Trees,
DAILY NEWS L.A., Feb. 10, 1999, at N16 (stating that "[t]he city of Los Angeles has
the same policy for maintaining the trees it owns as King Louis XIV had for dealing
with dissidents: Off with their heads").
189. Id.
190. For more information on the harmful effects of "topping," see GENE W.
GREY, THE URBAN FOREST 113-17 (1996).
191. See Editorial, Branchless Policy, supra note 188.
192. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3.
193. Id. at 31.
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mental impact or final EISs.194 An applicant, lead agency or con-
cerned environmental group seeking ERB review would file a
statement detailing the basis for challenging or upholding the lead
agency's determination.'95 Instead of the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review under an Article 78 proceeding,'96 the ERB
would use a "reasonableness" standard. 9 7 Its final determination
would not be subject to judicial review except in circumstances in-
volving allegations of corruption, fraud or misconduct. 19 8
Although these commentators claim that an intermediate review
process would "save significant litigation costs," the addition of an
ERB would not alleviate any of the time and expense developers
incur prior to receiving a negative or positive declaration under
SEQRA. 199 The developer still must pay the lead agency's fee, as
well as charges for any reports or studies required before the appli-
cant could begin to invoke ERB review.200 The commentators also
recognized that concerns about the ERB's independence and pro-
fessionalism might arise.20' In response to this possibility, they
have proposed that the ERB be comprised of individuals nomi-
nated by various organizations rather than employees of the
state.20 2
Some U.S. lawmakers favor an extremely contentious environ-
mental policy over expanded conservation laws.20 3 These legisla-
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Article 78 proceedings involve challenges to a municipality's final determina-
tion on issues authorized by state or local statutes. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801.
197. Compare New York City Coalition for the Preservation of Gardens v. Giuliani,
670 N.Y.S.2d 654, 654-60 (1997) (finding judicial review limited to whether the deter-
mination was made in accordance with lawful procedure and whether it was "arbi-
trary and capricious"), with Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 31 (stating ERB review
would be "less deferential than the arbitrary and capricious standard used in Article
78 proceedings").
198. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 31.
199. Id. Furthermore, the applicant would be required to pay the review board's
review costs in addition to the lead agency's review fees. The proposal also creates a
30 day period for anyone to challenge the board's decision with an additional 60 days
for the board to respond. This 90 day period comes in addition to the time spent in
preparing the EIS and conducting the required studies. Although the review board's
decision is purportedly not subject to "judicial challenge," there are circumstances
where an action can be brought to court, which will not save any litigation costs. See
id.
200. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(7) (stating that developers must pay
a fee for a lead agent's review).
201. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 31.
202. See id.
203. One lawmaker advocates logging in the national forests, stating that, "My en-
vironmental friends may not agree with me on that issue, but I believe it is sustaina-
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tors assert that expanded logging makes the most "environmental
sense. "204 By harvesting mature forests that have sequestered a
large volume of carbon, loggers clear areas for saplings, which will
grow more rapidly. Carbon trapped in the mature trees is then
converted into "homes, telephone poles [and] books. '20 5
The debate over logging as a means of environmental conserva-
tion has raged for several years in Congress and has surfaced most
recently with the introduction of a bill aimed at the management
and protection of national parks and public lands.20 6 The tension
between logging as a benefit to the economy and a detriment to the
environment has caused a large rift among environmentally con-
scious U.S. lawmakers.20 7 On a national scale, the government cer-
tainly owns enough land to consider the possibility of some logging
as a practical environmental management tool, at least with respect
to a few designated forests.
On a local level, however, logging issues can position a commu-
nity in an environmental quandary.208 Residents in Missouri log
and clear-cut their land for its local chip mill business.20 9 Because
nearly eighty-five percent of the forest is privately owned, the Mis-
souri Department of Conservation cannot dictate how a landowner
should exploit her property. 210 As a result, stormwater washes soil
in clear-cut regions into local tributaries, contaminating the water
supply.211
ble, logging in the national forests." 143 CONG. REC. H5049-01, at H5103 (daily ed.
July 10, 1997) (statement of Rep. Miller).
204. Cushman, supra note 25. The "most environmental sense" argument advo-
cates the cutting of mature forests, "which are no longer growing quickly" and replac-
ing them with saplings. Id.
205. Id.
206. See 144 CONG. REC. H9741-05, at H9756 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Vento) (passage of H.R. 4570 would be a "return to the thrilling days of the
104th Congress and the antienvironmental message that came from it" because it
would accelerate the logging of the national forests); see also 138 CONG. REC. 22,027
(1992) (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (a proposed amendment to a bill would author-
ize "salvage logging" of dead and dying trees that would still have the same environ-
mental effects "like any other logging ... includ[ing] destruction of wildlife habitat,
reduced water quality, and erosion"). But see 140 CONG. REC. S14,698-02, at S14,699
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (report commenting that "logging fire-killed timber provides
the opportunity to explore new, efficient, economically and environmentally sound
ways to manage the national forests").
207. See discussion supra note 206.
208. See Tom Uhlenbrock, Which Forest Do You Prefer? (This is a Test), ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, May 31, 1998, at B1 (debate over jobs versus the environment, and
property rights versus government intervention, rages in the Ozarks).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
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Still, the Missouri Department of Conservation believes that log-
ging for chip mills plays an important role in forest management
because it removes trees otherwise not fit for timber sale.212 Resi-
dents of Missouri, however, are concerned that excessive clear-cut-
ting has taken a toll on the community's environment. 213 Although
landowners do not want politicians to legislate their land use, the
local forest manager fears that without some governmental inter-
vention the region will bear the consequences of massive logging
which lead to extensive soil erosion and water pollution.214 While
the community is not currently facing a drastic reduction in its tree
canopy coverage, it may soon experience the adverse effects of un-
impeded logging.21 5
I. Comprehensive Urban Forestry Program:
Solutions to Green Space Issues
As discussed in Part II, cities and communities have responded
differently to the issue of urban green space. While one city has
relied heavily on its state environmental protection laws, others
have employed the use of modern ecological analysis or tree and
landscaping protective ordinances.216 Individually, these responses
have had varying degrees of success, but no particular plan has in-
dependently succeeded in protecting urban green space.21 7
212. See id.
213. See id. Research has shown that massive clear-cuts alter wildlife makeup of
the forest, eliminating some inhabitants permanently. Rain that was once trapped by
the forest erodes the ground, carrying sediment into the waterways. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See, e.g., Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3 (New York City relies on CEQR
which is based on SEQRA); Moll & Berish, supra note 5 (Atlanta utilized CITYgreen
as well as a UEA of the city); Radcliffe, supra note 88 (Keller, Texas enacted strict
tree preservation ordinances).
217. New York City's reliance on its version of SEQRA has resulted in "enormous
fragmentation and inconsistency." Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3. Atlanta,
which opted to conduct an ecological analysis of its city, could not act upon the ana-
lytical findings without the support of its local government and grass-roots citizens
groups. See Dawe, Atlanta: Positive Energy, supra note 95; Moll & Berish, supra note
5. Tree and landscaping preservation ordinances may exist on a city's books, but they
rarely find strict enforcement and may face constitutional challenges. See Editorial,
Things Looking Up, supra note 108 (Atlanta's tree ordinance has never been en-
forced); see also Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga.
1994) (upholding the constitutionality of a city's tree and landscaping ordinance). But
see Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46, 66 (N.J. 1982) (holding that the tree
legislation was deemed "presumptively valid," but its application to the plaintiff was
unconstitutional).
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A successful urban environmental strategy should combine each
of these responses as part of a comprehensive urban forestry pro-
gram ("UFP"). Under a UFP, a city may rely on its state sanc-
tioned environmental protection laws, but should adopt measures
that address the particular needs of its municipality. For instance, a
city should employ the available ecological analysis tools to struc-
ture a sustainable urban community.
In conjunction with the laws and ecological analyses, a city also
should enact tree and landscaping ordinances tailored to its urban
environment. Tree ordinances should not only serve to protect ex-
isting trees, but also should contain aggressive planting programs.
Moreover, in drafting the ordinances, the community should con-
sider its local needs and enact rules that are flexible enough to al-
low for further development. Without such flexibility, the
community may find enforcement difficult and the purposes of the
ordinances frustrated.218
In addition, the ordinances should protect a property owner's
constitutional use of land by providing uniform treatment to those
similarly situated while assuring enforcement that is rationally re-
lated to the ordinances' goals.219 Proposed development projects
which meet the standards set forth in the city's UFP will ensure
that continued community growth takes into account vital environ-
mental concerns.
Under a UFP for New York City, actions that qualify as "Type
II" or "Exempt Actions ' 220 pursuant to SEORA or CEOR should
not escape environmental consideration. Although the state legis-
lature has determined that these types of activities will not signifi-
cantly impact the environment, it made such a determination
without the ecological research tools currently available. 221 The
New York State legislature should consider amending SEQRA to
mandate use of an environmental analytical tool for development
projects, such as CITYgreen. Through the use of CITYgreen, the
218. See, e.g., supra notes 166-175 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of constitutional issues arising from tree ordinances, see supra
notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
220. "Type II" and "Exempt Actions" have been determined not to have a "signifi-
cant impact on the environment or are otherwise precluded from environmental re-
view under Environmental Conservation Law, article 8." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(a); cf 43 R.C.N.Y. § 6-04.
221. The legislature made its determination based on its social policy. Legislators
found that there was "a need to understand the relationship between the maintenance
of high-quality ecological systems and the general welfare of the people of the state,
including their enjoyment of the natural resources of the state." N.Y. ENV-rL. CON-
SERV. LAW § 8-0103(3).
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City can conduct a UEA for certain proposed "Type II" activities
to decide if some natural resource measure will produce an envi-
ronmental benefit from the activity, such as the addition of trees
where none previously existed or the replacement of trees up-
rooted for development on a "Type II" site.
Similarly, the City can employ CITYgreen for certain "Type I"
activities in lieu of preparing an EIS or in conjunction with the
EIS's studies.222 A UEA produced through CITYgreen could re-
veal alternate methods of energy conservation and stormwater
management through the expansion or preservation of trees on
property. It could also show whether natural resources can miti-
gate the otherwise adverse impact of certain "Type I" development
actions. Because CITYgreen and the UEA are not as involved as
the preparation of an EIS, they will not incur the same expense as
an EIS.223
While some have criticized results from satellite imaging used in
CITYgreen,224 the message behind the aerial portraits has not been
lost on communities.225 Despite noting that "problems arise with
differences in detail in the pictures taken by older, lower-resolution
satellites and those taken by more modern equipment," officials
222. Currently, the designation of an activity as "Type I" presumes that the activity
will likely have a significant adverse effect on the environment and "may require an
EIS." N.Y. CoMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a)(1); cf 43 R.C.N.Y. § 6-15.
Preparation of an EIS involves considerable expense and time and does not guarantee
that the project can proceed without additional delays or challenges thereto. On the
other hand, a UEA through CITYgreen costs approximately $5000 to $80,000, de-
pending on the size of the project, and can be conducted quickly. Compare N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (requiring a number of studies as well as fees to the
reviewing agency), and Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 3 (noting that some EISs
are approved within days of submission while others are delayed for months and
those approved may be challenged in court), with Moll & Berish, supra note 5 (stating
that the "cost of conducting an analysis can range from $5000 to $80,000, depending
on the size of the city, the information local agencies have on hand, and the amount of
time local officials can contribute to conducting the analysis"), and Moll, supra note
37 (stating that "[tihe analysis can be done quickly").
223. According to Alice Ewen, director of the CITYgreen program at American
Forests, the cost of purchasing the software program is only $800.
224. Critics in Seattle disparage CITYgreen's use of black coloring on satellite
images for areas with less than twenty percent tree cover. Although twenty percent
canopy coverage is not optimal for some areas, there still are some trees in the area,
which the choice of shading does not reveal. The shading projects the image of barren
land, which is not accurate on ground level. See J. Martin McOmber, Treeless in Seat-
tle?: Images Miss Mark, SEATTLE TIMES, July 17, 1998, at Al.
225. Skeptics in the Seattle area have questioned the results of a UEA conducted
on its city from 1972-1996. According to American Forests, Seattle appears to have
lost 37 percent of its heavily forested areas over the research period. Residents
claimed, however, that some of the images that showed barren sites were actually
wooded. See id.
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have had to acknowledge that they needed greater focus on their
local reforestation program. 26 CITYgreen has encouraged in-
creased monitoring of the city's natural landscape. 22 7
Even where a proposed activity would qualify for exempt or
"Type II" treatment under CEQR or SEQRA, under the city's
UFP, the developer may be required to conduct the geographic in-
formation system ("GIS") survey described in CITYgreen. The
GIS will present the developer with various hypothetical scenarios
involving the removal or addition of trees around the project.228
The UFP also could provide a forum for concerned environmental-
ists and city residents to protest the urban forester's decision to
allow tree removal. 29 Public notice could be provided with respect
to trees selected for removal. The notice would contain the envi-
ronmental analyses undertaken in making the decision. Protesters
would have no more than thirty days to counter the decision by
submitting their own environmental analyses of the project. The
urban forester or environmental committee would make the ulti-
mate decision on which plan makes the most environmental sense.
In addition to implementing CEQR and CITYgreen, New York
City's UFP must contain a detailed, strictly enforceable tree and
landscaping ordinance.230 The ordinance should commission an
Urban Forester2 31 or city management committee to oversee its en-
forcement.232 The type of project to be completed will determine
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See Benyus, Click Here For Cleaner Air, supra note 3.
229. See, e.g., Rachel Gordon, City Fells Final 4 Hallidie Plaza Trees: Neighbor-
hoods Come Together to Save Street Greenery, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 19, 1998, at A-11
(reporting that the public has ten days to protest urban tree removal after notice
posted on targeted tree).
230. Guidelines for developing a community tree preservation ordinance have been
promulgated by the Community Tree Preservation Task Force of the Minnesota
Shade Tree Advisory Committee. The first step in developing an ordinance is an as-
sessment of the tree resources in the urban forest. The publication also acknowledges
that enforcement issues cloud the drafting process and makes recommendations on
how to overcome these challenges. See A Guide to Developing a Community Tree
Preservation Ordinance (visited July 5, 1999) <http://willow.ncfes.umn.edu/mnstac/
treepres.htm>.
231. An "Urban Forester" would be commissioned to oversee the city's UFP. The
position would entail the supervision of the tree conservation ordinances, as well as
the recommendation of appropriate tree plantings. See, e.g., Brandon Loomis, A New
Tree Preservation and Planting Ordinance in Farmington Would Make It a City True to
Its Roots, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 7, 1998, at D1; Wireback, supra note 9.
232. Currently, the City Planning Commission oversees the implementation of laws
that require environmental reviews of actions taken by the city. See 62 R.C.N.Y. § 5-
01 (1997). This commission could be placed in charge of tree ordinance enforcement.
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whether the city ordinance requires the replacement in kind of
those trees removed during development 233 or requires developers
to reimburse a tree fund if replacement of the trees is not possi-
ble.234 Alternatively, the ordinance can credit developers who con-
serve trees by relaxing other, less pressing zoning requirements.235
If the ordinance places restrictions on private landowners' treat-
ment of trees, it should be carefully drafted to avoid constitutional
issues such as governmental takings, equal protection and due pro-
cess.236 Indeed, although the Supreme Court recently upheld a tree
preservation law, two Justices believed that such laws may consti-
tute a regulatory taking.237
Although the use of trees is not the only answer to the urban
green space problem, it provides the most cost-effective solution. 38
The UFP need not involve the creation of another legislative
board, such as the ERB.239 Creating another bureaucratic group
233. Under the existing administrative code, trees removed need only be replaced
by "2112 to 6 inch caliper trees." N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 18-107. However, caliper
trees are not necessarily the best trees for the urban environment. Recommended
urban trees include dogwoods, crab apples or magnolias for small areas or plantings
close to power lines. In larger spaces, the city can choose "ginkgo, oaks, sweet gum,
linden and basswood" as well as sugar and red maples. Sue Lowe, You Can Turn
Over a New Leaf By Planting Trees, S. BEND TRIB., Jan. 4, 1999, at B3.
234. See Editorial, Things Looking Up, supra note 108 (Atlanta's tree ordinance
demands inch-for-inch replacement of trees destroyed by developers or contributions
to a tree bank for plantings in other areas).
235. See Liz Szabo, Chesapeake Panel to Consider Tree-Saving Ordinance, VIRGIN-
IAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Oct. 8, 1997, at B5 (stating developers who save trees may
build closer to the road or construct fewer parking spaces under proposed ordinance);
Jake Sandlin, Council Chief Urges Builders to Save Trees, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GA-
zErE, Oct. 10, 1998, at B2 (noting that ordinance rewards developers with a point
system based on tree preservation).
236. Keller's city tree ordinance requires developers, as well as residents who own
more than five acres to obtain city permission to cut down trees. One resident com-
plained that this restriction may be unconstitutional. See Radcliffe, supra note 88; see
also Loomis, A New Tree Preservation, supra note 231 (stating ordinance requires
homeowners to seek a permit from the city's urban forester before planting a tree).
237. See Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized
administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional
difference.").
238. See, e.g., William Stevens, Urban Trees: Forest Service Quantifies Benefits,
GREENWIRE, Apr. 19, 1994 (researchers calculated that planting and maintaining
trees in Cook and DuPage counties in Illinois would cost $21 million, but yield a $59
million benefit). See also, e.g., Gene Duvernoy, Keeping It Green: Political and Ad-
ministrative Issues in the Preservation of the Urban Forest, in URBAN FOREST LAND.
SCAPES: INTEGRATING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 78, 78-79 (Gordon A.
Bradley ed., 1995) (noting that the benefits of urban land preservation programs are
permanent and the payoffs are "extraordinary").
239. See Gerrard & Bose, supra note 55, at 31.
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may exacerbate existing problems with environmental assessment
review instead of realizing the purpose for which the state enacted
SEQRA.24 ° Input from an additional board would only compound
the time delays already inherent in the environmental review pro-
cess. Existing problems include a failure of SEQRA to incorporate
tree planting programs as an integral part of development and a
lack of environmental focus in certain "Type II" activities.
As an environmental management tool, logging would not affect
a community such as New York City which does not maintain land
for this purpose. As discussed earlier, logging creates its own envi-
ronmental hazards for those urban areas which rely on their forests
for the local economy. Similar to logging communities, however,
New York City must consider the effect of failing to sustain ade-
quate tree coverage. Without trees as natural allies in preventing
excessive stormwater runoff and water contamination, the City and
logging towns both subject their residents to substantial environ-
mental risks associated with these phenomena.24'
Under a UFP, use of CITYgreen software and a UEA can re-
solve these environmental risk factors. These ecological tools will
be more consistent and predictable if required for both "Type I"
and "Type II" actions. They can set a standard for judging the en-
vironmental effectiveness of urban planning. The lead agency will
determine the effect of the UEA and can make an educated and
economic judgment about urban development projects. Such anal-
yses should also be made available to the public for review.
Those wishing to challenge the lead agency's decision should be
allowed to contest the data only if the analysis was fraudulently
conducted or the alternative chosen was clearly unreasonable given
the other options available. Also, standing should be granted to
any person wishing to challenge the city's environmental determi-
nations by showing that the city has not fulfilled the objectives set
forth in the UFP.242 A court should show extreme deference to the
240. The New York State legislature, in enacting SEQRA, noted that:
Trees and shrubs can improve the quality of urban environments by helping
to prevent erosion, by providing shade, modifying extremes of temperature
and humidity, helping to reduce noise and air pollution, and enhancing the
aesthetic quality of life.... [V]egetation in urban green space can contribute
to urban water shed management and provide habitats for desirable urban
wildlife.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 53-0301(3) (1997).
241. See supra notes 44-47.
242. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that an
organization had standing to pursue action against the USDA under the Endangered
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lead agency's review and dismiss any case which does not meet the
burden of proof set forth above.
Conclusion
In order to inject more environmental focus into future develop-
ment, New York City should adopt a comprehensive UFP. As part
of the UFP, the City would utilize recently developed environmen-
tal software, such as CITYgreen, as well as a UEA to assess the
current status of its urban forest and evaluate the -environmental
impact of all development projects. A successful UFP will also in-
corporate tree and landscaping protection ordinances. These ordi-
nances can mandate replacement of removed trees or payments to
a tree planting fund in the event that replanting is not possible.
They also can credit developers who endeavor to save existing
trees.243 Caution should be taken when drafting restrictive provi-
sions for private landowners to avoid constitutional issues relating
to governmental takings, equal protection and due process.
244
Trees are not a "soft benefit '245 as once characterized by devel-
opers. 246  Their concrete economic value can be ascertained
through the use of CITYgreen and a UEA for many construction
projects in New York City. Because all types of development
projects would be reviewable under the City's UFP, it will generate
greater predictability in the environmental review process than
currently obtainable under SEQRA.247 A comprehensive UFP
also can actualize the potential benefits of urban green space by
protecting existing trees and, hopefully, planting more trees ...
please.
Species Act for failure to carry out its conservation program for endangered darter,
salamanders and wild rice without showing that it had suffered an injury in fact).
243. See, e.g., Ed Cullen, The Green Team: Baton Rouge Working Hard to Maintain
City's Urban Forest, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, L.A.), Apr. 20, 1997, at 1H.
244. See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
245. The "soft benefit" argument stems from those developers, engineers and ur-
ban leaders who do not want to incur the expense of replacing trees after removing
them for development. Often a city's requirements for drainage, roads and other in-
frastructure win out over tree conservation. If a city values these man-made improve-
ments more than its natural resources, trees certainly appear less "beneficial."
246. See MacDonald, supra note 4; see also Tom Bailey, Jr., Nothing So Unloved as
a Tree Law in a Growth Town, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 15,
1998, at B3 (trees viewed as a "hindrance" according to one developer).
247. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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FRIENDS OF THE COURT? THE ETHICS OF
AMICUS BRIEF WRITING IN FIRST
AMENDMENT LITIGATION
Allison Lucas*
The bane of lawyers is prolixity and duplication.... In an era of
heavy judicial caseloads and public impatience with the delays
and expense of litigation, we judges should be assiduous to bar
the gates to amicus curiae briefs that fail to present convincing
reasons why the parties' briefs do not give us all the help we
need for deciding the appeal.'
Introduction
In March 1993, James Perry, armed with an AR-7 rifle, strangled
a quadriplegic, eight-year-old boy, and shot to death the boy's
mother and his nurse in Rockville, Maryland.2 Perry was a con-
tract killer hired by the boy's father, who was interested in the al-
most $2 million award that the boy had won in a settlement for
injuries that had left him paralyzed for life.' In preparing for and
committing these murders, Perry followed - almost to the letter - a
book entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Con-
tractors ("Hit Man"), a 130-page "how-to" on murdering and be-
coming a professional killer.4 Perry was convicted in 1996 of
capital murder, and subsequently the victims' families filed a civil
lawsuit against Paladin Press, the publishers of Hit Man, for aiding
and abetting the murders.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.S. in Journalism,
Northwestern University, 1993. I would like to extend my appreciation to Professor
Benjamin Zipursky for his valuable insight and advice, and to James DeFilippis for his
endless encouragement.
1. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, C.J.).
2. See Perry v. Maryland, 686 A.2d 274, 276 (Md. 1996).
3. See Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W.
3558 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1998) (No. 97-1325). Paladin settled the case in May, 1999. See
infra note 5.
4. See Perry, 686 A.2d at 279.
5. See Paladin, 128 F.3d at 241. The case settled May 21, 1999, when Paladin
Press agreed to a "multimillion-dollar settlement" with relatives of the three people
murdered See Ruben Castaneda & Scott Wilson, "Hit Man" Publisher Settles Suit;
Littleton Made First Amendment Defense Dicey, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al. In
addition to that part of the settlement, Paladin agreed to make contributions to two
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The district court granted Paladin summary judgment, and in the
appeal that followed, a host of media lawyers submitted an amicus
curiae brief urging affirmation of the lower court decision.6 What
followed was not only a reversal of summary judgment, but also a
stunningly harsh critique of Paladin Press by Judge Luttig in the
Fourth Circuit for its potentially critical role in the murders.7 Lut-
tig also scolded the media organizations and their lawyers who
zealously advocated on behalf of Paladin Press.8
The example above is only one among many cases in which the
legal community and the community-at-large have become wary of
enthusiastic support thrown behind a defendant, especially in situa-
tions where the defendant's conduct is egregious and the outcome
is legally significant. This Note seeks to explore the ethics of writ-
ing amicus briefs, specifically in defamation and privacy cases
where the conduct of defendants may seem indefensible to many
mainstream journalists and their attorneys. By using two recent
First Amendment cases, Rice v. Paladin and Khawar v. Globe, In-
ternational,9 it will illustrate the potential conflicts and usefulness
of writing such briefs. Part I will discuss the history of amicus cu-
riae briefs, their purposes and cases where amicus briefs have been
particularly helpful or persuasive for judges. It will also discuss
Chief Judge Richard Posner's recent move to limit their use in the
Seventh Circuit. Part II will discuss Paladin and Khawar and also
review cases in which there was a strong public sentiment against
the application of First Amendment protections to particular
speech. Part III will analyze the debate on each side, arguing that
despite the outrageous conduct of a media defendant, it is proper
for other media lawyers to continue the practice of amici submis-
sions. However, even though there is a moral obligation to con-
tinue representing a client in such cases, the scores of people in the
media and general public may be justified in feeling that media
organizations should not rush to defend any and all media conduct
for which a publisher might be liable. This Note will conclude that
charities chosen by the plaintiff, and to give the plaintiffs the remaining 700 copies of
the book. See id.
6. See Brief of ABC, Inc., et. al. as Amici Curiae, Rice v. Paladin 128 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2412) [hereinafter ABC Paladin Amicus Brief] (on file with
the Fordham Urban Law Journal). For further discussion of the amicus briefs, see
part II, infra.
7. See Paladin, 128 F.3d 233 passim.
8. See id. at 265.
9. 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998).
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despite these justifications, it would be a bad precedent to start
dismissing amici concerns.
I: The History and Policies of Amicus Brief Writing
A. History of the Amici
Some scholars suggest that the use of amicus curiae is rooted in
ancient Roman law,' ° where the amicus was usually court-ap-
pointed and offered non-binding opinions on law unfamiliar to the
court." However, the role for which amicus briefs are known to-
day became a common practice in England by the 17th Century.1 2
The function of the amicus curiae at common law was a form of
oral "shepardizing," the bringing up of cases not known to the
judge. 3 In this role, the amicus submission originally was intended
to provide a court with impartial legal information that was beyond
its notice or expertise, which is where the name amicus curiae, or
"friend of the court" is derived. 4 In many cases, the amicus was a
bystander who acted on behalf of infants, and also called attention
to manifest error, to the death of a party to the proceeding, and to
existing applicable statutes.' 5 The amicus did not need to be an
attorney, and the general attitude of the courts was to welcome
such aid, since "it is for the honor of a court of justice to avoid
error.
', 6
The courts expanded amicus participation in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Judges and attorneys alike appointed them-
selves amici and advised each other in client representation,1 7 over-
coming the problem of representation of third parties in common
lawsuits.1 8 In England, this expanded participation also included
10. 1 BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 188 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914), cited in Judith S.
Kaye, One Judge's View of "Friends of the Court", N.Y. ST. BAR J., Apr. 1989, at 8, 9.
11. Comment, The Amicus Curiae, 55 N.W. U. L. REV. 469, 469 n.3 (1960).
12. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1964).
13. See id.
14. See Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 46.
15. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 695.
16. Id. (citing The Protector v. Geering, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (Ex. 1656)).
17. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 696.
18. See id. Problems of representation of third party interests under the common
law system were plentiful. The complex federal system meant not only that state and
national interests were conflicted, but also that an even greater number of conflicted
public interests were potentially unrepresented in the courts of private suits. Id. at
697-99. Courts, "where obvious injustice would be caused by lack of representation,
allowed outsiders to intervene generally by exercise of what was called 'the inherent
power of a court of law to control its processes.'... [O]ften the court merely extended
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taking sides. For example, in Coxe v. Phillips,19 an amicus repre-
sented a spouse's interests in an action on a promissory note, de-
spite the fact that he was not party to the suit.2 0
This pattern followed in the United States as well, where the
amicus moved from being a friend of the court to a friend of a
specific party. The practice started in the United States in the nine-
teenth century to address concerns of collusion between two adver-
saries.21 "The amicus is treated as a potential litigant in future
cases, as an ally of one of the parties, or as the representative of an
interest not otherwise represented.... [T]he institution of the ami-
cus curiae brief has moved from neutrality to partisanship, from
friendship to advocacy. 22
Over the last century and a half, some courts have insisted on
neutrality from an amicus, z3 and others have accepted only limited
advocacy.24 However, the majority of courts recognize that amici
need not be completely disinterested, and an amicus "who takes a
legal position and presents legal arguments in support of it [fulfills]
a perfectly permissible role. '2 5
B. The Current Amici Curiae
There is little doubt that amicus briefs have shaped the law. The
most visible court to be influenced by amici has been the Supreme
Court, and one of the most influential amicus curiae has been the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). a6 For example, in
1961 the ACLU convinced the Supreme Court to apply the exclu-
the privilege of filing a brief 'by leave of the court."' Id. at 699 (quoting Krippendorf
v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884)).
19. 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1736).
20. Id. The amicus in this case not only had the action vacated, but also was able
to convince the court that the two parties involved were collusive, and had them
found in contempt of court. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 696-97.
21. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) (granting amicus request for rehearing,
due to nonrepresentation of state interests).
22. Krislov, supra note 12, at 704.
23. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Saranac River Power Corp., 278
N.Y.S. 203 (1935)(refusing to consider an amicus brief because it was partisan).
24. See United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 1991).
25. Gary F. Smith & Beth E. Terrell, The Amicus Curiae: A Powerful Friend for
Poverty Law Advocates, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 772, 776 (Nov.-Dec. 1995) (quoting
Funbus Sys. Inc. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986).
A more detailed discussion of the history of amicus briefs is beyond the scope of this
discussion. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see generally Krislov, supra
note 12.
26. See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Par-
ticipation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 L. & POL'Y 161 (1987).
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sionary rule, previously applied only in federal actions, to the
states.27 From 1961 to 1966, the ACLU participated as amicus cu-
riae in such groundbreaking decisions as Gideon v. Wainwright,28
Escobedo v. Illinois29 and Miranda v. Arizona.30 During a twelve-
year period from 1969-1981, the ACLU participated in forty-four
percent of all criminal cases in which an amicus brief was filed.31
There are many other circumstances in which the Court has used
amicus briefs to shape its opinions. In Romer v. Evans,32 Justice
Kennedy's opinion seemed to accept the argument offered by Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe of Harvard and several other constitutional
scholars, that a Colorado amendment constituted a per se violation
of the equal protection guarantee under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.33 In three separate antitrust cases in the Supreme Court's
1991-92 term, amici seem to have influenced the court.34 And,
from 1981 to 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") filed briefs on the merits as amicus in nine Supreme Court
cases - the SEC's views were adopted by the Court in eight of those
cases.
35
27. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[N]either of the principal litigants raised the issue of the exclusionary rule in
their briefs or at oral argument, [but] the ACLU [in its amicus curiae brief]
had asked the Court to find that evidence which is unlawfully and illegally
obtained.., not be permitted into a state proceeding and that its production
is a violation of the Federal Constitution, the Fourth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment. We have no hesitancy about it, because we think it is a
necessary part of due process.
Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 26, at 163.
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to trial includes
the right to effective assistance of counsel).
29. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (excluding evidence on a finding that denying an accused
person's request for assistance constitutes a denial of the right to assistance of
counsel).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excluding statements of a defendant when procedural
safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion were not used).
31. See Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 26, at 168. In the 1998-99 term, the ACLU
submitted 16 amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court. See ACLU Web Site (visited
June 25, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/court/summ-95.html>.
32. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado voters' initiative that barred
enactment of the state and local laws or regulations protecting homosexuals from
discrimination).
33. See Wohl, supra note 14, at 48.
34. See Stephen Calkins, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269 (1993)(discussing the role
that amici played in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992), Morales v. TWA, 504
U.S. 374 (1992), and Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
35. Id. The court accepted the SEC's views in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988), Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 377 (1983), Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 682-83 (1985),
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The use of amicus briefs has flourished in local courts as well. In
Polaroid v. Travelers Indemnity Co. ,36 even though the Massachu-
setts court ultimately rejected the amicus corporation's position,
the court remarked that it found the brief to contain "the most
comprehensive and instructive argument" on appellant's behalf.37
The Polaroid court also indicated that the presence of amicus briefs
prompted them to address issues they might not otherwise have
addressed.38 In several cases, courts have indicated that the views
of amici influenced their opinions.39
Currently, courts have found briefs so effective in a variety of
types of litigation that some judges have even requested that cer-
tain advocates submit briefs.40 For example, in Massachusetts, the
Supreme Judicial Court has requested amicus briefs in connection
with its advisory opinions to the legislature. a In recent years, the
Appeals Court in Massachusetts requested an amicus brief in at
least two cases (both raising landlord-tenant issues).42 During a
five and one half year period, about 200 cases in the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts involved amicus briefs.43
1. Reasons for amicus submission
There are several reasons why amicus briefs are requested. First,
an amicus curiae can furnish a statewide or national perspective to
show the legal or social consequences that a decision could have.44
Second, it can be used to explain how a regulation or statute at
Gould v. Ruenfenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 702 (1985), ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner, 472
U.S. 299, 300 (1985) and Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 649 (1986). The court
declined to adopt the SEC's position in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69 (1987). See id.
36. 610 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1993) (upholding insurers' refusal to settle pollution
claims of insured).
37. Id. at 920 n.15.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Ctr., 960
F.2d 229, 231 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting recommendation of amici); Harris v. Capi-
tol Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991) (adopting an amici's point that
plaintiff's interpretation of a statute would generate massive expenses within the
states's business communitites).
40. See E. Susan Garsh & Joanne D'Alcomo, Role of the Amicus Brief, MASSA-
CHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MASSACHU-
SETrs §§ 17, 17.3 (1996).
41. See id.
42. See Poncz v. Loftin, 607 N.E.2d 765, 766 (Mass. 1993); Jinwala v. Bizzaro, 505
N.E.2d 904, 904 n.1 (1987).
43. Garsh & D'Alcomo, supra note 40, at § 17.3.
44. See id.
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issue fits within a larger regulatory or statutory framework.45
Third, the amicus can furnish additional information to describe
how a particular industry operates.46 Often, an amicus may have
more familiarity with an issue on appeal than the parties them-
selves.47 Finally, it can apprise the court of the details of another
case pending in the system posing related issues.48
For these reasons, the use of amicus briefs in appellate and
Supreme Court litigation has exploded since the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. In the 1995-96 term, amicus briefs were
filed in nearly ninety percent of the cases the Supreme Court de-
cided;49 by contrast, during the 1980-81 term, seventy-one percent
of the Court's cases decided by opinion had amicus filings, and
only thirty-five percent of the cases decided in the 1965-66 term
included such briefs.5 0 In the 1998-99 term, ninety-five percent of
cases argued before the Supreme Court had at least one amicus
filing.51 The numbers are even more dramatic than they appear,
since it is common for several amicus organizations to file briefs in
a given case. 2
2. Amicus Procedures
Both federal and state courts usually are lenient about granting
motions for leave to file an amicus brief. The showing that a pro-
posed amicus must make is minimal; it is much lower than the
threshold that must be met for intervention by a third party.53 An
intervenor must serve a motion that states the grounds for inter-
vention and accompany a pleading setting forth the claim or de-
fense for which intervention is sought. 4
In the Supreme Court, the rules for submitting amicus briefs are
simple. An amicus brief submitted before the Court's considera-
tion of a writ of certiori may be filed if accompanied by the written
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. David G. Knibb, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL: A MANUAL ON
PRACTICE IN THE US COURT OF APPEALS § 29, 29.14 (3d. ed. 1997).
48. See Garsh & D'Alcomo, supra note 40, at § 17.3.
49. See Wohl, supra note 14, at 46.
50. See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. Rnv. 603, 603
(1984).
51. This statistic is based on a review of 90 cases argued before the Supreme Court
this term.
52. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 603.
53. A party may intervene as a matter of right, or by permission. FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)-(b).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
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consent of all parties, or if the court grants leave to file." An ami-
cus brief may also be filed in a case before the Court for oral argu-
ment if accompanied by the written consent of all parties, or if the
Court grants leave.56 The briefs must indicate whether counsel for
a party authored the brief in whole or in part, and must identify
every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, who made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the
brief.57 The rules are the same in the Federal Courts of Appeals.58
One of the key limitations that courts have enunciated through
opinions, is that an amicus may not raise issues that the parties
could have but did not.59
The rules of submitting amicus briefs in state courts vary with
each state. For example, in New York State, an amicus party must
satisfy the court that at least one of the following criteria has been
met: (1) the parties are not capable of a full and adequate presenta-
tion, and the movant could remedy that situation; (2) the movant
would invite the court's attention to law or arguments that might
otherwise escape its consideration; or (3) an amicus brief would
otherwise be of special assistance to the court. In addition, an ami-
cus brief may not introduce new issues, but may only relate to the
issues raised by the parties.6 °
C. Limiting The Use Of Amicus Briefs
In 1989, Judge Judith Kaye (then Associate Judge of New York
State's Court of Appeals - now Chief Justice) wrote her views on
the worth of amicus briefs.6" She praised the Court of Appeals'
expressed interest in receiving amicus curiae submissions,62 and
said that despite the transformation from "selfless servant[s] of his-
55. See S. CT. R. 37.2(a).
56. See S. CT. R. 37.3(a).
57. See S. CT. R. 37.6. An exception is made for a brief written on behalf of the
United States. See S. Cr. R. 37.4.
58. See FED. R. App. P. 29.
59. See United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1979) (refusing to
consider arguments not raised by the parties); Preservation Coalition Inc. v. Pierce,
667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to consider, on appeal, issues raised by parties
below, but not amicus).
60. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 500.11(e) (1998).
61. See Kaye, supra note 10, at 9.
62. See id. The Court of Appeals amended its rules in 1988 so that when the court
each week informed the public about its new filings, it also issued the following invita-
tion to interested persons: "The subject matter of the newly filed cases may suggest
appropriate motions and participation which the Court welcomes." Id.
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tory" to their advocacy role today, "the amicus curiae ... retain[s]
the mark [of] a friend. 63
Eight years later, Judge Kaye's words were challenged. In Ryan
v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,64 Judge Posner denied
a motion for leave to file an amicus brief because the brief would
repeat arguments made by a party.65 In a short opinion, Posner
argued that closer scrutiny of such briefs was necessary because the
vast majority of amicus briefs did not materially assist the judges in
deciding the case at hand.66 He noted several situations where an
amicus brief should normally be allowed.67 The first situation is
when a party is not represented at all. The second is when the
amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected
through the decision in the present case (though not affected
enough to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in
the present case). The third is when the amicus has unique infor-
mation or perspective that can help the court more than the liti-
gants' lawyers can.68 "Otherwise, leave to file an amicus curiae
brief should be denied. '69
Other scholars argued Judge Posner's point long before the Ryan
decision. Two law professors assert that in certain areas, such as
social science, amicus briefs are too often designed to persuade
rather than inform the court, and thus, the attorneys are not guided
by scientific norms of neutrality and objectivity, but by the ideol-
ogy of advocacy. 7° "The desire to win the case encourages the
amici to distort or ignore any damaging social science findings."'71
However, it is reliance on Judge Posner's criticism of the amicus
brief in Ryan that has led other circuit courts to preclude amici
63. See id. at 13.
64. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. See id. The Chicago Board of Trade moved under FED. R. App. P. 29 for leave
to file an amicus brief in support of the petitioner, who was challenging a disciplinary
order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Judge Posner originally de-
nied the motion without a statement of reasons. This opinion stems from a further
motion by the Board of Trade, asking Posner to explain his decision on the motion.
See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. These sentiments are echoed in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S.
555, 556 (1903), American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,
699 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1983), Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) and
United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
70. Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Sci-
ence: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100 (1993).
71. Id.
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from offering their opinions in cases.7 2 In addition, some state
courts have taken the same position. In Ferguson v. Brick,73 the
Arkansas Supreme Court's attitude toward amici was almost hos-
tile. 4 The court traced the descent of amicus briefs, from helpful
friendships, to unabashed advocacy, and on to mere lobbying.
"Henceforth, we will deny permission to file a brief when the pur-
pose is nothing more than to make a political endorsement of the
basic brief."' 76 The legal press has also used Judge Posner's opinion
to reiterate that a "friend of the court" is quite different from a
"friend of a party."
77
Although some courts have followed Judge Posner's lead, some
lawyers have instead cited the dangers of his restrictions. Luther
Munford, a prominent appellate attorney, argues that for decades
partisan interests may befriend a court by providing useful infor-
mation, even if it benefits only one side. 78 To illustrate his position,
Munford points to the 1908 Brandeis brief in favor of child labor
regulation,79 written on behalf of the National Consumers League,
as well as the important briefs written by the ACLU8' and the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.81
72. See e.g., United States v. Hunter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9869 (D. Vt. 1998)
(denying the American Civil Liberties Foundation of Vermont its motion to file brief
due to lack of convincing reason as to why an amicus brief was desirable); United
Stationers, Inc. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying
several parties motions because it determined that the government and stationers
"adequately and thoroughly addressed the issue at bar").
73. 649 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1983).
74. See id at 398.
75. See id. at 397-98.
76. Id. at 173.
77. See Amicus Briefs Must Add Something, 13 No. 1 FED. LITIGATOR 30 (Jan.
1998).
78. See Luther Munford, Listening to Friends of the Court, 84 A.B.A. J. 128 (Aug.
1998). Munford is the former president of the American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers.
79. Louis D. Brandeis' brief for the defendant figured prominently in the opinion
of Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (restricting women's working hours on the
premise that a woman's primary function was to bear children). The brief contained
two pages of legal arguments, but more than 100 pages referring to factual reports and
existing laws affecting the parties. Briefs with this type of jurisprudence and constitu-
tional advocacy have come to be known as "Brandeis briefs."
80. See discussion, supra notes 26-31, and accompanying text.
81. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in 1989 persuaded the Supreme Court
to limit the retroactivity of a new constitutional ruling. See Munford, supra note 78, at
128.
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3. Ethical guidelines for submission
Although there are no ethical code provisions governing the sub-
mission of amicus briefs, some portions of the ABA Model Rules
and the Model Code indicate that it is ethical for an attorney to
submit a brief if it would amount to helpful representation of his or
her client.82 In addition, discipline may be imposed on a lawyer if
he or she neglects a client matter; 3 however, since the topic of this
Note deals with clients who are not parties to a litigation, it is un-
likely these provisions would apply.
H. First Amendment Defendants And Their "Friends"
A. Rice v. Paladin
1. The facts and lower court decision
In early 1992, James Perry responded to a catalogue solicitation
by Paladin Press,81 and ordered two of the publisher's books: Hit
Man, a how-to hit manual, and How to Make Disposable Silencers.
A little more than a year later, Perry murdered Mildred Horn, her
quadriplegic son Trevor, and Trevor's nurse.85 Perry was found
guilty of murder on three counts,86 and subsequently, the victims'
representatives filed a civil action against Paladin Press for aiding
and abetting Perry in the commission of his murders through the
publication of Hit Man's killing instructions.8 7 The U.S. District
Court for Maryland granted summary judgment to the publishers
because Paladin's speech was not excepted by the "imminent law-
less action" exception cited in the landmark First Amendment case
Brandenburg v. Ohio.88
82. See infra Part III.C for a fuller discussion of the Model Rules and Model
Codes.
83. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1994) [here-
inafter Model Code].
84. Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 241 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997).
85. See id. at 239.
86. See Perry v. State, 686 A.2d 274 (Md. 1996).
87. Rice v. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996). It is interesting, although not
germane to the discussion, to note that the author of Hit Man, Rex Feral, was actually
a divorced mother of two when she wrote the book in 1983. Originally, she submitted
a novel, but Paladin's editors wanted a how-to. She got her ideas from books, televi-
sion, movies, newspapers, police officers, her karate instructor and a lawyer friend.
See David Montgomery, If Books Could Kill; This Publisher Offers Lessons in Mur-
der. Now He's a Target Himself, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at F1.
88. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. at 845-46. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
was the landmark Supreme Court case stating that a statute that purported to punish
mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others
merely to advocate the describe type of action, was a violation of the First and Four-
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The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. A host of promi-
nent media entities, including the American Broadcasting Com-
pany, America Online, the New York Times Company, Society of
Professional Journalists, and the Washington Post Company (here-
inafter "Paladin amici"), submitted an amicus curiae brief to the
Court of Appeals urging affirmation of the district court decision.89
The amici argued that under Brandenburg, Paladin's books contain
protected speech, because the books do not incite imminent lawless
action. They also argued that the First Amendment, does not yield
to the law of aiding and abetting90 and concluded that the lawsuit
threatened entire genres of expression.91
2. The appellate decision
In April 1997, the Court of Appeals overturned the District
Court decision, and found that the book was not entitled to protec-
tion under the First Amendment's free speech clause because it
was not merely "abstract advocacy. '92 Judge Luttig first quoted
extensive passages from Hit Man, noting that "the court has even
felt it necessary to omit portions of these few illustrative passages
in order to minimize the danger to the public from their repetition
herein." 93 He then illustrated the striking similarity between
quoted passages from the Hit Man and James Perry's actions in
1993, and stated that a reasonable jury clearly could conclude that
Paladin aided and abetted in Perry's triple murder 94 based on the
stipulations of the parties95
teenth Amendments. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The courts have used Bran-
denburg to exonerate defendants, absent a showing of "imminent lawless action."
89. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2-3.
90. See id. at 17.
91. See id. at 22-27. The amici cite various publications, such as Abbie Hoffman,
Steal This Book (1971), Malcolm X, By Any Means Necessary (2d ed. 1992), Jonathan
Swift, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland From
Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country (1729), as examples of threatened publi-
cations. See id. at 4-5.
92. Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 233 (4th Cir. 1997). The judge, in a 32-page
decision, spent a good part of the opinion quoting graphic portions of the Hit Man
text and comparing it to Perry's strikingly similar actions. For example, "Hit Man
specifically instructs its audience of killers to shoot the victim through the eyes if
possible: 'At least three shots should be fired to insure quick and sure death ....
[A]im for the head - preferably the eye sockets if you are a sharpshooter.' James
Perry shot Mildred Horn and Janice Saunders two or three times through the eyes."
Id. at 240.
93. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 239 n.1.
94. See id at 242-43.
95. Those stipulations include an acknowledgement by Paladin that:
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Paladin Press assisted Perry, according to Luttig, by providing
detailed instructions on the techniques of murder and murder for
hire with the specific intent of aiding and abetting the commission
of these violent crimes. 96 He argued that this case bore no resem-
blance to a host of First Amendment cases in which the defendant
promoted "theoretical advocacy.
97
3. Legal community response
The reaction from the legal community was similar. Rodney
Smolla, a leading First Amendment lawyer, shifted away from his
usual role to become one plaintiff's attorney. Writer and attorney
Stuart Taylor agrees with Smolla's decision. "A murder manual
intentionally marketed to would-be contract killers (along with
fantasists and others) doesn't strike me as the kind of 'freedom of
speech' that the framers sought to protect. 9
8
Smolla and Taylor are not alone. One critic champions govern-
ment regulation of speech such as Paladin's, that provides detailed,
step-by-step instructions about how to commit violent felonies.99
Another detractor compares Paladin's liability to that of a gun
dealer or a bar owner, saddling publishers with a duty to desist
from publication of such books.1°° Some scholars echo Judge Lut-
tig's view, dismissing concerns that a decision unfavorable to Pala-
din would implicate a host of authors, moviemakers and other
[I]n marketing Hit Man, Paladin 'intended to attract and assist criminals and
would-be criminals who desire information and instructions on how to com-
mit crimes' but also that it 'intended and had knowledge' that Hit Man actu-
ally 'would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to
plan and execute the crime of murder for hire.
Id. at 241.
96. See id. at 255. Judge Luttig's opinion notes that in cases where aiding and
abetting liability was to be imposed on publishers, there is an intent requirement. He
states that Paladin Press:
[S]tipulated to a set of facts which establish as a matter of law that the pub-
lisher is civilly liable for aiding and abetting James Perry in his triple murder,
unless the First Amendment absolutely bars the imposition of liability upon
a publisher for assisting in the commission of criminal acts.
Id. at 241.
97. Id. at 249 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 235 (1961)).
98. Stuart Taylor Jr., A Constitutional Suicide Pact?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996,
at 23.
99. See Avital T. Zer-Ilan, Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, 106
YALE L.J. 2697, 2697 (1997) ("Instructional speech like the kind found in Rice is
easily distinguishable from general advocacy, description, opinion or political speech.
For example, speech that provides instructions on how to blow up buildings or com-
mit murder, torture, or rape falls well within this exception.").
100. Bruce Fein, Crime, Responsibility and Free Speech, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
1996, at A17.
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artists. They question whether holding Hit Man's publisher liable
would really endanger the First Amendment rights of these media
entities in light of the historic purposes of the Amendment.101
4. Amici concerns
After his assessment of the case and the district court's opinion,
Judge Luttig sternly addressed the media amici's brief. His con-
demnation focused on the fact that the Paladin amici stood behind
a defendant that knowingly and intentionally gave a dangerous
weapon to a murderer.
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vig-
orously defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to in-
tentionally and knowingly assist murderers with technical
information which Paladin admits it intended and knew would
be used immediately in the commission of murder and other
crimes against society is, to say the least, breathtaking.10 2
Judge Luttig further stated that it should be apparent to all par-
ties involved that the First Amendment values that Paladin and
amici sought to protect would not be adversely affected by allowing
plaintiff's action against Paladin to proceed. "[N]either the exten-
sive briefing by the parties and the numerous amici in this case, nor
the exhaustive research which the court itself has undertaken, has
revealed even a single case that we regard as factually analogous to
this case. '10 3
Richard Smolla agrees with Judge Luttig about Paladin's media
amici. He compares Paladin's amici with those who advocate simi-
lar protection for the publisher of a terrorist manual that provides
detailed instructions on how to smuggle bombs onto airplanes.
Similarly, Smolla indicates that the amici advocate for publication
of manuals on how to steal nuclear materials from Russia, build a
nuclear device and blow up a few million people. 104 "How immi-
nent would the intended explosion have to be to satisfy [the 'immi-
nent danger' exception to First Amendment protections cited in]
101. Amy Dilworth, Note, Murder in the Abstract: The First Amendment and the
Misappropriation of Brandenburg, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 565, 587. See also
Bennett L. Gershman, Perverting the First Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 1998, at 2.
102. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 265.
103. Id. Amici also argues that recognizing this type of cause of action against Pal-
adin predicated on aiding and abetting will subject broadcasters and publishers to
liability whenever someone imitates or "copies" conduct that is either described or
depicted in their broadcasts, publications or moves. The judge dismissed this conten-
tion as "simply not true." Id.
104. See Taylor, supra note 98, at 23.
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Brandenburg? Is the Constitution a suicide pact?'' °5 - Law profes-
sor Bennett Gershman argues that when the free speech propo-
nents champion subterfuge, the First Amendment is perverted and
its friends are discredited. 1 6 He further argues that the media's
complicity in Paladin's "audacious misuse of the First Amendment
should be underscored,' 0 7 and that the inability or unwillingness
of presumably responsible members of the media to make elemen-
tary, common sense distinctions raises serious questions about their
judgment. 108 He states that if defenders of the First Amendment
fail to grasp that "simple but overarching truth, and fail to brand
Paladin's corruption for what it is, then they . . . delegitimize
themselves."'0 9
B. Khawar v. Globe, International
1. The Facts
A similar sentiment to that stated in Paladin was enunciated in
the recently decided case of Khawar v. Globe International" In
November 1988, Roundtable Publishing published a book entitled
The Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert Kennedy, alleging
that the Iranian Shah's secret police, working together with the
Mafia, carried out the 1968 assassination of Robert Kennedy. The
book contained four photographs of a young man standing in a
group of people around Senator Kennedy at the Ambassador Ho-
tel in Los Angeles shortly before he was assassinated."' It identi-
fied the man in pictures as Ali Ahmand, and alleged that he was
the real Kennedy murderer.
Five months after the book was published, the Globe, a weekly
tabloid newspaper, ran an article containing an uncritical summary
of the book's allegations. The Globe enlarged one of the photo-
graphs in the book, and added an arrow pointing to the accused
man, and again identified him as the assassin." 2 The man in the
photograph was actually named Khalid Khawar, not Ahmand; he
was a photographer who had been hired by an Indian newspaper to
write about the Los Angeles convention. In August 1989, Khawar,
105. Id.
106. See Gershman, supra note 101, at 2.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. May 17, 1999)
(No. 98-1491).
111. See id. at 698-99.
112. See id.
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who received death threats following the Globe article's release,
sued the Globe, Roundtable and the book's author, Robert Mor-
row, for libel." 3
The jury in the case granted judgment to Khawar in the amount
of $1.75 million, and held that: "(1) the Globe article contained
statements about Khawar that were false and defamatory; (2)
Globe published the article negligently and with malice or oppres-
sion; (3) with respect to Kennedy's assassination, Khawar was a
private rather than public figure; and (4) the Globe article was a
neutral and accurate report of the Morrow book. 11 4 Since the last
two determinations were advisory only, the trial court ruled as a
matter of law that the article was not an accurate and neutral re-
port.11 5 In affirming the trial court ruling, the California Court of
Appeals held that California had not adopted a neutral reportage
privilege for private figures, and therefore it was not necessary to
decide whether the Globe article was a neutral report.11 6
2. Neutral Reportage Defense
In this case, the media's concern was the issue of applying neu-
tral reportage to private figures. Neutral reportage is a privilege
available in some states that gives a First Amendment defense to
publishers who republish defamatory statements." 7 The Second
Circuit defined neutral reportage in 1977 in Edwards v. National
Audubon Society, noting that "[W]hen a responsible, prominent or-
ganization . . . makes serious charges against a public figure, the
First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting
of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regard-
113. See id. at 699. Although Morrow defaulted, and Roundtable settled with
Khawar before trial, the trial court vacated Morrow's default and ultimately entered
judgment .in his favor, based on findings that Khawar could not be named in and
could not be identified from the photographs in Morrow's book. See id.
114. Id. at 699.
115. See id. at 700. The trial court's decision that the Globe article was not a neu-
tral report was based on its finding that although Khawar could be identified from the
Globe photo, which included an arrow pointing directly at Khawar, it was impossible
to identify Khawar from the smaller, darker and less distinct image of him that ap-
peared in the Morrow book. See id.
116. See Khawar v. Globe, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 92, 102-04 (1996).
117. See Khawar, 965 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1998). The privilege is similar to the com-
mon law privilege of "fair report," which California codified in CAL. CIVIL CODE
§§ 47(d) and 47(e). See id.
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ing their validity."" 8 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
neutral reportage privilege. 1 9
Media conglomerates like ABC and CBS, publishers such as
Knight-Ridder, and associations like the California First Amend-
ment Coalition and the Radio-Television News Directors Associa-
tion submitted a total of three amicus briefs 20 ("Globe amici")
urged the court to reverse the Court of Appeals, decision. The
briefs asserted that the neutral reportage privilege extends protec-
tion to the media where they accurately and neutrally report that
claims have been made about private individuals involved in public
controversy.' 21
The briefs offered several other reasons for reversal. The first
was that the court analysis did not focus on the republication as-
pect of the Globe's defense.' 22 A duty to reinvestigate those claims
would bar the media from informing the public about many news-
worthy matters, in violation of the First Amendment. In addition,
the ABC brief cited Time v. Pape,23 which states that in the repub-
lication context, truth or falsity and actual malice are judged by
examining whether the media accurately republished the underly-
ing claims.' 24
3. California's Ruling
The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision.
Justice Kennard declined to address the amici's concerns about
neutral reportage for private figures, and instead affirmed the
lower court opinion on this individual's status as a private person
for the purpose of defamation law. 125
Justice Kennard concluded that Khawar was not a public figure
in relation to the article 126 and stated that California does not rec-
118. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971)).
119. Khawar, 965 P.2d 696, 705 (1998) (citing Harte-Hanks Commuunications v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (declining to decide the issue)).
120. See Brief of ABC, Inc. et al. [hereinafter ABC Khawar Amicus Brief]; Brief of
Los Angeles Times et al. [hereinafter L.A. Times Amicus Brief]; and Letter Brief of
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. and Knight-Ridder Pub., Inc., as Amici Curiae, Khawar
v. Globe, 965 P.2d 696 (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
121. See L.A. Times Amicus Brief at 20-22; ABC Amicus Brief at 7-13.
122. See L.A. Times Amicus Brief at 15.
123. 1 U.S. 279 (1971).
124. See id., cited in ABC Khawar Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 15-20.
125. Khawar, 965 P.2d at 703.
126. See id. at 698. Khawar was a young journalist at the time who was photo-
graphed near Kennedy, a prominent politician, moments before his death. However,
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ognize neutral reportage for private figures. She declined to decide
whether California recognized such a privilege for public officials
or public figures, stating:127
Only rarely will the report of false and defamatory accusations
against a person who is neither a public official nor a public fig-
ure provide information of value in the resolution of a contro-
versy over a matter of public concern. On the other hand, the
report of such accusations can have a devastating effect on the
reputation of the accused individual, who has not voluntarily
elected to encounter an increased risk of defamation and who
may lack sufficient media access to counter the accusations.128
While the California courts did not address the amici as the
Fourth Circuit did in Paladin, the mainstream press did. Mike Wal-
lace, CBS anchor for the television show "60 Minutes," ran a story
criticizing the media (including his own network). 29 Speaking to a
lawyer who worked on the amicus brief in support of the Globe,
Wallace stated "I know damn well that I would never in a million
years have been permitted to put on 60 Minutes what the Globe
put in their magazine. '"130 Howard Kurtz, press critic for the Wash-
ington Post added, "[t]he nation's top news organizations have a
knee-jerk tendency to rush to the defense of any journalist in
trouble. They're afraid [the Khawar case] would set some kind of
legal precedent. I don't think we should apologize for the worst
excesses of our business. '' 3 Specific to this case, the Globe did not
do any journalism homework to insure a fair report.132 But the ar-
gument was the same as in the Paladin case, in that the media enti-
ties involved in writing the amicus briefs compromised their
journalistic ethics by supporting the Globe.
C. Other "Friends of the Courts"
Both Paladin and Khawar are good examples of the public's out-
raged response to the defense of the media's conduct, but they are
not the only cases. For example, in September 1997, the death of
he was never a suspect, was never publicized and never sought to influence public
discussion on the topic. See id.
127. See id. at 707 ("Republication of accusations made against private figures is
never protected by the neutral reportage privilege.").
128. Id.
129. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Khawar v. Globe, 965 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1998).
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Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed in Paris resulted in a backlash
against the paparazzi and their tactics. 133
Scrutiny has hit the mainstream media as well. When Richard
Jewell, a security guard in Atlanta, became a suspect in the Centen-
nial Olympic Park bombing during the Olympics in July, 1996, the
media essentially tried and convicted him in the press.134 Federal
prosecutors exonerated Jewell almost three months later;135 he sub-
sequently filed defamation suits against many major news
organizations.1
36
In 1992, a police officer's family sued rap artist Tupac Shakur,
Atlantic Records, and Time Warner when the officer was shot by a
19-year-old man who had been listening to Shakur's album, 2pa-
calypse Now. 137 On this case's heels, Ice-T also attracted attention
when he released the song "Cop Killer" from his album, Body
Count. The release of the song, and songs such as those found on
2pacalypse Now led to an all-out attempt by groups such as the
Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas, and people like
Oliver North and former Representative Susan Molinari to censor
the music. 138 The protests seemed to have the desired effect. Due
133. See James C. Goodale & Jeremy Feigelson, Greater Legal Restrictions on the
Paparazzi?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 4.
134. See, e.g., Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects "Hero" Guard May Have
Planted Bomb, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, at iX (stating that "Richard
Jewell ... fits the profile of the lone bomber. This profile generally includes a frus-
trated white man who is a former police officer, member of the military or police
'wannabe' who seeks to become a hero."), Andrea Peyser, Who Checked "Rambo"
Crossing Guard's Record?, N.Y. POST, July 31, 1996, at 3 ("He was a fat, failed former
sheriff's deputy[.]"). Jewell, initially identified as a hero for discovering a knapsack
containing the bomb, was turned into a suspect within days of the explosion. For
weeks following the incident, "a horde of news media members campled outside his
mother's apartment ... where Jewell live[d]." Bill Rankin, Jewell is Cleared in Bomb
Case: No Longer a 'Target,' Feds Say, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 27, 1996, at Al.
135. See Rankin, supra, at Al.
136. Jewell settled his claims against NBC and CNN for undisclosed amounts. Suits
against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, and the New York Post, are pending. See
Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Charles L.
Babcock & Cami Dawson Boyd, Can Suspects Sue the Media for Coverage of Investi-
gations?, 15 COMM. LAW. 3 (Summer 1997); Judge Lets Jewell Continue Suit, FLORIDA
TODAY, Oct. 3, 1998, at 3A.
137. See Davidson v. Time Warner, 25 Media L. Rep. 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The
plaintiffs argued in this suit that 2Pacalypse Now did not merit First Amendment pro-
tection because it was obscene, contained "fighting words," defamed police officers
and tended to incite imminent illegal conduct on the part of individuals like the of-
ficer's killer. The court, however, granted summary judgment to the defendants.
138. See Jason Talerman, Note. The Death of Tupac: Will Gangsta Rap Kill the
First Amendment?, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 117, 137 (1994) (noting that both Rep-
resentative Susan Molinari and Oliver North cited Time Warner's profit motive as
contrary to constitutional protection).
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to these objections and support of the censorship by public offi-
cials, musician Ice-T voluntarily withdrew "Cop Killer" from Body
Count.139 Two weeks after Ice-T pulled the song, he and other rap
artists met with Warner Group. The musicians were told to change
their lyrics or find another label. 4°
III: Analysis of the Debate
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it."'' These words by Voltaire echo the senti-
ments of both the media and their lawyers, when it comes to de-
fending the First Amendment. Paladin and Khawar question
whether it is permissible - and proper - for the media to support
parties in a litigation who have, by social, moral and journalistic
standards, acted inappropriately. They also question whether it is
unethical for lawyers to support the media's attempts to defend
such conduct.
The answer to the first question, according to Judge Luttig, and
other critics like Chief Judge Richard Posner and Mike Wallace, is
that it is not proper.'42 Anti-media sentiment has grown tremen-
dously in recent years, to the point where a recent Roper-Freedom
Forum-Parade poll states that fewer than twenty percent of people
polled rated the ethics of journalists as high, and sixty-five percent
of respondents said there are times when publication or broadcast
should be prevented. 43 For those who wish to maintain the pres-
tige of journalism, it may be critical to point out defendants who
give the profession a bad name.
Ultimately though, it is wrong to criticize the media and their
amici for defending their peers. There are compelling explanations
that indicate that the scores of media who have sided with such
defendants have made the right decision. One of the most impor-
tant reasons is that a media client may think it has a legitimate
interest in the outcome of the case purely from a precedential
standpoint - the case law may be unclear or non-existent. If this is
the case, then the media are only protecting their First Amendment
freedoms, and their actions are proper.
139. See id. at 135.
140. See id.
141. Talerman, supra note 138, at 117 (citing Voltaire).
142. See supra notes 64-69, 129-31 and accompanying text.
143. See ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, NEWS JUNKIES, NEWS
CRITICS: How AMERICANS USE THE NEWS AND WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT IT (Feb.
1997), cited in Daniel Schorr, Forgive Us Our Press Passes, 20 HASTINGS COMMIENT.
L.J. 269, 271 (Winter 1998).
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A. The Goals of an Amicus
The first step in the analysis of Judge Luttig's and Mike Wal-
lace's arguments is defining precisely the goals of an amicus curiae.
Judge Posner argues that many amicus briefs are simply redundant,
echoing the parties' briefs rather than giving new legal analysis,
and are thus detrimental, not legitimate. 44 In Ryan v. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission,45 the amicus claimed to have an
overriding interest in the case because the defendant was one of its
members. Accordingly, it wanted to express its view that the evi-
dence clearly established the lack of any need for the sanction im-
posed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.146 Judge
Posner replied that the court is helped only "by being pointed to
considerations germane to our decision of the appeal that the par-
ties for one reason or another have not brought to our attention,"
not by an amicus' "expression of a 'strongly held view' about the
weight of the evidence.' 1 47 Judge Posner's point is well taken. Ap-
pellate judges are flooded with briefs on both sides of the argu-
ment, and many attorneys understand that the courts should not be
compelled to read additional briefs that merely scream "me
too. "1
48
Putting the redundancy argument aside, parties in an amicus cu-
riae brief do not necessarily support a defendant's conduct alleged
by the plaintiff. Instead, they may provide the court a legal analy-
sis illustrating why a decision will be bad precedent for other simi-
larly situation parties.1 49 In addition, they may focus the court's
attention on the broader implications of various possible rulings. 50
There are also times when, because of page limitations on the
briefs of parties to the litigation, or because of other considera-
tions, an amicus may be in a better position to make a specific
point than a party to the litigation. For example, in Metromedia v.
San Diego,'5' San Francisco sought to exclude most billboards from
144. See supra notes 64-68, and accompanying text.
145. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1064.
148. Thomas R. Newman & Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Justifying the Filing of Amicus
Briefs, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 2, 1998, at 3.
149. See, e.g., Brief for the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as
Amicus Curiae, Haddle v. Garrison, 132 F.3d 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (arguing that the
lower court decision would deny the protections afforded in section 1985(2) to indi-
viduals working under employment contracts of indefinite length).
150. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 608.
151. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
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designated sections of the city. 152 The billboards carried primarily
commercial messages, but also some political messages as well.
Billboard owners were not in a position to argue credibly on behalf
of political speech because they did not engage in political speech
(they leased billboard space only), and so the billboard owners'
lawyer invited the ACLU to file an amicus brief emphasizing the
political speech aspects of the case. 153
Other legitimate reasons for filing amicus briefs include clarify-
ing convoluted litigation, collecting useful historical or factual ref-
erences that merit judicial notice or urging limitations on rulings.154
It is imperative to the adversary system that an amicus with legiti-
mate interests be able to assert its arguments. Thus, it can be
deemed ethical for an amicus party to submit a brief where that
party is motivated by one of the enumerated reasons.
B. Legitimate Interests
It is clear that Judge Luttig, Mike Wallace and their peers, saw
few, if any, legitimate interests expressed by the amici who filed in
the Paladin and Globe cases. However, there are strong arguments
for amici involvement in both Paladin and Khawar. In these cases,
it is not necessarily whom the media stood behind, but the constitu-
tional right each supported that legitimized each interest. Thus,
the media amici pass a "legitimate interest" test that refute the crit-
ics' notions of the amici's decision to file in the litigation.
1. Paladin's Critics and the Brandenburg Precedent
In Paladin, the amici articulated a chilling effect argument 155 that
the District Court accepted. However, the Fourth Circuit rejected
this claim, arguing that:
152. See id.
153. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 607. The majority of the Court in Metromedia
agreed to strike down the San Diego ordinance. The four justices in the plurality
"thought the ordinance was constitutional insofar as it regulated only commercial
speech, but struck down the entire ordinance because it unconstitutionally regulated
political speech, and the commercial and political regulations were not severable." Id.
154. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 128.
155. See id. The Amici concluded:
A word, a lyric, a film clip - these are the living embodiments of our proud heritage
of defending the rights of even the most outrageous speaker. They are capable of
enriching, entertaining, educating, and - occasionally - shocking and horrifying us.
But whatever their power, they are incapable of acting. To hold a word or an image
jointly responsible for even the most ghastly criminal act diminishes us all, because it
means that some speech surely will be chilled in the process.
Id. at 28.
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[F]or almost any broadcast, book, movie or song that one can
imagine, an inference of unlawful motive from the description
or depiction of particular criminal conduct therein would almost
never be reasonable, for not only will there be ... a legitimate
and lawful purpose for these communications, but the contexts
in which the descriptions or depictions appear will themselves
negate a purpose on the part of the producer or publisher to
assist others in their undertaking of the described or depicted
conduct. 1
56
The crux of the majority's criticism was that because Paladin ad-
mitted that it intended and knew the book would be used "immedi-
ately in the commission of murder and other crimes[,]' 1 57 this case
did not affect any First Amendment principles. The court's argu-
ment focused on Paladin's actions, and its intent to publish danger-
ous speech.
Despite the court's assertion, the chilling effect that reversal of
the District Court's summary judgment would have on subsequent
media conduct was a valid concern for the media amici. The media
did not cheer for Paladin, nor did they argue that the book was
necessary. Furthermore, they did not condone the type of violence
advocated in Paladin Press' books. Instead, the Paladin amici ar-
gued there was no distinction between the constitutional protection
for the type of information found in Hit Man, and protection for
similar information found in "a vast array of fiction, nonfiction,
music, electronic communication, and video programming.' '1 58
The media's position is reasonable and passes a legitimacy test.
It was in the media's best interest in Paladin to advocate for First
Amendment freedoms. The media generally strive to extend First
Amendment protections as much as possible, thereby alleviating
concerns about potential lawsuits. 159 In this case, the media enti-
ties were worried that the precedent set by a reversal of summary
judgment for the defendant would subject information in books to
censure review by trial.160
156. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 266.
157. Id. at 265.
158. ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
159. For example, the media have previously stood behind defendants like Hustler
Magazine. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (prohibiting public
figures and officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without showing a false statement of fact being made with actual
malice); Hustler v. Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a Hustler arti-
cle did not incite an adolescent to perform an act that led to his death).
160. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 22. The ABC Paladin Amicus
Brief states:
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Because it is unclear how restrictive the limits set by Branden-
burg v. Ohio 161 are, it is in the media's interests to ensure that such
protections continue. Because Brandenburg has almost exclusively
been applied to political speech, 62 some Paladin supporters won-
der whether its First Amendment protections would extend to Pal-
adin if it had written a chapter in its book extolling the virtues of
contract killing. 63 It was this type of arbitrary line-drawing that
the amici attempted to defend themselves against.
2. The Globe and Neutral Reportage
Mike Wallace and Howard Kurtz presented a similar argument
to that of Judge Luttig. Wallace's "60 Minutes" interview with
Khalid Khawar occurred before the California Supreme Court
ruled on the case."6 Criticizing the media's defense of Paladin,
Wallace noted that "[t]his case is about Khalid Khawar, who was
libeled. The jury found that he had been libeled. An appellate
court agreed. That's what the case is about. It's about a human
being and his family.' '1 65
Nevertheless, the media amici make several compelling argu-
ments that this case was about more than the facts. There was an
important legal issue at stake - the application of neutral reportage
to public figures. "[T]he neutral reportage privilege protects the
media from defamation liability for the non-malicious publication
of a serious accusation made by a prominent person where such
accusations in and of themselves are newsworthy, while preserving
the private figure's right to seek damages from the original pub-
lisher."'1 66 The impact of the Khawar litigation would not be lim-
ited to tabloids like the Globe or the Enquirer, but also to the
A decision that allows this claim to survive - even for a brief time - will have
a destabilizing effect on First Amendment law, and will inevitably unleash a
hailstorm of derivative suits on the communications industry as plaintiffs
search for deep pockets to avenge imagined affronts, or real affronts better
recompensed by perpetrator than publisher.
Id. See also supra notes 26-31 (providing examples of this premise) and accompany-
ing text.
161. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
162. See Robert J. Coursey III, Note & Comment, Another Case of Freedom vs.
Safety: Stretching the First Amendment to Protect the Publication of Murder Manuals
- Brandenburg Need Not Apply?, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 899 (1998).
163. See id. at 899-900.
164. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998).
165. Id.
166. L.A. Times Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 24.
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mainstream press; and there was the possibility that future courts
may eliminate neutral reportage altogether. 167
The amici expressed additional concern about the Court of Ap-
peals ruling - that failure to reinvestigate a story constitutes "ac-
tual malice" if the court later concludes that the book's assertions
were improbable.16 The brief filed on behalf of ABC noted that
where the media simply informs the public of the "historical fact"
that allegations have been made, and do not report the allegations
as true or otherwise distort them, then "the media cannot be held
liable because the report was 'materially true' and thus 'constitu-
tionally protected.' 1 69
In addition, the brief filed by Davis, Wright and Tremaine, attor-
neys for the amici curiae, including the Los Angeles Times, NBC,
and the New York Times, argue that a ruling mandating a duty of
independent investigation resurrects strict scrutiny.170 In this por-
tion of the brief, there are only brief mentions of the Globe case;
the rest of the argument is a strictly legal analysis.
What the amici stress - and what people like Mike Wallace and
Howard Kurtz largely ignore - is that it is not necessarily Paladin,
or the Globe, that the media amici are defending. Instead, the
amici's primary goal is to protect the constitutional rights guaran-
teed and extended by the First Amendment. In the final paragraph
of the Paladin amicus curiae brief, amici note that "[r]einstatement
of this case will engender a new tort against the written word - a
futile exercise in 'pigeonholing' [that] endangers the pigeon."' 1
C. Legitimate Interests of Lawyers
If there is a compelling and legitimate interest of the media
amici, the same conclusion can be reached for the lawyers who
write the amicus for their media clients. As noted above, there are
167. See Jane Kirtley, Defamation Judgment Puts Onus on Media, AM. JOURNALISM
REv., Jan. 1, 1999. Kirtley stated:
Future courts may interpret the ruling as creating a creating a legal obliga-
tion to independently investigate defamatory statements made by authorita-
tive sources before repeating them. That may be a desirable journalistic
aspiration. But courts are ill equipped to second-guess news judgment or
allocation of resources. You can bet they'll seldom be satisfied that a re-
porter did all he or she could to determine the truth.
Id.
168. See Khawar v. Globe, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (Ct. App. 1996).
169. ABC Khawar Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 20.
170. L.A. Times Brief, supra note 166, at 9.
171. ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 27 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AM.
CONSTrTUTIONAL L. §§ 12-18, at 943 (2d ed. 1988)).
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many reasons, why the media amici have a vested interest in de-
fending their peers. If that is the case, and an appellate decision
may affect future litigation for the lawyer's client, that lawyer has
an obligation to serve the amici's interests.
Even if that were not the case - even if the media had been
misguided - there still may be the ethical obligation of the amici's
lawyers to advocate for their clients. There are no ABA Model
Rule or Code provisions that deal specifically with advocating for a
non-client in a case that may have an effect on a current client.
However, there are several general comments that provide a good
basis for analysis.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules")
require a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client. 172 The Model Rules further state that "a
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposi-
tion, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor."' 73 An amicus brief would likely
fall within the ambit of "lawful and ethical measures."
The Model Rules also note that a lawyer should act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.174 The Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Code") similarly notes that a lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.175
An attorney's ethical obligation to assist the judge or jury in arriv-
ing at its distillation of the "truth" is best fulfilled through the zeal-
ous advocacy of the client's position under the existing paradigm of
civil litigation. 76 The attorney's primary obligation is to pursue -
to the fullest extent of the law - his or her client's rights. 77
172. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.3 (1983).
173. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
174. See id. Rule'1.3 cmt. 1.
175. MODEL CODE Cannon 7. Some states have moved to eliminate the word
"zeal" in their Codes of Professional Responsibility because a lawyer on behalf of a
client might interpret zealousness to mean "zealotry," justifying wrongful conduct. It
might also be interpreted to imply a requirement of personal involvement rather than
detached commitment. See George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners?,
59 OCT. OR. ST. B. BULL. 31, 32 (1998). An in-depth analysis of this point is beyond
the scope of this article.
176. Jamil N. Alibhai et al., Zealous Advocacy and the Search for Truth, 61 TEX.
B.J. 1009, 1014 (1998).
177. See id.
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Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules tangentially addresses the role of a
lawyer when the relationship is ongoing; it states that if a lawyer
has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters,
the client can assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing
basis. 78
Finally, it is up to the client to determine the objective of the
litigation. 179 Logically, it seems that if the objectives of a client are
to prevent bad precedent for possible future litigation, it is the obli-
gation of the lawyer to represent his or her client in that matter.
However, the rules also state that a lawyer has professional discre-
tion in determining the means by which a matter should be pur-
sued.' 8° It is, however, within the ethical boundaries that a lawyer
pursue any objectives of the client.' 8 '
The Model Rules provide an escape hatch for an attorney. A
lawyer may withdraw from a matter if the client insists on pursuing
an objective that the lawyer finds repugnant or imprudent.'82
However, it would be hard in these cases for a lawyer to prove that
such objections are repugnant to him or her.
When taken collectively, it becomes clear that there is no ethical
problem with a lawyer writing a brief on behalf of an interested
third party. Furthermore, if there is a legal avenue for that client
to take, there may even be an obligation to pursue such a course of
action. If a lawyer is within his or her boundaries to promote an
objective of an interested media client, there is no reason why that
attorney should be required to withdraw, especially if the lawyer is
not particularly disturbed by the behavior the media client wants to
uphold. 83 In tandem with the idea that an attorney should repre-
sent a client zealously, it only makes sense that writing amicus
briefs falls within the ambit of responsible lawyering.
178. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. 3 ("[A] lawyer should carry through to con-
clusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a
specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a
lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue, to serve on a continuing basis
unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.").
179. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2.
180. See id.
181. The exception, of course, is to perpetuate or aid in the commission of a crime.
See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 cmt. 2. See also MODEL CODE at DR 2-110(b).
182. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16.
183. It is useful to note that a lawyer's representation of a client, including repre-
sentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social, or moral views or activities. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b).
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If it is not unethical on the part of media entities and their law-
yers to advocate as amici on behalf of a media defendants,184 why,
in these cases, do some members of the media shy away from de-
fending organizations such as the Globe and Paladin Press? A
plausible reason may be that the press and other media would like
to distance themselves as much as possible from tabloids or "alter-
native" publishing companies such as Paladin. When Howard
Kurtz notes in Mike Wallace's "60 Minutes" interview with
Khawar, that "we should [not] apologize for the worst excesses in
our business," he adds, "I think we should blow the whistle on
them.'1 85 The media have been accused of tabloid journalism for
years, 86 and some journalists wonder aloud how to rise above the
stereotypes. 87
Many authors of articles and discussions regarding these cases
defend Paladin and the Globe, 88 but even more still distance
themselves from the publishers.18 9 However, "[t]hese are hardly
the kinds of facts that First Amendment lawyers die for," writes
one editor about the Paladin case. 19° "But as is so often the case
with constitutional rights, they must defend the most unsavory
characters ... to protect the rest of us.' 91 '
It is unlikely that in either Paladin or Khawar, the mainstream
media would publish these types of articles or books. The media
are loosely governed by their own set of rules that the Society of
Professional Journalists ("SPJ") promulgated in its Code of Ethics
in 1926, and revised in 1973, 1984, 1987 and 1996.192 The rules pro-
184. The only caveat is that a lawyer may not further a crime or fraud. See MODEL
CODE at 7-102.
185. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998).
186. See generally JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: How HE MEDIA UN-
DERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1996) (criticizing major news organizations for
accelerating the decline of journalism); HOWARD KURTZ, HOT AIR: ALL TALK ALL
THE TIME (1996) (saying that the press have given into sensationalism).
187. See, e.g., Jon Lafayette, RTNDA: Journalists Hash Out Trust Issue: Has Credi-
bility Eroded?, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 22, 1997, at 1A. The article describes the
Radio-Television News Directors Association's annual conference where speakers
discussed accountability to the public. Id.
188. See, e.g., Andrea Neal, In Defense of the Most Unsavory, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 14, 1996, at A8 (defending Paladin Press, stating that "the information found in
Hit Man can be found in other works of fiction and non-fiction"); Kirtley, supra note
167 ("My support for self-criticism [by the media] stops at the courthouse door.").
189. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 100 ("[D]rawing sensible lines is the hallmark of
enlightened law .... The First Amendment is no exception.").
190. Neal, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. David A. Logan, "Stunt Journalism," Professional Norms, and the Public Mis-
trust of the Media, 9 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 160 (1998).
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vided for journalists, unlike the Codes, do not come with the threat
of disciplinary procedures if they are not followed.193 In addition,
the journalism codes that are in place deal only in generalities.194
For example, the American Society of Newspaper Editors calls for
"the highest ethical and professional performance," in its "State-
ment of Principles" but does not define that term.195 "[T]here is an
obligation on the part of each editor, each reporter, each publisher,
to decide upon her or his own ethical standard," says respected
journalist A.M. Rosenthal. 196 "I do not believe in regulation of the
newspaper business from the outside, and philosophically, I have to
be against regulation from the inside. I do not want to sit in judg-
ment on another newspaper and I do not think it is a healthy thing
to do."
197
Moreover, the press have no guidelines with regard to assisting
media defendants - most likely they will do what is in their best
interests for their own publications. If this is the case, then it might
be in the best interest for a single publication to discredit a defend-
ant or media amici to uphold its own integrity.
Conclusion
For those who chose to criticize the media entities that signed on
to the Paladin and Globe amicus briefs, it may be that these critics
have false views of what it means to write an amicus brief.
Although the one understanding of amici has come to be advocacy
for a certain client, 98 many amici - and in fact those that are prob-
ably most effective - are those who argue a legal issue without
zealously advocating for a specific defendant. 99 This is actually a
return to where amici have stood since the 1800s - as a friend to
the court and to the law.
However, it may also be the case that a new rule of law would be
a crucial defensive or offensive tactic for a party. In such cases,
regardless of the enthusiasm for with which a friend advocates, it
193. Deann Evans, Most Journalists Follow Basic Ethical Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB-
UNE, May 22, 1994, at F4.
194. See Brian Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial
Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 100 (1994).
195. American Society of Newspaper Editor, Statement of Principles (visited June
25, 1999) <http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm>.
196. Remarks by A.M. Rosenthal, ASNE 1987, Proceedings of the 1987 Conven-
tion of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, at 36, 45, cited in, Murchison,
supra note 194, at 101.
197. Id.
198. For history of amicus briefs, see supra Part I.
199. See ACLU cases, supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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would set a bad precedent to condemn amici who stand up for their
peers and the law.
EXPANDING NEW YORK'S DNA DATABASE:
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Robert W. Schumacher II*
Introduction
On a December morning in New York City, a young girl is found
by authorities, sexually molested and murdered. There is no evi-
dence present at the crime scene to produce a suspect. The victim's
friends and family are questioned, but no one is able to provide any
leads. As the investigation continues, however, lab reports un-
cover semen samples from the victim's body. With today's technol-
ogy, such evidence can be run through New York State's
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") database, with the hope of finding
a match between the semen found on the victim's body and a sam-
ple already existing in the database. Currently, this database con-
tains DNA profiles from those previously convicted of certain sex
offenses, homicide, assault and escape.'
Unfortunately, the crime scene sample does not match any re-
corded in the database. The killer murders four more girls in the
same way before being captured in the act with victim number six.
Upon detention, it is discovered that the killer had been con-
victed of two misdemeanors in New York State within the last year-
Sexual Misconduct and Reckless Endangerment in the Second De-
gree. Had New York's compulsory DNA statute been more expan-
sive to mandate samples from all those arrested for fingerprintable
offenses, the initial sample collected would have matched this
man's DNA profile. The lives of five young girls could have been
spared.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., magna cum
laude, Villanova University, 1997. I would like to extend my appreciation to Profes-
sor Daniel Richman for his valuable insight and advice. I also wish to thank my par-
ents, Robert Sr. and Rosemary, and sister, Melanie, for their steadfast love, support
and encouragement.
1. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994). Specifically, felons are required
to submit a DNA sample when convicted of an assault under N.Y. PENAL LAW sec-
tions 120.05, 120.10 and 120.11, a homicide under sections 125.15-125.27 or a sex of-
fense under sections 130.25, 130.30, 130.35, 130.40, 130.45, 130.50, 130.65, 130.67,
130.70 and 255.25. See id. § 995.7. Also, submission is required when a felon is con-
victed under sections 205.10, 205.15, 205.17 and 205.19 relating to escape and other
offenses, where the offender has been convicted within the previous five years of one
of the other felonies enumerated. See id.
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This Note analyzes New York City Police Commissioner Howard
Safir's ("Safir") proposal to expand New York's DNA Database to
include profiles from all persons arrested for a recordable offense.
Part I discusses the admissibility of DNA identification technology
in New York courts and gives an overview of the molecular biology
of DNA, explaining the powerful investigative advantage of DNA
and the main profiling methods available. In addition, Part I de-
scribes other DNA database programs currently in place and con-
cludes with a detailed outline of Safir's proposal. Part II defines
the controversy surrounding Safir's proposal, specifically Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns, as well as fears of potential misuse
of DNA profile information stored in a computer database. Part
III addresses these concerns and details New York's specific need
for an expanded statute in light of New York's recidivism rates,
recent crime trends, investigative efficiency and lower administra-
tive costs. This Note concludes that Safir's plan is an effective, cut-
ting-edge law enforcement tool that does not overly intrude upon
an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
I. Overview of DNA Uses
DNA identification techniques are capable of assisting law en-
forcement officials in implicating the guilty and exonerating the in-
nocent.' In the early 1990s, New York State recognized these
inherent benefits and began admitting the probative evidence in
judicial proceedings.
2. Despite these apparent benefits in criminal prosecutions, opponents to the
processes of DNA identification cite two main arguments against the admissibility of
findings in criminal proceedings. First, because DNA profiling is a long complex pro-
cess, opponents attack relaxed testing protocols that could lead to error. See ROBERT
J. GOODWIN & JIMMY GURULE, CRIMINAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 285 (1997).
Specifically, results are unreliable when mislabeling, contamination and comparison
negligence occurs. See id. One illustration of the call for quality control and profi-
ciency standards in laboratory DNA testing can be found in New York v. Castro, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985, 997-98 (Sup. Ct. 1989), where the court held DNA evidence in-
admissable because those testing the sample failed to follow appropriate standards
and controls.
Second, critics attack the accuracy of probability estimates concerning the chances
of another person having a similar genetic make-up as the accused. See id. The
probability figures, usually in the one-in-several million range, if wrongfully calcu-
lated, are "unreliable, misleading, and highly prejudicial." Id.
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In 1994, in People v. Wesley,3 the New York Court of Appeals
found Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP") 4 pro-
filing admissible in New York State. The court ruled that the
RFLP profiling method is generally accepted as reliable in the sci-
entific community,6 using a test for admissibility of novel scientific
evidence similar to that in Frye v. United States.7 The majority de-
cision noted that questions of procedural negligence and
probability inaccuracy were irrelevant to the issue of admissibility,
but instead, were matters for jury consideration.8
Seven months after Wesley, a New York trial court held that
Polymerse Chain Reaction ("PCR") 9 profiling techniques were
generally admissible in criminal proceedings in People v.
Palumbo."° Relying on universal acceptaoce in other jurisdic-
tions,1 the Palumbo court found the PCR test to be "generally ac-
3. 633 N.E.2d 451 (1994). This case involved the murder of seventy-nine year-old
Helen Kendrick. See id. at 453. The investigation of her death led to Wesley when a
bloodstained T-shirt with gray and white hairs on it, bloodstained underwear and
bloodstained sweatpants were found in the defendant's apartment. See id. DNA
comparisons provided inculpatory evidence, though the defendant was linked to the
crime through a number of incriminating statements and nylon from Wesley's carpet
found on the deceased's dress. See id. Wesley questioned whether DNA profiling
evidence was admissible in New York and, if so, whether it should have been admitted
against him. See id. at 452.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-52.
5. See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 455.
6. See id.
7. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The rule of Frye is that scientific expert testi-
mony is admissible only after the espoused theory has gained general acceptance in
the scientific field. See id. at 1014. Specifically, the Frye court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. The Wesley court felt Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(1993), which held that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, was
inapplicable here. See Wesley, 633 N.E.2d at 454 n.2.
8. See id. 457-58. In concurrence, Chief Judge Kaye disputed the finding that
RFLP was a reliable scientific technique in 1988, when conducted against Wesley. See
id. at 463 (Kaye, J., concurring).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 53-70.
10. 618 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1994). In a second-degree murder proceeding, the
defendant requested a determination on the admissibility of a DNA profile taken
using the PCR profiling method. See id. at 198.
11. See id. at 200-01 (citing Oregon v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1993);
Clarke v. Texas, 813 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Spencer v. Virginia, 393 S.E.2d
609 (1990); Washington v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)).
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cepted as reliable in the scientific community."12 The Palumbo
court further addressed opponents' concerns regarding probability
issues in stating "[t]hat the PCR test may only show that the de-
fendant and the assailant are part of a relatively large group of
people having the same characteristic goes to weight of the evi-
dence, not its admissibility."' 3
While generally admissible in New York State, however, DNA
evidence still generates heated debate, specifically over its use as
an identification tool in conjunction with technological revolutions.
In order for one to fully understand the relevant issues being
raised, an overview of DNA science and profiling techniques is
necessary.
A. Molecular Biology of DNA
DNA is the fundamental material that defines the genetic char-
acteristics of all life forms. 14 DNA is present in most body cells,
specifically those with nuclei, and can be carried in bodily fluids
such as saliva, blood or semen.'5 DNA sequences vary in length
and are composed of four organic bases, namely adenine ("A"),
cytosine ("C"), thymine ("T") and guanine ("G"), arranged in long
chains that form a double helix.' 6 Essentially, the structure resem-
bles a twisted ladder.' 7 The sides of the ladder consist of repeated
sequences of phosphate and deoxyribose sugar.' 8 The rungs of the
ladder are formed by pairs of the aforementioned bases.' 9 A single
DNA molecule consists of over three billion base pairs where A
matches only with T, while C exclusively pairs with G.2 ° Thus, if a
section of bases on one side of the ladder is ATTACAGGC, the
opposite side would be TAATGTCCG.2 '
12. Palumbo, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
13. Id.
14. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., Glossary in MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL
G-8 (3d ed. 1994) (defining DNA as "serv[ing] as the carrier of genetic information").
15. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 385 (2d ed.
1983); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (detailing the scientific
background behind the theory of DNA identification). Red blood cells, for instance,
which do not have nuclei, do not carry DNA. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988. Also,
DNA may be recoverable from other tissue through a cell's mitochondria. See Barry
Scheck, Privacy: The Impact of DNA Databases 33 (March 2, 1999) (transcript on file
with Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter Scheck Transcript].
16. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 15, at 99.
17. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
18. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
19. See id.
20. See Louis LEVINE, BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 11 (1969).
21. See id.
1638
1999] NEW YORK'S DNA DATABASE 1639
Over ninety-nine percent of the base pairs described are the
same in all humans, responsible for a human's inherent form.22
The remaining base pairs, however, vary from person to person,23
accounting for physical differences among humans that make each
24person unique.
B. DNA Profiling25
DNA profiling technology provides law enforcement officials
with a means of identifying individuals by detecting differences in
cell structure.26 DNA profiling involves three basic steps:
(i) an analysis of both the known sample (taken from the sus-
pect) and the unknown sample (recovered from the crime
scene) to derive a series of DNA patterns present in each; (ii) a
comparison of these profiles to determine if there is a match
(indicating that an identity of source is possible) or an exclusion
(indicating that such identity is unlikely); and (iii) if there is a
match, a statistical analysis to determine what proportion of per-
sons in the same population as the suspect have the same DNA
patterns. 27
22. See Judith A. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENIFIC EVIDENCE 273, 281 (1994); KEITH INMAN & No-
RAH RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 29 (1997).
23. While DNA is unique to each individual, identical twins, with the same genetic
make-up, will posses identical DNA. See McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 281.
24. See id. Within a cell's nucleus, DNA is apportioned into forty-six sections
called chromosomes. See SIMON EASTEAL ET AL., DNA PROFILING: PRINCIPLES PIT-
FALLS AND POTENTIAL 9 (1991). The ordinary human cell contains twenty-three pairs
of matching chromosomes, one chromosome per pair inherited from each parent. See
id. Each human cell actually contains the same twenty-two pairs of chromosomes and
a pair of sex chromosomes (male cells contain X and Y chromosomes, while female
cells contain two X chromosomes). See id. The portion of DNA involved in produc-
ing certain physical traits is called a gene. See McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 281.
Genes are located at specific sites, or loci, upon certain chromosomes. Alternate
forms of genes are known as alleles. See id. at 282. Alleles have a dramatic impact on
cells, accounting for variant physical expression among humans. See EASTEAL ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 12. A locus where the allele differ among humans is called
"polymorphic, and the difference is known as polymorphism." Mckenna et al., supra
note 22, at 282.
25. In 1984, Alec Jeffreys discovered a unique application of technology for
personal identification purposes. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 19. He
termed the method "DNA fingerprinting," but scientists generally agree a better term
for the process is "DNA typing" or "DNA profiling." See id.
26. See Mira Gur-Arie, The Science of DNA Profiling, in NEW YORK'S DNA
DATABANK AND COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, AN ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 737
OF THE LAWS OF 1994, INCLUDING THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE NEW STATUTORY
PROVISIONS 16 (1994) [hereinafter COMMISSION ANALYSIS].
27. Id. at 17 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN Fo-
RENSIC SCIENCE 51 (1992); Bruce S. Weir, Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA
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Identifying individuals for law enforcement purposes can be ac-
complished by utilizing one of several methods for comparing ge-
netic variation.28
1. RFLP Analysis
RFLP analysis determines the size of a repetitive sequence of
base pairs.29 "Because the length of these sequences (sometimes
called band size) of base pairs [can vary greatly] ... comparison of
several corresponding sequences of DNA from known (suspect)
and unknown [crime scene] sources gives information about
whether the two samples are from the same source. "30
In the first step of RFLP analysis, DNA is separated from a sam-
ple of cells through the use of a centrifuge. 31 After extraction, the
DNA is cleaned with organic solutions and divided into fragments
with restriction enzymes.32 Through a procedure called "agarose
gel electrophoresis," the fragments are then separated by length
and placed adjacent to a positive electrode in a container full of
agarose gel.33 Electric current is applied to the sample, causing
DNA fragments to separate by length.34
After electrophoresis, the resulting DNA fragments are trans-
ferred from the gel to a nylon membrane, through a process called
"Southern Blotting. ' ' 35 The DNA is then unzipped by "heating
[and] separating the double helix into single strands[,] ' '36 exposing
Debate, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 11, 654 (1992)); see also Arizona v. Bible, 858
P.2d 1152, 1180 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
28. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 17.
29. See M. KRAWCZAK & J. SCHMIDTKE, DNA FINGERPRINTING 27 (1994). Base
pair sequences consistently repeat. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALU-
ATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 14 (1996). The repetitive sequences are known as Varia-
ble Number of Tandem Repeats. See id.
30. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
31. See DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS: ISSUES 5
(1991) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS]. A centrifuge is "a machine [used] for
whirling fluids rapidly to separate substances of different densities by centrifugal
force." WEBSTER'S TIIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 363 (1986).
32. Restriction enzymes are virtual scissors used to cut DNA chains at specific
sites. This stage is known as restriction digestion. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra
note 26, at 18.
33. See id. Agarose Gel is a "gelatin-like material solidified in a slab about five
inches thick." McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
34. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. DNA carries a negative
charge and will, when electrocuted, move toward the positive electrode. See DEPART-
MENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5. The distance a single DNA fragment travels
depends on its length, as shorter fragments travel farther than longer, heavier frag-
ments. See id.
35. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
36. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 282.
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the A, T, C and G base blocks.37 Next, the unzipped fragments are
exposed to radioactive probes,38 "designed to be attracted only to
polymorphic DNA segments, those that vary somewhat among
individuals. 39
The radioactivity of the probes allows for visual tracking via X-
rays.40 When film is developed, bands called "autorads" are visi-
ble, representing an actual print of DNA band patterns.41 The final
stage of RFLP analysis involves band pattern comparison.42 "Ge-
netic differences between individuals will be identified by differ-
ences in the location and distribution of the band patterns, which
correspond to the length of the DNA fragments present."43 If two
samples are from the same source, "hybridized DNA fragments of
approximately the same length should appear at the same point in
the suspect and evidence specimen[s]. '44 This procedure, there-
fore, is not an actual comparison of genetic code, but is instead a
measure of length of DNA fragments at a particular site on the
DNA chain.45
RFLP analysis is a useful technique because it is capable of dis-
criminating between samples.46 If at different markers there is
band consistency, a high probability47 exists that the DNA came
37. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
38. The probes are laboratory developed fragments carrying radioactive markers.
See id. Each probe seeks out a matching sequence and binds to the complimentary
strands. See id.
39. COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. This process is known as "hy-
bridization." Id. The probes will seek out sequences with which they match and at-
tach themselves to the strand. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 5.
Therefore, a strand of "ATrGCA, for example, will bind with TAACGT." Id. at 6.
40. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
41. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. This image of bars is a com-
parable configuration to that found on a supermarket bar code. See INMAN & RUDIN,
supra note 22, at 65.
42. The autorads can be compared either visually or by computer. See COMMIS-
SION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. Machine comparison converts the bar pattern
into numeric code for purposes of analysis. See id.
43. DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
44. McKenna et al., supra note 22, at 283.
45. See COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 18. Each fragment tends to vary
in length among individuals. See id. While no single fragment is unique, an identical
combination of lengths is extremely rare. See id. When a match is made, therefore,
an estimate of the "frequency with which such a set of fragment length patterns is
likely to appear in a given population[ ]" is necessary to evaluate the significance of
the match. Id. at 18-19.
46. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 27.
47. A five marker match would indicate that the same pattern could only be found
in one-in-ten to one hundred million individuals. See id. at 27.
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from the same source, thereby identifying a suspect.48 Moreover,
matching more bands increases the discrimination power of the
analysis.4 9 Conversely, inconsistency at markers is dispositive that
the suspect should be excluded.5°
One potential drawback to RFLP analysis is that a sufficient
sample size is required to initiate the process. 1 Similarly, older
samples cannot be utilized via this process because bacteria eats
away at the DNA sample, rendering it useless for identification
purposes.52
2. PCR Technique
PCR is another effective identification technique available when
there is an insufficient amount of DNA for RFLP analysis.53 Es-
sentially, the process replicates a minuscule DNA sample to enable
genetic analysis.54
The first step, called denaturation, involves separating the two
strands of the double helix so each can be used to generate a new
strand.55 Next, DNA primers56 are used to establish a foundation
on which DNA can replicate.5 1 The primers must have a compli-
mentary sequence of bases to the sample so that synthesis is possi-
ble. 8 An enzyme is applied to the sample, causing the primers to
synthesize with their complimentary strands.5 9 This process is per-
formed over and over, resulting in millions of copies of DNA iden-
48. See id. A commonly misunderstood point is that a DNA match via RFLP is
not a declaration that a defendant is the source of the specimen tested. See COMMIS-
SION ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 19. Rather, the match of a DNA profile is merely an
estimate of the frequency "with which this particular pattern of fragment lengths is
likely to occur in the defendant's relevant ethnic population." Id.
49. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 27.
50. See id. at 28.
51. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 69.
52. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 28.
53. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6. Another benefit of using this
technique compared to RFLP is that one sample can be tested several times. See
Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 30. Comparatively, RFLP analysis usually only
permits but one test if a limited sample is present. See id. at 28.
54. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 129.
55. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 69. Separating the double helix re-
quires heating the sample to 94°C. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 129.
56. Primers are "short synthetic pieces of DNA that match defined locations by
complimentary base pairing." INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70.
57. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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tical to the original sample.60 Finally, DNA is placed in a filter to
evaluate the amplified sample.61
One manner of analysis is the DQ Alpha technique. Under this
process, the amplified DNA sample is placed over strips of probes
containing DNA segments corresponding to a base known to exist
at the studied site.62 A reagent is then applied that produces
colored dots to appear where binding is successful between the am-
plified DNA and the probe DNA, confirming the presence of
targeted alleles.63 Because a high percentage of the population
may carry a given allele,64 the analysis must be completed several
times at different loci to narrow the percentage of people that
could carry the fragments present in the DNA sample. 65 The prob-
lem with this technique, therefore, is its lack of discrimination, rais-
ing concerns over a coincidental match.66
Another analytic technique is the D1S80 method. Similar to
RFLP, D1S80 analyzes the variation present at a given locus of a
defined DNA fragment.67 However, because the sample size is
small, it is amplified using PCR.68 Like RFLP, D1S80 distinguishes
the sample manually using a chart resembling a supermarket
barcode. 69 Because only a limited number of loci are analyzed
under this system, the power of discrimination is not as great as
that of RFLP.7 °
3. Mitochondrial DNA
While both the RFLP and PCR methods analyze genetic mate-
rial residing within a cell's nucleus, other bits of genetic material
60. The process is also known as "molecular Xeroxing" because of this duplication
effect. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70.
61. See People v. Lee, 537 N.W.2d 233, 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
62. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 70-71.
63. This comparison process is therefore known as "reverse-dot blot procedure or
the blue-dot procedure." Lee, 537 N.W.2d at 251.
64. At any given locus, for example, there may be alleles resulting merely in
brown or green eyes. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 6.
65. See id.
66. This method guarantees only that one of every 5000 individuals will posses this
genetic make-up. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 31.
67. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 47.
68. However, unlike RFLP, the power of discrimination is limited because usually
only one locus is analyzed. See id.
69. See id. Another comparison method, Short Tandem Repeats (STR) is strik-
ingly similar to the D1S80 system, except repeat units are shorter. See id. at 48.
70. Also, the significance of the test may be further reduced if it analyzes alleles
common among individuals in particular racial groups. See id. at 47.
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exist in a cell's mitochondria.71 The main advantage of analyzing
mitochondrial DNA ("mDNA") is that it is available in hair and
bone, materials that would prove useless with other testing tech-
niques.72 However, discrimination is a substantial problem because
mDNA, transmitted maternally, is identical in siblings and between
mother and child.73
C. DNA Databases
DNA evidence has limited use as an identification tool without
the utilization of a computer database. 4 A DNA database is a
computerized collection of DNA profiles capable of being used for
criminal identification purposes.75 DNA profiles are ideal for such
storage because the information can be stored in numeric code,
thereby requiring minimal technology.76 Essentially, a DNA test
result derived from a crime scene sample can be checked against
the digital profiles stored in the database.77 Any matches made
with database profiles can then be used as probable cause to obtain
a sample from a suspect for further testing.78 This procedure
guards against sampling errors that could have occurred during
data entry.79
71. Mitochondria are subcellular compartments or organelles that supply power to
the cell. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 72.
72. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 34.
73. See EASTEAL ET AL., supra note 24, at 136.
74. Without the use of random DNA profiles to check it against, a sample of DNA
recovered from a crime scene would only be valuable if there were a suspect in cus-
tody who provided a sample matching the unknown sample. See generally KRAW-
CZAK & SCHMIDTKE, supra note 29, at 93 (acknowledging the limited impact of DNA
evidence in a criminal justice system that does not utilize databases). Therefore, with-
out other evidence at a crime scene that produces a suspect, DNA evidence has little
value. See id.
75. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 133.
76. See id. at 134. While DNA databases store the computerized DNA profile of
an individual, the genetic samples from which the profiles are derived are often also
kept in storage for future analysis. See Jean M. McEwen, DNA Databanks, in GE-
NETIC SECRETS 231 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
77. See DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 25. This process is inherently
similar to the one currently used to track latent fingerprints. See INMAN & RUDIN,
supra note 22, at 133. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) con-
tains millions of citizens' fingerprints on computer file. See id. Fingerprints, like
DNA, are unique to the individual and do not change over the course of one's life.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 57. Prints dusted at crime
scenes can, therefore, be compared with those in the system to generate suspects or
lead to convictions. See id.
78. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 22, at 134.
79. See id.
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1. Current State Laws on Criminal DNA Databases
As of June 1998, all fifty states have passed legislation to create
state DNA databases."' Generally, these laws require designated
offenders to provide a genetic sample 81 for inclusion in the state
DNA bank.82 States usually cite the assistance of law enforcement
in identification and detection or exclusion of individuals under
criminal investigation as the main purpose of database legislation.83
The scope of criminals included in DNA databases varies from
state to state. Most statutes simply require a DNA sample from
persons convicted of sex offenses and violent felonies.84 Mean-
80. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1101 (Michie
1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-
201(5)(g)(I) (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West 1994); DEL. CODE
ArN. tit. 29, § 4713 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-4-60 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-
5504 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
9-8 (West 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 13.10 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511
(1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:605 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1573 (West 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 3 (Law.
Co-op. 1997); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520m (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 299C.155 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-15 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 650.050 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
4104 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0913 (Michie 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:22 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.17 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-
16-2 (Michie 1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
266 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-05 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07
(West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.085
(1998); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7651.302 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-4
(1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-600 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-
14 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-113 (1991); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 411.141 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 1931 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.43.752 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-1 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.77
(West 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-402 (Michie 1997).
81. Some states require a blood sample for testing. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 706-603(b) (Michie 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584.A.2 (West 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(1)(a) (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1992); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 995-7 (McKinney 1994). Others, alternatively, call for a saliva swab.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(a)(1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(7)
(Michie 1994).
82. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 232.
83. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(2) (Michie 1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 44.41.035(a) (Michie 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.175(2) (Banks-Baldwin
1992).
84. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603(3) (Michie 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-2511(a) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103(10-11) (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:1-20.20(a) (West 1994); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c.3. (McKinney 1994).
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while, other states have increased the legislative scope to include
persons convicted of any felony. 5
2. National DNA Database Policy
The federal government also has taken steps in conjunction with
states to apply technology to national criminal investigations. The
DNA Identification Act of 199486 authorized the FBI to establish
the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS").87 CODIS is a
three-tiered 88 computer system used to facilitate the exchange of
DNA profile information across the nation.89 The national tier of
the CODIS network, the National DNA Index System ("NDIS"),
is "a repository for DNA profiles submitted by participating states.
The NDIS allows states to exchange DNA profiles and perform
inter-state [searches]." 9 To aid in administration, DNA profiles
are stored in three indices: convicted offenders, unknown suspects
and a population file used for statistical purposes. 91 States there-
fore are not limited to their own databases, and can search more
effectively for suspects who cross state lines.92
85. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-1
(1995).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (1994).
87. See id. § 14132.
88. CODIS' three hierarchical levels include local, state and national tiers. See
What's the Difference Between NDIS and CODIS (visited Jan 20, 1999) <http://
www.fbi.gov/pressrel/diff> [hereinafter FBI Release]. All three contain DNA
profiles, but each are flexible to meet the specific legislative or technical needs of
state and local enforcement agencies. See id. The Local DNA Index System (LDIS)
is "installed at crime laboratories operated by police departments or sheriff's offices.
All DNA profiles originate at the local level, then flow to the state and national
levels." Id. The State DNA Index System ("SDIS"), "allows laboratories within a
state to exchange DNA profiles. The SDIS is also the communications path between
the local and national tiers. The SDIS is typically operated by the agency responsible
for implementing as a state convicted offender statute." Id.
89. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 233.
90. FBI Release, supra note 88.
91. See Howard Safir, Remarks to the Students of Bronx High School of Science
(Dec. 14, 1998) at 9-10 (transcript on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal) [herein-
after Safir's Plan].
92. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 233. For example, in December 1997, within
minutes of networking eight states into CODIS, a perpetrator in a 1989 Wisconsin
rape and attempted murder was identified as a convicted Illinois sex offender. See
Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 10. Also, by September 1996, databases accounted for
matching 58 profiles where unknown DNA from a crime scene was found to be the
same as a criminal profile of a known offender in another state. See McEwen, supra
note 76, at 233.
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3. More Intrusive DNA Databases
The theory behind more expansive databases, storing the profiles
of all those arrested, is not an unprecedented concept. Great Brit-
ain currently permits its law enforcement officials to collect non-
intimate samples, such as hair and saliva, from all individuals ar-
rested for a recordable offense.9 3
The British system, operational since April 1995, has met with
resounding investigative success.94 Approximately 135,000 samples
were collected within the system's first year95 and 463,000 samples
currently are included. 96 To date, over 38,000 suspect to crime
matches have been obtained in investigations, with a success rate of
three to five hundred matches per week.97 Over the last five years,
40,000 crimes have been solved with the help of DNA database
profiles and more than 51,000 suspects have been exonerated.98
Additionally, over 6,000 links have been made between separate
crime scenes, proving crimes were being committed by the same
individual. 99 These statistics exemplify the investigative benefits
offered by an expansive DNA database.
D. Safir's Proposal
On December 14, 1998, New York City Police Commissioner
Howard Safir launched a bold campaign to widen the scope of New
York's compulsory DNA statute to encompass aspects of Great
Britain's system.100 Safir's plan calls for the universal DNA testing
93. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, Pt. IV, § 55 (1994) (Eng.). The
samples taken include non-intimate tissue such as hair or saliva. Louisiana also au-
thorized a similar system to begin in the Fall of 1999. See Eric Fettmann, Isn't Crime
the Worst Privacy Invasion of Al1?, N.Y. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at 81.
94. In addition to using its database, Great Britain also practices "Bloodings" in
circumstances where an offender is known to live among a certain population. Law
enforcement officials will collect blood from every person in the area to ferret out the
guilty. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 42. Such DNA samples, however, are
not placed into the State databank. See id.
95. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 236.
96. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 45.
97. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13. The greatest number of hits in a week
was over 1000. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 47.
98. See Today: Police Commissioner Howard Safir and Norman Siegel of New
York Civil Liberties Union Debate Proposed Policy of Taking DNA Sample and Other
Tests on Everyone Arrested in New York City (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 15,
1998) [hereinafter Today Debate] (quoting Safir's comments on Great Britain's inves-
tigation success).
99. See Fettmann, supra note 93, at 81.
100. Safir introduced the initiative for the first time while addressing the students
of the Bronx High School of Science. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 1.
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of all those arrested so that the individual's DNA can be included
in a DNA database.10' If passed, such an amendment would ex-
pand section 995 of the New York Executive Law,0 2 which cur-
rently permits involuntary DNA samples to be taken from
designated offenders for inclusion into a statewide database. 3
This DNA database includes DNA identification information from
persons convicted of assault, homicide and certain sex offenses. 4
In short, Safir's plan is to begin taking DNA samples from all
individuals arrested for a recordable offense, as opposed to limiting
testing to designated offenders under section 995.105 Under the
proposal, police would swab a suspect's mouth for about thirty
seconds to collect DNA present in saliva.' 6 The DNA sample
would then be used to create a computerized DNA profile, which
would then be stored in a statewide database. This information
would aid in suspect identification by matching genetic material
found at crime scenes against a pool of known offenders, similar to
the method currently employed in matching latent fingerprints
against criminal records. 0 7 According to Safir, creation of a uni-
versal DNA database will enable police to narrow the field of pos-
sible suspects in a crime more quickly (exposing the guilty and
exonerating the innocent), efficiently arrest repeat offenders and
save costs.
10 8
Meanwhile, Safir assures steps would be taken to minimize the
risk of abuse of the collected specimens. 10 9 First, the computerized
DNA profile would be expunged and the DNA sample destroyed
upon acquittal or pardon of an offense. 10 Second, access to the
database would be limited so the information could not be misap-
101. See id.
102. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1994).
103. See id. § 995-c.3.
104. See id. § 995.7.; see also supra note 1 (detailing specific offenses enumerated
within the statute). This current program covers only eight percent of felony offend-
ers. See Gary Spencer, Action Predicted on Bills on DNA, Ending Parole, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 8, 1999, at 7. Blood samples have been taken from about 6000 offenders since
the program began in 1996. See id.
105. See Today Debate, supra note 98. Safir wants to assure the public that unre-
cordable offenses, such as traffic infractions, would not fall within the scope of this
proposal. See id.
106. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
107. See Spencer, supra note 104, at 7.
108. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 14-17.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
110. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
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propriated, but instead used exclusively for law enforcement iden-
tification purposes."'
Publicly, Safir's plan has been met with mixed reaction. New
York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani wholly endorses the plan as a
novel, effective law enforcement tool." 2 A number of other politi-
cians likewise support the program, but to varying degrees. 113 For
instance, some would simply prefer to expand the statute to include
DNA from only convicted felons, and not those convicted of all
offenses as Safir suggests."14 On the other hand, some are ada-
mantly opposed to amending the statute altogether." 5
II. Conflict Surrounding Safir's Plan
A. Constitutional Argument Against Safir's Plan
Opponents of DNA extraction for use in a universal database
argue that the procedure violates the Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches and seizures on the grounds that
such bodily searches are conducted in the absence of individualized
suspicion." 6 For instance, Norman Siegel, executive director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union contends that the practice is un-
constitutional because "in order to get DNA under the Fourth
111. See id.
112. See Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani: Celebrating Our Progress in Building a
Safer City, and Moving Forward (WINS Radio Broadcast, Jan. 3, 1999) (visited Jan.
14, 1999) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/htm/99a/me990103.html>. Specifically,
Mayor Giuliani stated:
[A] few weeks ago Police Commissioner Safir called for what we believe can
be another important tool to continue reducing crime in the City: DNA test-
ing. Sampling the DNA of all those who are arrested-through a very simple,
non-invasive procedure that involves briefly placing a swab in the mouth to
collect saliva is essentially a more advanced and more precise form of finger-
printing. In concert with strict privacy protections so that the process cannot
be misused, DNA represents an important new tool in policing that can help
convict the guilty and, equally important, keep the innocent free.
Id.
113. For example, State Senator Roy Goodman hails the proposal as offering a
high-tech crimefighting tool. Senator Goodman states, "This is a better fingerprint.
Call it a throat print. I think it makes all sorts of sense." Tracey Tilly, Dem[ocrat]s
Rip Safir's DNA Plan, Pol[itician]s See 'Police State' Tactic, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
16, 1998, at 8.
114. State Senator Dale Volker feels Safir's idea has a more realistic chance of be-
coming law if it limits DNA testing to suspects arrested on felony charges. See Mat-
thew Cox, Cool Response to Safir DNA Plan, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1998, at A30.
New York Governor George Pataki plans to propose such an idea alongside Safir's
Plan to the State Assembly. See Spencer, supra note 104, at 7.
115. See infra text accompanying note 117.
116. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992); Boling v. Romer, 101
F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1996); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1081 (1993).
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Amendment, [the government] would have to show that the gath-
ering of the DNA is relevant to the crime. That means that [the
government has] to show that there was blood, semen, [or] saliva at
the crime scene in order to make the match." '117 Proponents of
such plans, however, observe that if individualized suspicion must
exist before a suspect is required to submit a sample, an effective
DNA database would be impossible to implement. 8 DNA
databases refute the idea of individualized suspicion because the
collection of samples is intended to "solve future cases for which
no present suspicion can exist."'1 9
1. The Fourth Amendment Standard
The primary function of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure a
citizen's personal privacy against unwarranted State intrusions.'
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
... particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." '12 This federal guarantee also prohib-
its unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by state officers
via the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 To prove an action violates
Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, one must first show that the
government action constituted a search, then prove it lacked the
requisite amount of reasonableness.
2. The Search Requirement
Implication of Fourth Amendment protection first requires the
determination of whether a government official's action constitutes
a search. 23 In Katz v. United States,124 the Supreme Court intro-
117. Today Debate, supra note 98.
118. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 305.
119. Id.
120. See United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1975); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (holding that "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth [Amendment], it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of ex-
clusion as is used against the Federal Government").
123. See Hon Charles E. Moylan, Jr., A Conceptualization of the Fourth Amend-
ment, in WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK, A
CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONs 6 (1995).
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duced the appropriate standard as to what actiofis constitute a
"search" within the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. 125 The
Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 26
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan refined the Court's analy-
sis, defining a "search" as a government intrusion into an area
where an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy. "127
Given this framework, the Supreme Court has determined the
withdrawal of blood to be a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 28 Specifically, in Schmerber v. California,29 the Court de-
finitively stated, "[i]t could not reasonably be argued ... that the
administration of the blood test in this case was free of the con-
straints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly
constitute searches ... within the meaning of that Amendment."'130
124. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125. In Katz, FBI agents, without first obtaining a warrant, used electronic eaves-
dropping equipment to record Charles Katz's conversation in a public telephone
booth. Officials recorded Katz's voice as he transmitted wagering information over
the telephone. It was clear the agents violated Katz's Fourth Amendment rights be-
cause they did not obtain a court order for placement of the equipment. The issue,
however, was whether the Fourth Amendment even covered such a situation without
a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. See Katz v. United States,
369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
126. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court then found "[t]he Government's activi-
ties in electronically listening to and recording [Katz's] words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted
a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353.
127. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
128. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Supreme
Court held a state could withdraw blood from a motorist suspected of drunk driving,
despite his refusal to consent to the search. See id. at 758-59. The Court felt the
action did not violate the motorist's Fourth Amendment rights because the Fourth
Amendment's proper use is to protect only against intrusions that are not justified
under the circumstances or made in an improper manner. See id. at 768. The blood
test was performed properly, "taken by a physician in a hospital environment accord-
ing to accepted medical practices." Id. at 771. The intrusion, meanwhile, was classi-
fied as insignificant since "tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical
examination and experience with them teaches that the quality of blood extracted is
minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain." Id.
129. See id. at 757.
130. Id. at 767.
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Since Schmerber, the withdrawal of blood consistently is referred
to as a "search.' 131
Collection and analysis of urine similarly has been deemed a
Fourth Amendment search by the Court.13 2 In Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 33 the Supreme Court announced, "it is
clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expecta-
tions of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable...
and.., these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment.' 34 Skinner further documents unanimous recogni-
tion of this principle among the Federal Courts of Appeals.135
3. The Reasonableness Requirement
Finding a practice to be a "search" under the Fourth Amend-
ment is only the first step toward setting the standard governing
such intrusions.'36 "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all
searches and seizures but only those that are unreasonable.' '1 37
131. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
("We have long recognized that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be
analyzed for alcohol content' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search."); Win-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (reaffirming the Schmerber analysis); Rise v.
Oregon, 59 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Non-consensual extraction of blood im-
plicated Fourth Amendment privacy rights."); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th
Cir. 1992) (noting that "the bodily intrusion resulting from taking a blood sample
constitutes a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment").
132. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. In Skinner, the Court upheld the Federal Rail-
road Administration's drug and alcohol tests as constitutional. See id. at 634. The
Court concluded the testing was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the
absence of a search warrant or reasonable suspicion of any particular employee due to
the compelling government interest served by the mandate, which outweighed the
voiced privacy concerns. See id.
133. See id. at 602.
134. Id. at 617.
135. See id. (citing, for example, Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th
Cir. 1988); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1143 (3d Cir. 1988);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1987)).
136. See id., at 618-19; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
137. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682
(1985)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). This reasonableness re-
quirement arises from the Constitutional language itself. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
(guaranteeing security against "unreasonable searches and seizures"). Schmerber also
articulately stresses the need for a reasonable search:
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the cir-
cumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the
question[ ] we must decide in this case [is] ... whether the means and proce-
dures employed in [the search] respected relevant Fourth Amendment stan-
dards of reasonableness.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
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Reasonableness "depends on all of the circumstances surrounding
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure it-
self. ' 138 Therefore, the viability of a search "'is judged by balanc-
ing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' ,139
The Skinner4 ° Court recognized that in most criminal cases the
aforementioned balance is struck by requiring a search warrant in
the Fourth Amendment.' 4' When non-consensual extraction of
bodily fluids is performed without a warrant or individualized sus-
picion, the Court demands that the state have "'special needs' be-
yond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements." '142 Specifically,
the Court stressed:
[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional
floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In
limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important government in-
terest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be rea-
sonable despite the absence of such suspicion. 143
B. Potential for Misuse of Obtained Information
In addition to the documented constitutional arguments,'144 op-
ponents of DNA databanking also highlight the serious risk of
abusing the vast amount of information available in an individual's
138. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 337 ("[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes
place.").
139. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979)); see also, T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 337; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979);
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992).
140. 489 U.S. at 602.
141. See id. at 619.
142. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)). See
supra note 132 (summarizing Skinner). The Court stated the scrutinized regulation
furthered the government's special need to prevent accidents and casualties in rail-
road operations that result from railroad employees under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21. Once this "special need" for testing was
found, the Court concluded the warrant requirement in this case would not further
traditional purposes of a warrant because drugs and alcohol dissipate quickly from the
body. See id. at 623. Requiring a warrant would, therefore, frustrate the govern-
ment's interest in the search. See id.
143. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
144. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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DNA.145 The DNA of an individual, serving as the human code, 46
is a virtual blueprint of genetic make-up that carries a map of that
person's biological past and future. 147 Opponents cite numerous
instances where such information, when misappropriated, can be
used for nefarious purposes. 148 For instance, some are concerned
that employers would use private genetic information in a discrimi-
natory manner. 149 Also, there is a fear that insurance companies
might use the information of disease propensity to raise health in-
surance premiums or deny coverage altogether. 50 Even the gov-
ernment is cited as a potential candidate for misappropriation of
the information. 151 These arguments are further supplemented by
Justice Brennan's152 concurrence in Whalen v. Roe, 153 stating pro-
145. See C. Teddy Li, Boling v. Romer: Federal Courts Condone Forced Withdrawal
of Blood for DNA Databanks Despite Constitutional Concerns, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL'y 421, 431 (1998) (citing Yale H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Databanks:
Revolution for Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L.
461, 462 (1995)).
146. See id.
147. See Karen Ann Jensen, Note, Genetic Privacy in Washington State: Policy
Considerations and a Model Genetic Privacy Act, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 357, 359-60
(1997). This commentary utilizes the term "future diary", which is applicable to the
instant contentions. See id. at 360. Acknowledging a diary contains past information
of a personal and private nature, genetic information stored in DNA can be called a
"future diary" because it carries information about future health. See id.
148. See Fettmann, supra note 93, at 81.
149. See Kathy Day, Genetic Testing Leads to Discrimination Questions, SAN Di-
EGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 4, 1992, at 1 (raising the issue of whether employers
who possess knowledge of an individual's high susceptibility to an occupational dis-
ease would deny a job); see also Michael Kirby, Genetic Testing and Discrimination:
The Development of Genetic Testing Confronts Humanity with Urgent Challenges,
UNESCO COURIER, May 1, 1998, at 29 (stressing that an employer's desire to know
of a worker's disease susceptibility in light of potential costs such as disability bene-
fits, sick leave and replacement pay).
150. See Kirby, supra, note 149, at 29. Insurance in the past was relatively fixed by
analyzing the risks of the "onset of a multitude of genetic disorders amongst all mem-
bers of the insuring public." Id. Kirby argues that now the insurance company will
gain an upper hand in offering higher premiums or flatly denying coverage because of
the availability of particular genetic information of inherited orders. See id. Insurers
merely argue they should be able to obtain such information because it is merely
"substituting the latest scientific information for the old-fashioned medical check-ups
and replacing generalized data of life expectancy with accurate predictive data of ge-
netic disorders." Id.
151. See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded
'Future Diaries', 270 JAMA 2346, 2348 (1993). Annas envisions law enforcement or
child protection agencies using DNA information to ensure parents of children with
inherent genetic conditions are providing proper medical care. See id.
152. See id. at 2346.
153. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). This case concerned an action brought by physicians and
patients challenging a New York statute requiring the state to be provided with a copy
of a prescription for certain drugs. See id. The Court held the statute to be a reason-
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phetically: "The central storage and easy accessibility of computer-
ized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that
information, and I am not prepared to say that future develop-
ments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such
technology."' 54
While "genetic redlining' 1 55 may be easy to dismiss as an alarm-
ist or extremist reaction, 56 a simple look at American genetic prac-
tices over the last century illustrate why there is a cause for
concern. During the 1920s, for example, strong judicial support
was lent to the eugenics movement, calling for sterilization of citi-
zens deemed undesirable. 57 Specifically, the Supreme Court up-
held a Virginia statute compelling sterilization for those judged to
be "manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.'1 58
Evidence of genetic redlining is not so dated, however. In fact,
during the 1970s, states enacted legislation to identify carriers of
the sickle cell anemia gene to discourage them from bearing chil-
dren.159 African-Americans, as the primary carriers of the gene,
immediately felt discriminatory repercussions in the form of de-
creased job opportunities and higher insurance premiums. 60
III. Analysis
A. DNA Extraction Under Safir's Plan is a Search Within the
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
Under the analyses of Schmerber and Skinner, Safir's plan, call-
ing for swabbing an accused's cheek to obtain a saliva sample for
DNA analysis,' 6 ' should be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.
able exercise of the state's broad police power, responding to concerns that drugs
were being appropriated for unlawful use. See id.
154. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. "Genetic Redlining" is "differentiated treatment based on apparent or per-
ceived human variation." Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling:
Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465,
534 (1990).
156. See Today Debate, supra note 98. (including Safir's classification of the liberal
view as "alarmist").
157. See Hoeffel, supra note 155, at 534 (citing PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 124 (1977)).
158. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
159. See Hoeffel, supra note 155, at 534.
160. See id. at 534-35; see also Day, supra note 149, at 1 (describing how the identi-
fication of sickle cell anemia carriers led to exclusion of opportunities in the military
from amphibious and flight assignments).
161. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
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Although a relatively new analysis, 62 saliva sampling is favorably
comparable with the testing of blood and urine.163 First, the proce-
dure involves an intrusion reaching "beyond the physical charac-
teristics exposed to the public and into the security of the
person.' '164 Second, a saliva sample can, like blood and urine, pro-
vide significant amounts of genetic identity information. 65 Over
the last decade, courts utilized these factors in asserting that an
oral swabbing procedure, like the one suggested by Safir, impli-
cates the Fourth Amendment. 66 At least one New York Federal
District Court is among those in compliance. 67
B. Safir's Plan is Reasonable
Because saliva extraction can be considered a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, the next question is whether the practice is
reasonable and can be answered by balancing the intrusion against
the promotion of legitimate government interests. The constitu-
tional challenge to DNA databanks consistently has been over-
ruled through consideration of a number of factors. Limited
privacy rights, strong government interest and minimal bodily in-
trusion each prove the validity of the practice in question.
162. See Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (commenting that
while no court to date had explicitly held saliva extraction to be a Fourth Amendment
search, this court would make the assertion).
163. See Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 255.
164. Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 253 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)).
165. See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55.
166. See Shelton v. Gundmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (involv-
ing swabbing the inside of an individual's mouth cheek with a sponge-like tooth-
brush); Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55 (assuming the saliva sample would be obtained by
swabbing the inside of the subject's mouth with a pad of some sort).
167. See Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. at 55. This case involved a prosecution for sending
threatening communications through the mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. See id.
at 51. The government obtained a "so-ordered" subpoena directing the accused to
provide a saliva sample. See id. The defendant refused, claiming the prosecution
must first obtain a valid search warrant in conformance with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. See id. The District Court was asked to decide whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to the ability of the Government to obtain saliva samples.
See id. The court held that, in light of the facts that the search implicated a dignity
interest by swabbing the inside of the defendant's mouth and the sample can provide
a significant amount of genetic information not within the public domain, proper com-
pliance with the Fourth Amendment is necessary. See id. at 55.
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1. Limited Privacy Right Upon Arrest
In Jones v. Murray,168 perhaps the definitive authority on the
constitutionality of body fluid extraction for use in DNA
databases, 169 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the
DNA testing statute in question did not violate an inmate's Fourth
Amendment privacy right.170 The court reasoned, in part: "prob-
able cause had already supplied the basis for bringing the person
within the criminal justice system. With the person's loss of liberty
upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to per-
sonal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.' 71
The Supreme Court has recognized this principal in holding both
body cavity searches of prisoners172  and penitentiary cell
searches 73 constitutional. Accordingly, while a free citizen need
not expect such routine searches, that same individual cannot raise
privacy objections upon arrest. 74
2. Strong Government Interest
Upon arrest, a suspect's identification becomes a matter of legiti-
mate state interest, relevant to solving the crime for which the
arrest took place and for establishing a record to aid in solving past
and future crimes. 75 As such, criminals remain willing to take cer-
tain steps to hamper positive identification by law enforcement of-
ficials by disguising faces, changing names or even altering
168. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992). This case involved the challenge that a Virginia
statute requiring DNA testing for all felons violated the individual's civil rights. See
id. at 305.
169. See State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085 (1993) ("Jones v. Murray ... is persua-
sive authority for the proposition that drawing of blood from convicted felons to es-
tablish a DNA data bank for use in future prosecution of recidivist acts does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.").
170. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 311.
171. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
172. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, prisoners in a federal peniten-
tiary questioned the constitutionality of visual body cavity searches in light of their
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 558. The Court upheld the searches, concluding
the limited privacy rights of prisoners to be outweighed substantially by the govern-
ments' need for penal security. See id. at 559.
173. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson, an inmate brought an
action against an officer for destruction of his property during a prison cell search.
See id. at 520. In rejecting the prisoner's claim, the Court declared: "[W]e conclude
that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells[.]" Id. at
530.
174. See James P. O'Brien, Jr., Note, DNA Fingerprinting: The Virginia Approach,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 801-2 (1994).
175. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.
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features.176 As the Jones court reasons, however, DNA databases
can play a pivotal role in aiding officials with legitimate pursuit of
suspect identification:
DNA... is claimed to be unique to each individual and cannot,
within current scientific knowledge, be altered. The individual-
ity of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law en-
forcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even
a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match
that [he] ... left at the scene of a crime within samples of blood,
skin, semen, or hair follicles. The governmental justification,....
therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from that tra-
ditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, but
with additional force because of the potentially greater precision
of DNA sampling and matching methods.177
Along with the government's interest in identification, deter-
rence of both criminal and harmful actions is also a documented
government interest in DNA databanking. 178 DNA databases can
address this national interest by serving as a significant deterrent
against recidivist activity.179 In theory, those with prior arrests who
previously submitted a DNA sample would be deterred from fu-
ture criminal behavior due to an increase in likelihood of capture
accompanying the strong identification power of DNA evidence. 80
3. Minor Intrusion in DNA Extraction
The bodily intrusion requested under Safir's plan, namely ex-
tracting DNA with a swab of the oral cavity to obtain a saliva sam-
ple,"" must be evaluated -against the aforementioned governmental
interests. In People v. Wealer,8 2 upholding a correctional code
provision for mandatory blood and saliva sampling from state pris-
oners, the court presented a persuasive argument about the intru-
176. See id. at 307.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21
(1989) (upholding mandatory drug testing of railroad employees because of the im-
portance of preventing harmful accidents and casualties); National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (highlighting the need for sober customs
officials to protect national borders from contraband smuggling).
179. See State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085-86 (1993) (disclosing the rationale be-
hind the Virginia compulsory DNA statute at issue in Jones).
180. Accord O'Brien, supra note 174, at 797 (asserting that "DNA fingerprints on
file ... deter future criminal behavior and ... increase the likelihood of capturing
repeat offenders").
181. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
182. 636 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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sive levels of saliva extraction.'83 The Wealer court reasoned the
procedure involved in taking saliva samples is inherently less intru-
sive than that required for extracting blood.1 84 Therefore, if taking
blood samples withstands constitutional scrutiny, taking saliva sam-
ples likewise is reasonable. 185 It thus follows that if blood sampling
no longer is to be considered an overly intrusive procedure, 86 sa-
liva sampling cannot be an inherently violative process either.187
C. Safeguards Can Protect Against Misuse of Information
Learning valuable lessons from the dark moments of genetic red-
lining in American history, legislators may consider several alterna-
tives to ensure DNA information stored in a database will only be
used for the stated purposes.
1. Unambigtuous Legislative Drafting
Clear, unambiguous legislation such as the DNA Identification
Act of 1994,188 is one solution.18 9 This particular federal law pro-
vides that the results of DNA tests performed for a federal law
enforcement agency may be disclosed only to criminal justice agen-
cies for the purpose of law enforcement identification, 9 ° judicial
183. See id. at 1132.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 131, at 771 (chronicling reasons why blood testing is not an
overly intrusive procedure).
187. See Wealer, 636 N.E.2d at 1136. Where blood testing involves actually piercing
skin, a saliva extraction gently swabs the inside of an individual's mouth cheek to gain
the necessary sample. See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
Similarly, an argument can be made that the swabbing procedure is less physically
intrusive than the constitutionally protected fingerprinting process. While swabbing
invades the oral cavity, it is a quick, pain-free action. During fingerprinting, however,
arestees may need to be physically guided to mark the inkpad and print card. Accord
People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 924 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917) (acknowledging the consti-
tutionality of the fingerprinting process while stressing the importance of an arestee's
freedom from torture or duress). This ordeal presents a constitutional physical intru-
sion greater than swabbing for saliva.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (1995).
189. See Annas, supra note 151, at 2349 ("[D]ata protection principles suggest that
there should be... stringent rules for the ... distribution of... information derived
from [DNA molecules] because of the unique characteristics of genetic information,
including the fact that DNA molecules contain an individual's probabilistic future
diary.").
190. 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(1)(A).
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proceedings,' 9 ' criminal defense, 92 inclusion in a population statis-
tics database, identification research and protocol development for
quality control. 93 The DNA Identification Act then outlines spe-
cific penalties for unauthorized disclosure of DNA information
available in a federal database and for unauthorized possession of
DNA samples indexed in a database or individually identifiable
DNA information. 194 Violation of any of these mandates may be
punishable with a fine up to 100,000 dollars. 95 States, including
New York, with DNA databank statutes in place have modeled
their legislation to mirror the federal act in this regard.196 In draft-
ing more expansive legislation to replace section 995, New York
could easily pattern the statute to reflect that currently in place. 97
2. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Anti-discrimination legislation is another alternative to combat
genetic redlining. 198 For example, New York amended its anti-dis-
crimination laws to deem it an unlawful, discriminatory practice for
an employer to refuse employment or to discharge an employee
based on "genetic predisposition or carrier status."'199 The specter
191. Results of DNA tests performed for law enforcement purposes may be dis-
closed in judicial proceedings only if "otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable
statutes or rules." Id. § 14133(b)(1)(B).
192. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(C).
193. Test results may only be used for these three purposes where personal identifi-
able information is removed. See id. § 14133(b)(2).
194. See id. § 14133(c)(1)-(2).
195. See id.
196. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:612, 15:617-18 (West 1999).
197. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 995-c.-f. (McKinney 1994). New York law currently
mandates that records in its state DNA index only be released for law enforcement
identification purposes to a federal, state or local law enforcement agency, district
attorney's office, for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant or representative or
for inclusion into a population statistical database, development of identification re-
search and protocol or quality control when personal identifiable information has
been removed. See id. § 995-c.6.(a)-(c). Also, confidentiality requirements stipulate
such information may not be released to "insurance companies, employers, or poten-
tial employers, health providers, employment screening or personnel companies, or
... private investigation services." Id. § 995-d.1. Any person who intentionally dis-
closes a DNA record or results of a DNA test to an unauthorized agency or intention-
ally uses such information for unauthorized purposes is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, subject to a fine of up to 10,000 dollars. See id.
§ 995-f.
198. See generally, Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic
Material; Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J. L. & MED.
109, 128 (1996).
199. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1.(a) (McKinney 1993) (amended 1996); see also, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12a. (West 1994) (amended 1996) ("It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination for an employer,
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of criminal prosecution or civil liability can serve to deter possible
offenders and pacify liberal activists.
3. Manner of Storage
The nature of the DNA information stored in a databank can
also quell the concern for misappropriation of information. Stan-
dard DNA profiles, capable of being stored as a mere numeric
code, will provide little information regarding inherited medical or
physical traits.2° The privacy issues in databanking arise instead
from retention of samples themselves, once identification informa-
tion is entered into the database.2°a These samples are where the
wealth of genetic information is stored because further testing
could be performed on them in the future. 2 2 In light of these pri-
vacy risks, one suggestion for preserving confidentiality more effec-
tively would be to destroy genetic samples after analysis.20 3 Such
an approach would provide law enforcement officials with data
necessary for identification purposes, while addressing the obvious
concerns for abuse of any other readily obtainable information.
Additionally, Safir's plan recognizes the debate surrounding ge-
netic information available in a DNA sample.2° Wanting to avoid
comparisons to a virtual police state, where all citizens' profiles are
available for identification purposes, Safir proposes that an ar-
rested citizen's sample would be destroyed and the DNA profile
erased from the databank once the person is found innocent or
exempt from prosecution.20 5 This practice succeeds in being sensi-
tive to concerns of information misappropriation by taking an af-
firmative step in assuring certain information is unobtainable (via
expungement) to unauthorized parties.
because of . . .genetic information ...[to] refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
discharge ... from employment such individual.").
200. See Paul B. Ferrara, DNA Benefits Outweigh Any Risk, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb-
ruary 11, 1999, at A49.
201. See McEwen, supra note 76, at 237.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 238. McEwen, however, questions the feasibility of this approach in
light of a crime lab's need to save samples for reanalysis as technology improves, the
needs of a defendant to challenge the sample itself in a future case or the need for
routine quality control checks. See id. To solve this problem, perhaps, an additional
sample could be recollected at a future date, retested for identification purposes and
subsequently destroyed. See Jensen, supra note 147, at 382.
204. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 13.
205. See id. Under the current New York law, upon reversal of a conviction or
grant of a pardon of an individual whose DNA record has been stored in the state
database, the DNA record is expunged from the index and all samples, analyses and
other documents are destroyed. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 995-c.9. (McKinney 1994).
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D. New York City's Need for an Expanded DNA Database
While Safir's plan withstands constitutional scrutiny,2 °6 as well as
questions involving misappropriation,2 °7 the benefits of the practice
for New York City also support passage into legislation.
1. Suspect Identification
Perhaps the greatest benefit an expanded DNA database yields
is the increased number of suspects identifiable under a more in-
clusive law who, under current legislation, are not being profiled.
In his proposal, Safir provides one example of how identification
information becomes more useful under the proposed system.20 8
In examining the last one hundred forcible rape or sodomy cases in
which arrests were made, seventy-five arrestees had prior ar-
rests.20 9 According to Safir, however, "in only eighteen of the cases
did the perpetrator have prior arrests and convictions for crimes
that would place them in . . . [the] convicted offender DNA
database.'21' The logical conclusion, therefore, is that a significant
number of investigations and apprehensions could be conducted
with greater speed and efficiency if New York collected DNA
profiles from all those arrested. l I
A consultation of New York State inmate profiles supports this
assertion.21 2 Across New York State, only 7.9% of inmates had no
prior convictions and only 12.9% had no prior arrests.21 3 These
statistics show an overwhelming majority of inmates serving time
who had prior infractions with the law214 and would therefore have
been eligible for a DNA profile under Safir's plan, perhaps expe-
206. See supra text accompanying notes 161-187.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 188-205.
208. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 15.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 16. Safir then goes on to cite the program in Great Britain as evi-
dence of this theory. See id. Safir states that over an eighteen-month period ending
in October 1998, British law enforcement identified 175 rape suspects, 46 murder sus-
pects and over 19,000 burglary suspects with help from their expansive DNA
database. See id.
212. See STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Divi-
SION OF PROGRAM PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, THE HUB SYSTEM:
PROFILE OF INMATES UNDER CUSTODY ON JANUARY 1, 1998 (1998) [hereinafter 1998
PROFILE].
213. See id. at 32.
214. Statewide, a majority of inmates (69.0%) had either served a prior jail term
(23.8%) or a prior prison term (35.2%) and 20.1% had a prior conviction without jail
or prison. See id. at 32.
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diting the investigation and arrest for each inmate for his or her
criminal commission.
Meanwhile, in light of the total number of inmates under cus-
tody,215 a large percentage of DNA profiles could be taken for use
in future investigations. While those persons serving terms for se-
lect homicides, assaults and sexual offenses are already included in
the state DNA database under current law, a majority of inmates in
New York State prisons are not being profiled.216 Specifically, al-
most a third of inmates (32.8%) are committed for drug offenses,
18.8% for robbery and 5.9% for burglary.217 If each of these of-
fenders were to be profiled under Safir's plan, approximately
40,000 more DNA profiles would be available to law enforcement
statewide to aid in future investigations.21 8
The relevance of these 40,000 additional profiles comes to light
when recidivism rates in New York are provided. While there are
many ways to measure recidivism, it will be defined as the return or
recommitment to New York State Department of Correctional
Services' custody for purposes of this Note.219
Approximately forty-four percent of the inmates released in
1993 were recommitted within three years of their release.22 ° Sta-
215. As of January 1, 1998, there were 69,099 inmates under custody in New York
State. See id. at 2.
216. According to the 1998 Profile, of all those inmates under custody in New York
State currently eligible for inclusion in the state's DNA databank, 9.1% are serving
for Murder, 2.6% for Attempted Murder, 4.6% for Manslaughter, 2.9% for Rape in
the First Degree, 1.9% for Assault in the First Degree, 1.6% for Assault in the Second
Degree, 1.5% for Sodomy in the First Degree and 1.0% for Sodomy in the Second
Degree. See id. at 26.
217. See id. at 25-26. These percentages represent the largest commission statistics,
with others, such as kidnapping, weapons offenses, arson, etc. rounding out the rest of
the prison population. See id.
218. 40,000 represents 57.5% of the 69,099 inmates under custody listed in the 1998
Profile. See id. at 2.
219. See STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Divi-
SION OF PROGRAM PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, 1993 RELEASES:
THREE YEAR POST RELEASE FOLLOW-UP 3 (1997) [hereinafter 1993 RELEASES].
There are several forms of releases such as release of an inmate to a health facility,
parole or completion of sentence. See id. at 1. The 1993 Releases includes only re-
leases on parole and sentence completion. See id. Therefore, readmission to a New
York correctional facility and, thus recidivism, is measured by either parole violation,
occurring when a released inmate violates rules of parole and is returned to prison to
continue serving time on a remaining sentence, or new felony commitment, occurring
when an inmate commits a new crime within the community and receives a new sen-
tence for it. See id. at 4. Essentially, the 1993 Releases provides return to custody
statistics for all inmates released from New York State prisons in 1993 during a three-
year follow-up period. See id. at 1.
220. See id. at 3.
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tistics for return rates of those originally serving time for offenses
not currently covered by section 995 prove the benefits of including
all offenders in a statewide DNA database. 221 For example, the
category defined as "Property and Other Offenses," which includes
inmates committed for Burglary in the Third Degree, Grand Lar-
ceny, Forgery, Stolen Property, Driving While Intoxicated and
other crimes, demonstrated that within three years, fifty percent of
offenders were recommitted for another offense.2 22 Similarly, of
those who served time for drug offenses, forty percent returned.223
Among other current crimes not covered by section 995, "offenses
that demonstrated high return rates were Robbery 3rd (fifty-six
percent), Burglary 3rd (fifty-five percent), Stolen Property (fifty-
two percent) and Grand Larceny (fifty-one percent). 224
Indeed, these numbers suggest a striking trend: the same indi-
viduals constantly are being recycled through New York's prisons
for repeat offenses. If DNA samples were taken from all arrestees,
these individuals' computerized profiles would be included upon
their first sentence. While obviously not helpful in all investiga-
tions, DNA database profiles would be immensely helpful in those
investigations which include genetic samples left behind at crime
scenes. Because many of the same individuals are recommitting
crimes, proliferation of this investigative tool can help ease the bur-
den on police, thereby reducing the time and cost of investigations.
2. Maintaining New York City's Low Level of Crime
Over the past decade, New York City has undergone a social
renaissance, transforming itself into an inherently safer metropo-
221. Interestingly, homicide releases, currently covered by section 995, demon-
strated one of the lowest recidivism rates. See id. at 16. Of 176,991 inmates released
during 1985-1993, 6399 had been committed for a homicide offense (Murder, At-
tempted Murder, Manslaughter and all other Homicide offenses), only 25% returned
to prison within three years. See id. "Approximately 9% of those released with homi-
cide offenses returned as new court commitment; only 6% returned for a new homi-
cide offense." Id. Similarly, sex offenders (i.e. Rape, Sodomy, Sexual Abuse and all
other Sex Crimes), covered under section 995, returned 33% within three years, an-
other lower return rate. See id. at 18. "Of the sex offenders who returned to prison
for the commission of new crime, 25% returned for the commission of another sex
offense, 19% returned for a drug offense, and 17% returned for robbery." Id.
222. See id. at 11.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 10. Offenses currently included under section 995 showed comparable
percentages, but represented a smaller number of inmates. For example, where Rape
in the First Degree had a 46.8% return rate, 124 violators out of 265 were recommit-
ted. See id. at 11. Comparatively, Robbery in the First Degree, with a 46.2% return
rate, represents the return of 995 out of 2217 violators. See id.
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lis. 225 A brief consultation of crime rate statistics over this period
lends weight to this assertion. For example, in 1998, only 628 homi-
cides were reported in New York City,226 less than a third of the
number of homicides in 1990, when a record 2262 were commit-
ted.227 Overall, major crimes in the city dropped approximately
eleven percent from 1997, with the most drastic declines recorded
in homicides, down nineteen percent, and car thefts, which
dropped fifteen percent. 228 Also, in 1998, "[t]here were fewer re-
ported robberies, assaults, burglaries, grand larcenies and car
thefts, and - despite early indications that the drop in rape was
leveling off - [there has been an] 11 percent . . . [drop in]
rapes. "229
Criminologists debate the causes of the consistent and dramatic
drop in New York City's crime rates. Some cite factors such as the
booming economy, the drop in the number of people in their late
teens and early twenties, the decline of drug use and the increase of
incarceration as reasons for the decline.23° Others even suggest
that the current generation of teens witnessed first hand the effect
of lawlessness on their families and have become weary of its
costs.
231
One factor resulting in the dramatic crime rate drop, however,
can be found in the aggressive policing of New York City's popu-
lace.232 Among other implemented strategies, the move away from
community policing, calling for officers to simply walk neighbor-
hood beats, towards utilizing modern technology to fight crime has
225. See David Kocieniewski, Murders Drop 25% as Violent City Crime Falls Again,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at B3 (quoting Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's characterization:
"Over the past four years, New York City has been transformed from the crime capi-
tal of the world to the safest large city in the United States").
226. See Micheal Cooper, Chicago Logs More Killing than New York City in '98,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, at B3 (observing that New York City, with an estimated 7.3
million population logged 69 less homicides than did Chicago, a city with a 2.7 million
population).
227. See Micheal Cooper, Homicides Decline Below 1964 Level in New York City,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al (stating homicide levels today are the lowest since
1964, when 636 homicides were reported).
228. See id.
229. Id. Between 1990 and 1997, the total number of felony convictions has de-
creased 19.1%. See Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Indicators
by Percent Change, New York City: 1990-1997 (visited Jan. 10, 1999) <http:/I
criminaljustice.state.ny.us>.
230. See id.
231. See David Kocieniewski, Crime in City Down in '97 by 9.1 Percent, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1998, at B1. Kocieniewski refers to this reason as the "little brother factor."
Id.
232. See Kocieniewski, Murders, supra note 225, at B3.
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been very helpful in lowering crime.233 Moreover, Mayor Giu-
liani's constant call for a proliferated police force,3 the devotion
of police resources to an anti-drug campaign,235 and the work of
the department's street crime unit 236 each play a role in addressing
criminal problems.
The expansion of New York's DNA database is another aggres-
sive police tactic that can help keep crime rates in New York City
at these low levels. While some would question the allocation of
funds toward more policing,237 expansion of law enforcement tac-
tics and crime reduction play too crucial a role in New York City's
revitalization, from the growth in tourism to "the impressionistic
sense that residents feel better about their hometown. ' 238 Plans to
increase police efficiency, such as Safir's plan, cannot be dismissed
because the city can not lose its momentum if there is an expecta-
tion to drive down crime.239
Meanwhile,' due to the investigative efficiency posed by Safir's
plan, costs associated with lengthy police investigations (such as in-
terviewing multiple suspects, attempts to uncover inculpatory evi-
dence and preparing eyewitnesses for prosecution) would
drastically decrease, as a profile match in a database would prove
highly probative in either exonerating the innocent or convicting
the guilty.24° Cost and time aside, a review of the success of a simi-
lar program in Great Britain241 proves the effects of the practice on
crime fighting, showing the strategy would aid in maintaining (or
bettering) the low crime rate existing in New York City today.
233. For example, police are using computer maps to chart crimes and assign of-
ficers where they will be used most effectively throughout the five boroughs. See
Cooper, Homicides, supra note 227, at Al.
234. The size of the New York City police force has swelled to nearly 40,000 of-
ficers. See Kocieniewski, Murders, supra note 225, at B3.
235. The anti-drug initiative seeks to exile narcotics dealers from neighborhoods by
saturating high-crime areas with law enforcement officials. See id.
236. This police unit seizes illegal weapons, helping to reduce the number of shoot-
ings from 2500 in the first half of 1993 to fewer than 1000 in the first half of 1998. See
id.
237. For example, Peter F. Vallone, the Speaker of the City Council, and Glenn
Passman, the Associate Director of the Public Policy Organization, City Project, ques-
tion whether the Mayor is already doing too much with law enforcement at the ex-
pense of other city services such as education, health care and social services. See
Dan Barry, Mayor Says Adding Officers is Key to City's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1999, at B10.
238. Id.
239. See id. (quoting Eli Silverman, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice).
240. See Safir's Plan, supra note 91, at 15.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
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3. Backlog Caveat W
While the positive logical effects of an expanded DNA database
are apparent, one prevalent administrative issue must be addressed
before New York can seriously consider putting Safir's plan into
action. That problem is state DNA laboratories lack the funds, fa-
cilities and personnel to type enough cases. Consequently, a signif-
icant backlog results, even under the current, less expansive, DNA
collection statute. 42
According to Professor Barry C. Scheck,243 the backlog results
from samples that have been collected but not profiled due to
sheer volume. 2 " Similarly, New York has a significant number of
rape kits from unsolved sexual crimes that include genetic samples
that have not been profiled and checked against the state
databank.245 Yet another problem resulting from the overload is
the large number of owed samples that have yet to be collected
from convicted felons under the current statute because they are
out on parole.246
The effects of backlog in New York are numerous. Databases
are not being utilized to their full investigative advantage because
they are not being kept current. 47 Even when labs are able to ana-
lyze a profile, it takes months to produce results,248 by which time a
suspect may already be awaiting trial, thereby creating unnecessary
expenses for the judicial system 249 and overall injustice to the de-
242. See Barry C. Scheck, Getting Smart About DNA (US Does Not Use DNA Tech-
nology to Full Advantage), NEWSWEEK 69 Nov. 16, 1998; Mike Pezzella, FBI DNA
Dragnet to Track Fugitives in 50 States, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Oct. 19, 1998,
at 1. Nationally, over 450,000 samples exist at crime laboratories that have not yet
been analyzed. See Kendall Anderson, Panel Debates Taking DNA Upon Arrest;
Some at Dallas Meeting Say Samples Backlogged, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
March 2, 1999, at 13A.
243. Barry C. Scheck is a law professor and co-director of the Innocence Project at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York City. See Scheck, DNA, supra
note 242, at 69. The Innocence Project utilizes DNA testing to aid in defending in-
mates wrongfully convicted of crimes. See id. Professor Scheck is also a commis-
sioner on New York's Forensic Science Review Board, which created and maintains
the state's DNA databank. See id.
244. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 54.
245. Professor Scheck estimates there are approximately 10,000 such kits in New
York, which were formerly being thrown away before a change in policy. See id. at 59.
246. See id. at 56.
247. See id. at 54.
248. See Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 62; see also Cellmark to Use New DNA
Test to Link Criminals to Unsolved Crimes, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 15, 1999.
249. "[D]efendants are likely to plead guilty quickly after getting bad DNA re-
sults." Cellmark, supra note 248.
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tained.25° Comparatively, the British, who have made the invest-
ment in sufficient personnel and facilities, are able to profile their
crime scene DNA within two weeks because they do not have
backlog problems. 251
The solution to the problem of backlog simply would be to fund
the state laboratories so that they are able to efficiently transform
incoming evidence into computerized profiles, as well as eliminate
the current backlog at these labs. 2  In a recent budget proposal,
President Clinton set aside federal funds to aid anti-crime initia-
tives.253 Recognizing the backlog issue, the proposal allots fifteen
million dollars to eliminate over one million backlogged convicted
offender DNA samples at state laboratories.25 4 When these old
samples are digitized, states can allocate funds to provide facilities
and personnel to handle the volumes of incoming samples and thus
prevent future backlog.
Conclusion
The ability to store the genetic records of criminals in a database
is an invaluable tool when used for law enforcement identification
purposes. Such a technique, however, is not used to its utmost po-
tential when only selected criminals are included in the database.
The implementation of a system where DNA is taken from all
those arrested for inclusion in a statewide DNA database would
strengthen the fight against crime in New York by detering recidi-
vism, assisting in maintaining record low crime rates and easing in-
vestigative burdens on law enforcement agencies.
The proposed system, in light of inherent government interest in
crime fighting, does not violate an arrestee's privacy rights.
Although steps first should be taken to address the misappropria-
tion of information and backlog, the New York State Legislature
should adopt Safir's plan into law because of its potential as an
invaluable law enforcement tool.
250. "[I]ndigent defendants, unable to make bail, spend time in jail for crimes they
did not commit." Id.
251. See id.; See also Scheck Transcript, supra note 15, at 62.
252. See Scheck, DNA, supra note 242, at 69; see also Anderson, supra note 242, at
13A.
253. See Juan Otero, Clinton Focuses Funds on Anti-Crime Initiatives, NATION'S
CITIES WKLY. Feb. 8, 1999, at 13.
254. See id.
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DAMNED TO THE INFERNO?
A NEW VISION OF LAWYERS AT THE
DAWNING OF THE MILLENNIUM
Robert J. Cosgrove*
Introduction
Through Me the Way Into the Woeful City,
Through Me the Way to the Eternal Pain,
Through Me the Way Among the Lost People,
Justice Moved My Maker on High,
Divine Power Made Me and Supreme Wisdom and Primal Love;
Before Me Nothing Was Created But Eternal Things and I
Endure Eternally.
Abandon Every Hope, Ye That Enter.'
So engraved are the gates of Hell in Dante's Inferno. In the
deepest regions of hell, damned for all time, lie the fraudulent and
treacherous - those individuals who used their great skills, their
great powers of reason, for ends contrary to the common good.2
Here, in the eighth and ninth circles of the inferno, forever rest the
souls of those to whom much was given, much expected and very
little returned. Most prominent among the damned of these circles
are the religious, political and legal leadership of ancient times who
failed to use their authority3 to bring their community closer to
happiness.4 Rather than using their power to pursue basic goods,5
* J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 1999. B.S.F.S. Georgetown Univer-
sity, 1996. Special thanks to Professors Russell Pearce and Annette DePalma of Ford-
ham University, Dennis Cariello and Bill Miller of the Fordham Urban Law Journal
for their insight and guidance on this piece and Fordham University's Stein Scholars
Program in Public Interest Law and Ethics for its support over the past three years.
1. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 47 (John D. Sinclair ed. and trans.,
1939).
2. See id. at 329. As used in this Comment, the phrase "common good" will refer
to those self-evident basic goods whose pursuit leads to integral human fulfillment or
eudymonia. Basic goods are basic reasons for action. They are the only aspects of
human well-being that are self-evident and indemonstrable. Through "non-inferential
acts of understanding by the mind working inductively on the date of inclination and
experience" basic goods are made known to humans. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING
MEN MORAL 13, 15 (1992).
3. As defined by John Finnis authority is the power of those in command to order
the polis' activities in accordance with the pursuit of the common good. See JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 246 (1980).
4. See ARIsToTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics vi (David Ross, ed. and trans., 1925)
(discussing Aristotle and his conception of the most enviable form of life). When I
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these souls successfully lined their own pockets with ill-gotten
gains.
If American public perception is to be believed,6 the modern
American lawyer will soon be joining individuals like Fra Gomita7
and Ulysses 8 in the bowels of hell. Certainly, disrespect for the
legal profession is nothing new. 9 From the ancient Goths' 0 to the
writings of William Shakespeare, 1 lawyers have often borne the
brunt of public discontent. The plethora of lawyer jokes available
today is firm evidence that this trend continues. 12 Indeed, a 1997
New York Times review of the film, "The Devil's Advocate" went
use the word happiness, what I am really talking about is eudymonia. Eudymonia is
the end of all action, the good for man and woman. Eudymonia is sought for its own
sake. It is human flourishing that results from living a virtuous, good life - a life in
which the basic goods are sought. See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 44
(Robert Audi ed., 1995).
5. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 3, at 86-89 (listing his conception of basic goods:
life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and
religion).
6. See Robert F. Cochran, Lawyers and Virtue, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707, 707
(1996) (discussing popular discontent with the legal profession in the aftermath of
Watergate).
7. Fra Gomita was the deputy of Nino Visconti, Judge of Gallura, a division of
Sardinia, a part of medieval Italy who was hanged for his knavery. See DANTE, supra
note 1, at 277.
8. In his Inferno, Dante turns the classic tale of Ulysses on its ear. He places
Ulysses in the eighth bolgia, the circle of hell reserved for the evil counsellors who
used their great mental gifts for guile. Because of their greater natural endowments,
"their sin is reckoned greater, and their place is lower than that of thieves." Here,
rather than focusing on the heroic, Dante stresses Virgil's description of Ulysses as
the "contriver of crimes." Id. at 329-332.
9. For an old-fashioned lawyer bashing, see the work of Samuel Coleridge, "He
saw a lawyer killing a Viper on a dunghill hard by his own stable; And the Devil
smiled, for it put in mind of Cain and his brother Abel." Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
The Devil's Thoughts, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE
320 (1912), reprinted in CORPUS JURis HUMOROUS 251 (John B. McClay & Wendy
Matthews eds., 1994).
10. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 308 (Anne M. Cohler et. al. eds.
and trans., 1989) (when speaking of the Goths, noted approvingly, "They cut out law-
yers' tongues and say, "Viper, stop hissing.") The Goths were "a Germanic people
who settled near the Black Sea around the second century A.D." The western branch
of the Goths, the Visigoths, was instrumental in the sacking of Rome in 395 A.D. The
Goths were what are popularly known as barbarians. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA 477 (1992).
11. See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer, 20 J. LEGAL
PROF. 5, 6 (1995/96) (discussing Shakespeare's well-known comment on killing all the
lawyers).
12. For an illuminating and often humorous analysis of this phenomenon, see
Thomas W. Overton, Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Dead Snakes: The Lawyer Joke as
Societal Text, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1069, 1107 (1995).
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so far as to ask, "What does it say about our society that the worst
guy we can imagine is a fast-talking lawyer?"' 3
But why such hostility toward lawyers? Easy answers abound.
According to some, it is the disproportionate amount of influence
that lawyers wield in American politics that stirs the flames of re-
sentment.' 4 Others contend that the problem lies in the high sala-
ries and extravagant lifestyles, commonly thought to be the norm
of the lawyer's life, but foreign to most Americans.1 5
Such explanations are largely unsatisfactory however. Lawyers
as a group are particularly active in politics, but this has been true
since the dawn of the republic when respect for the legal profession
was far greater than it is now.' 6 As for the perceived salary gap, it
is present when one compares the salaries of the highest paid law-
yers at America's largest law firms with the average American in-
come, but only a small percentage of practicing lawyers work for
such firms. Most lawyers work for far less money at much smaller
organizations.' 7 The root cause of public hostility thus must lie
elsewhere.
This Comment argues that the problem lies not in the behavioral
practices of lawyers, i.e., not in their societal function or consump-
tion habits, but rather in a cultural shift of the purposes and ends of
law itself.'8 Specifically, this Comment contends that as the result
of several historical trends, great popular confusion about the end
or Aristotelian final cause19 of law has arisen. To deal with the
13. Michiko Kakutani, Whatever Happened to the Devil?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec.
7, 1997, at 36.
14. See HEINZ EULAU & JOHN SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS 11 (1964) (provid-
ing a statistical analysis of the number of lawyers in positions of power in federal and
state governments).
15. See Donald B. Ayer, Stewardship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2150, 2153 (1993) (noting
the pervasive "yuppie" mentality of new associates at big firms).
16. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (Daniel Boor-
stin ed., 1990) (noting lawyers' role as America's governing class).
17. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 87-91 (1994).
18. Thus, I do not view the crisis in legal ethics or professionalism as one of busi-
ness/professional paradigmatic thinking. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professional
Paradigm Shift, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (discussing business/professional para-
digmatic thinking); Timothy Terrell & James Wilson, Rethinking Professionalism, 41
EMORY L.J. 403 (1992) (same). Rather, my tack is much broader and sweeping and
makes great use of interdisciplinary sources. In my view, the problem with lawyers is
not that they do not act in accordance with academic predictions or recommenda-
tions. Instead, the problem lies in the American psyche and how law itself is viewed.
19. For a discussion of Aristotelian causation, see DANIEL ROBINSON, AN INTEL-
LECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 89-90 (1986).
If we examine a statue, there is a sense in which we attribute the cause of it
to the substance of which it is made, for example, stone. Here, we have what
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resulting uncertainty people have channeled or directed their hos-
tility2 ° toward the law and ultimately its high priests, lawyers.21
To support this position, five issues will be addressed: (1) the
definition and purpose of law; (2) the republican theory of lawyer-
ing;2 2 (3) the realities of the modern law school and its effective-
ness in training republican lawyers; (4) whether or not a republican
theory of lawyering is in line with modern American realities; and
(5) prescriptions for the future.
Before entering the heart of this Comment, a brief word on the
importance of this issue is in order. Why does it matter if law and
the legal profession are the subject of scorn and ridicule resulting
from confusion? The answer is simple. America, unique among all
other nations, is built upon the rule of law. 3 Law is the glue that
molds this nation of diverse immigrants into a relatively unified
and stable polis. 24 Absent faith in law, America cannot survive and
prosper in the next millennium 25
Of perhaps greatest concern is disenchantment with the law in
America's urban centers. It is in urban centers that lawyers are
most heavily concentrated. 26 America's cities house her largest law
firms, need the most criminal prosecutors and defense attorneys
Aristotle referred to as the material cause. The difference between a lump
of stone and a statue is that the latter has a certain essence or form - not any
single one, but one that is not random... [This is the essence of a statue] ...
or its formal cause. Returning to the statue, one might attribute the cause of
it to the changes produced by hammer and chisel. Blow by blow, these
changes lead to the finished work. A causal explanation based upon these
actions expresses what Aristotle called the efficient cause .... [The final
cause] is the goal or end of the artist." [It is why stone is changed into
statue.]
Id.
20. An analysis of transference of emotion and ingroup-outgroup behavior is be-
yond the scope of this Comments. Generally however, sociologists use the term "in-
group" to refer to those groups whose members identify themselves primarily by their
common hatred for another group, an "outgroup." For a more detailed discussion,
see JOAN FERRANTE, SOCIOLOGY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 162 (1995).
21. This explanation has the added advantage of helping to explain why so many
lawyers are dissatisfied with their own lives. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 84 (dis-
cussing the unhappiness of many lawyers).
22. The republican theory will be exclusively examined for the simple reason that
it best ties in with the classical formulation of law argued in this Comment.
23. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 11.
24. See GEORGE KENNAN, AROUND THE CRAGGED HILL 157 (1993).
25. For a discussion of the importance of something to believe in as a precursor to
societal order, see Benedetto Croce, Of Liberty 92, reprinted in THE AMERICAN EN-
COUNTER (James F. Hoge Jr. & Fareed Zakaria eds., 1997).
26. As an example of this phenomenon, note that almost all of the top-grossing
American law firms are based in major metropolitan areas, most notably, New York.
See generally John E. Morris, The Global 50, AM. LAW. Nov. 1998, at 45.
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and have the greatest demand for classical public interest 7 law-
yers.28 The modern American is most likely to have contact with a
lawyer in the big city, and it is from these urban contacts that their
conception of what the law can be is shaped.
At the same time, it is the cities that receive the bulk of new
immigrants to the United States.29 As has always been the case,
these immigrants bring with them their own cultural values and
norms. But unlike the immigrants of the nineteenth century, mod-
ern immigrants do not come primarily from a homogenous Eu-
rope.30 This makes their incorporation into a society where the
rule of law is paramount more difficult. To insure the continued
viability of American democracy, great effort must be expended to
make certain that the newest of Americans are blended into the
polis by keeping law as the glue that binds Americans together.
I. Law: Definitions and Purpose
Any definition of law must first take into account human na-
ture.31 The vision of human potential that one accepts will largely
dictate one's conception of law (i.e., is the purpose of law to make
men more moral32 or to constrain human weakness). 33 Pared down
to its essence, there are two visions of human nature, often inter-
twined, that have exerted the most influence on the development
of legal philosophy over the centuries: humans as reasonable ani-
mals or humans as self-interested individualists.
The theory of humans as reasoned animals gets its start in Greek
philosophy.34 According to Plato, the mark of a good man35 was a
rational and cultivated mind, for it was the power of reason that
27. That is, poverty law. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED 14-16 (1993) (dis-
cussing the formation of The Legal Aid Society).
28. In his remarks at Fordham University in the spring of 1997, Peter Edelman
noted this very fact. See generally Peter Edelman, Opening Address, 25 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 685 (1998) (remarks at a conference entitled "Lawyering for Poor Commu-
nities in the Twenty-First Century").
29. See ANDREW BOYD, AN ATLAS OF WORLD AFFAIRS 197 (9th ed. 1991).
30. See EDWARD N. LUT'WAK, THE ENDANGERED AMERICAN DREAM 181-183
(1993).
31. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 175, 176 (1993); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 543, 547, 548 (1986) (discussing the interaction between conceptions of human
nature and the rule of law).
32. See GEORGE, supra note 2, at 1.
33. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 79 (5th ed. 1961).
34. See DANIEL ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS 16 (1996).
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separated man from the animals.36 In one of their rare moments of
agreement, Aristotle built upon Plato's work and argued that man
was by nature a political animal who found greatest happiness in
the development of his faculties of practical wisdom3 7 in the com-
munity.38 In the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas built upon the writ-
ings of Aristotle and conceived of man as the lone being in the
universe with intelligence, will and reason.39 Underlying these con-
ceptions is the idea that humans are perfectible; that through the
powers of the polis - societal pressure and law - men and wo-
men could be helped to lead more virtuous lives. 4° Also funda-
mental to these theories was the idea that, from the moment of
birth, humans were fundamentally unequal. Whether speaking of
Plato's myth of the metals41 or Aristotle and Aquinas' beliefs that
justice was not a function of arithmetic, but rather distributive or
role based equality,42 the conception of individuals who possessed
different rights and obligations, despite their common orientation
to the good, runs strong through this classical tradition.
In contrast is the seventeenth-century notion of man as nothing
more than a supreme individualist, who if not constrained by the
powers of the law, would surely destroy all those around him.43
Unlike their classical counterparts, the moderns, led by Hobbes,44
argued for the universal fundamental equality of all humans who
differed only in their relative strength and power. In this tradition,
humans are not considered pre-ordained to the good or to a com-
munal life. Rather, their sole concern is the acquisition of and sus-
35. "Man" is Plato's choice of words, not mine. All future such references should
be assumed to be a specific reference to the work of the individual philosopher
discussed.
36. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 260 (Richard Sterling & William Scott trans.,
1985).
37. Practical wisdom is in its essence, reason, virtuously exercised. See CAM-
BRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 44.
38. See Miriam Galsto, Taking Aristotle Seriously, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 338
(1994).
39. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 56 (R.J. Henle ed. and trans.,
1993).
40. See, e.g., Russell Hittinger, Natural Law and Virtue 62-63 in NATURAL LAW
THEORY (Robert George ed., 1992).
41. See PLATO, supra note 36, at 113. He writes, "We should tell them [the peo-
ple] that although they are all brothers, god differentiated those qualified to rule by
mixing in gold at their birth. Hence they are most to be honored. The auxiliaries [the
guardian class] he compounded with silver, and the craftsmen and farmers with iron
and brass."
42. See AQUINAS, supra note 39, at 72.
43. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 304.
44. See generally, THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985)
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tained dominance over sources of wealth - namely property.45
The purpose of law in this tradition is not to make men and women
more moral, but rather simply to constrain their otherwise hostile
and antisocial tendencies.46
The development of American law has largely been a product of
the latter school of thought.47 But although our system of law is
premised on this notion, in political discourse, Americans do not
think of their legal system as a constraining mechanism on human
vice, but rather as a vehicle through which the common good of the
nation can be achieved. 8 This has resulted in a schizophrenia in
our collective consciousness. We cannot understand why the law is
talked about as the bedrock of America (e.g., "we are a nation of
laws and not of men" 9 ), but then used to further unsavory ends.50
A large part of the problem lies in the distinction, which we have
somehow lost, between private and public law 1.5 As in the days of
the Romans, private law is and should be concerned primarily with
the transactional relations between individuals. 52 It is in this arena
that lawyers should generally follow the advice of Lord Brougham
and do all that they can to save the client and further his or her
ends.53 Here the lawyer has an obligation to ensure that in recipro-
cal exchanges, principles of equality are upheld. 4 This is not to
suggest that the lawyer should use any means available to achieve
his or her objectives, however. Rather, operating within the "spirit
of the laws, '' 55 the lawyer should attempt to provide her client with
the best counsel available. 6
45. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 305.
46. See NORMAN BOWIE AND ROBERT SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLIT-
ICAL ORDER 13-14 (2d ed. 1986).
47. See Sherry, supra note 31, at 543.
48. See George Kennan, Moralism-Legalism, reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 3 (Thomas Patterson ed., .1989).
49. GLENDON, supra note 17, at 8.
50. See Ayer, supra note 15, at 2154.
51. But see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1,
22 (1988) (for a discussion of the problems with this approach). After all, in a very
real way, all private disputes have a public component and vice-versa.
52. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 8 (1962).
53. GLENDON, supra note 17, at 40.
54. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at xiii-xiv; see also AQUINAS, supra note 39, at
72.
55. By "spirit of the laws," I borrow from Montesquieu and refer to the idea that
law has purpose - specifically to help man abide by his moral, political and civil
duties. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 5.
56. See KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 143
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Consider, for example, the case of a local merchant, Peter.57 His
livelihood depends on the sale of oranges which he buys from
Sally, a local orange farmer. The contract he signed with Sally pro-
vides in relevant part that, for the next ten years, Sally will provide
Peter with all the oranges he needs for one dollar an orange. No
lawyers participated in the drafting of this contract.58 Five years
into the contract, terrible weather destroys the bulk of the region's
orange crop. Only Sally, through her use of expensive precaution-
ary measures, is able to save her crop. Because of these measures
selling Peter oranges for one dollar each would result in a great
pecuniary loss to Sally. At the same time, on the open market,
oranges are being sold for five dollars each, a price certain to inflict
hardship on Peter. Sally obviously wants to get out of the contract
- her financial security depends on it. Peter obviously wants to
keep the contract - his financial future depends on it. They each
seek counsel after recognizing that they cannot amicably resolve
their dispute. 9 What should the contacted lawyers do?
In this case, Lord Brougham's motto is a point well-taken.
Given an ambiguous fact pattern with neither party entirely right
or wrong, there is nothing wrong with the lawyer using all the tools
at her disposal to achieve the best result for her client.6 ° In the
hypothetical case of Peter and Sally, neither party is all right or all
wrong. After all, when Peter and Sally entered the contract,
neither party could have known that bad weather would destroy
the bulk of the region's crop, nor that Sally would save her crop
only at considerable expense.6 ' Obviously, it was not either party's
intent to sell or buy oranges at a price far below market value.
Rather, Sally wanted to ensure a buyer of and Peter a supplier for
oranges at reasonable market value.
To assist the parties in cleaning up the mess they created, aggres-
sive advocacy by lawyers for both sides is essential. Sally needs a
lawyer who, stressing contractual principles of "unjust enrich-
ment," can convince a judge or jury that the contract is void on its
57. This hypothetical assumes that, as a matter of law, a Corbinian public policy
emphasis is placed on contract interpretation. See generally A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS (1950).
58. This point is important, for it assumes equality of bargaining between Peter
and Sally when they drafted the contract. The implications of the scenario in which
only one party is represented by a lawyer is beyond the scope of this Comment.
59. Again so that equality of bargaining is assured.
60. It is in such circumstances that the idea of zealous advocacy is best pursued.
61. Certainly, if they had acted more prudently they could have created an "exi-
gent circumstance" opt-out provision, but such foresight was not shown by either
party.
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face. Peter, on the other hand, needs a lawyer to argue that parties
are bound to finish what they have begun; once assumed, a respon-
sibility is not so easily shirked. Both arguments have merit. The
ultimate question of who can best bear the loss (or rather on whom
the loss should fall) is a factual question on which reasonable peo-
ple can differ. In this private law matter, lawyers act best when
they work to ensure their client gets a fair shake - that an equita-
ble result is reached.
In contrast, public law concerns itself with the promotion of the
common good, with the pursuit of integral human fulfillment. It is,
in Aquinas' words, "a dictate of practical reason, for the Common
Good, made by him who has the care of the community, and
promulgated."62 Here the primary emphasis is not on relationships
between individuals, but rather on the coordination of societal re-
sources and talents so as to assist individuals in realizing happi-
ness.63 The lawyer's role in this scheme is to act as guardian, as a
high priest of the law. The realization of basic goods64 should be
the desired end.
Consider again for a moment the case of Peter and Sally. As-
sume now, that for nutritional reasons, oranges are a necessary
part of life in Peter's town. No supplements are available. Without
the oranges, the entire population of Peter's town will become bed-
ridden. Peter is the only seller of oranges in his town and the peo-
ple cannot afford more than one dollar an orange. Should Sally's
lawyer act in the same way she did in the first scenario?
No reasonable person can contend that public policy is best
served by letting the inhabitants of Peter's town become ill.65 If
this is an unreasonable intellectual premise, why should a lawyer
be allowed to make such an argument in court? The public good is
not served by Sally's winning. Rather, it is only furthered if the
people of Peter's town can stay healthy and are given the opportu-
nity to lead productive lives. In reality however, many lawyers
would make just such an illogical argument.
For example, it is clearly not in anyone's best interest to have
toxic paints in schools, yet lawyers in mass tort cases defend the
62. AQUINAS, supra note 39, at 51.
63. See FINNIs, supra note 3, at 276.
64. In this scenario the public policy favoring upholding the bargain between two
parties (see FRIEDRICH KESSLER, CoNrRAcrs 21 (3d ed. 1986)) is outweighed by the
competing social policy of self-preservation (see FINNIS, supra note 3, at 86).
65. In making this assertion I explicitly reject the notion that the operation of the
market or the "Invisible Hand" always results in the best possible end.
19991 1677
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
producers of these paints. 66 What good is served by such a de-
fense? 67 None quickly springs to mind. In dealing with such a
case, or the case of Sally, the lawyer should factor these public pol-
icy considerations into his or her decision-making process. In cases
where one party is clearly acting improperly, the goal of represen-
tation should not be winning the client's case at all costs. Rather,
the focus should be on achieving a result that most accords with the
culpability of the client's behavior and the public policy interests
involved. This certainly requires the lawyer to exercise his or her
practical wisdom, but so what? That is the mark of humanity,68 the
reasoned animal, whose most notable creation is law itself.
This vision of lawyering begs the question: should the legal pro-
fession require lawyers not only to represent clients to the best of
their abilities, but also to determine the culpability of their clients
and whether a particular factual dispute is private or public? Yes.
As Ulysses failed to learn, from those to whom much is given,
much is expected. The privilege of practicing law carries with it a
certain burden - the burden of exercising practical wisdom. It is
not too much to ask to require lawyers to use their great education
and experiences to make judgement calls. Indeed, this is what they
do every day right now. What is different in this approach is the
requirement that lawyers consider the ends for which they are
working.
The problem with this theory however is that it is foreign to the
modern (post 1960s) lawyer's sensibilities. It is not what he is
taught in law school. It is not what she is taught in a firm. Value
neutrality, the predominant religion of the modern law school,69
makes judgement calls as to ends difficult. And this value neutral-
ity is emphasized as being equally valid in application to either pri-
vate or public transactions. But, as has been discussed, public law
is fundamentally not about value neutrality. Rather, it is about
choosing ends that most benefit the entire community. While rea-
sonable people might differ as to what the best end is, there is a
66. See Peter Passell, The Split Over Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1997,
at D2 (discussing the implications of lead paint and tobacco class action suits).
67. Here, I am not suggesting that the adversarial system is completely flawed, nor
without merits in and of itself. In an imperfect world, with imperfect information, it is
often the only way we have to insure that a just result is achieved. But in making such
a statement, I am reminded of Churchill's saying on democracy - it is the worst form
of government except for all the rest.
68. Reason as the hallmark of humanity is an idea first articulated by Pericles, the
ancient Athenian orator. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 45.
69. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom
29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 255 (1977).
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marked difference between saying that in a range of good options
"x" is better than "y," and claiming that any option regardless of its
wisdom is valid. It is in the latter camp that most modern lawyers
fall.7 ° While this is fine in the realm of private law, it does nothing
to promote the common good on issues of concern to the entire
community.
Most Americans do not understand this vision of lawyers. They
think of law as a chalk-line that separates right from wrong, per-
missible from impermissible conduct.7 Moreover, philosophical
distinctions between issues of public and private law are difficult to
draw. In the resulting maelstrom of confusion, lawyers have be-
come a distrusted, feared and sadly, often hated, group. Unless
changes are made to the development of the modern American
lawyer, such popular distaste is only likely to grow.
In brief then, part of the popular discontent with the legal pro-
fession and law itself is a failure to recognize the distinction be-
tween private law that holds individuals' needs paramount and
public law that inculcates virtue in the citizenry thereby promoting
the flourishing of the "good life" for the broader community. This
dichotomy must be better explained both to lawyers and the gen-
eral populace if law is to regain a position of respect within society.
Otherwise, the current norm of mercenary lawyers and a dissatis-
fied public will continue.
H. The Republican Theory of Lawyering
Thus far, this Essay has detailed some of the current problems
affecting the law and the legal profession. It has hinted that law-
yers should take the lead in undertaking the kinds of systemic re-
forms needed to re-fuse law with popular culture. What has not
been answered is why lawyers should assume this mantle. An anal-
ysis of classical republican theory provides an illuminating answer.
In its broadest sense, the phrase "classical republican" refers to a
philosophical school of thought that traces its roots back to Aris-
totle's contention that man is fundamentally a political animal. 72
What this functionally means is that humans have within them the
potential to develop virtue through a process of education and
habit leading to happiness. This can best happen within the frame-
work of a political society. To achieve this end, it is of paramount
importance that the individual assumes an active role in the affairs
70. Id. at 247.
71. See, e.g., AMERICA'S PURPOSE 2 (Owen Harries ed., 1991).
72. See Galsto, supra note 38, at 339.
1999] 1679
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
of this polis, for it is only through such activity that character can
be developed.73 Underlining this concept is the classical notion
that the communal life in which humans work together is an essen-
tial element of what it means to be human in the first place.74 To
be fully human, one must work with other humans to create an end
result that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Traditionally, however, this did not mean that every member of a
society should play the same role.75 Rather, given the unequal dis-
tribution of talents and resources within a community, each citizen
should be provided the opportunity to fulfill his or her role based
on their interests and ability.76 Particularly important in the order-
ing of a society was that certain individuals assume the authority
and power necessary to organize communal affairs for the common
good.77
In America, this role was filled by lawyers.78 De Tocqueville re-
marked that in nineteenth-century America, lawyers fashioned the
country to suit their own needs. 79 So too, was the pattern of behav-
ior for lawyers in the early twentieth century. From judges like
Learned Hand8" to lawyer-statesmen like Dean Acheson,81 lawyers
attempted to create order out of chaos, thereby (consciously or
not) re-shaping America in their own image. Of primary note here
is the emphasis these lawyers placed on the rule of law, on the idea
that it is law and law alone that separates the civilized life from the
barbaric.82
The lawyers' legal ethics code has roots in this republican
ethos.83 George Sharswood argued that a lawyer's primary mission
73. See Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics 80-81 in MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Robert Horwitz, ed., 3d ed. 1986).
74. See FINNIS, supra note 3, at 88.
75. See generally SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA, MACCHIAVELLI IN HELL (1989) (discuss-
ing Macchiavelli's political and moral theories).
76. Taken to extremes, you have Plato's myth of the metals. See PLATO, supra
note 36, at 113-115.
77. See FINNIS, supra note 3, at 242.
78. See MARK MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1-6 (1995).
79. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 280.
80. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE
JUDGE (1994).
81. See generally WALTER ISSACSON & EVAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN (1986).
82. Acheson, for example, played an instrumental role in the establishment of the
United Nations. This transnational institution is premised on the idea that sovereign
states can be obligated to follow a common ethos as to permissible and unacceptable
conduct. See MARK JANIS ET. AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TEXT AND
MATERIALS 19 (1995).
83. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Code, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992).
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was the service of the polis' common good - even when such ser-
vice conflicted with the needs and wishes of the lawyer's own cli-
ent.84 This contention was widely accepted until the 1960s when
economic pressures began to change the dynamics of the provision
of legal services.85 It was during this decade that idea of republican
lawyering met its demise.86
Of particular importance is the fact that during the 1960s, law-
yers began to lose the distinction between public and private law.
Too often, lawyers advocated positions in politics that they as citi-
zens would never deem acceptable. The age of value-neutral law-
yer/technicians had begun.87 Lawyers began to think of their role
in society not as guardians/promoters of the common good, but
rather as zealous-advocates or hired guns, willing to do whatever it
took, regardless of the social cost, to ensure their client's victory.
Too often victory for the individual was won at the cost of commu-
nal good.
The net result today is a nation under lawyers who fail to under-
stand the purpose of law. This is why Americans are unhappy with
lawyers and why so many lawyers are unhappy with themselves.
Law used to be a calling which had, as an added bonus, the poten-
tial to provide one with a comfortable life.88 Today, law as a calling
is an idea foreign to practicing lawyers. Thanks to the value neu-
trality of the legal academy, lawyers view their work as just another
job, another way to make a living.
Yet despite all of this, law schools continue to produce a sizable
percentage of all future political leaders and staffers in America. 89
Thus, whatever the flaws of the current system, the reality is that
those who find the idea of law appealing are also among the most
likely to find a career in politics rewarding. America is still a na-
tion under lawyers. The trick is to make sure lawyers are up to the
task.
84. See id. (discussing Sharswood's conception of a lawyer's obligation to the com-
mon good).
85. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 2-3.
86. See KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 50.
87. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 2-3.
88. See Sol Linowitz, Speeches from the Cornell Law School Centennial Celebra-
tion, April 15-16, 1988 - Keynote Address, 73 CORNELL L. REv 1255, 1256 (1988).
89. See MILLER, supra note 78, at 1-6.
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Il. The Modern Law School: Toward a Guardian Class or a
Community of Sophists?
Complicit in the shifting tides of public favor for the legal profes-
sion are the actions of the modern law school. As any second-year
student can tell you, the pressures to enter a big firm, even at
schools renowned for their public interest slant, are intense. 90
These pressures are all the more persuasive given the value skepti-
cism taught as an integral part of the law school curriculum. 91 Law
students are thereby shorn of their idealism and left in the position
of being very well-educated Sophists92 who see the application of
their talents to the pursuit of money as valid as any alternative
schema.
The birth of the modern law school can be directly traced to
Christopher Langdell and the Harvard legal science revolution of
the 1870s. There law changed from being a magico-mystical pur-
suit in which law was derived from universal norms to a hard-nosed
science in which, through the application of the case method, legal
truths could be derived from the available case law.93 In line with
the scientific faith of the time,94 the Harvard revolution caught on
and became the predominant method of American legal education.
Of paramount importance to this philosophical school was treatise
writing in which the principles of specific bodies of law were laid
out in a systematic fashion.95
This notion of legal scientific certainty came under much attack
in the twentieth century - first from the legal realists and later
from the critical legal theorists and law and economics adherents.
Legal realists argued that law was nothing more than the result of
the personal biases of judges and lawyers.96 Critical theorists con-
90. See Brett S. Martin, Why Most Law Schools Are Failing at Public Interest Law,
NAT'L JURIST, Oct. 1997, at 7. Martin argues that in most law schools career planning
offices encourage students to pursue jobs in firms without fully discussing the public
interest alternatives available.
91. See Cramton, supra note 69, at 247, 255.
92. Sophists were ancient Greeks who professed to teach, for a fee, rhetoric, phi-
losophy and how to succeed in life. They have historically been portrayed as intellec-
tual charlatans. Sophist philosophers were among the first to argue that there is no
truth, only opinion. See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at
752.
93. See Robert Gordon, Legal Education and Practice: The Case for and Against
Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1995).
94. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, (James Strachey ed.
and trans., 1961) (arguing that the long-cherished "opiate of the masses," religion,
should be replaced with faith in science).
95. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 185.
96. See id. at 189.
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tended that law could only be taught through an interdisciplinary
approach in which black-letter law was understood simply as an
attempt by existing elites to maintain their grasp on power. 97 Pro-
ponents of the law and economics school proposed that law is intel-
ligible only if viewed through the lens of the insatiable human
desire for the acquisition of property.98 More than their revolu-
tionary predecessor of legal science, these schools of thought de-
valued the notion of universal or transcendental norms.99 They
devalued the notion of laws as a means through which societal
good can be realized. They are the norm of the modern
academy. 1°°
These academic battles for the heart and soul of the modem law
school have had several results. First, and perhaps most frighten-
ing, they have fostered within law students, and thus America's fu-
ture oligarchs, a cynicism and distrust of law as anything more than
personal perspective. 10 1 Take for example, a typical first year con-
stitutional law class. The professor who runs the class is likely to
emphasize the "principles" on which the justices of the Supreme
Court base their decisions. But often lost in the discussion is
whether these principles actually benefit society. Certainly, law
students need to learn how to interpret Supreme Court opinions,
but in analyzing these decisions why is the question of whether the
opinion is right or wrong never asked? Put another way, why are
not students asked to give the best possible result given a tabula
rasa?1°2 Perhaps, it is simply a lack of time. But if lawyers are not
challenged to think through the theories which underscore their
beliefs in law school, then when will it happen? Given the lack of a
universal undergraduate curriculum, 10 3 there is currently no institu-
97. See id. at 210.
98. See KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 227.
99. See BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 159-197 (1996).
100. See KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 225.
101. See Cramton, supra note 69, at 255.
102. By "tabula rasa" I mean a blank tablet on which empirical experiences have
not yet formed an imprint. See CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note
4, at 439.
103. See generally HAROLD BLOOM, THE DEATH OF THE WESTERN CANON Chap. 1
(1994). The problem with students who do not speak the same language by virtue of
the same basic grounding is simple - they cannot understand each other, much as the
best educated German cannot understand the best educated Arab. Lacking this com-
mon linguistic currency, a discussion on the best end to be pursued is impossible. Such
is the lesson of the biblical tower of Babel. There is a reason that medieval philoso-
phers were so concerned with the question of how many angels could fit on the head
of a pin. See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, DINOSAUR IN A HAYSTACK: REFLEC-
TIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY Chap. 4 (1994).
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tion where students are given the opportunity to challenge each
other's beliefs on the same points after studying the same material.
This does not bode well for the judges and leaders of tomorrow,
whose personal beliefs never will have been challenged.
The net result of all this is lawyers who do not believe that law
really can orient people toward the good. While distrust of law is
certainly a feature of law in despotic societies, it is a harmful atti-
tude in a democratic one based on the rule of law.10 4 For if lawyers
do not believe that the damsel they are sworn to protect is anything
more than a harlot in disguise, how can they lead a nation premised
on the notion that law has moral force? 10 5
Second, these academic battles have had little relation or con-
nection to the larger legal community. Because of a combination
of radical political beliefs and an increasing specialization, legal
scholars have become an "insular minority" incapable of communi-
cating with the outside world."0 6 As a general rule, most law
professors have limited work experience - usually a clerkship and
two or three years of practice. 7 And the limited experience they
have received, because of the problems outlined previously, has re-
cemented their close-mindedness toward the law. Since most stu-
dents do not eventually become law professors, this is quite worri-
some. Law students are being sent out in the world, with no real
sense of the intricacies of their practice or the skills needed to run a
nation. 108
This previous point is particularly troublesome in light of the
breakdown of the old system in which law school taught you to
think like a lawyer and the firms taught you the actual intricacies of
being a practicing lawyer - specifically the human side of the
law.'0 9 Today starting associates have limited contact with their
superiors, as they spend several years alone in a library researching
and drafting memos. Client contact does not come until late in the
104. See Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POLICY 24, 226
(1993).
105. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE FOUNDING FATHERS 62-74 (discussing moral
conceptions of the Founding Fathers and their impact on America legal development)
in MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 73.
106. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 221.
107. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1992).
108. See generally Richard Cappalli, The Disappearance of Legal Method, 70 TEM-
PLE L. REV. 393 (1997).
109. See Linowitz, supra note 88, at 1257.
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game."' The human thus becomes foreign and the notion of com-
munity dissolves in the bargain.
Finally, because of the decreased emphasis on public service in
terms of both theory courses that teach students about the com-
mon good and clinical courses that apply the taught theory, law
students are increasingly incapable of meeting the demands of be-
ing republican lawyers.' In most cases, in most law schools, law
students are not encouraged to take a public service legal job.
Often, jobs in public service are seen as a fall-back for those law
students who did not make the cut for the prestige firms. This is
hardly the kind of attitude that should be inculcated if law students
are someday going to be the ruling elite.
Despite these flaws however, law schools remain the best place
to train a guardian class. Barring a fundamental change in
America's undergraduate institutions, only in the legal academy
will students be versed in a common language. Knights of old were
trained in the ways of the swords and the principles of chivalry
before they were sent out on the fields of battle. Today, our battles
are fought not on open fields, but rather in courtrooms and senate
chambers." 2 Our knights thus must be trained in procedure and
legal method, before they are allowed to fight the fights needed to
achieve social justice and order.
ml. Modern Realities: Can Law Be Saved?
There's an old clich6 that states "you can take a horse to water,
but you can't make him drink." It is a particularly apt description
of the current crisis in American law. Thus far this Comment has
argued that (1) there is general popular confusion as to the nature
and purpose of law; (2) lawyers have the potential, by virtue of
their status as American oligarchs, to assist in the lifting of this veil
of ignorance; and (3) that despite its structural flaws, the American
law school remains a valid vehicle through which a guardian class
can be taught. The net conclusion derived from these arguments is
that lawyers can help America regain her faith in the law. What
has not been asked is whether Americans want to regain their lost
faith.
Several historical developments warrant attention. First is the
increased distrust Western civilization has had for universal themes
110. See generally P.Z. Parsa, The Drudge Report: Brief Grief, NEW YORK MAO.,
24-31, June 21, 1999.
111. See KRONMAN, supra note 31, at 269.
112. As an example of this phenomenon see DAvis, supra note 27, at 39.
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since the Enlightenment. 113 Effectively, Enlightenment philoso-
phers began to attack the Christian vision of "God" and a universal
end which made the cosmos intelligible.114 For political reasons,
the power of divine sovereigns was questioned and the notion of
"good" set to rest on majority opinion. While there is nothing
wrong with democratic rule, the work of J.S. Mill and other writers
stressed majority will as the dispositive factor. 1 5 This belief repre-
sented a dramatic shift from the Athenian notion of democracy
with its conception of some things being fundamentally "right" or
"wrong. 11 6 Conceptions of right and wrong came to be seen
merely as vehicles through which leviathans could maintain their
dominion over society." 7 In place of the gods of old the Enlighten-
ment raised the new idol of science and scientific method." 8 Faith
in science however has never satisfied the human subconscious to
the extent that its proponents once believed it would. 19 But, since
the gods have already been destroyed, all that is left is a hole in the
self - a missing center of identity and definition as part of a larger
community. 120
Further complicating matters is the increased weakness of the
nation-state, the building block of Western order since the Treaty
of Westphalia in 1648.121 For a long time, it was the state that filled
the void created by the death of religion. In an attempt to find
meaning, citizens were willing to trust, believe in and ultimately
fight for the nation.12 2 In a world in which great power battles and
showdowns are increasingly rare,'123 it is unlikely that faith in the
113. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, at 204.
114. See PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN 820-821 (1991).
115. See BOWIE, supra note 46, at 35-38.
116. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 40, at 76-79 (discussing why temperance is bet-
ter than indulgence).
117. See BOWIE, supra note 46.
118. See generally RICHARD WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (1948).
119. Id. at 300. Although it is still a popular idea. See Resolved: Science Is at an
End. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at F5.
120. Also note that Enlightenment philosophers moved away from the notion of
distributive equality. This has had the effect of weakening public support for the idea
that some people's skills and talents are best used in leadership capacities - in ori-
enting the community toward the common good. The hole in the self can also be
attributed to this phenomenon.
121. See generally JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION STATE
(1995).
122. See generally GIDON GOrrLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH
TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY (1993) (examining the
role of nationalism in the formation of the modem state).
123. See, e.g., JOHN MUELLER, RETREAT FROM DOOMSDAY: THE OBSOLESCENCE
OF MAJOR WAR (1996).
1686
NEW VISION OF LAWYERS
nation will continue to suffice for many people. For in the absence
of war, of a chance to define oneself by what one is not, how can
states possibly hope to garner the faith of their populace?
In such an era, where there are no gods and no states, is it any
wonder that the human thymos124 is currently most satisfied in the
pursuit of a capitalist commercial life? 125 The commercial life, is,
as Fukuyama argued, the one quasi-warlike creative vice left
through which the individual can be defined.1 26 The last man of the
modern era is the businessman-capitalist not the lawyer-statesmen
or the philosopher-king, for kings and statesmen no longer have
kingdoms to rule. Tomorrow's battles will seemingly be fought in
the world of economics. The question is for how long?
Psychology teaches us that, the one constant, throughout all
time, across all civilizations, is the need of a society to believe in
something - to have something to fight for. 127 The mere pursuit
of money has never been a sufficient something. 128 Something else
must take its place. But what? Given the diversity of religions,
political viewpoints, etc., in modern America, it is unlikely (and
indeed undesirable) that a new Christendom or the like can be
founded. But what all Americans do have in common is a faith,
however skeptical or bruised, in law.129 If lawyers can begin to re-
new their understanding and commitment to the law as the effi-
cient cause 130 of the common good and happiness, this faith can fill
the void left in the wake of the destruction of the old gods. In so
acting, American society can move beyond its current fixation on
the stock market and on to more pressing issues in social justice
and welfare.13 1
124. Thymos is an "innately political virtue necessary for the survival of any polit-
ical community, because it is the basis on which private man is drawn out from the
selfish life of desire and made to look toward the common good." FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 183 (1992).
125. See generally id.
126. See id. at 190.
127. See ABRAHAM ROSMAN & PAULA G. RUBEL, THE TAPESTRY OF CULTURE
190 (1995) (discussing humanity's need to have its cognitive, substantive and psycho-
logical needs fulfilled - an end historically achieved through the use of religion).
128. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 538-541
(1987) (for a discussion of how great economic powers have historically translated
that power into military and political clout).
129. See STEPHEN SOLARZ, OF VICTORY AND DEFICITS 89-95, in AMERICA'S PUR-
POSE, supra note 71.
130. See supra note 19 (discussing Aristotelian causation).
131. See David Hendelman, Stocks Till We Drop, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at
A31.
1999] 1687
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
IV. Recommendations for Change
It is apparent that structural reforms need to be undertaken,
both within the legal community and in the community at large, if
"we are to remain (or return to being) a nation of laws and not of
men." 132 Three reforms in particular seem warranted. Through
the application of these reforms, the intrinsic advantages possessed
by lawyers can be brought to the forefront. Consequently, a
greater return on those to whom much was given can be
demanded.
Most importantly, the modern law school needs to be re-ex-
amined. There needs to be an increased acceptance in law school
faculties of classical notions of law. Students must be taught that
belief in law as something more than random whim of judges and
politicians is acceptable. Studies in ethics seminars which include
both a theoretical and service component should become an essen-
tial element of every law student's curriculum. These programs
should include not only discussions of traditional pro bono work,
but also of non-traditional legal jobs such as public service or gov-
ernment work.133 Law schools also need to better fund post-gradu-
ate public interest legal programs, thereby manifesting a greater
commitment to public interest law. Given the great cost of such an
undertaking, law schools would be wise to work with the leaders of
the bar to create a greater number of post-graduate fellowships
and loan-forgiveness programs that are in part funded by the prof-
its of the large firms.134
Second, law schools and the bar associations need to work
closely together to implement legal public education programs at
the nation's high schools and universities. Much as Sol Linowitz
has suggested,'35 both high school and college students need to re-
ceive training about the purpose of law, the content of law, the
132. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 8.
133. A good example of just this type of program exists at Fordham University
School of Law. Members of Fordham's Stein Scholars Program in Law and Ethics (a
competitive public interest program that designates certain students as Stein Scholars
based upon their previous public interest experiences and desire to perform such
work in the future) are required to take a semester long course in the spring of their
second year which incorporates both a theoretical and clinical component. For exam-
ple, during my second year, I was fortunate enough to work with Lawyers Alliance for
New York on the incorporation of a day-care center in an under-developed area of
Brooklyn, New York. The practical work on this project (e.g., meeting with the client,
drafting the articles of incorporation and by-laws) was supplemented with heavy aca-
demic reading in theories of lawyering and public interest law.
134. For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Edelman, supra note 28.
135. See Linowitz, supra note 88, at 1257.
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notion of rights - both collective and individual - and finally of
obligations. Not only would this benefit the majority of Americans
who will never attend law school, but it is also likely to have the
added bonus of increasing the dialogue between academics and
practitioners. They will have to cooperate to design a curriculum.
Finally, perhaps it is time to do more than re-examine the zeal-
ous advocacy paradigm of lawyering. While alternative notions of
lawyering abound (e.g., community activist, community liaison,
community empowerer, etc.) in the main, the organized bar re-
mains wedded to the notion of zealous advocacy. 136 As has been
noted however, zealous advocacy does not properly take into ac-
count public law's concern for the common good. Alternative vi-
sions that place a greater emphasis on practical wisdom, need to be
better integrated into the legal mainstream. Active lobbying by
academics and concerned practitioners for such changes would do
much to put the ball in motion.
Conclusion
In summary, this Comment has argued that because of a series of
historical events, Americans have become confused about the pur-
pose of law. Rather than seeing law as a culture specific derivation
of eternal principles, many Americans now see law as an arbitrary
and capricious device - which does not equate with their under-
standing of what law should be. Such a belief is reinforced by law-
yers, who in pursuit of the client's interests, fail to care for the
common good. Law schools, in their training of the high priests of
the law, have hardened this principle into their willing clay, first
through the Holmesian legal science revolution and more recently
through legal realism, law and economics and critical legal studies.
It is of little surprise then, that the "best and brightest" of the mod-
ern law-student do not attempt to become philosopher-kings or
lawyer-statesmen, but rather value-neutral technicians.
Such a state of affairs cannot stand if America is to prosper into
the next century. Today's lawyers, despite their training, given their
continued role as a political elite, must begin to return the law to
its purpose as the instrument for the realization of basic goods and
ultimately happiness. To achieve this end, law schools must be re-
formed, new education techniques implemented in high schools
and colleges, and the credo of individual client first, last and always
re-examined. The fruits of this labor, while not likely to be imme-
136. See Pearce, supra note 83.
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diately apparent, have long term significance for a more healthy,
greater good. For not only will we have saved law and the legal
profession, but more importantly, we will have begun to save our-
selves. People need to believe in something and the erection of a
"god of law" is at least something all Americans can believe in.
If such changes can be realized, perhaps, unlike our predeces-
sors, we will not be doomed to the lowest reaches of hell. Rather,
we can be a modern Virgil,137 who, through our developed practical
wisdom and a touch of grace, can lead the American populace up
to Paradiso,'138 up to our own golden city on a hill. If used wisely
and creatively, the law has within it the power and potential to im-
plement the systemic reforms necessary to reshape America into
the "champion and vindicator of liberty" that John Adams once
promised she would be.'39 Such a course will not be without its
challenges and it certainly will not come easy. But as Virgil once
counseled Dante, "Here must all distrust be left behind, here must
all cowardice be ended."' 4 ° For it is only through the rejection of
our fears and doubts, that great things can be done.
137. In Dante's Divine Comedy, Virgil, the ancient poet, plays guide to Dante, the
poet and pilgrim, who has lost his way in the "middle of the journey" of his life. See
ALIGHIERI, supra note 1, at 23.
138. Dante's end journey in the Divine Comedy. See DANTE ALIGHIERI,
PARADISO (John D. Sinclair ed. and trans., 1948).
139. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN TRADI-
TION 384, in THE AMERICAN ENCOUNTER, supra note 25.
140. ALIGHIERI, supra note 1, at 47.
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